Explaining ‘Clean Skins’: The Dynamics of Small Group Social Networks and the London Bombers
Carlyle A. Thayer Professor of Politics Director, UNSW Defence Studies Forum School of Humanities and Social Sciences Australian Defence Force Academy
[email protected]
Paper to Workshop on Sacrificial Devotion in Comparative Perspective: Tamil Tigers and Beyond Sponsored by Department of Anthropology University of Adelaide
Adelaide, South Australia December 5-7, 2005
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Explaining ‘Clean Skins’: The Dynamics of Small Group Social Networks and the London Bombers Carlyle A. Thayer*
Abstract In the aftermath of the July 7th 2005 London bombings, there was intense speculation by media commentators and security analysts about the degree to which al Qaeda was responsible. When the identities of the bombers was known, media commentators and security analysts then turned their attention to explaining how so‐called ‘clean skins’ could be recruited into the global jihad. Mainstream analysis tended to focus on the roles of brainwashing and a mastermind behind these suicide attacks. This paper offers an alternate approach to understanding how ‘clean skins’ become suicide bombers. This paper utilizes social network theory which stresses the importance of social background (socio‐economic status, education, faith as youth, occupation, and family status). Social network theory argues that social bonds predating formal recruitment into the global jihad are the crucial element of the process. The main venue for joining global jihad consists of groups of friends (‘a bunch of guys’) that spontaneously assemble in mosques. According to forensic psychiatrist Marc Sagemen, author of Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), joining the global jihad is a three‐pronged process of social affiliation (social bonding) involving membership in ‘small‐world’ groups based on friendship, kinship and discipleship. Over time members of these cliques experience a progressive intensification of their beliefs and faith leading them to embrace the ideology of global jihad. The next stage involves an encounter by the small group with a link to the jihad. The final stage involves intense training and voluntary recruitment usually marked by a formal ceremony (swearing an oath of loyalty). Social network theory thus rejects the argument that individuals become terrorists because of top down recruitment and brainwashing.
The London Bombings In early July 2005, Shahzad Tanweer rented a Nissan Micra from a local agency. On July 7th he drove two of his friends to a house in the Burley area of Leeds to pick up a number of explosive devices. This group was joined by the fourth
Professor of Politics, Postgraduate Coursework Co‐ordinator and Director, UNSW Defence Studies Forum, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University College, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra. *
3 bomber in his car and they then drove to Luton in Bedfordshire, parked their cars in the railway station and took a Thameslink train to King’s Cross in London. There they split up. •
Mohammed Sidique Khan exploded a device on the Edgware Road subway, killing at least seven persons.
•
Shahzad Tanweer detonated an explosive device on the Circle Line between Liverpool Street and Aldgate killing at least seven persons.
•
Germaine Lindsay set off an explosive device near King’s Cross Station killing at least 26 persons.
•
Hasbib Hussain found his assigned Northern line disrupted. He left the scene and made frantic mobile phone calls to the other bombers; but these calls went unanswered. Almost an hour after the first attacks, he set of his bomb on the No. 30 bus in Tavistock Square, killing at least thirteen people.
After the July 7 bombings, police found 16 other explosive devices in Tanweer’s rental car at the Luton railway station car park. Several of the devices consisted of plastic bottles turned into nail bombs with a detonator attached to an electric cable and were designed to be carried in a rucksack. The explosive devises used in the London bombings probably weighed 4.5 kilograms each and were composed of triacetone triperoxide (TATP). British forensic experts characterized the London bombs as ‘crude homemade devices’. A police official stated, ‘Everything that we have suggests that these could have been made with knowledge in this country. These are the type of devices you can make yourself with information you could acquire from the Internet, or other extremist training manuals’.1 The July 7 London bombings prompted immediate speculation by counter terrorism specialists and media commentators that al Qaeda was responsible. David Martin Jones, an Australian academic, wrote, ‘the al‐Qaeda in Europe group that claimed responsibility for the attacks skillfully planned and executed the operation’.2 The London bombings were immediately compared to the March 2004 attacks in Madrid. Who else could have carried out synchronized attacks of
Raymond Bonner, Stephen Grey and Don Van Natta, ‘British Inquiry Shifts Away From Foreign Aid for Plots’, The New York Times, July 31, 2005. 1
David Martin Jones, ‘Schizophrenia that dogs UK’s war on terrorism’, The Australian Financial Review, July 13, 2005, 63. 2
4 this nature? Al Qaeda was not in decline, they argued, and the July 7th bombings were proof. When the identity of the bombers was discovered media attention took a new direction. All four of the bombers were ‘clean skins’ or ‘lilywhites’, that is, they were unknown to police and security authorities.3 Family relatives speculated that Tanweer must have been brainwashed by an extremist religious teacher. Media commentator Cameron Stewart, for example, stressed the emotional vulnerability of the younger bombers to an older mentor. Stewart also suggested that Tanweer might have been indoctrinated by radicalized imams while on a visit to Pakistan in late 2004/early 2005. Cameron also argued that Muslims who seek to become suicide bombers are ‘rarely able to carry out their plans without access to a well‐connected mastermind who can provide them with explosives and reinforce their willingness to die for Islam’.4 British police gave priority to identifying the support network including bomb maker and master planner that had enabled these attacks to take place. As of this writing, police have not indicated any success in this endeavour. As evidence was assessed, analysts became more introspective. Al Qaeda, they concluded, was no longer the highly capable terrorist organization it once was. When al Jazeera television broadcast a videotape containing the last testimony of Mohammed Sidique Khan and a commentary by Ayman al‐Zawahri, al Qaeda’s number two, officials were quick to point out that this did not conclusively prove al Qaeda was behind the 7/7 attacks in London. As the profiles of the four bombers indicates, all were homegrown. According to several analysts, this represented Britain’s worst nightmare because homegrown terrorists are so hard to detect. The 7/7 attacks were also the first terrorist suicide bombings to be carried out in the United Kingdom and they seemingly spawned a second round of copycat bombings on July 21.
The use of the term ‘clean skins’ may be found in: Martin Chulov, ‘Under the Radar’, The Australian, July 14, 2005, 14; John Steele and Douglas Jehl, ‘Home‐grown mayhem’, The Australian Financial Review, July 14, 2005, 61; Peter Wilson, ‘Britain’s home‐grown enemy’, The Australian, July 14, 2005, 1; and Daniel McGrory and Michael Evans, ‘Bombers’ leader identified by police’, The Times [London] reprinted in The Australian, July 15, 2005, 1 and 9. ‘Lilywhite’ was a term used during the IRA bombings for terrorists with no known connections to militants, see: ‘How Police Traced the Suspects’ Trail’, The Economist reprinted in The Weekend Australian, July 16‐17, 2005, 28 and Daniel McGrory, ‘Britian’s home‐grown enemy Call that cracked the case’, The Times [London] reprinted in The Australian, July 14, 2005, 1‐2. 3
Cameron Stewart, ‘Enemy within’, The Weekend Australian, July 16‐17, 2005, 19 and 28.
4
5 This paper will apply social network theory to explain the phenomenon of the emergence of homegrown ‘clean skin’ terrorists in Britain. This theory has wider applicability, including to Australia. Two caveats are in order. First, this research is an off‐shoot of the author’s main interest in the emergence of new terrorism in Southeast Asia. Second, this paper must be viewed as only a preliminary analysis until British security officials release further details of their investigation.
Social Network Theory Marc Sageman provides perhaps one of the most insightful accounts into why individuals become terrorists based on his study as a forensic psychiatrist of the biographies of nearly 400 individuals who were members of what he terms the ‘global Salafi jihad’.5 Sageman considers three main explanatory approaches to the study of why individuals join terrorist groups: (1) social background, (2) common psychological make up, and (3) situational factors. Sageman evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. He then constructs a theory of social networks to explain the dependent variable of why individuals become terrorists. Sageman’s study makes clear that the global jihad movement is historically unique when compared with other terrorist groups. Social background. In terms of geographical origin, of 172 persons in Sageman’s first study, two‐thirds came from six countries: Saudi Arabia (N = 31), Egypt (24), France (18), Algeria (15), Morocco (14) and Indonesia (12). Sageman’s second and larger study revealed that ‘most of the terrorists in the sample come from core Arab countries, immigrant communities in the West, Indonesia or Malaysia’.6 In his first study, Sageman identified four large geographical clusters if the pattern of interaction among individual terrorists is used to discriminate among the sample: •
Central Staff (al Qaeda leadership), 32 members;
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Core Arab States (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, Kuwait), 66 members;
5Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University Pennsylvania Press,
2004) considers the backgrounds of 172 terrorists. This data set was expanded to ‘about 400’ in his later study, ‘The Normality of Global Jihadi Terrorism’, The Journal of International Security Affairs, 8, 2005, 79‐90. For details on the demographic backgrounds of suicide terrorists consult: Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), 199‐ 216. Sageman, ‘The Normality of Global Jihadi Terrorism’, op. cit., 80.
6
6 •
Maghreb Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and well as migrants from these countries living in France), 53 members; and
•
Southeast Asia (Jemaah Islamiyah [JI] members from Indonesia and Malaysia), 21 members.7
Sageman included five variables in his analysis of social background factors: socio‐economic status, education, faith as youth, occupation, and family status. In terms of socio‐economic status, the Southeast Asia cluster may be classified as solidly middle class. The Central and Core Arab clusters are similar and are skewed toward the middle and upper classes; while the Maghreb cluster is evenly divided between lower and middle classes. The 172 members of Sageman’s sample came from relatively well‐to‐do families and were much better educated than the population at large in the developing world. Over sixty percent had at least some college education. They were a better‐educated group than their parents. A sizeable proportion had experience living abroad in the Middle East and the West. They were able to speak several languages. The Central Staff cluster was the best educated. Eighty‐eight percent had completed a college or tertiary education and twenty percent held doctorates. The majority of Sageman’s sample attended secular schools; only seventeen percent had Islamic primary and secondary educational backgrounds. It is significant to note that the Southeast Asia cluster was drawn mainly from religious studies, while terrorists in the other clusters undertook science, engineering or computer science courses. Of those who had an Islamic education, half were from Indonesia. The Indonesian network stands out among the other clusters with such a high percentage of its members the product of Islamic education. Three‐quarters of Sageman’s sample can be classified as professional (medical doctors, architects, teachers or preachers) or had semi‐skilled occupations (police, military, mechanics, civil service, small business, students). The remaining one‐
Indonesians form the majority of the members of the Southeast Asia cluster (12 of 21); other members include: Malaysia (3), Singapore and the Philippines (2 each), and Australia and Kuwait (1 each). Most of the members of JI were former students and/or staff at two boarding schools, Pondok Ngruki in Indonesia and Pesentren Luqmanul Hakiem in Malaysia, founded by the group’s leaders. The Southeast Asia cluster is also the second oldest (formed in 1993), and developed in the 1990s when the leaders of JI were exiled in Malaysia. JI did not embark on terrorism until after its leaders returned to Indonesia in 1999. 7
7 quarter of the sample was classified as unskilled workers; here the Maghreb Arabs predominated. Sageman’s follow up study confirmed his earlier findings: ‘[i]n terms of socio‐ economic background, three‐fourths come from upper and middle class families. Far from coming from broken families, they grew up in caring intact families, mildly religious and concerned about their communities. In terms of education, over 60 percent have some college education. Most are in the technical fields, such as engineering, architecture, computers, medicine, and business…’8 In terms of faith as youth, thirteen of sixteen Central Staff were considered religious as children. The Southeast Asia cluster exhibited a similarly high pattern due to the boarding school experience of its members. The Core Arab cluster also showed early religious commitment. The Maghreb cluster was an exception; its members were brought up in a secular school environment. Sageman’s second study found that ‘[a]bout half of the sample grew up as religious children, but only 13 percent of the sample, almost all of them in Southeast Asia, were educated in Islamist boarding schools or madrassas’.9 The entire sample of second generation Europeans went to secular schools. About ten percent of the entire sample were Catholics who converted to Islam. In terms of family or marital status, seventy‐three percent of the sample was married. All of the Central Staff and Southeast Asian leaders were married (data available on 37). These individuals were encouraged by their social networks to marry their colleague’s sisters and daughters. These in‐group marriages forged close religious and political relationships and thus contributed to the security of the group.10 Sageman’s follow‐up study reached the same findings: ‘[t]here‐ fourths are married and the majority have children’.11 This marital profile is unique to the global Salafi jihad; most other terrorists were unmarried. Psychological explanations. Sageman considered and rejected a variety of psychological explanations as factors explaining why individuals became terrorists.12 His first sample was relatively small as sufficient information was
Sageman, ‘The Normality of Global Jihadi Terrorism’, op. cit., 80.
8
Ibid.
9
See the discussion in Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, Asia Report No. 63, Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 23, 2003, 27‐29. 10
Sageman, ‘The Normality of Global Jihadi Terrorism’, op. cit., 80.
11
These factors included: mental illness, terrorist personality, pathological narcissism, paranoia and authoritarian personality.
12
8 available on only ten cases out of 172. In his later study, Sagemen could only find data on about one‐third of the total. These data revealed ‘less than eight percent showed evidence of a conduct disorder. The rest of this group seems to have had normal childhood without any evidence of getting in trouble with the law’.13 Situational factors. Sageman considers five variables as part of this explanatory approach: age, place of recruitment, faith, employment, and relative deprivation. The average age when a person ‘joined the jihad’14 to become a terrorist was 25.69 years. The Southeast Asian cluster had the highest mean age on joining, 29.35 years, followed by the Central Staff whose average on joining was 27.9 years. Seventy percent of the terrorist leadership sample joined the jihad in a country other than where they had grown up. They were expatriates away from home and family – workers, refugees, students and fighters against the Soviet Union. The Central Staff members converted to global jihad while in the Sudan. Indonesian members of JI joined while living in Malaysia. With the exception of the Southeast Asians and the Saudis, most other terrorist leaders joined the jihad in the West – France, Germany or the United Kingdom. In a significant finding, Sageman discovered that there was a decided shift in the degree of devotion to Islam in adulthood (greater than religious devotion as youths) by individuals prior to their becoming mujahedin. Ninety‐seven percent of his terrorist sample adopted Salafi Islam before joining the jihad through exposure at mosques where religious leaders espoused the discourse of jihad. Next, Sageman considered the variable relative deprivation. The biographic data indicated that just before joining the jihad, future terrorists suffered from social isolation, spiritual emptiness and underemployment (lack of a full‐time job). These became a source of grievance and frustration. Sageman concluded that his data supported relative deprivation as a necessary but not sufficient explanation of why the individuals in his sample turned to terrorism. Finally, Sageman considered situational circumstances at the time of joining the jihad as a variable in explaining why individuals decided to join the global jihad. Sageman found that ‘most terrorists joined the jihad through friendship and kinship bonds’ and that the decision to join the jihad was a collective not an
Sageman, ‘The Normality of Global Jihadi Terrorism’, op. cit., 80.
13
Sageman defines ‘join the jihad’ as an individual’s decision (as part of a group) to go somewhere for training – Afghanistan, the Philippines, Malaysia or Indonesia. 14
9 individual decision. In his words, ‘’[t]hese were not individual but collective decision. These pre‐existing friendship bonds accounted for all the students joining the jihad…’15 In other words, ‘[j]oining this violent social movement was a bottom‐up activity.’ After 9/11 and the elimination of terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan, a new pattern emerged. ‘Now’, writes Sagemen, ‘volunteers join the movement and perform operations without being trained or formally joining the old al Qaeda’.16 Sageman’s study discounts the role of religious fanaticism in post‐9/11 new terrorism. Sageman argues that young men ‘drifted toward local mosques because they were looking for Muslim friends, and that’s where Muslims hang out. And this is where pure chance might have contributed to their radicalization’. There was a dip in religiosity when groups of friends formed but ‘within a short time, there was a dramatic shift in devotion to their faith. But social bonds predated any ideological commitment. There was no evidence of “brainwashing”: the future terrorists simply acquired the common beliefs of their friends’.17 In summary, Sageman argues that joining the jihad was a three‐pronged process of social affiliation (social bonding) involving membership in ‘small‐world’ groups based on friendship, kinship18 and discipleship. Over time members of these cliques experienced a progressive intensification of their beliefs and faith leading them to embrace the global Salafi jihad ideology. The next stage involved an encounter by the small group with a link to the jihad. The final stage involved intense training and voluntary recruitment usually marked by a formal ceremony (swearing an oath of loyalty). Sageman’s findings reject the arguments that individuals become terrorists because of top down recruitment and brainwashing. In his view, social bonds predating formal recruitment into the jihad are the crucial element of the process. Groups of friends that spontaneously assemble in mosques constitute the main vector for joining the jihad.
Sageman, ‘The Normality of Global Jihadi Terrorism’, op. cit., 84.
15
Ibid, 85.
16
Ibid.
17
For example, Ali Ghufron, his three younger brothers and the next door neighbour were all involved in the 2002 Bali bombings. 18
10
Profile of the Suicide Bombers Mohammad Sidique Khan, 30. Khan was born in Pakistan. He originally lived and grew up in Beeston. He attended Matthew Murray High School. When his parents moved to Nottingham, he remained in Beeston to attend Leeds University. He met his wife at university and was the father of two children. Khan is reported to have visited Pakistan a few times for short visits.19 In 2002, he was employed as a teaching assistant in Beeston’s Hillside Primary School for children with learning disabilities and for children of newly arrived immigrant families. His most recent job was in an Islamic bookshop. Khan attended the Muslim Association mosque on Stratford Street in Beeston with Tanweer and Hussain. Khan recently moved to Dewsbury. He and his wife separated in late in 2004 around the time she fell pregnant with their second child. Reportedly they continually argued over his growing religious fervour. His wife supported women’s rights and opposed Muslim extremism.20 In 2004, Khan was the subject of a routine terrorist threat assessment by MI5. He was judged not to be a threat to national security.21 Khan and Tanweer traveled to Pakistan together in November 2004. Khan regularly visited Tanweer at Chak village and both later attended an Islamic studies course at a madrassa. According to reports, Khan and Tanweer met a known al Qaeda activist who was later jailed for bombing a church.22 Pakistani intelligence reported that Khan also met with al Qaeda operative Mohammed Yasin (aka Ustad Osama), an explosives specialist with the militant group, Harkat‐e‐Jihad.23 In February 2005 Khan and Tanweer left Pakistan together and returned to Leeds.
John Steele and Douglas Jehl, ‘Home‐grown mayhem’, The Australian Financial Review, July 14, 2005, 61. 19
‘Families speak of shock, disbelief on learning of the secret double lives’, The Canberra Times, July 18, 2005, 6 and Peter Wilson, ‘Focus on suspects’ home turf’, The Australian, July 15, 2005, 9. 20
David Leppard, ‘Attacker was judged by MI5 to be no threat’, The Sunday Times [London] reprinted in The Australian, July 18, 2005, 12 and Elaine Sciolino and Don Van Natta, ‘June Report Led Britain to Lower Its Terror Alert’, The New York Times, July 19, 2005. 21
Daniel McGrory and Zahid Hussain, ‘Militant longed for suicide mission’, The Times [London] reprinted in The Weekend Australian, July 23‐24, 2005, 14. 22
Glenn Frankel, ‘British Pursue Link Between 2 Sets of bombers’, The Washington Post, July 25, 2005, A1. 23
11 Shahzad Tanweer, aged 22. Shahzad’s father migrated from the Faisalabad region of Pakistan and settled in the Leeds area. Shahzad’s father owned and operated the South Seas Fisheries, a fish and chips shop. Previously he owned a butchery and a curry takeaway. He was respected locally as a businessman. Shahzad’s mother makes clothes at the family home. Shahzad Tanweer was born in Bradford on December 15, 1982 and then moved first to Beeston in 1984 and then to Colwyn Roads, Leeds five years later. He lived with his parents and three younger siblings in a house converted from two semi‐detached terrace houses. His sister went to university and manages a shoe shop. He attended Wortley High School where he was an excellent student and outstanding athlete in several sports (cricket, track and field, and soccer). He attended Leeds Metropolitan University and studied sports science and took martial arts classes. Last season his cricket team won its division in a Leeds‐wide competition for Pakistani‐British players. He had aspirations to play county cricket. Also, he was one belt away from a black belt when, about six months before the bombing, he suddenly stopped attending classes. And he became a less regular participant of pickup games of soccer and cricket at a nearby park.24 Occasionally he worked in his father’s fish and chips shop. Tanweer’s family went to the Hardy Street mosque in Beeston, but Tanweer attended the Bengali mosque and the Muslim Association mosque on Stratford Street in Beeston. Mohammad Sidique Khan and Hasib Hussain also prayed at the Stratford Street mosque. Tanweer frequented the Hamara Youth Access Point, a drop in centre for teenagers. In 2004, Tanweer was arrested for disorderly conduct but was cautioned and not charged. Tanweer dropped out of his sport science course at Leeds Metropolitan University at end of 2004.. He told his parents that he wanted to join a group of friends from his local mosque on a two months visit to a religious school near Lahore.25 He promised his perplexed parents he would pick up his studies on return. He reportedly took part in the haj before traveling to Pakistan. He arrived there on November 19, 2004 in the company of Mohammad Sidique Khan.
Peter Wilson, ‘”Anyone could be a terrorist”’, The Australian, July 14, 2005, 1 and 2.
24
Daniel McGrory and Zahid Hussein, ‘Bombers schooled in hate on visit to Lahore’, The Australian, July 15, 2005, 8. 25
12 While in Pakistan Tanweer visited his relatives in the village of Chak No. 477 near Faisalabad. On previous visits to Chak, Tanweer would play cricket with his cousins. But this trip he was more subdued and remained secluded in his grandfather’s house. On his most recent trip he was outspoken in expressing his views regarding Muslim oppression at the hands of the West. The treatment of Muslim prisoners at Guantanamo Bay particularly rankled. He confided to a cousin his admiration of Osama bin Laden and his desire to be a ‘holy warrior’ to avenge the way Muslims were being treated.26 Tanweer and Khan reportedly met a known al Qaeda activist who was later jailed in Peshawar for terrorist offenses. They later attended a two‐week course in Islamic studies at Jamia Manzoorul Islam madrassa in Muridike. Tanweer and Khan left Pakistan on February 8, 2005 and returned to Leeds. According to his uncle, Bashir Ahmed, ‘He came home after three months because he didn’t like the people there’. Tanweer resumed his studies; he also exhibited a new found religiosity. He started attending mosque three times a day sometimes in the company of Hussain. In June, Tanweer and Khan went on a white water rafting trip to Wales. Hasib Hussain, aged 19. Hussain’s family originated from Pakistan. His father is a factory worker and Hussain had three siblings. The family lives in a four bedroom red‐brick house in inner‐Leeds suburb of Holbeck, where Hussain spent his entire life. His family often went to Beeston for grocery shopping at halal butchers and to attend mosque. Hussain attended Matthew Murray High School but not at the same time as Khan. He had a troubled adolescence and smoked marijuana. After 9/11 Hussain, aged 14, passed out flyers saying ‘justice has been done’. Friends say he ‘went off the rails’ and left school in 2003 without graduating. In an effort to instill some discipline, his father sent him to Pakistan, Hussan underwent a change and returned more devoutly religious. His older brother expressed concern when Hussain joined a Muslim group, grew a beard, and started wearing a white robe. Hussain, Khan and Tanweer prayed together at the Muslim Association mosque on Stratford Street. In 2004 Hussain was arrested for shoplifting and was cautioned but not charged. In July 2004 Hussain returned to Pakistan and remained there until August 2005
Daniel McGrory and Zahid Hussain, ‘Militant longed for suicide mission’, The Times [London] reprinted in The Weekend Australian, July 23‐24, 2005, 14. 26
13 when he returned to Leeds. His visit overlapped with that of Khan and Tanweer but there are no reports that the three met up. Jermaine (Jamal) Lindsay, late 20s (some reports say 19). Much less is known at this stage about Lindsay’s biographical details and his relationships with the other three London bombers.27 He was born in Jamaica and grew up in Hudderfield. He converted to Islam and changed his name to Jamal. Lindsay attended Islamic religious classes after‐school. His wife is white and converted to Islam two years ago. Reportedly he visited Afghanistan in 2001 and retuned a hardline Muslim. Lindsay had a fifteen month old daughter at the time of his suicide. A short time before the London bombings Lindsay moved to Aylesbury in Bukinghamshire and lived in a rented redbrick semi‐detached house. During his short stay, his family did not mix with the rest of the Muslim community. He was reportedly seen in Leeds in the company of the other bombers. There is speculation he may have met the other bombers during a trip to a madrassa in Pakistan.28 On July 7, Khan, Tanweer and Hussain drove by car to Aylsebury to meet up with Lindsay and then proceeded to the Lutton rail station to take the train to London. U.S. officials claim Lindsay was on a terrorist watch list and MI5 failed to monitor his activities.29 Intelligence connects Lindsay to a ‘bomb factory’ in Leeds area where materials were stored to make explosive devices. Allegedly, he also had links with criminal activity in the Lutton area.
Social Network Theory and the London Bombers30 After the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, there was a major migration of Pakistanis to the United Kingdom. The new arrivals worked in the textile miles of northern England. The majority came from Kashmir, others came from Gujarat
Details about Lindsay have been culled from: Daniel McGrory and Michael Evans, ‘Bombers’ leader identified by police’, The Australian, July 15, 2005, 1 and 9; Adam Fresco, Sean O’Neill and Stewart Tendler, ‘Family man named as fourth bomber’, The Times [London] reprinted in The Weekend Australian, July 16‐17, 2005, 10; and (‘London three in Pakistan together’, The Times [London] reprinted in The Australian, July 19, 2005, 10. 27
‘London three in Pakistan together’, The Times [London] reprinted in The Australian, July 19, 2005, 10. 28
David Leppard, ‘Attacker was judged by MI5 to be no threat’, The Sunday Times [London] reprinted in The Australian, July 18, 2005, 12. 29
This section draws heavily on and is a close paraphrase of Amy Waldman’s excellent, ‘Seething Unease Shaped British Bombers’ Newfound Zeal’, The New York Times, July 31, 2005.
30
14 and Punjab provinces. Britain’s new arrivals experienced minimal integration into wider society due to such factors as ethnicity, language, culture and religion. They formed insular communities based on their identity as Muslims and Friday prayers at the mosque became a major focal point. The suburb of Beeston Hill is a gathering place for Leeds’ Muslim community due to its concentration of Asian grocery shops, halal butcheries and mosques. In late 1980s, most mills and factories in northern England were shut down. Pakistani mill workers either retired or moved into such new occupations as taxi drivers or shop keepers. South Asians prospered more than whites which generated some resentment. According to the 2002 census, Beeston comprised 77% whites and 18% Asian. Almost half the population is under thirty years of age. Young men divided into white and Asian gangs, and a racist milieu pervaded the streets. Generally, in the language of social welfare workers, young Asian men were NEET – ‘Not in Education, Employment or Training’.31 But, according to one account, second‐generation young Asian men were more ‘directionless than deprived’.32 The families of the three London bombers – Khan, Tanweer and Hussain – came from the Punjab. These families were not faced with staggering poverty and unemployment. Their offspring were the first generation to be educated entirely in Britain. They achieved English‐language fluency and became adept at using the Internet. Some had expectations of taking over the family business. Khan, Tanweer and Hussian grew up in Beeston where their lives were comparatively easy. Khan, Tanweer and Hussian were afforded access to secondary and even tertiary education. The trio attended the same small neighbourhood mosque on Stratford Street. Generally, they ‘hung out’ together playing pickup soccer in Cross Platts Park and social cricket. Their beliefs and identities straddled their parent’s traditional values and the working‐class culture around them. They were alienated from their parents’ rural South Asian culture which they viewed as backward. They also felt alienated from mainstream British society. The Beeston school system made almost no accommodation to the presence of second‐generation Asian young
According to a study produced by Whitehall, Islamic extremism was being driven by high levels of deprivation in Muslim communities. Muslims in the United Kingdom were three times as likely to be unemployed, with 43 percent have no educational qualifications and more than half classed as ‘economically inaction’; ‘Al‐Qai’da “recruits affluent students’’’, The Sunday Times (London) reprinted in The Australian, July 11, 2005, 13.
31
Ibid.
32
15 men. They learned little about Pakistan or Islam. They were expected to become British. In Beeston this meant tattooing, drinking, pit bulls, and drugs. According to one investigative journalist, ‘They don’t know whether they’re Muslim, British or both’.33 The neighbourhoods were rough and ‘hardness’ was essential.34 Islam provided a way out of aimlessness, addiction, and violence. At first Khan then Tanweer and Hussain became religious. This trio definitely swam against the tide. Khan and Tanweer became active in creating a network of organizations designed to lure Asian youths off the streets through sports, outings and educational activities. For example, Khan availed himself of a grant from the Leeds City Council to equip a gym on behalf of the South Leeds Asian Youth Association. Khan, Tanweer and Hussain came to Islam like converts who questioned everything and accepted nothing. As ‘born again Muslims’ this ‘group of friends’ developed a new social conservatism that distanced themselves from their peers. Sometimes they came in conflict with their parents who, as shopkeepers, sold cigarettes, bacon, tinned pork and girlie magazines, goods they considered a violation of their faith. They rejected the Islam of their parents. Khan saw their religious adaptation to life in Britain as having contaminated Islam. The trio stopped praying at their parents’ mosque; but used its gym to warn other youth against the type of Islam being practiced upstairs. They attended a Deobandi mosque where the imam preached a more rigid orthodox school of Islam that advocated a literal approach to religion. Khan and his friends soon left the Deobandi mosque in frustration and contempt for its imam.35 For them Islam was politics – hatred pf the West due to the oppression of Muslims in Kashmir, Kosovo, and Iraq. The London bombers gravitated towards an extreme form of Islam, called Salafism, that was rapidly spreading through the Internet, university societies and Islamic bookshops. Salafism demanded a return to Islam in its early years. All other forms of Islam were rejected as impure. Salafism provided unequivocal answers. It taught that the ummah was one community, if one part of the ummah
Ibid.
33
Ibid. and Tamara Jones, ‘Among the Young of Multiethnic Leeds, A Hardening Hatred’, The Washington Post, July 20, 2005, A14. 34
Amy Waldman, ‘Seething Unease Shaped British Bombers’ Newfound Zeal’, The New York Times, July 31, 2005. 35
16 suffered the rest would be in pain as well. Therefore, Salafi Muslisms had an obligation to undertake physical jihad under certain conditions. In sum, the London bombers did it themselves in Beeston. They were not recruited, indoctrinated or brainwashed. They might have gathered at a derelict house on Stratford Street for small group discussions.36 After they left the mosque they gravitated to the Iqra Learning Centre.37 There they formed discussion groups and study circles. They posted political tracts on the Internet and produced DVDs which they circulated in Islamic bookshops. These materials were as much political as religious. A central theme was that the West was waging a crusade against Islam. Material produced and distributed by the Iqra Learning Centre juxtaposed images from the Crusades with war mutilated Muslims. Marc Sageman posits that the process of joining the global Salafi jihad is a three‐ pronged process of social affiliation involving membership in ‘small‐world’ groups based on friendship, kinship and discipleship by individuals whose age averages nearly 26.38 The account presented in this paper provides preliminary support for his theory of social networks. Mohammed Sidique Khan, Shahzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain were aged between 19 and 30. Their average age, falling between 22 and 24, is slightly lower than average. This ‘group of friends’ formed social affiliations based on their identities as British Muslims who grew up in the Leeds suburb of Beeston. Although it is unknown when they first met, it is known that they went to the same mosque, played social sports together and interacted in a local youth association. The biographies of the London bombers provide details that document their passage through the first of Sageman’s three‐pronged process. During this stage the trio experienced a progressive intensification of their religious beliefs that eventually led them to embrace the ideology of global jihad. This was graphically illustrated in Khan’s testimonial video aired after his death (see Appendix A). Khan stated, ‘Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters’.
Peter Wilson, ‘Focus on suspects’ home turf’, The Australian, July 15, 2005, 9.
36
Ibid.
37
Sageman, ‘The Normality of Global Jihadi Terrorism’, op. cit., 80.
38
17 There is much less direct evidence of how the trio transitioned to stage two. It seems reasonably clear that Khan and Tanweer (and possibly Hussain) established a direct link to the global jihad through their 2004 visit to Pakistan, if not earlier. Pakistani intelligence and other reports suggest they may have made contact with the militant organizations Lashkar‐e‐Tayyaba and Jaish‐e‐ Mohammed, and/or other militants such as Zeeshan Siddique. So far there is no public evidence to suggest that the London bombers were voluntarily involved in intense terrorist‐type training overseas or participated in a formal swearing in ceremony. Khan’s video testimonial does suggest, but not conclusively, some link with an al Qaeda‐affiliated militant group or individual.
Conclusions The London suicide bombings of July 2, 2005 has resulted in a re‐think by security and intelligence analysts about the factors that shape homegrown terrorism and terrorist support networks. Increasingly, analysts are becoming skeptical about ‘top down’ models that emphasize the role of foreign actors in the recruitment and indoctrination/brainwashing of the new generation of terrorists.39 Australian security officials concluded, for example, that the London bombers were ‘a self‐contained cell working without sanction from terror masters’.40 Al Qaeda, for example, is no longer perceived as the key organizational player. A senior Australian official stated that the London attacks were ‘probably independent of al‐Qaeda’.41 But ‘al Qaedaism’ has become a potent ideology and Osama bin Laden is now perceived by the new generation as more of an icon than leader. One senior counter terrorism official has concluded, ‘Al Qaeda is finished. But there is Al Qaedism. This is a powerful ideology that drives local groups to do what they think Osama bin Laden wants’.42 According to another analysis, ‘From Bali to Madrid to London, it seems increasingly likely that young
See the remarks by Pierre de Bousquet, director of D.S.T., France’s domestic intelligence service quoted in Elaine Sciolino, ‘Europe Meets the New Face of Terrorism’, The New York Times, August 1, 2005. 39
Martin Chulov, ‘Police blindsides by self‐contained cells’, The Australian, July 11, 2005, 2.
40
Martin Chulov, ‘Bomber group likely to be independent’, The Weekend Australian, July 9‐10, 2005, 4. 41
Elaine Sciolino and Don Van Natta, ‘Searching for Footprints: Bombings Link Doubted’, The New York Times, July 25, 2005. 42
18 men who did not train with bin Laden in Afghanistan and have no established place in the al‐Qa’ida hierarchy are committing attacks of their own conception under the al‐Qaida banner’.43 Social network theory helps to explain the rise of homegrown groups that form spontaneously ‘from below’. Social network theory stresses the importance of social bonds among of groups of friends (‘a bunch of guys’) that predate formal recruitment into the global jihad as the crucial element of this process. The data presented in this paper provides support for Sageman’s three‐pronged social network theory. It is clear that a process of social bonding based on friendship helped to create a ‘small world’ group. Kingship and discipleship played no discernable part, but the role of Khan, the oldest, as mentor should be noted. The Beeston trio experienced a progressive intensification of faith in the period from 2003 that led them as a group to embrace the ideology of global jihad. It is still unclear when and how Lindsay became associated with this group. Authoritative details about the second prong in this process – establishing a link to global jihad – is lacking. But publicly available evidence points to Pakistan at the likely meeting place between members of the Beeston trio and members of extremist Muslim groups. It is not known where Khan made his testimonial video. Lindsay may have had independent connections to the global jihad as result of his unconfirmed visit to Afghanistan in 2001. There is no evidence that the four London bombers underwent any form of intense training and recruitment. Social network theory thus rejects the argument that individuals become terrorists because of top down recruitment and brainwashing. According to British authorities ‘the youths’ path to terrorism may have stemmed from internet journeys they embarked on themselves’.44
Ian Bremmer, ‘Opening new franchises of fear: Blair’s front line’, The Weekend Australian, July 9‐ 10, 2005, 22. For a similar analysis quoting western intelligence agencies, see: Geoff Kitney, ‘Local terrorist cells seen as rising threat’, The Weekend Australian Financial Review, August 6‐7, 2005. 43
Martin Chulov, ‘Under the Radar’, The Australian, July 14, 2005, 14.
44
19
Appendix A Full Text of Videotape of Mohammad Sidique Khan broadcast by al‐Jazeera Television BBC News, September 4, 2005: The full text of the videotape of Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the four 7 July [suicide] bombers, which was aired on Arabic television channel al‐Jazeera and in which he explains his motives. Text begins: Iʹm going to keep this short and to the point because itʹs all been said before by far more eloquent people than me. And our words have no impact upon you, therefore Iʹm going to talk to you in a language that you understand. Our words are dead until we give them life with our blood. Iʹm sure by now the mediaʹs painted a suitable picture of me, this predictable propaganda machine will naturally try to put a spin on things to suit the government and to scare the masses into conforming to their power and wealth‐ obsessed agendas. I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our driving motivation doesnʹt come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer. Our religion is Islam ‐ obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Muhammad... This is how our ethical stances are dictated. Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation. A second part of the tape was less clear, but he could be heard saying: I myself, I myself, I make dua (pray) to Allah... to raise me amongst those whom I love like the prophets, the messengers, the martyrs and todayʹs heroes like our
20 beloved Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, Dr Ayman al‐Zawahri and Abu Musab al‐ Zarqawi and all the other brothers and sisters that are fighting in the... of this cause. With this I leave you to make up your own minds and I ask you to make dua to Allah almighty to accept the work from me and my brothers and enter us into gardens of paradise. Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/‐/1/hi/uk/4206800.stm.
21
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