UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE Trademark Trial and Appeal Board P.O. Box 1451 Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
coggins
Mailed:
September 17, 2009
Opposition No. 91185180 Tatuaje Cigars, Inc.1 v. Nicaragua Tobacco Imports, Inc.
Before Quinn, Kuhlke, and Mermelstein Administrative Trademark Judges. By the Board: This case now comes up on opposer's motion for summary judgment (filed January 28, 2009) on the ground of priority and likelihood of confusion. A party is entitled to summary judgment when it has demonstrated that there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The evidence must be viewed in
a light favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the nonmovant's favor.
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Opryland
Inasmuch as the pleaded registration was assigned from Peter H. Johnson to Tatuaje Cigars, Inc. and the assignment was recorded with the Assignment Services Division of the Office at Reel 3812 Frame 0663 prior to the institution of this proceeding, Tatuaje Cigars, Inc. should have been listed as the opposer herein. Board records have been updated to list Tatuaje Cigars, Inc. as the opposer.
Opposition No. 91185180 USA Inc. v. The Great American Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 23 USPQ2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Applicant filed an intent-to-use application on the Principal Register for the mark TATTOO, in standard character form, for the following goods2: Cigar and cigarette boxes; cigar and cigarette boxes not of precious metal; cigar bands; cigar boxes; cigar boxes not of precious metal; cigar cases; cigar cutters; cigar holders; cigar humidifiers; cigar lighters; cigar tubes; cigars; tobacco, cigars and cigarettes; cigarillos; in Class 34. Opposer filed a notice of opposition against the registration of applicant's mark on the ground of priority and likelihood of confusion pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
In the notice of
opposition, opposer asserted ownership of Registration No. 2836665 for the mark TATUAJE, in typed form, for "cigars," in Class 34.
This registration issued April 27, 2004.
By way of its motion for summary judgment, opposer has properly made its pleaded registration of record which shows that the registration is valid and subsisting and owned by opposer.
In view thereof, opposer has established its standing
and priority is not an issue.
King Candy, Inc. v. Eunice
King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108 (CCPA 1974). See also Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000); and Lipton Industries, Inc.
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Opposition No. 91185180 v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA 1982). With regard to the goods, the "cigars" identified in opposer's registration are identical to applicant's "cigars" identified in the application.
Moreover, in its brief in
opposition to the motion, applicant concedes that the parties' goods are "similar." (App. Br. p. 2.) Considering the channels of trade and classes of purchasers, because the goods are, in part, legally identical and otherwise closely related, and because there are no limitations in either the registration or the subject application, we must presume that applicant's and opposer's goods will be sold in the same channels of trade and will be bought by the same classes of purchasers.
See Hewlett-Packard
Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Canadian Imperial Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987); and In re Smith and Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994).
Moreover, in its brief
in opposition to the motion, applicant concedes that the parties' channels of trade are "similar." (App. Br. p. 2.) Accordingly, opposer's motion for summary judgment is granted, in part, as to opposer's standing, opposer's priority, the similarity of goods, the channels of trade, and the classes of purchasers. 2
Application Serial No. 77359141, filed December 25, 2007, under
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Opposition No. 91185180 However, upon careful consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, and drawing all inferences with respect to the motion in favor of applicant as the nonmoving party, we find that opposer has not demonstrated the absence of genuine issues of material fact for trial with respect to the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks when compared in their entireties in terms of appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.
Accordingly, opposer's
motion for summary judgment is denied, in part, as to the similarity of the marks.3 Inasmuch as the issues remaining for trial have been narrowed considerably, the parties are encouraged to consider Accelerated Case Resolution (ACR).
The parties are directed to
the following URL where they may find more information on ACR: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/acrognoticerule.pdf
The parties spent some length in their briefs discussing each other's conduct, unclean hands, and fraud.
In view of
applicant's failure to file a (compulsory) counter-claim to cancel opposer's pleaded registration or to file a cross-motion for summary judgment on its affirmative defense of unclean hands, we note that a discussion of opposer's use of other
Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b). 3 The parties are reminded that evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is of record only for consideration of that motion. Any such evidence to be considered at final hearing must be properly introduced during the appropriate trial period. See, for example, Levi Strauss & Co. v. R. Joseph Sportswear Inc., 28 USPQ2d 1464 (TTAB 1993).
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Opposition No. 91185180 terms on packaging for opposer's goods appears to be immaterial to this proceeding. Proceedings are resumed.
Discovery is open.
Disclosure
and trial dates are reset on the following schedule. Expert Disclosures Due Discovery Closes Plaintiff's Pretrial Disclosures Plaintiff's 30-day Trial Period Ends Defendant's Pretrial Disclosures Defendant's 30-day Trial Period Ends Plaintiff's Rebuttal Disclosures Plaintiff's 15-day Rebuttal Period Ends
10/21/2009 11/20/2009 1/4/2010 2/18/2010 3/5/2010 4/19/2010 5/4/2010 6/3/2010
In each instance, a copy of the transcript of testimony together with copies of documentary exhibits, must be served on the adverse party within thirty days after completion of the taking of testimony.
Trademark Rule 2.l25.
Briefs
shall be filed in accordance with Trademark Rules 2.128(a) and (b).
An oral hearing will be set only upon request
filed as provided by Trademark Rule 2.l29.
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