Taking Stock: The Cure For Chronic Overfishing (2007)

TAKING STOCK: The Cure for Chronic Overfishing

SUMMARY AND FINDINGS In numerous cases around our coasts, no amount of warning – economic or ecological – has deterred continued overfishing. Too often fishing pressure is intense enough to reduce fish populations below the minimum needed to sustain themselves, or to prevent recovery to sustainable levels.1 Examples abound, including the collapse of the Pacific sardine fishery in the 1960s, the halving of the Atlantic swordfish population since the 1970s, the depletion of red drum during the blackened red fish craze of the 1980s, and the epic New England fishery disaster of the early 1990s. Although the amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act in 1996 (MSA) defined overfishing, prohibited fishery managers from setting fishing quotas above the maximum sustainable yield, and required managers to rebuild overfished stocks as quickly as possible, loopholes in the MSA have allowed overfishing to continue unchecked in some regions. The fishery management councils have too often ignored the advice of scientists and permitted unsustainable levels of fishing year after year, largely by failing to adopt or enforce the catch limits recommended by fishery scientists. The absence of accountability for exceeding limits has allowed overfishing to continue with impunity. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the agency responsible for management of U.S. ocean fish populations, has not stepped in to disapprove management plans that fail to accomplish the objective. The result is chronic overfishing, a condition characterized by persistent levels of fishing beyond what is sustainable. The findings of this report indicate that there has been very limited improvement in reducing overfishing since 1998, when NMFS issued its first report on the status of U.S. fish stocks. The most recent report to Congress on the status of stocks (for 2006) actually showed an increase in the number of stocks experiencing overfishing, for the first time in eight years.2 Moreover, the findings of this report indicate that overfishing is still a chronic problem in many U.S. fisheries, primarily in regions where managers have failed to employ science-based catch limits and to close fisheries when the catch reaches those limits. Specific findings include: • For the majority (54%) of managed fish stocks, NMFS still does not know if overfishing is occurring. • Despite limited progress in reducing the number of stocks subject to overfishing since 1998, the practice persists and is threatening overall ecosystem health. • In general, overfishing has continued on stocks managed by councils that implemented ineffective effort-based controls, such as limiting the days a vessel can go to sea, rather than enforced catch limits. • In regions where annual catch limits are employed and enforced, chronic overfishing is not occurring. The failure to end overfishing fueled the debate over reauthorization of the MSA in 2006. The new Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act (MSRA) removes the discretion that allowed managers to avoid imposing limits in the past; the MSRA now requires annual catch limits in all U.S. fisheries as well as accountability measures. These requirements, together with the stipulation that catch limits may not exceed the fishing level recommended by the councils’ scientific advisors,3 are aimed at addressing the underlying causes of chronic overfishing. Now it is time for NMFS to write clear, unambiguous rules for implementing the new requirements and to enforce those rules when regional fishery management councils fail to comply.

1

INTRODUCTION: THE WHAT AND WHY OF OVERFISHING When fishing fleets take more fish than a population is producing, that stock experiences overfishing. If allowed to continue for a long period, overfishing can cause profound changes not only in the target fish stock but also in the sea around it. Numerous scientific reports, congressional hearings, and scientific journal articles have identified overfishing as a persistent problem in U.S. fisheries for decades,4 with predictable results: many depleted fish stocks have not recovered and fisheries fail to realize their long-term potential yield. For the first 20 years of U.S. fishery management following the passage of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act in 1976, the law required councils to define overfishing for managed species and stipulated that they should prevent overfishing. But neither the law nor National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) guidelines explicitly compelled the councils or the agency to halt the practice. Many managers have been persuaded to mistrust scientific recommendations or find them unpersuasive in the face of stakeholder demands. Short-term economic concerns pressure managers to keep catch limits high. The 1996 amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act attempted to tackle overfishing by amending management requirements in several key areas, as shown in the box below.

MSA AMENDMENTS OF 1996 • Limited the allowable catch to maximum sustainable yield (MSY); disallowed overfishing for economic or social reasons • Required management plans to define overfishing using objective and measurable criteria • Established deadline for ending overfishing and rebuilding depleted populations, with some exceptions

But loopholes in the MSA and the regulations implementing the new requirements allowed managers to put off tough measures to halt overfishing. Managers have continued to ignore scientific advice. Fishing has continued without hard and fast catch limits, and NMFS never fulfilled its legal responsibility to disapprove deficient plans and develop measures to end overfishing if a council failed to do so. In some cases, deadlines for recovery of overfished stocks stretch so far into the future that some stocks may never recover. Ten years after passage of the MSA, overfishing is still common practice. The failure to end overfishing fueled the debate over reauthorization of the MSA in 2006. The highest priority in the newly amended law is to end overfishing, a chronic condition in too many of our nation’s fisheries. The amendments to the fisheries law require the regional fishery management councils to set annual catch limits for all managed fisheries, accompanied by measures to ensure accountability.5 The new law also requires the preparation and implementation of a plan that immediately

2

MSA AMENDMENTS OF 2006 • Requires management plans to set annual catch limits • Councils must heed recommendations of scientific advisors when setting catch limits • Adds the requirement for accountability measures to ensure that objectives are met • Requires managers to end overfishing within two years

ends overfishing and commences rebuilding of overfished stocks within two years of being identified as overfished or approaching overfished.6 These requirements, together with the stipulation that catch limits may not exceed the fishing level recommended by the councils’ scientific advisors,7 are aimed at addressing the underlying causes of continued overfishing.8 Chronic overfishing has resulted in enormous losses of potential revenue, exports, jobs, recreation and other economic activity. By one estimate, Americans have foregone nearly $3 billion in revenue from our fisheries annually because stocks are not producing what they could if overfishing ended and populations rebounded.9 Despite some encouraging trends in some fisheries, the record demonstrates that the tough new requirements for annual catch limits are long overdue and urgently needed. NMFS is now revising its regulatory guidelines to implement the new MSRA requirements in order to end overfishing. Last revised in 1998, the National Standard Guidelines are intended to provide fishery management councils with guidance on how to implement the law’s 10 national standards, the first of which concerns overfishing and “optimum yield.” National Standard 1 stipulates: “conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery.”10 To accomplish this goal, the new rules for implementing annual catch limits and accountability measures must provide clear guidance to the councils or risk allowing the councils to interpret the law as they see fit. Even though the short-term effect of stopping overfishing may result in reduced catches, shorter seasons and decreased incomes, the long-term costs of allowing overfishing to continue are much higher.

3

CHRONIC OVERFISHING BY THE NUMBERS Has overfishing persisted long enough to be considered chronic? Certainly the notion that overfishing is something to be avoided has been part of the Magnuson Act since its passage in 1976. Since the 1996 amendments, the law has required that managers actually keep track of overfishing and report to Congress on their success at ending it.11 Using that requirement as a starting point provides almost a decade of information to consider, as shown in Figure 1. The figure shows that stocks experiencing overfishing, as a percentage of all managed stocks, have changed very little over the period. This is attributable to the fact that NMFS has made a number of administrative changes which consolidated and reduced the total number of stocks evaluated in the annual reports – from over 900 before 2005 to only 530 since 2005. In contrast, when one examines the change in the percentage of assessed stocks experiencing overfishing, the picture seems a bit brighter, as illustrated in Figure 2. However, NMFS still does not know if overfishing is occurring for about half (54%) of the stocks that are reported annually to Congress. FIGURE 1. STATUS OF ALL MANAGED STOCKS, 1999-2006

Figure 1. The bars represent the percentages, by status, of all managed stocks over the period for which comparable data are available (1999-2006). Although the total number of managed stocks reported to Congress annually has changed over time, the number of stocks subject to overfishing has remained relatively constant at approximately 10%.

4

FIGURE 2. ASSESSED STOCKS SUBJECT TO OVERFISHING, 1999-2006

Figure 2. Comparing only assessed stocks, not all stocks, there has been no real improvement in the percentage of stocks subject to overfishing since 2001, which has hovered around 20 percent.

The first annual Report to Congress: Status of Fisheries of the United States, or Status of Stocks (SOS) report was issued in 1998. Of the 152 species whose status was reported in the first edition of SOS, 102 were classified as overfished in 1998. By 2006, one-third (35) of those same species were still reported as overfished. Eight of the original species are no longer reported because of changes in status or NMFS made changes in how it reported status.12 Also among the stocks no longer appearing in the annual report are 10 species of Pacific salmon that are endangered, and 16 species of sharks that were known to be experiencing overfishing, but disappear from the list after their consolidation in a shark complex assessed as “status unknown.” In fact, a 2006 report by the Network found that 75 percent of the reduction in the number of stocks subject to overfishing is the result of administrative shuffling and reclassification.13 Despite these changes and the difficulties of assessing trends when the baseline of stocks reported to Congress has changed so dramatically, many of the assessed stocks listed as experiencing overfishing have remained on the list year after year. Depending on how one defines “chronic overfishing,” between 30 and 50 species14 appear on the list of species being fished too intensively on a routine basis, including some of the most important in the country, such as cod and red

5

snapper. Defining “chronic” as subject to overfishing in six or more of the nine years (1998-2006) results in 49 stocks that fit the definition. In addition, there are the instances where no overfishing definition was in place for several years, but once it was defined for a stock, overfishing has continued from that time to the present – adding more stocks. The bottom line? Chronic overfishing takes a toll. Of the 49 stocks on which overfishing persisted for six or more years of the nine-year period since 1998, 31 were still subject to overfishing in 2006. In addition, the status of 12 shark stocks which were previously subject to overfishing was reclassified as “unknown.” By 2006, only 6 of the stocks suffering a six or more year bout of chronic overfishing showed enough improvement to be reclassified as “not overfished.” Figure 3 shows the number of stocks subject to overfishing, and for how many years they experienced overfishing. Table 1, below, is an expanded view of the stocks subject to chronic overfishing. It lists specific stocks, by council, that have been subject to overfishing in six or more of the nine years since the first Status of Stocks report assessed them.

FIGURE 3. STOCKS SUBJECT TO CHRONIC OVERFISHING, 1998-2006

Figure 3. Of the 49 stocks that have been subject to chronic overfishing for six or more years since 1998, 31 were still subject to overfishing in 2006. Only 6 species actually showed enough improvement to be reclassified as “not overfished.”

6

TABLE 1: STOCKS SUBJECT TO CHRONIC OVERFISHING BY COUNCIL

Years Over Fishing 6

ASMFC

CFMC

American Lobster1

GMFMC

HMS

MAFMC

Vermilion snapper2 Red Drum

12 species large coastal sharks

Black Sea Bass

Red Grouper3

Dusky Shark4

Tilefish5

Sandbar shark11

Summer Flounder12

N. Atl. Blue Marlin W. Atl Sailfish W. Atl. Bluefin White Marlin N. Atl. Albacore Bigeye Tuna

Scup

7 8 Queen Conch

Red Snapper

9

1

American Lobster were subject to overfishing every year until 2004, when it ceased to appear in the SOS.

7

2

Overfishing for Vermilion Snapper was not defined until 2000, when the stock was listed as subject to overfishing, a status that remained consistent for the stock until it was no longer listed as subject to overfishing in 2006.

8

3

Gulf Red Grouper stocks were listed to have an unknown overfishing status until 2000. The stock was subject to overfishing every year afterward.

4

Dusky shark were subject to overfishing in every year of the analysis except 2004 and 2005, when the stock was considered to be included in the large coastal shark complex. In 2006, the stock was again considered to be subject to overfishing.

5

Tilefish ceased to be subject to overfishing in 2005.

6

American Plaice were subject to overfishing every year until 2005. The stock continued to be listed as overfished in 2005 and 2006.

NEFMC

NEFMC/ MAFMC

SAFMC

American Plaice6 Cape Cod Yellowtail Flounder7 Georges Bank Cod8 Atlantic Sea Scallop9 M.Atl./S.NEngland Yellowtail Flounder10

Gulf of Maine Cod White Hake

Monkfish(N) Monkfish(S)

Red Drum Black Grouper Black Sea Bass Gag Grouper Golden Tilefish Red Snapper Snowy Grouper Speckled Hind Vermilion Snapper Warsaw Grouper

Cape cod yellowtail flounder were not subject to overfishing in 2003 but the stock was during all other years included in the analysis. Georges Bank cod were subject to overfishing every year with the exception of 2000 and 2001.

Atlantic Sea Scallop were subject to overfishing every year except 2003 and 2006.

9

10

Middle Atlantic Yellowtail Flounder were subject to overfishing from 2000-02 (the stock’s status was previously unknown). In 2003, it was combined with the Southern New England Yellowtail Flounder stock, which was then listed at subject to overfishing in all subsequent years.

Sandbar Shark are considered part of the Large Coastal Shark complex but are assessed separately.

11

Summer flounder were not subject to overfishing in 2003 but the stock was during all other years included in the analysis.

12

In general, overfishing has continued on stocks managed by councils that implemented ineffective effort-based controls on fishing, such as limiting the days a vessel can go to sea, or gear restrictions. Councils such as the North Pacific and Pacific that employ “hard” catch limits (requiring that fishing stop when the target catch is attained) have managed to avoid overfishing as defined in the annual reports to Congress. In the Gulf of Mexico region, the council employs hard catch limits but has failed to prevent continued overfishing because the limits have been set too high for some stocks.15

7

CHRONIC OVERFISHING BY MANAGEMENT REGION The regional councils with the highest percentages of stocks subject to chronic overfishing are those that do not employ hard catch limits: the New England Council’s groundfish complex, the South Atlantic Council’s reef fish complex and the large coastal shark complex managed by NMFS. Figure 4 shows the percentage of managed stocks experiencing chronic overfishing by council. Neither the Pacific nor North Pacific council had stocks that were subject to chronic overfishing by this report’s definition. Overfishing has occurred in some years on some species within the Pacific groundfish complex, where management was confounded by lack of data and flawed assumptions in stock assessments. Subsequent management actions to limit catches on seven badly overfished rockfish stocks have prevented chronic overfishing, but it took a lawsuit by conservation groups to compel council action. In the North Pacific, intermittent overfishing has occurred on several crab stocks, but imposition of reduced catch limits also prevented overfishing from becoming chronic. The most telling point is that where managers ended overfishing, and stocks were healthy enough to be reclassified from overfished to not overfished, the management plans included concrete annual catch limits that were enforced. FIGURE 4: STOCKS SUBJECT TO CHRONIC OVERFISHING BY COUNCIL

8

SOURCES OF CHRONIC OVERFISHING

New England Groundfish The sorry state of cod, flounder and haddock off New England became the poster child for the fight to end chronic overfishing. The fishery first came under a management plan in 1985. By 1989, the council had admitted what scientists had been saying for years about overfishing, but continued to delay action to devise concrete measures to stop overfishing. Despite a lawsuit, congressional intervention, changes in the law aimed directly at their inaction, declaration of a fishery disaster, and a multi-million federal bailout, the council still manages without catch limits. The combination of effort-based controls such as a moratorium on new fishing permits, daysat-sea restrictions, and trip limits under amendments to the groundfish plan have failed to end overfishing of the famed cod stocks of Georges Bank and Gulf of Maine. Although fishing mortality does appear to have declined from the peak levels of the early 1990s and the cod stocks have rebounded slightly from the record-low levels of the mid-1990s, both stocks are still experiencing overfishing and spawning stocks remain far below the target rebuilding biomass levels. Ironically, the species that has recovered most – yellowtail flounder – is subject to a hard bycatch cap imposed as part of a program to allow scallop fishermen into groundfish closure areas. The New England groundfish crisis illustrates the consequences of ignoring scientific advice and knowingly overfishing in a misguided attempt to mitigate shortterm economic and social impacts.

9

Lack of firm catch limits, absence of effective accountability measures, failure to heed scientific advice on limits, and risky decision-making are all major factors contributing to chronic overfishing. Even though ending overfishing has been a goal of fishery management since at least 1976, these factors have made it difficult for managers to accomplish the goal. Managers in councils and the agency have often knowingly allowed overfishing to continue; New England groundfish, mid-Atlantic summer flounder, and Gulf of Mexico red snapper are all examples of this. NMFS has approved council plans that did not end overfishing within required time limits. Absent or Inadequate Annual Catch Limits (ACLs). The most blatant is the absence of annual catch limits on a fishery. Examples of this include: New England groundfish such as cod and haddock managed under the Northeast Multispecies Complex Fishery Management Plan (FMP); snowy grouper, golden tilefish, black sea bass and vermilion snapper managed under the South Atlantic Snapper Grouper FMP; and summer flounder managed by the Mid-Atlantic Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass FMP. In the first, the fishery is controlled by effort limits such as mesh size and days-at-sea rather than catch limits. In the South Atlantic, size, gear and area restrictions have been applied unsuccessfully. In the Mid-Atlantic, ACLs are inadequate because while total landings are limited, total catch is not, making it difficult to determine the extent to which discards are contributing to fishing mortality. Finally, some councils, like New England, knowingly set ACLs that allow overfishing in a misguided attempt to mitigate short-term economic impacts. Risk-Prone Decision-Making. Another source of chronic overfishing is reluctance by managers to apply the precautionary approach when they lack the specific information to manage many individual components of a mixed species fishery. Despite guidance to the contrary,16 managers err too often in favor of risky fishing rather than sustainable fishing. In the face of uncertainty and pressure from the fishing industry, fishery managers tend to base their decisions on an overly optimistic view of the condition of fishery resources. The result is that no catch limits are set, or limits are set at a point that does not allow a margin of error for uncertainty in underlying information or changes in environmental conditions. These ‘risk-prone’ decisions eventually result in overfishing.17 In the case of Pacific groundfish, for example, the Pacific Fishery Management Council set catch limits too high in the 1990s based on inadequate information and optimistic assumptions regarding the health of groundfish stocks. Managers were initially slow to act at the first signs of distress because of limited information about these species. Better information by the late 1990s revealed that longlived rockfish have among the lowest productivity rates of any fish in the world and indicated that the stocks were badly depleted, and thus the catch limits had been too high to sustain healthy stocks. As a result, the Secretary of Commerce declared the fishery a disaster in 2000.

Ignoring the Best Available Science. Yet another contributor to chronic overfishing is a failure by managers to follow the scientific advice provided to them by their own experts. For example, stock assessment scientists urged a 50 percent reduction in mortality for spiny dogfish for many years, only to be overruled repeatedly in council votes. As predicted, overfishing continued until 2003, and spiny dogfish continue to be depleted today. In the case of red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico, scientists have been recommending catch levels be set well below what the council has consistently allowed, delaying rebuilding of this stock indefinitely. One of the reasons Gulf of Mexico scientists have urged tighter limits on red snapper catch is because this species is subject to extraordinary levels of bycatch mortality; perhaps as many as 80 percent of juvenile snappers are killed in other fisheries. Bycatch of overfished species such as yelloweye rockfish (in directed fisheries on the rest of the Pacific groundfish complex) has complicated rebuilding plans there. Bycatch (the catching and killing of non-target fish and other ocean wildlife) is one reason why catch or mortality limits are exceeded. Others include lack of enforcement, failure to account for exceeding caps in subsequent season limits, and just plain cheating.

SUMMER FLOUNDER Summer flounder is second only to striped bass in its popularity with Mid-Atlantic anglers, and is in the top 10 for both commercial and recreational species in pounds and numbers of fish landed. Yet summer flounder, also known as fluke, has been subject to overfishing for years in both sectors. Conservation groups sued successfully in 1999 arguing that quotas were set too high. As recently as November 2007, managers were urging allowable landings in excess of scientific recommendations and complaining that the current limits are too low. The recreational fishery for fluke was shut down in November after exceeding the quota. The council approved the first plan for summer flounder in 1988; an overfishing definition was adopted in 1991 and quotas set for the first time in 1993. Initial management measures included gear specifications, mesh restrictions, minimum fish sizes, possession limits and area restrictions. Later action limited entry to the fishery. Managers have been trying to cut fishing mortality on summer flounder since the late 1980s, but an unwillingness to impose economic burdens on fishermen, overly optimistic quota setting, underreporting

from states, dealers and fishermen, all contributed to excessive catches. Overages in the recreational fishery and to a lesser extent the commercial fishery have all contributed to excessive catches. State and federal managers have adhered to a risk-prone policy of setting the summer flounder landing limit at the maximum allowable level, allowing no margin of safety against discard mortality or excess catch in the recreational sector. As a consequence fishing mortality on this stock has surpassed target levels consistently, resulting in chronic overfishing. The 2006 stock assessment advised a precautionary Total Allowable Landings (TAL), lower than what might be indicated by projections, to compensate for the history of underestimation of fishing mortality and overestimation of stock biomass. Most recently, the council and states have recommended a 2008 TAL well well above recommendations of their scientists. NMFS has issued a proposed rule that fails to adhere to the scientific recommendations and cautionary advice offered by the agency’s own regional administrator.

10

Lack of Accountability. It is not enough just to have a catch limit. Instances where limits are in place but are routinely exceeded underscore the need for accountability measures to accompany catch limits. For example, discards in the summer flounder fishery in the Mid-Atlantic are not monitored. The fishery operates with a size limit so that both the commercial and recreational sectors discard undersized fish. Mortality associated with these discards is not adequately accounted for in setting catch limits. Further, landings from the recreational sector in that fishery and in the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery are not known until after the season has ended. The recreational limits have been exceeded annually in both fisheries for many years without any reduction in the limits for subsequent seasons. In another example of the need for accountability, the large Pacific whiting trawl fishery was closed in summer 2007 after it exceeded the widow rockfish bycatch limit – established based on the rebuilding plan for this overfished stock. In one case, enforcement officers found that a whiting boat had disabled its monitoring camera and dumped an unreported widow rockfish catch overboard.

GULF OF MEXICO RED SNAPPER The red snapper fishery has a long history in the Gulf of Mexico. Fishing for red snapper, a popular food and game fish, commercially dates back to the late 19th century and recreational fishing in the Gulf for red snapper took off in the middle of the 20th century. Decades of popularity among commercial and recreational fishermen led to a steady decline in red snapper abundance in the Gulf of Mexico. In addition, shrimp trawlers kill large numbers (up to 25 to 45 million annually) of juvenile red snapper as bycatch, fish that never have an opportunity to reproduce. Today the population of mature red snapper is estimated to be only about three percent of historical levels. Scientists first assessed red snapper as overfished in 1988. Catch limits were first set in 1990. Varying size limits, closed seasons, trip limits, and bag limits have all been used to reduce the catch of red snapper by commercial and recreational fishermen. Fishery managers also require the use of bycatch reduction devices in shrimp trawls to allow juvenile red snapper to escape the trawls. Unfortunately, catch limits were exceeded regularly by fishermen and bycatch reduction devices did not reduce the amount of red snapper killed by shrimpers as much as anticipated. Because of this, fishery managers pushed

11

back the rebuilding deadlines for red snapper from as early as 2000 until the current date of 2032. In addition, fishery managers blatantly set the catch limit for red snapper 50% higher than the recommendations of their own scientists in 2005. This short-term thinking led to more and greater cuts in fishing in 2007 and put off the economic rewards of a rebuilt red snapper fishery. In fact, a federal court ruled in March 2007 that fishery managers based the existing plan to rebuild red snapper on flawed logic, not science, and did not follow the law. Due to this lawsuit, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council voted in June 2007 to set a catch limit for red snapper based on the advice of their scientists for the 2008 fishing year. The Gulf Council also put new restrictions on shrimpers to reduce the amount of bycatch of red snapper in their trawls. Now it is up to the National Marine Fisheries Service to implement these new rules in order to rebuild the red snapper fishery in the Gulf of Mexico so that there are more fishing opportunities in the future, not fewer.

HOW MSRA CAN HELP MANAGERS END OVERFISHING The new provisions in the MSRA remove the remaining discretion that has allowed fishery management councils to put economic considerations above biological imperatives. These provisions close the loopholes with respect to the time allowed for responding to overfishing, and they demand that managers heed the advice of their scientific experts. NMFS is now proceeding with rulemaking to implement the new directions called for in the MSRA. NMFS plans to have guidelines in place in 2008 that will incorporate guidance for annual catch limits into its existing guidelines for National Standard 1. Councils have until 2010 to bring their plans into compliance with new requirements to end overfishing through the use of ACLs and accountability measures for stocks subject to overfishing, and 2011 for all other stocks. In the meantime, councils are required to follow scientific advice when setting catch limits. Critical issues that advocates will watch for in the coming months include application of the precautionary approach, avoiding the boom and bust cycles that result from targeting displaced effort to unassessed stocks, rigorous response – either in-season or in subsequent years – to cases where fishing exceeds annual limits, and explicit guidance for moving toward a more holistic, ecosystem-based approach to fishery management, in which the food needs of other fish and wildlife are considered and accounted for when setting ACLs.19 To ensure that the new provisions are effective, NMFS must write strong rules and enforce compliance when councils fail to live up to the intent of Congress. The Network believes that the revised National Standard 1 guidelines must include the features summarized in the next page.

12

MARINE FISH CONSERVATION NETWORK RECOMMENDATIONS The National Marine Fisheries Service is now drafting new rules that are intended to guide council implementation of the requirements for annual catch limits and accountability measures in all U.S. fisheries. The revised National Standard 1 guidelines must close the loopholes that have allowed overfishing to occur on a routine basis, and NMFS must exercise its legal responsibility to ensure that the councils comply. • Annual Catch Limits (ACLs) should be set for each managed stock and based on an explicit set of decision rules. These limits must be numeric (e.g., pounds or numbers of fish), fully account for all sources of fishing mortality (including bycatch and discards), and peer reviewed independently of the council management process. • As required by the MSRA, a council may not exceed the limit recommended by its scientific advisors when setting an ACL and the ACL should account for the inherent uncertainty in that advice; the greater the uncertainty, the greater the precaution the council should take. • Overfished stocks should be restored as soon as possible and within the tenyear rebuilding time frame required by the MSRA. Crucially, the MSRA clarifies that overfishing must not be permitted during a rebuilding program. • ACLs must be accompanied by accountability measures that are approved by the Secretary of Commerce, subject to regular scientific review, and developed with opportunities for public comment. Performance should be measurable and measures should be modified if not working. • NMFS should provide explicit guidance for addressing ecosystem considerations when setting ACLs, starting with forage fish rules that are designed to protect food webs.

13

END NOTES 1

National Research Council. 1999. Sustaining Marine Fisheries. National Academy Press. Washington, D.C.

2

NOAA Fisheries. Report to Congress: Status of Fisheries of the United States for 2006.

3

MSRA Sec. 302(h)(6) (16 U.S.C. 1852(h)(6))

4

See, for example, CEQ, 1981; American Fisheries Society, 1989; Fox et al, 1990; S.Rpt. 101-414, 1990; Hearings House Merchant Marine & Fisheries on H.R. 780, 1993; Our Living Oceans, 1999.

5

MSRA Sec. 303(a)(15) (16 U.S.C. 1853(a)(15))

6

MSA Sec. 304(e)(3).

7

MSRA Sec. 302(h)(6) (16 U.S.C. 1852(h)(6))

8

See USCOP (2004), Recommendations 19-1, 19-2, and 19-3 requiring regional FMCs to set catch limits within the bounds recommended by the councils’ science and statistical committees.

9

Somma, A. 2003. The environmental consequences and economic costs of depleting the world’s oceans. Economic Perspectives, electronic journal of the U.S. Department of State. Vol. 8 No. 1, Jan. 2003. Available online at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ ites/0103/ijee/somma.htm

10

MSA sec. 301(a)(1); 16 U.S.C. 1851.

11

“The Secretary shall report annually to the Congress and the Councils on the status of fisheries within each Council’s geographical area of authority and identify those fisheries that are overfished or are approaching a condition of being overfished. For those fisheries managed under a fishery management plan or international agreement, the status shall be determined using the criteria for overfishing specified in such plan or agreement.” 16 U.S.C. 1854(e)(1).

12

No longer appearing in SOS are two stocks of silver hake, one determined in 2002 to be rebuilt, the other in 2003 to be rebuilding; red hake, whose status was last reported in 2001 as unknown; Bering Sea snow crab, not overfished as of 2005, WashingtonOregon-California Bank rockfish, not overfished as of 2000; Washington-Oregon-California silvergrey rockfish, whose last status was reported as unknown in 2002; yellowtail snapper, reported last in 2003 as not overfished; pelagic armorhead, combined in a complex in 1999, and squirrelfish snapper, also combined in a complex in 1999 and reported as not overfished.

13

For a detailed examination of how administrative changes affected the picture of stock status, see, Marine Fish Conservation Network. Shell Game: How the Federal Government is Hiding the Mismanagement of Our Nation’s Fisheries. Washington, D.C. (2005).

14

The Status of Stocks Report to Congress lists “stocks” rather than species. Some of these stocks are collections of species grouped or separated for management purposes, sometimes to account for geographically discrete populations of the same species, or for other reasons. This report has attempted to examine not only the complex but also the component species within it. Where SOS has split a species into several stocks, or grouped species into a complex the analysis follows the species groupings assessed in Our Living Oceans, which preceded the SOS.

15

Marine Fish Conservation Network. Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council Report. Washington, D.C. (2006).

16

Restrepo (Convenor) et al. 1998. Technical Guidance on the Use of Precautionary Approaches to Implementing National Standard 1 of the MSFCMA. NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F/SPO July,1998.

17

National Marine Fisheries Service. 1991. Strategic Plan.

18

In the past, fishery managers operated under a presumption that in the absence of information about a stock, especially a previously unexploited one, fishing could proceed without restriction. As established fisheries became depleted, fleets moved on to new targets. Without status information or catch limits, stocks such as monkfish, spiny dogfish and tilefish soon became overfished, too.

19

National Research Council, Committee on Ecosystem Effects of Fishing, Phase II. Dynamic Changes in Marine Ecosystems: Fish, Food Webs, and Future Options. National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. (2006) 160 pp.

The Marine Fish Conservation Network wishes to acknowledge the work of Sherry L. Bosse, JD, and Suzanne Iudicello, JD, in preparation of the background documents and analysis that went into this report. Photo Credits: All photos are from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Library.

14

Marine Fish Conservation Network 600 Pennsylvania Ave. SE, Suite 210 Washington, DC 20003 P 202. 543. 5509 • F 202. 543. 5774 [email protected] www.conservefish.org

The Marine Fish Conservation Network is the largest national coalition solely dedicated to promoting the long-term sustainability of marine fish. With almost 200 members – including environmental organizations, commercial and recreational fishing associations, aquariums, and marine science groups – the Network uses its distinct voice and the best available science to educate policymakers, the fishing industry, and the public about the need for sound conservation and better management practices.