T8 B5 Faa Wash Center Dana Mcfarland Fdr- Typed And Handwritten Notes- Emergency Traffic Management Response Issues203
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ZDC INTERVIEW 12/4/03 DANA McFARLAND (TMU on 9/11) •
Has no objections to recording.
•
FAA background: Hired in 1991, ZDC whole time. TMU since 1998.
•
Traffic management coordinator. Usually ESP (Enroute Spacing) and WSP (all other issues) and a DD posit (re-router for severe weather). WC and SC posits have most contact with Command Center.
•
Command Center divided into East, West, Severe Weather areas. Multiple people in each area.
•
ZDC always talking to the East side at Command Center.
•
Group Conference Calls (Strategic Planning telecom - every 2 hours) all major TRACONS, Airlines, and Command Center. Works out the larger plan taking into account traffic density and weather.
•
Training TMUs in emergency traffic management response issues? Yes for HJs, but standard to the controllers HJ training. Any special TMU training HJ? Not really, but we do have comms with all of the other centers and can be used in emergencies.
•
Don't know if TMU is recorded. Assume it is.
•
9/11: Don Slaughter was her supervisor on 9/11. First phone call came in over the CC line, notified of poss HJ heading "our way" - NY Center was also onteh line. It turned out to be AA11.1 went to Gary and told him about it. Don't recall if they referred to it by name. I went to Area 8 (Virginia was Supervisor there) and watched the aircraft. Another call came in from CC to notify them that the ac had crashed into WTC.
•
NY Center went into ATC 0 (full ground stop). Massive effort to reroute ac on ground and in air. Boston then does same. Tons of phone calls.
•
Got calls on FLT175, UA93 (we watched him on Primary only). As well as multiple erroneous calls/reports.
•
For a hj, we would try to determine where they were going and provide heads up to the Area Supervisors or centers that the ac would be heading towards.
•
Any calls on AA77? Don't remember any call, but I wasn't the only one receiving calls. We were all answering the phones.
•
Did most of information sharing with Dave
•
Don't recall any call to the WOC. Possibly the OPS Manager did. Or my supervisor may have.
•
Did not speak with Huntress or anyone in NORAD. Did well after the attacks, but not during (Rich Downer coordinated with them later in the day).
•
Our contacts were mostly with the Command Center. Our focus was on the grounding efforts.
•
Recalls CC putting out a general "watch for suspicious activity" but doesn't recall specific instructions to turn on Primaries.
•
General impression of CC's situational awareness: they were dependant on NY Center and that area's TRACON.
•
AA11: CC provided us with a location of the ac and a heading on it.
•
AA77: Because Indy lost the track, you wouldn't know where to look.
•
Because NY notified us of AA11 we knew exactly where to look. Not the same with AA77.
•
Did get word when Dulles Approach picked up a fast-moving, Primary target heading to DC. How did you know Dulles picked it up? We got a call from Dulles (Mark someone..) I know they also called the White House.
•
Learned it was AA77 that hit Pentagon much later in the day.
•
Report of military crash in Camp David. False.
•
Any knowledge of reports that AA11 was still heading south? No, don't recall any such reports.
•
Aware ac was scrambled? Performed a "see all" function and watched fighters take off from Langley. Not involved in comms with them, focus of routing and landing ac. No NEADs comms.
•
Talk to NEADs a lot post-9/11.
•
Aware of any ROE or shoot down orders? No.
,1
,1
\
^§
5~-
t
?1
lit U/
h tfjfaj
L/Uj /
JJ_13_
/
/
ft/ lihlr
a
///
•*
Has no objections to recording.
•
FAA background: Hired in 1991, ZDC whole time. TMU since 1998.
•
Traffic management coordinator. Usually ESP (Enroute Spacing) and WSP (all other issues) and a DD posit (re-router for severe weather). WC and SC posits have most contact with Command Center.
•
Command Center divided into East, West, Severe Weather areas. Multiple people in each area.
•
ZDC always talking to the East side at Command Center.
•
Group Conference Calls (Strategic Planning telecom - every 2 hours) all major TRACONS, Airlines, and Command Center. Works out the larger plan taking into account traffic density and weather.
•
Training TMUs in emergency traffic management response issues? Yes for HJs, but standard to the controllers HJ training. Any special TMU training HJ? Not really, but we do have comms with all of the other centers and can be used in emergencies.
•
Don't know if TMU is recorded. Assume it is.
•
9/11: Don Slaughter was her supervisor on 9/11. First phone call came in over the CC line, notified of poss HJ heading "our way" - NY Center was also onteh line. It turned out to be AA11.1 went to Gary and told him about it. Don't recall if they referred to it by name. I went to Area 8 (Virginia was Supervisor there) and watched the aircraft. Another call came in from CC to notify them that the ac had crashed into WTC.
•
NY Center went into ATC 0 (full ground stop). Massive effort to reroute ac on ground and in air. Boston then does same. Tons of phone calls.
•
Got calls on FLT175, UA93 (we watched him on Primary only). As well as multiple erroneous calls/reports.
•
For a hj, we would try to determine where they were going and provide heads up to the Area Supervisors or centers that the ac would be heading towards.
•
Any calls on AA77? Don't remember any call, but I wasn't the only one receiving calls. We were all answering the phones.
•
Did most of information sharing with Dave
•
Don't recall any call to the WOC. Possibly the OPS Manager did. Or my supervisor may have.
•
Did not speak with Huntress or anyone in NORAD. Did well after the attacks, but not during (Rich Downer coordinated with them later in the day).
•
Our contacts were mostly with the Command Center. Our focus was on the grounding efforts.
•
Recalls CC putting out a general "watch for suspicious activity" but doesn't recall specific instructions to turn on Primaries.
•
General impression of CC's situational awareness: they were dependant on NY Center and that area's TRACON.
•
AA11: CC provided us with a location of the ac and a heading on it.
•
AA77: Because Indy lost the track, you wouldn't know where to look.
•
Because NY notified us of AA11 we knew exactly where to look. Not the same with AA77.
•
Did get word when Dulles Approach picked up a fast-moving, Primary target heading to DC. How did you know Dulles picked it up? We got a call from Dulles (Mark someone..) I know they also called the White House.
•
Learned it was AA77 that hit Pentagon much later in the day.
•
Report of military crash in Camp David. False.
•
Any knowledge of reports that AA11 was still heading south? No, don't recall any such reports.
•
Aware ac was scrambled? Performed a "see all" function and watched fighters take off from Langley. Not involved in comms with them, focus of routing and landing ac. No NEADs comms.
•
Talk to NEADs a lot post-9/11.
•
Aware of any ROE or shoot down orders? No.
,1
,1
\
^§
5~-
t
?1
lit U/
h tfjfaj
L/Uj /
JJ_13_
/
/
ft/ lihlr
a
///
•*
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