T8 B21 Neads Floor 2 Of 3 Fdr- Draft Commission Text- Cockpit Warning 281

^(jA CT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW

At 9:16 a.m. the FAA's Air Traffic Control center in Boston recommended to the system's command center that a cockpit warning be sent to the pilots of all commercial aircraft in the sky on the morning of 9/11 to secure their cockpits. While Boston Center sent out such warnings to the commercial flights in its sector, we could find no evidence that a nationwide warning was issued by the Air Traffic Control system. Several FAA authorities interviewed by the Commission stated that it was the air carriers' responsibility to notify their planes of security problems. One highly placed FAA Air Traffic Control official stated that it was simply not the FAA's place to order the airlines what to tell their pilots.12 (LISTEN TO IV) (WHAT DID POLICY REQUIRE) The United Airlines flight dispatcher who sent the warning to Flight 93 began to issue cockpit warnings to the airline's coast to coast flights by his own initiative at 9:19 a.m..13 A company-wide order for dispatchers to warn cockpits was issued at 9:21 a.m.14 We could find no evidence that American Airlines sent any cockpit warnings to their aircraft on 9/11 whatsoever.15 While the evidence points to the exact time that the hijackers invaded the cockpit, we have found no conclusive evidence to indicate precisely when the terrorists took over the main cabin or moved passengers seated in the first class cabin back to coach—a tactic reported by several passengers during phone calls to parties on the ground. The Commission believes, however, that it is most likely the four hijackers breached the cockpit simultaneous to taking over the front of the plane and pushing passengers back into the coach cabin. Taking over the cabin first would likely have alerted the flight deck to a problem. However, waiting to control and/or move passengers until the cockpit was secured would have increased the risk of passenger intervention, particularly if the passengers witnessed the hijackers displacing the crew from the controls. On the morning of 9/11, 37 of Flight 93's passenger seats were occupied representing an occupancy rate of slightly over 20 percent, well below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001.16 No evidence exists, however, to indicate that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels to facilitate their operation. Financial records indicate that the hijackers did not purchase additional seats in order to reduce the passenger load and all four of the individual who held reservations for the flight but did not board the aircraft were cleared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.17 The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11, operated in five-man teams. They initiated their cockpit takeover operations within thirty minutes of takeoff, most likely after the seatbelt sign had been turned off and the flight attendants were beginning cabin service. On Flight 93, however, the hijackers numbered four, and waited until approximately 47 minutes after takeoff to begin their takeover. The evidence supports no conclusion as to why the hijackers' takeover of Flight 93 occurred so late into the trip compared to the others flights.

SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW