T8 B2 Faa Ny Center Martin Fournier Fdr- Handwritten Notes
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[Classification] MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center Type of event: Interview Date: Tuesday, September
, 2003
Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown Team Number: 8 Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred
, FAA General Consul
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account. Marty Fournier QA support specialist 802011 accident package experience preparation. Currently op sup area c ZNY for almost a year assigned position in November 2002. Prior to that was one of the Q&A support specialist. Several duties main focus to insure quality of air traffic at facility. Minimum requirements maintained provided briefings to specific air craft functions. Air craft accidents pilot error, preparing incident file and package. Held that position at ZNY January 1999. Used to ATC and last four years there as tm specialist at Oakland center since 1986. First with FAA June 24, 1986. 9/11 serving as Q&A support specialist. Office on second floor at the training wing adjacent to Q&A, east side of building. No access to radar scopes there. Job responsibilities vividly remembers in tape room investigating a pilot incident. Listening to voice tapes. Terry Kirk (?) office assistant told him Kevin Delaney wanted him to go and watch CNN since an aircraft had hit the towers. Under impression it was a small aircraft. Not sure what wording was. Started watching CNN live in cafeteria. Started filling up. More people down there than normal. Showing building that had already been hit. Watching second aircraft go behind. It looked fake for some reason. Speed of aircraft 5 or 600 mph - they just don't fly that fast under 10k. Had hand held phone with him and in communication with boss Delaney. Called down to conference room and realized there was a serious problem. Until second hit still thought 1st was a small airplane. Don't have live data upstairs.
At time saw second impact live still believed first impact small aircraft. Heard that directly from terry Kurk (?) she said CNN, some aircraft. News wasn't sure what it was. Just speculation. Things started rolling. After second impact Kevin at air traffic managers conference room. Knew first mode as Q&A specialist was to start pulling tapes. People being pulled off area b. trying to gather information. Many of those people just wanted to leave. Went down to conf room and a telcon was ongoing. Open microphone with maybe command center maybe headquarters. Reports of possible missing airplanes, doesn't know where that information came from. Definitely mike McCormack and Kevin Delaney down there. Just assisting where could. Grounding airplanes but reports of planes missing. Area b gathering. Paul Thumser, supervisor. CIC on duty at time though not sure who. Paul was concerned for there well being. Approached him to find out what happened. What they knew. Jim B r, ATC area b. several, with concurrence from union president, got old ops manager room to talk to them to find out what happened. Bob Ott. Possibly one of the support managers, mark Depalma. George Tracy (QA). Mark Merced, controller area b. Dave Bitinglia. Anthony Paulmiera. Names in support package. Evanna Dowis. Christopher tucker. Lorraine Barret. List in "BOX", accident file. Learned: tried to put them at ease best as could. Difficult situation. They were repeating the event. Went through the process. Advised that personal statements would be required. Don't remember if everyone in that room did provide statement. Would be people who talked to aircraft or were operationally involved, "worked the airplane". AA11 - learned first of, not sure without looking at package. Conversation from huntress, OMIC. Don't know which sector was called first, could be area b. don't know who picked up call. Knows there was a call from Boston to area b but not sure if that was first without looking at timeline. Situational awareness regarding AA11 impact: knows coordination Boston to New York. Knows huntress and OMIC. Knows call sign AA11 came up. Knows Boston said believed possible....hijack or not knows....but informed of lost beacon and primary target only. Thought maybe still at fl 290. Tape may indicate they aren't aware if that's him or not. Know area b asked UAL 175 to id AA11 on type and altitude. Didn't confirm whether or not American. Didn't seem to be 100% as it crossed the boundary. After second impact and leave cafeteria any discussion on what type of aircraft created impact 1? Not known specifically. Discussion to decide what it was? Can't remember. After second impact discussion on what type of aircraft hit south tower? People recounted what saw on scope and filling in wholes. Thing remember Jim Bouliber saying he observed second going down and concluding probably heading towards Manhattan and as it was descending. Know memory that people identified UAL 175 as impact 2.
Pentagon hit: doesn't remember. UA93: knows they were looking for a "missing" Delta. Was mention of aircraft missing or off course. Nothing specific in memory on ua93. Aftermath of second crash uncertainty over which aircraft had impacted north or south towers? Don't again remember. Only remembers his investigation. After investigation conclusion on awareness of impacts (which aircraft hit which)? Looking a from of mind of ATCs working aircraft. Desire at ZNY to distinguish one airplane from another? Telcon was with nationwide facilities and monitoring to insure that they were remaining on course etc. but specifically with AA11 and UAL 175 right after not sure when determined they specifically were gone. Effort to figure out what aircraft hit towers? UAL 175 had code change but was on course. Extreme amount of attention on AA11. Upsets the system. Doesn't know all the other distractions in the areas as trying to work other traffic. Problem with code changing, target went to coast, Dave Bittiglia realized UAL 175 had strange course. Some question of whether or not it might have been UAL 175 headed far off course. Are steps to verify planes that have headed off course. AA11 did learn after that Boston called to coordinate with ZNY. Told them primary target only and f!290. Doesn't know if ATC or OMIC known yet. Went into mode of who was at f!290. Assumption that it was American 11. Not on frequency, etc. Doesn't remember communication with company. But thinks there was since company was going to call ZNY with information. Effort to see if airborne, crash or on ground? AA11 -just doesn't know what exact steps taken. Doesn't recall if there was an effort to find out what happened. Who responsible for finding out about AA11? Not sure. Not sure if it's a requirement. Determined/confirmed that company missing aircraft quickly. But doesn't know what steps made to validate that. Efforts to determine what happened to UAL 175? Doesn't remember. Efforts to determine what hit the towers? Coordination between TMU unit and at least Newark tower. That discussion of aircraft and problems. Believes call signs stated. In conjunction with those conversations the second aircraft hit building. After seeing second aircraft live. Was safe to assume commercial aircraft - probably not. Just considered a large target. Agrees that when second plane could say definitely a fast moving commercial jet. Replied in slow motion. Once figured commercial jet, and trade center in ZNY - would have been normal procedure to figure that out. Stepping back even further from picture. In history of hijacks there are set procedures. 100% of air traffic workers would say a hijack is not a terrorist suicide mission. 8000 in air right now. Very vigilant watching for that. But two years of hindsight. Problem with 911 was Boston center having a possible problem AA11, think this is him - planted seed of uncertainty. ATCs NOT ALLOWED TO MAKE MISTAKES. UAL 175 heard
questionable communications of "everyone remain seated" from ground, or from departure - with hijacks you clear airspace and "let them do whatever they want - block his way from everyone else." never heard of such a scenario. Easter airlines was always a hijack target. Worked a hijack out there. Any hijack exercises? Received briefings and refresher training - requirements and procedures with handling hijack and what to do if they need to be intercepted. Did an intercept out west years ago. Procedures in place prior to 911. It's in the books. It gives the procedures. In the event of hijack military fighter intercepts on a different frequency. Never would have expected 911 events. Was there a reluctance to think that it was a commercial aircraft that hit towers. Did that understanding of hijacks have an effect on the mental processes on accepting that it was commercial aircraft that impacted WTC. Certainly. Don't think there's anything that can be done from ATC perspective to stop an aircraft from hitting something. In my opinion, doesn't think things could have been handled differently even if awareness was different. Higher awareness today, but doesn't know if anything could be done. Prior to 911 an off course aircraft is always going to get special attention. People did all they could and gave attention because of being drastically off course. Traditionally hijacked aircraft land. At some point is was accepted that it was UAL175 and AA11 by common sense. Conversations with companies etc. In conference room with area b controllers. Were they trying to figure it out? Yeah probably. Not sure. When the aircraft veers of course certain procedures followed. Not knowing what a target was going to do. Very leery of trusting what's not known. Go with best information at time. And make judgments based off that. When not talking to airplane in different mode. Altitude was questionable. Primary only, going off last known altitude. Where to go after reports of WTC hits for best information? OMIC. Recommendations: Vault cockpit. Make it impenetrable. FAM trips - vault it up even before 911. 99.9% of pilots territorial about cockpit. Thin door up to 911. Common sense. Familiarization trip training tool for ATCs to observe flight control from pilot end. OMIC -1 didn't go to OMIC person - went to OMIC area to track down call signs of suspected problem aircrafts. Everyone in mode of ascertaining what was going on.
Controller in charge (CIC) can't consul an employee. Terms are interchangeable. Either can be in charge of area. It's labor relations law. Area supervisor is official supervisor and is excluded from bargaining unit. Every supervisor takes two week course. UAL 175 and code change. When aircraft on assigned beacon code correlated - won't see code. When not in sync. Will see four digit code, and tag will stop tracking. Visually know when aircraft not on right code. If got one airplane in communication will pick up quicker than multiple planes. What is seen is another code. But shouldn't see a separate target. Depends on altitude. Depends on filters selected. Times when have "bad mode c" beacon may broadcast wrong altitude. If shuts of transponder: aircraft above 18k everybody required to have one, so when alt filters limits set do not press primary only. In case of generic aircraft at flight level that shut off transponder would not detect anything. If beacon code changes in same environment - computer would not recognize associated data tag with that aircraft the beacon would continue but the data tag itself would go into (CST) coast mode. Limited data block would change and beacon code that was original continues it comes up in a different code, but coast mode continue to track with limited data clock the says alt. Data tag associated with target, when it changes, data tag stops in spot where no longer picks up tag but actually beacon continues - - net result is one unknown with two different pieces of data. Still associated with proper aircraft, immediately ask why code change. Steps would be taken by controller of attempting to reestablish and verify contact. Would call UAL 175 "reset transponder squawk "couldn't do that part with UAL 175. Full Data block gives aircraft call sign, alt, varies-gives computer id, airspeed, whether aircraft in hand off status- after beacon changes, freezes in coast mode -airspeed will change to coast mode. When loose mode c info looses alt.
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[Classification] MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center Type of event: Interview Date: Tuesday, September
, 2003
Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown Team Number: 8 Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred
, FAA General Consul
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account. Marty Fournier QA support specialist 802011 accident package experience preparation. Currently op sup area c ZNY for almost a year assigned position in November 2002. Prior to that was one of the Q&A support specialist. Several duties main focus to insure quality of air traffic at facility. Minimum requirements maintained provided briefings to specific air craft functions. Air craft accidents pilot error, preparing incident file and package. Held that position at ZNY January 1999. Used to ATC and last four years there as tm specialist at Oakland center since 1986. First with FAA June 24, 1986. 9/11 serving as Q&A support specialist. Office on second floor at the training wing adjacent to Q&A, east side of building. No access to radar scopes there. Job responsibilities vividly remembers in tape room investigating a pilot incident. Listening to voice tapes. Terry Kirk (?) office assistant told him Kevin Delaney wanted him to go and watch CNN since an aircraft had hit the towers. Under impression it was a small aircraft. Not sure what wording was. Started watching CNN live in cafeteria. Started filling up. More people down there than normal. Showing building that had already been hit. Watching second aircraft go behind. It looked fake for some reason. Speed of aircraft 5 or 600 mph - they just don't fly that fast under 10k. Had hand held phone with him and in communication with boss Delaney. Called down to conference room and realized there was a serious problem. Until second hit still thought 1st was a small airplane. Don't have live data upstairs.
At time saw second impact live still believed first impact small aircraft. Heard that directly from terry Kurk (?) she said CNN, some aircraft. News wasn't sure what it was. Just speculation. Things started rolling. After second impact Kevin at air traffic managers conference room. Knew first mode as Q&A specialist was to start pulling tapes. People being pulled off area b. trying to gather information. Many of those people just wanted to leave. Went down to conf room and a telcon was ongoing. Open microphone with maybe command center maybe headquarters. Reports of possible missing airplanes, doesn't know where that information came from. Definitely mike McCormack and Kevin Delaney down there. Just assisting where could. Grounding airplanes but reports of planes missing. Area b gathering. Paul Thumser, supervisor. CIC on duty at time though not sure who. Paul was concerned for there well being. Approached him to find out what happened. What they knew. Jim B r, ATC area b. several, with concurrence from union president, got old ops manager room to talk to them to find out what happened. Bob Ott. Possibly one of the support managers, mark Depalma. George Tracy (QA). Mark Merced, controller area b. Dave Bitinglia. Anthony Paulmiera. Names in support package. Evanna Dowis. Christopher tucker. Lorraine Barret. List in "BOX", accident file. Learned: tried to put them at ease best as could. Difficult situation. They were repeating the event. Went through the process. Advised that personal statements would be required. Don't remember if everyone in that room did provide statement. Would be people who talked to aircraft or were operationally involved, "worked the airplane". AA11 - learned first of, not sure without looking at package. Conversation from huntress, OMIC. Don't know which sector was called first, could be area b. don't know who picked up call. Knows there was a call from Boston to area b but not sure if that was first without looking at timeline. Situational awareness regarding AA11 impact: knows coordination Boston to New York. Knows huntress and OMIC. Knows call sign AA11 came up. Knows Boston said believed possible....hijack or not knows....but informed of lost beacon and primary target only. Thought maybe still at fl 290. Tape may indicate they aren't aware if that's him or not. Know area b asked UAL 175 to id AA11 on type and altitude. Didn't confirm whether or not American. Didn't seem to be 100% as it crossed the boundary. After second impact and leave cafeteria any discussion on what type of aircraft created impact 1? Not known specifically. Discussion to decide what it was? Can't remember. After second impact discussion on what type of aircraft hit south tower? People recounted what saw on scope and filling in wholes. Thing remember Jim Bouliber saying he observed second going down and concluding probably heading towards Manhattan and as it was descending. Know memory that people identified UAL 175 as impact 2.
Pentagon hit: doesn't remember. UA93: knows they were looking for a "missing" Delta. Was mention of aircraft missing or off course. Nothing specific in memory on ua93. Aftermath of second crash uncertainty over which aircraft had impacted north or south towers? Don't again remember. Only remembers his investigation. After investigation conclusion on awareness of impacts (which aircraft hit which)? Looking a from of mind of ATCs working aircraft. Desire at ZNY to distinguish one airplane from another? Telcon was with nationwide facilities and monitoring to insure that they were remaining on course etc. but specifically with AA11 and UAL 175 right after not sure when determined they specifically were gone. Effort to figure out what aircraft hit towers? UAL 175 had code change but was on course. Extreme amount of attention on AA11. Upsets the system. Doesn't know all the other distractions in the areas as trying to work other traffic. Problem with code changing, target went to coast, Dave Bittiglia realized UAL 175 had strange course. Some question of whether or not it might have been UAL 175 headed far off course. Are steps to verify planes that have headed off course. AA11 did learn after that Boston called to coordinate with ZNY. Told them primary target only and f!290. Doesn't know if ATC or OMIC known yet. Went into mode of who was at f!290. Assumption that it was American 11. Not on frequency, etc. Doesn't remember communication with company. But thinks there was since company was going to call ZNY with information. Effort to see if airborne, crash or on ground? AA11 -just doesn't know what exact steps taken. Doesn't recall if there was an effort to find out what happened. Who responsible for finding out about AA11? Not sure. Not sure if it's a requirement. Determined/confirmed that company missing aircraft quickly. But doesn't know what steps made to validate that. Efforts to determine what happened to UAL 175? Doesn't remember. Efforts to determine what hit the towers? Coordination between TMU unit and at least Newark tower. That discussion of aircraft and problems. Believes call signs stated. In conjunction with those conversations the second aircraft hit building. After seeing second aircraft live. Was safe to assume commercial aircraft - probably not. Just considered a large target. Agrees that when second plane could say definitely a fast moving commercial jet. Replied in slow motion. Once figured commercial jet, and trade center in ZNY - would have been normal procedure to figure that out. Stepping back even further from picture. In history of hijacks there are set procedures. 100% of air traffic workers would say a hijack is not a terrorist suicide mission. 8000 in air right now. Very vigilant watching for that. But two years of hindsight. Problem with 911 was Boston center having a possible problem AA11, think this is him - planted seed of uncertainty. ATCs NOT ALLOWED TO MAKE MISTAKES. UAL 175 heard
questionable communications of "everyone remain seated" from ground, or from departure - with hijacks you clear airspace and "let them do whatever they want - block his way from everyone else." never heard of such a scenario. Easter airlines was always a hijack target. Worked a hijack out there. Any hijack exercises? Received briefings and refresher training - requirements and procedures with handling hijack and what to do if they need to be intercepted. Did an intercept out west years ago. Procedures in place prior to 911. It's in the books. It gives the procedures. In the event of hijack military fighter intercepts on a different frequency. Never would have expected 911 events. Was there a reluctance to think that it was a commercial aircraft that hit towers. Did that understanding of hijacks have an effect on the mental processes on accepting that it was commercial aircraft that impacted WTC. Certainly. Don't think there's anything that can be done from ATC perspective to stop an aircraft from hitting something. In my opinion, doesn't think things could have been handled differently even if awareness was different. Higher awareness today, but doesn't know if anything could be done. Prior to 911 an off course aircraft is always going to get special attention. People did all they could and gave attention because of being drastically off course. Traditionally hijacked aircraft land. At some point is was accepted that it was UAL175 and AA11 by common sense. Conversations with companies etc. In conference room with area b controllers. Were they trying to figure it out? Yeah probably. Not sure. When the aircraft veers of course certain procedures followed. Not knowing what a target was going to do. Very leery of trusting what's not known. Go with best information at time. And make judgments based off that. When not talking to airplane in different mode. Altitude was questionable. Primary only, going off last known altitude. Where to go after reports of WTC hits for best information? OMIC. Recommendations: Vault cockpit. Make it impenetrable. FAM trips - vault it up even before 911. 99.9% of pilots territorial about cockpit. Thin door up to 911. Common sense. Familiarization trip training tool for ATCs to observe flight control from pilot end. OMIC -1 didn't go to OMIC person - went to OMIC area to track down call signs of suspected problem aircrafts. Everyone in mode of ascertaining what was going on.
Controller in charge (CIC) can't consul an employee. Terms are interchangeable. Either can be in charge of area. It's labor relations law. Area supervisor is official supervisor and is excluded from bargaining unit. Every supervisor takes two week course. UAL 175 and code change. When aircraft on assigned beacon code correlated - won't see code. When not in sync. Will see four digit code, and tag will stop tracking. Visually know when aircraft not on right code. If got one airplane in communication will pick up quicker than multiple planes. What is seen is another code. But shouldn't see a separate target. Depends on altitude. Depends on filters selected. Times when have "bad mode c" beacon may broadcast wrong altitude. If shuts of transponder: aircraft above 18k everybody required to have one, so when alt filters limits set do not press primary only. In case of generic aircraft at flight level that shut off transponder would not detect anything. If beacon code changes in same environment - computer would not recognize associated data tag with that aircraft the beacon would continue but the data tag itself would go into (CST) coast mode. Limited data block would change and beacon code that was original continues it comes up in a different code, but coast mode continue to track with limited data clock the says alt. Data tag associated with target, when it changes, data tag stops in spot where no longer picks up tag but actually beacon continues - - net result is one unknown with two different pieces of data. Still associated with proper aircraft, immediately ask why code change. Steps would be taken by controller of attempting to reestablish and verify contact. Would call UAL 175 "reset transponder squawk "couldn't do that part with UAL 175. Full Data block gives aircraft call sign, alt, varies-gives computer id, airspeed, whether aircraft in hand off status- after beacon changes, freezes in coast mode -airspeed will change to coast mode. When loose mode c info looses alt.
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