T8 B2 Faa Ny Center Lorraine Barrett Fdr- Sep 03 Draft Mfr 728

[Classification] MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center Type of event: Interview Date: Tuesday, September

, 2003

Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown Team Number: 8 Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred

, FAA General Consul

Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account. Lorraine Barrett, CPC, certified professional controller Julio Enriquez

1500 EOT Started in April 1982. 1985 went to flight service station as a flight service specialist (deal with general aviation population) for 4 years. Came back in '89. Been a CPC at ZNY since then. Originally went to area c, and since 92 been in area b. Area B RA55 (H) handoff Yardly Sector on 9/11. Handles airspace Philadelphia to New York. R55 is Chris Tucker. Handoff positions are taken from other sectors so the R position has ability to give directions to airplanes when prepared to do so. Basically, handles the transfer of aircraft from sector to sector. Aircraft cannot control space without a handoff or a point out. Point out not a transfer of control. Just a notification that an aircraft is passing through another sector's space. 9/11 working a 7 to 3. Tapes began with her on UAL 175 flight. Called over to sector 42 to climb planes. Bittiglia said couldn't give higher. He was referring Barrett assumed to the AA11 flight. Left him at 38 and passed to 9. Started looking at scope to find any target it could. Saw one quick primary, and then it disappeared. Until Bittiglia's communication of difficulty had not awareness of hijacked or problem with AA11. Bittiglia said Boston looking for a hijack that ZBOS had lost. Just working planes coming out of the new York airspace. Somewhere around 1247z UAL 175 turns transponder. Heard McCormack in background speaking on the telephone. At this point, a little later, UAL 175 turning off course, and descending towards the airspace of t55. Chris Tucker started "turning" planes. When he turned the transponder, it was turned on at a different code. You could see exact track and altitude. 3321 he was squawking, but 3321 was assigned to a Delta plane. United now an unknown target. Tell a different Delta to take any actions possible to evade the plane squawking 3321. Cannot determine speed from beacon code. Dave Bittiglia tells people of no communications with the UAL 175, so controllers are looking specifically for that feature. Didn't see the UAL175, but would recognize the coast track. —Told off completely and then switched back on at a different frequency. All the limited on screen. After viewing the SATORI, notices that factor of code turn off, then turn on . Tucker was very busy watching airplanes and separating them. At some point turn off transponder code Please started turning towards tucker's air space. When saw 3321 beacon code, 0853 EDT tucker telling sector 09 to watch for target cause was going there way. Tucker id's aircraft as unidentified flight. 3321 on computer said associated to a

delta flight. R42 does overlap 55. 55 owns up to 28, 42 owns 28 and above. If just a code switch on UAL 175 would not be a sort blank space in communication. Mike McCormack.? Space at J6, had two planes vectoring towards the same space as 3321. No sign of call plane. Never connected 3321 as being UAL175. Didn't have real awareness of what was happening at the WTC. Just had heard a plane from Boston was lost, then began to wonder what result for 3321 would be. Aware that second plane that was missing was a united plane. Three planes that were crossed didn't give perfect information so target could be definitively identified. After watching Dave's SATORI, notice the 3321 Tracon code pull aware from UAL175 coast. Didn't flash the coast target. Normal job would have been to flash it to 10. Know that target was not a... Next fix, trying to identify so that when airplane infringes on airspace. Trying to direct planes away from 3321 beacon code. Fair to refer to as a hijack. Don't even know at what point they confirmed the hit on the WTC. In transcript talking/coordinating with Woodstown. Going to clip the side of the airspace. That's when hijack plane made notable turn into the city, short left rapid descent. Clarify Kennedy VOR means Kennedy Tracon. Tracon handles 17 and below, but called west and south Tracon, the didn't want any more planes since couldn't guarantee. Lost the aircraft at $22,000. Tucker knew that was where the WTC was. Switched over and took r. tucker knows some general aviation, a private pilot. Eight minutes after UAL 175 makes the Yardley turn to the north it is recognizable that UAL 175 First heard it was a private aircraft out of steward, by pikisbi. When that information came to the room someone, possible jimmy Bouliber, r68 (24 below), had told that it had struck WTC. Remember people coming into the room from the cafeteria without the information that the WTC had been hit for the second time. Remembers that has heard roughly five or ten minutes later. Assumed it was the target they had tracked, a commercial aircraft, had hit WTC. 3321 was moving very quickly, and decent was so rapid. Only remembers hearing someone say a united hit the towers. Regarding AA11, only recalls someone say it was a small pane. After pentagon crash, assumed it was the AA11 that had hit the pentagon.

After second aircraft hit, event the news broadcast saying it was a small plane that hit the first one. That view stayed on being a small aircraft until it was confirmed. Area B meeting. Marty Fournier, Bob Ott was trying to keep them informed. Thought AA11 had hit trade center, and that a different American Airlines flight hit the pentagon. This meeting was about 1916edt, and told to go the briefing. Was at h position until 1916, then r position until 930, then upstairs for conference. Written statements came thereafter. Doesn't remember if a verbal statement was taken. Remembers they were pushing for a statement. Had no problem with reviewing a taped verbal statement. Pre 9/11: hijacking participation on exercises in DynSim lab. But not an extensive exercise. Vastly different than actual hijacking of airplanes on 9/11. In scenario pilots still in control of airplane. All exercise based on scenario in which pilot in control of cockpit. Also scenarios when pilot would use code word. Also pilot could verbally explain situation if allowed for it. Has participated with military McGuire Air Force Base and Warren Grove (military airspace just above Atlantic City). Wouldn't know how to contact NEADS then, but now have direct line to Huntress. Could hear them talk because of Oceanic capacity. Pre 9/11 heard of hijack scenario? Never heard of anything like what happened. Pre 9/11 NORDO: all the time, still happens though even post 9/11. Maybe pilot or old sector ATC forgets to tell pilot to switch over. Happens on estimate a little less. Two years passed the pilots are still better at it. Loss of transponder: would happen relatively often. Sometimes switch relatively regularly. So ask to recycle it. And not urgent if talking to airplane. Never in career had both of the above happened at the same time. Had had course deviations, but never all three. Participated in ground stop in New York area. Somewhere around 5 after the hour all departures were stopped and ZNY went zero. Sector was already empty. RECOMMENDATIONS: Weren't any air traffic problems with 9/11. It was a security issue. Would want to prevent hijackers. Limited data gets altitude but primary doesn't. Only Search radar at Riverhead, NY military joint surveillance system radar gets attitude. The search part is military. Altitude data goes to military, not to FAA. Military looking for first only targets.