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Office of -the Regional Administrator, AEA-1 Tel. 718-:5S3-3001 Fax 718-995-5636

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To:

Ruth Leverenz

Fax:

817-222-5943

From:

Manny Weiss

Date:

09/14/01

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Ruth Procedure for notification once ROC is notified is to notify all Regional LOB'3 thai are Involved as well as headquarters ROC and NTSB if applicable. Attached are ROC logs for 9/11 and RANS notification log. First notiJIcation to ROC is of possible highjack at 1250 GMT (8:50 local) from N90 (NY TRACON). Message put on Regional Automated Notification System almost immediately. From its log, messages received by locations 1-11 between 8:55 and 9;07, Messagfi to headquarters ROC while dialed between 8:55 and 9'.2L3, was not picked up due to constant busy signal. The Region's ROC does not contact the DOD. If yoii need more, please call.

Manny

F-249

Eastern Region Operations Center Emergency Notification Process September 11, 2001 Background FAA Order 1990.1, FAA National Command and Control System, establishes policies and procedures and assigns responsibilities for the FAA Command and Control System. The system provides FAA Authorities, at all levels, with timely, accurate information, to enable the planning, directing, and controlling of significant events that could adversely impact the FAA mission. Paragraph 2-13, Critical Information Notification and Reporting Actions, outline events and occurrences required to be reported. These include aircraft accidents and suspected, forcible seizure of aircraft. Events of September 11, 2001 At 1250 UTC (0850 local), the Regional Operations Officer (ROO) received a telephone call from the New York TRACON (Terminal Radar Control facility) of the possible hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 757. Upon receipt of a preliminary notification of the possible hijacking, the Operations Center made notification in accordance with the attached Operating Guidelines. In preparing the notification message, the Operations Center observed local news stating an aircraft had struck one of the World Trade Center Towers. This information was included this in the notification message. Notification was made at 1254Z/8:54E utilizing the Regional Automated Notification System (RAMS). The following offices successfully retrieved the notification message: AEA-1, 3, 5, 6, 470, 600, 700, NY FSDO, NTSB, Leesburg MCC, and NY SECC. The following offices did not retrieve the notification message: Washington Ops Center, AEA-230, and AEA-505. (jte.usfjULi~. tfu
At 1359Z/9-59E the Operations Officer received a call from the New York State Police reporting a passenger on board United Airlines Flight 93 from Newark to San Francisco, called his mother on a cell phone that hijackers were rushing the cockpit. The __ information was immediately relayed to the Regional Administrator in the Crisis Command Center. At this point, a heads-up was given, by telephone, to the Washington Operations Center. At 1520Z/11:20E, Somerset, PA, Police Department called advising that an aircraft had crashed. At 15SOZ/11:50E, the Allegheny FSDO advised there was report of a downed aircraft in Somerset County and dispatched inspectors. Regional Crisis Command Center already had information. At 1600Z/12:OON, the Regional Operations Center advised the Washington Operations Center of the above. Between the hours of 1600Z and 1700Z, numerous calls were made to the Allegheny FSDO, local law enforcement, to confirm and obtain additional information, of the possible downed aircraft. At 1719Z/13:19E, notification of an aircraft accident was made via the Regional Automated Notification System in accordance with the attached Operating Guidelines. The following offices successfully retrieved the notification message: AEA-300, 470, 600, 700, PIT CASFO, AGC FSDO, NTSB, Leesburg MCC, and NWS. The following offices did not retrieve the notification message: PEMA, AEA-200, and 230. At 1800Z/14:OOE, in the Operations Center's continuing efforts to obtain information concerning the above events, contacted American Airlines and was able to determine the identification of the American Airlines aircraft that crashed into the World Trade Center and the identification of a second aircraft that crashed but it was not clear where. Crisis Command Center already aware.

Summary During this period of time, the Operations Officer was experiencing difficulty contacting FAA field facilities and local law enforcement due to telephone circuit saturation. Additionally, there was a large influx of incoming calls from various elements looking for information on the above incidents.

. Once .the Crisis Command Center was established and operational, information flow normally processed through the Operations Center in accordance FAA Order 1990.1, was processed directly to the Crisis Command Center. This included the following: Notification of a second aircraft striking the World Trade Center Notification of an aircraft striking the Pentagon The national ground stop of the National Airspace System Possible hijacking of United Flight 93 It should be noted, as in any crisis situation, in addition to notifications already annotated, additional telephone and verbal information was continually exchanged with Washington and appropriate lines of businesses.