T7 B16 Flight 11 Gun Story Fdr- Zelikow Facts V Fiction Email- Notes (paperclipped- See Alt Version T7 B7)
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TO: FM: RE: DATE:
Philip Zelikow Team 7 Facts vs. Fiction 9/12/2001
CASE STUDY
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The Question:
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Do the facts support allegations that a shooting occurred aboard American Airlines Flight number eleven on September 11, 2001? The question about such an incident arises from an FAA "Executive Summary" prepared by FAA headquarters personnel at 5:13 p.m. (EDT) on September 11,2001. The memo contains the following passage: "The American Airlines FAA Principal Security Inspector (PSI) was notified by Suzanne Clarke of American Airlines Corporate Headquarters that an on board flight attendant contacted American Airline Operations Center and informed that a passenger located in seat 10B shot and killed a passenger in seat 9B at 9:20 a.m. The passenger killed was Dan Lewin, shot by passenger Satam Al Suqami. One bullet was reported to have been fired."
Published accounts of the FAA memorandum include the following: Morrison, Blake, "9/11 Group Troubled By Gun Report; FAA Call it an Error; Families Seeking Probe," USAToday. February 28, 2002.
Eggen, Dan, "Airports Screened Nine of September 11 Hijackers, Officials Say," Washington Post. March 2,2002, pgAll. UP1 Hears, "Insider Notes from United Press International for March 6, 2002;" http://www.upi.com
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The Background: The FAA "Executive Summary" was produced by (Shirley Miller of T/SA is identifying the author of the executive summary so that we may talk with that individual) from information collected by various personnel stationed in the Federal Aviation Administration Command Center activated by the agency in response to the crisis on September 11,2001. As information flowed into the command center from many sources throughout the day on 9/11/2001, the data was placed into an official log. The executive summary was produced by FAA Civil Aviation Security personnel from the log information that evening, for distribution to the FAA administrator's office. . Commission Sensitive
9/11 Working-level Employee
The Discrepancy:
9/11 Working-level Employee
Commission staff interviewed Ms. JANET RIFFE who is the FAA Principal Security Inspector cited in the "Executive Summary." MS. RIFFE says that the summary accurately depicts the information she received from MS. CLARK. MS. SUZANNE CLARK, Security Manager, American Airlines maintains that she made no such statement to MS. RIFFE and that the information with regard to the shooting in the memorandum is erroneous. (Philip: Riffe said that the GAO investigated the gun issue and that Clark has consistently denied ever saying anything about a gun or shooting. The GAO says it conducted no such investigation. The DOT-IG has not conducted an investigation either. We are seeking to talk to Ms. Clark through AAL. This discrepancy is a problem that we should at least try to resolve if we can.) The differing accounts by MS. CLARK and MS. RIFFE about the source and veracity of the shooting report are troubling, but the discrepancy centers only on the question of what Ms. CLARK told Ms. RIFFE. The more important question is whether the facts suggest that such a shooting indeed took place. Clearly, the best evidence of what occurred aboard AAL #11 is provided by the accounts of eye witnesses aboard the plane and by the reports of those who heard their accounts directly. The Finding: The evidence derived from eyewitness accounts of the events that unfolded on AAL #11, does not support a conclusion that a shooting on the flight is likely to have occurred. Facts: Commission staff has identified evidence of at least three phone calls placed by flight attendants aboard AAL # 11 to American Airlines personnel on the ground. At least one phone call was placed by flight attendant BETTY ONG to the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Center located in Gary, North Carolina. At least two phone calls were placed by flight attendant AMY SWEENEY to American Airlines Flight Services personnel located at Boston's Logan International Airport. The first call from Ms. SWEENEY to Boston was cut-off for unknown reasons. Ms. SWEENEY called back establishing the second phone contact. (See FBI Document 265A NY 280350 CE 1013).
In the course of their phone calls, Ms. ONG and Ms. SWEENEY reported events onboard until the grounding of the aircraft. (See FBI Document 265A NY 280350 302 2882).
Commission Sensitive
/9/11 Personal Privacy A four-minute portion of the estimated 20 to 25 minute phon? call placed by Ms. ONG to the American Airlines Reservation Center was recorded oh tape.j Ms. ONG reported: "Somebody stabbed in business class and there is, we cari't breath in business class, so somebody's got mace or something." Ms. ONG provides no accouht of either the presence of a gun or the incidence of a shooting aboard the aircraft. ;(See FBI Document 265 A NY 280350 CE 1013).
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The Commission staff has identified at least nine/individuals who heard all, or portions of, the phone calls from Ms. ONG and Ms. SWEENEY. j The witnesses, all of which are American Airlines employees, include: MICHAEL WOODWARD, JIM SAYER, EVY NUNEZ. NYDIA GONZALEZ. RAY C. SCOTT, CRAIG MARQUIS, WINSTON SADT.fiR.r" land VANESSA MINTER. Seven of the witnesses were interviewed, individually, by the FBI about the phone calls, (staff must confirm individual interviews). Commission Staff can locate no FBI interviews of Ms.I |br Ms. MINTER. The witnesses that were interviewed by the FBI report that both Ms. ONG and Ms. SWEENEY explicitly reported the incidence of stabbings. No witnesses reported any mention by the flight attendants of a gun or shooting involving any pilot, passenger or crewmember. Excerpts of the witnesses' accounts of what Ms. ONG and Ms. SWEENEY said with regard to violence aboard the aircraft are as follows: MICHAEL WOODWARD: "A man in business class has had his throat slashed and is presumably dead " and "Number 1 flight attendant has been stabbed and number 5 flight attendant has been stabbed. There is a bomb in the cockpit." (See FBI Document 265A NY 280350 30257614).
JAMES SAYER: "Two flight attendants were stabbed and a man in business class had been Stabbed in the throat. " (See FBI Document 265A NY 280350 302 14510).
EVY NUNEZ: "Passenger in row 9 who had their throat cut. " (See FBI Document 265A NY 280350 302 9787).
NYDIA GONZALEZ: "stabbed" flight attendant, and, "Passenger by the name of Daniel Lewin may have been fatally wounded." (See FBI Document 265A NY 280350 CE 1018). RAY SCOTT: "stabbing of a flight attendant" and "individual seated in 9(B) appeared to be dead. " (See FBI Document 265ANY 280350 CE 1013). CRAIG MARQUIS: "Ong informed Marquis that the passenger in Seat 9(B) David Lewin had been fatally stabbed. " (See FBI Document 265A NY 280350 302 30391). (STAFF NEEDS TO COM-IKM M I A (' VIAUOUIS WAS ON TNI; I'HONI. R A T H E R HI AN SIMPLY HEARD THE ACCOUNT THIRD HAND)
Commission Sensitive
9/11 Personal Privacy
WINSTON SADLER: "FA's Number I and Number 5 had been stabbed" and "A passenger in 9(B) had been injured and possibly deceased." (See FBI Document 265A NY 280350 CE 1022).
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[NO FBI INTERVIEW LOCATED (Staff to follow-up with FBI) VANESSA MKER: NO FBI INTERVIEW LOCATED (Staff to follow-up with FBI) Accounts of the calls from Ms. ONG and Ms. SWEENEY were provided to the American Airlines System Operations Center (SOC) in Dallas, Texas, while the calls were in progress. (See FBI Document 265A NY 280350 302 30391) (STAFF NEEDS TO ADD CITATION OF IV WITH BKTH WILLIAMS WHO REPORTED SWEENEY CALL TO THE SOC).
The Commission can find no evidence that separate calls were placed to the SOC by any flight attendant from AAL #11. (NO RECORD OF PHONE CALLS FROM ANY OTHER FLIGHT ATTENDANTS ON AA11 CAN BE IDENTIFIED. BUT STAFF NEEDS TO SEE IF THE FBI EXAMINED EACH FLIGHT ATTENDANT'S CELL PHONE RECORDS AND THE GTE AIRPHONE RECORDS TO CONFIRM. NO INDICATION THE FBI DID THIS). Staff listened to tape recordings covering 5 positions at FAA's Air Traffic Control Systems Command Center (ATCSCC) for the period 08:15 to 11:15 a.m. on September 9, 2001. Those tapes covered multiple conversations concerning the hijack and tracking of AAL Flight #11. The FAA Command Center Tactical Net was frequently heard on those tapes. At approximately 11:00 EDT a conversation among officials in the ATCSCC can be heard discussing hijackers on American flight #11 with knives. No mention is made of firearms.
Discussion: Eyewitnesses Ms. ONG and Ms. SWEENEY placed phone calls from aboard the aircraft to American Airlines authorities on the ground in accordance with the air carrier's hijacking protocol. The protocol directs flight crews to contact ground personnel as soon as possible to provide a situation report of the emergency, including key details such as the precise seat assignment of the perpetrators. (STAFF WANTS TO CONFIRM THE PROTOCOL) Staff notes that the flight attendants did their duty with remarkable courage and composure. The evidence shows that both Ms. ONG and Ms. SWEENEY remained in phone contact with authorities up to the grounding of the aircraft, providing valuable information.
Commission Sensitive
Neither the tape recorded portion of Ms. ONG's call, nor the accounts by seven separate witnesses to the calls indicate that either Ms. ONG or Ms. SWEENEY reported the presence of a gun or the incidence of a shooting. The witnesses' accounts of the phone calls are consistent. The accounts indicate that the flight attendants were quite specific about the kind of weapons they reported present—knives, mace and a bomb—as well as the nature of the assaults on board—the "stabbing" of two other flight attendants and a passenger. A third flight attendant The possibility must be considered that perhaps a third flight attendant situated in a different part of the cabin than Ms. ONG and Ms. SWEENEY might have witnessed a shooting of which Ms. ONG and Ms. SWEENEY were unaware, and independently contacted the airline's System Operations Center to report the incident. Staff can find no evidence of any phone contact by any member of the other flight crew with the SOC either directly or indirectly. The facts show that the SOC was apprised of both the ONG and SWEENEY calls while they were in progress, and therefore SOC personnel including CRAIG MARQUIS were aware of the "stabbing" reports. (STAFF WANTS TO BE SURE THE FBI CHECKED THE CELL PHONE RECORDS OF TOE FLIGHT CREW AND THE GTE AIRPHONE RECORD FROM THE AIRCRAFT TO CONFIRM NO CALL WAS MADE TO THE SOC). Firearm experts indicate that the sound of a gun being fired in the cabin of an aircraft would be unmistakable and clearly evident to all aboard. It is implausible that Ms. ONG and Ms. SWEENEY would have neglected to report a shooting if they knew one had occurred, but it is equally implausible that a shooting occurred aboard the aircraft without their cognizance. Had the FAA executive summary described reports by American Airlines' System Operations Center of both a stabbing and a shooting, the accuracy of the memo which mentions only a "shooting" would be less suspect. Staff would note that in order to accept the accuracy of the executive summary with regard to a shooting, (disregarding the evidence by eyewitnesses to the contrary), one would have to believe that the SOC relayed to the FAA the account of a shooting that no witness recalls while neglecting to relay the account of a stabbing that was widely reported, including to personnel in the SOC. This is beyond the pale of plausibility. Finally, staff notes that the alleged victim of the shooting was seated in 9(B). Both the seat and its occupant are described by several of the witness accounts as the locus of the stabbing.
Commission Sensitive
It seems evident that the form of attack on the business class passenger—the only individual attack upon a passenger reported by eyewitnesses—became garbled as the account of the assault was relayed among airline and FAA authorities in the fog and confusion of the unfolding events of the day. Hijacker weapons and tactics Other relevant evidence bears mentioning. While investigators have uncovered evidence of numerous knife purchases by the 19 hijackers leading up to September 11, 2001, no firearm purchases are in evidence. The tactics of all four hijacking teams involved in the plot were similar. No evidence has been uncovered to suggest that firearms were used by the hijackers on any of the other flights. On the contrary, the common tactic among the four teams of employing knives, box cutters and mace, and the wielding of a bomb (either real or simulated), is indicated by the evidence. It seems unlikely that one of the teams would depart from the tactical discipline of the plotters' common strategy. Shooting account related to UAL #175 The evidence shows that authorities did receive a report of a "shooting" aboard one of the other flights hijacked on September 11, 2001. A passenger aboard UAL Flight #175, Mr. PHILIP BURTON HANSON placed two phone calls to his father LEE HANSON to report the hijacking of the aircraft. According to the FBI interview of LEE HANSON, his son reported that a flight attendant had been stabbed, and that the hijackers appeared to have knives and mace, and claimed to have a bomb. PHILIP HANSON requested that his father alert the airlines to the emergency. After hanging up with his son, LEE HANSON immediately contacted the Easton, Connecticut Police Department to report the hijacking. The phone call from LEE HANSON to CAPTAIN JAMES CANDEE of the Easton, Connecticut Police Department was tape-recorded. The tape recording indicates no mention of a shooting aboard UAL 175. (STAFF NEEDS TO REVIEW TRANSCIPT TO CONFIRM). Staff contacted CAPTAIN CANDEE of the Easton, Connecticut police. Mr. CANDEE confirms that LEE HANSON reported his son's account of a stabbing, but made no mention of a shooting aboard the hijacked aircraft. The evidence shows that a third party] ((apparently a family friend— Staff needs to find out) acting on behalf of the passenger's father, contacted United Airlines to report the emergency. Mr. I I to Id representatives of United Airlines that a passenger calling from aboard UAL #175 had told his father someone had been
Commission Sensitive
9/11 Personal Privacy
shot. From the evidence this appears to be erroneous information that is the product of the classic "phone" phenomenon. Ms. RIFFE told the staff that the environment in the FA A Command Center on 9/11 was quite hectic and that FAA personnel were dealing with a lot of erroneous information. The evidence shows that both United Airlines and American Airlines personnel were providing information to the Command CenterVSTAFF NEEDS TO CONFIRM). The AAL System Operations Center was similarly Wtctic. It is not unreasonable to expect that given the environment and the events of the pay, erroneous information was being communicated and recorded. Whatever the source of the notation in the FAA/interaal memo, the most authoritative evidence—that being eyewitness accounts of tne events that unfolded on AAL #11, does not support a conclusion that a shooting on the/flight is likely to have occurred. ###
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COMPUTER SEARCH METHODOLOGY Review of FBI reports naming each of the Flight Attendants via Concordance Database: Flight Attendant
Ong Sweeney Ares1fl&ui Collman Low Martin Nicosia Roger Snyder
FA mentioned in FBI Documents 13 18 (confirm) 2 2 2 5 4 2 1
Concordance Search Terms Shot AND flight attendant Shooting AND flight attendant Shot AND flight AND 1 1 Shooting AND flight AND 1 1 Shooting AND hijack* Flight attendant AND call AND American
CALLS REPORTED OR IN EVIDENCE Yes Yes No No No No No No No
Hits zero zero zero zero zero 80 (all documents reviewed)
* Means the search engine will search every permutation of the word.
Commission Sensitive
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I contacted Captain James Candee of the Easton, (Connecticut) Police Department to ask him about his conversation with Lee Hanson, father of Peter Burton Hanson, a passenger aboard United Flight #175.. The following is what Captain Candee told me: Lee Hanson called the Easton Police Department originally looking for Chief Solomon. Solomon was not available to take the call, so it was given to Capt. James Candee. Candee said that Lee Hanson told him "one of the stewardess' throats had been slashed." Candee said that nothing was said about a gun or shooting. Candee also told me that Lee had called the commission twice, and that it was his impression Lee Burton had called the Police Department immediately after receiving the phone call from Peter. Candee said he called the FBI to report the conversation with Lee, and Lee's conversation with his son.
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f Briefing OSI was asked to obtain the facts surrounding the preparation of and the information contained in an executive summary prepared for FAA Administrator Jane Garvey on September 11, 2001. We interviewed 27 people during the course of our investigation, to include the FAA Administrator; Deputy Administrator; FAA senior management and personnel; and American Airlines personnel. We conducted 11 interviews of various FAA security and intelligence personnel before identifying the author of the executive summary, a security staff member. The security and intelligence managers could not identify the person(s) involved in preparing the executive summary. FAA Security had 2 crisis management centers in operation on September 11, 2001. The primary crisis management center (ACC) became operational at approximately 8:55 a.m. It was staffed with FAA security directors/senior managers and other pertinent staff. They also setup an auxiliary crisis management center at approximately 11:00 a.m. Both crisis management centers received and recorded information concerning the hijackings. FAA's Principal Security Inspector (PSI) contacted American Airlines via telephone for a status update at 9:20 a.m. and was advised of a shooting. The PSI received specific information regarding the names and seat numbers of the passengers involved in the alleged shooting. The information was recorded and posted in both crisis management centers without any additional corroboration. Interviews of the PSI, the author and other security personnel confirmed that this information was recorded and posted in the crisis management centers and later included in the executive summary. We uncovered a phone call received by the FAA Washington Operation Center (WOC) reporting a shooting aboard American Airlines Flight 11. The WOC, a 24-hour operations center located in a room adjacent to the ACC, received the report of a shooting at 8:44 a.m. on September 11, 2001. The WOC never reported this information to FAA security personnel in the ACC. Interviews of American Airlines personnel contradict the statements of FAA security personnel. American Airlines personnel deny ever reporting a shooting on any of the hijacked flights on September 11, 2001. However, a former American Airlines employee recalled hearing an anecdotal report of a gunshot aboard one of the hijacked flights on September 11, 2001 at the American Airlines Corporate Security Office in Dallas, TX. Due to the lack of cooperation from American Airlines, we did not receive any additional information. Based on our investigation, there is no information to corroborate a shooting on American Airlines Flight 11.
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Alleged Gun on AA Flight 11 Q: Was there a gun on AA#11. An FAA Executive Summary states that a gun was fired. What is the truth? Major Points: •
Questions about information from the criminal investigation should be directed to the FBI and the TSA has the records concerning the operations of the Aviation Command Center on September 11th.
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Also the matter was investigated by the GAO - and we are not privy to their report on the mater
•
DOT/FAA has no information which confirms the presence of a gun on AA Flight 11 or any other of the four hijacked aircraft.
•
FBI has advised that they had no evidence of a gun being used onboard the aircraft.
•
It is our understanding that one of the personnel working in the FAA's Aviation Command Center during the incident believed they had been provided information by a representative of American Airlines to the effect that one individual onboard the aircraft had shot another individual onboard with specific passenger names and a seat location being mentioned.
•
This information was received in the command center during a chaotic period in which a great deal of information, some of it erroneous, was being received. Later in the day this information was included in a draft "Executive Summary" briefing book item prepared in a separate room based on information received in the Command Center.
•
At about the same time, however, in the Command Center, the information in question was double checked and FAA was advised by American Airlines that the information was not correct. American reported that it had no information about anyone being shot.
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We do not know if someone mistakenly used or thought they heard the word "shot" when the term used was actually "killed", "stabbed", "cut" or some other word - or if the error arose in some other fashion - nor if an error occurred, if it occurred at American Airlines or in the Aviation Command Center.
•
In such situations the term "Fog of War" applies. In the early reporting on incidents it is quite common for erroneous facts to be reported, conclusions to be based on incomplete facts or various forms of mis-communication to occur. On 9/11 there were reports of incidents which did not actually occur, such as the reported car bomb exploding at the Department of State.
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