T5 B61 Vip Fdr- 2-15-02 Wainstein Memo Re Final Report On Interview Project 225

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15/04/04

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• U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for United States Attorneys

Office of (he Director '

Room 2244A. Mala Justice Building laA*nvi.

WV 514-2121

. 20S30

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM:

Kenneth L. Wainstein Director

J. Patrick Rowan Assistant United States Attorney DATE:

February 15,2002

SUBJECT:

Final Report on Interview Project

I.

Introduction

In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the federal government launched an unprecedented campaign against the forces of terrorism. In partnership with its federal, state and local law enforcement partners, the Department of Justice developed an Anti-Terrorism Plan that focuses on! the prevention of further attacks against the United States. The Attorney General explained in a September 17, 2001 directive to the United States Attorneys, that the "guiding principle of this enforcement plan is the prevention of future terrorism through the dismantling of terrorist organizations operating within the United States." He directed that "(fjederal law 'enforcement agencies and ttie" United States AtKmeyT"I)rBc^s*rT"/ iiisc eveiy iivailaEle law enforcement tool to incapacitate these individuals and their organizations/' and instructed each United States Attorney to establish an Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF), consisting of federal law enforcement agencies and the primary state and local police forces in that district, to serve as the primary coordinating body for implementing the Anti-Terrorism Plan in each district The! Anti-Terrorism Plan has two primary strategic goals: (1) to develop intelligence that will help us idehtify and apprehend those who are involved in the planning or perpetration of terrorist attacks; and (2) to undertake law enforcement operations that sow disruption among those planning such attacks. In furtherance of those two goals, the Attorney General announced on November 9, 2001 that the Department of Justice would undertake to interview several thousand non-immigrant aliens from countries with an Al Qaeda terrorist presence about their knowledge of terrorist elements within this country. This undertaking, known as the Interview Project, was designed as a nationwide law enforcement operation that would both develop intelligence and sow disruption among potential terrorists, thereby serving both goals of the Anti-Terrorism Plan.

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Under the oversight and operational leadership of the United States Attorneys' Offices, law enforcement officers throughout the country located the individuals on the list, thoroughly interviewed them about their knowledge of foreign terrorists, and submitted the results of the interviews for entry into a database dedicated to this project. Now that the project is substantially completed, we can assess whether h achieved its objectives. This report wiill provide that assessment. H.

Implementation of the Interview Project

The following is a short description of the process by which this project was designed and implemented a.

Creation of the List of Individuals to be Interviewed

The critical first step in the Interview Project was to determine who should be interviewed. This task was assigned to Ihe members of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF). The FTTTF, which was established by the Attorney General on October 31, 2001, is charged with preventing terrorist attacks by tracking the movements of foreign terrorists and prevetrtingthem from entering the country. In order to accomplish its mission, the FiTfr has access to intelligence information and databases maintained by various branches of the government Members of the FTTTF started by analyzing investigative information reading known foreign terrorists, including the perpetrators of the PENTTBOM attack, and identifying certain commonalities among them. Theyfound that the foreign terrorists were primarily (1) males between the ages of 18 and 33; (2) who entered the United States after January 1 , 2000 on a Bon-unmigrant visa; and (3) who held passports from or resided in countries which have an AI Qaeda terrorist presence. They then adopted those commonalities as the parameters by which they compiled the list of interview subjects, on the theory that the most likely persons to know about such terrorists are other demographically similar persons who might, wittingly or unwittingly, be in the same circles,

The FTTTF used those parameters to search the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) database that contains all arrival records for persons who filled out an INS 1-94, which is a form that must be completed by all non-immigrant aliens upon their entry into the United States. That search resulted hi a list of persons who fit the selected criteria. That list was tlten run against FBI systems, so that any person already under investigation by the FBI was eliminated from the list Using public source databases to obtain any last known address information for the aliens, the frTilV then selected 5,147 aliens from the list who were most likely to be located in the United States, focusing particularly on those who had entered the country more than once since January 1 , 2000. The aliens were separated by state of most current address, and the lists were turned over to the Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) for distribution to the United States Attorneys* Offices.

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Announcement of the Project

In his November 9,2001, memorandum to the United States Attorneys and the ATTFs, the Attorney General announced the project, summarized its objectives, and established a one-month deadline for its substantial completion. Citing September 11th and the clear indications that further attack was likely, the Attorney General explained that "it is absolutely imperative that we in law enforcement do everything in our power to prevent any such attack. These interviews are a critical step in that effort, as they will provide information and leads that will help us identify :and apprehend terrorists in our midst before they have an opportunity to cause more pain and suffering to the American people." The Attorney General then explained that the aliens on the list had been selected for interviews simply because they fit the criteria of persons who might have knowledge of foreignbased terrorists, and not because they were suspected of any criminal activity. Accordingly, he directed that the interviews be conducted on a consensual basis and that the interviev/ees be treated not as criminal suspects, but rather "as potential witnesses and sources of information." In conjunction with the Attorney General's memorandum, the Deputy Attorney General issued guidelines for the interviews that addressed the manner of conducting the Interviews, the topics to cover during the interviews, and the implementation procedures and deadlines. EOUSA then distributed to each United States Attorney's Office the list of aliens to be located in that district as well as a list of topic questions that was to be provided to the interviewing investigators for their use in the interviews. The list of questions corresponded with the format of a database, known as the ATTF Computerized Reporting System, in which United States Attorneys' Offices would input the results of the interviews and thereby preserve the information for future use by anti-terrorism investigators. The day following distribution of these documents, EOUSA held a conference call with all United States Attorneys, and many of the United States Attorneys and their Anti-Terrorism Coordinators had further discussions about the project at EOUSA's National Anti-Terrorism Conference the following week. Within days of their return from the conference, the: Coordinators ro|ecttQ-tfaje-ATT-F membms, copies of the memoranda and the interview questions. The United States Attorneys, in coordination with Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents in Charge, were responsible for assigning the interviews to task force: members. In some districts, there were enough FBI agents and police officers on the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) to handle the assignments. While it would have been ideal to have such specialized investigators assigned throughout the country, that option was unavailable in most districts because of the number of interviewees and the other investigative demands on those anti-terrorism investigators. Consequently, we decided to call upon our state, local and federal partners on the ATTFs, an extraordinary collection of investigators who, though largely lacking speci:5c experience in terrorism investigations, have ample experience in criminal investigation that easily transfers to this new arena. Like military reservists in a war situation, these investigators serv
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disruption to other aspects of the federal government's anti-terrorism effort1 The United States Attorneys were also responsible for determining bow best to cany out the interviews in their respective districts. In most districts, investigators simply visited the interviewee's residence or called the interviewee and requested an interview. In two districts with a large number of interviewees - the Northern District of Illinois and the Eastern District of Michigan — the United States Attorney opted to solicit interviews by sending each of the individuals on the list a form letter that explained the Interview Project and requested that the incipient call to schedule an interview. If no call was received from the recipient, investigators followed up with a personal visit to request an interview. c.

Outreach Efforts to the Affected Cpmmunjtjpg

Media reports following the announcement of this Project suggested that seme immigrant communities perceived this project as an effort to "harass" or "round up" persons who fit a certain ethnic and/or religions profile. In order to allay these concerns and to solicit their cooperation, the Attorney General and other Department officials held meetings with members of die affected communities. For example, on November 27, 200 1 , the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, and the Director of the Department's Office of InterGovernmental Affairs attended an Iftaar dinner (a traditional evening dinner at which Muslims break their fast during Ramadan) at the Islamic Center of Washington. After dinner, the Attorney General addressed questions from those in attendance concerning the government's investigative efforts. Then, on December 2, 2001, the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division met in Detroit with representatives of the Arab-American community there to discuss the investigation and the Interview Project These outreach efforts were duplicated on a local level by United States Attorneys, FBI Special Agents in Charge, and other ATTF members. In the Central District of California, for example, the United States Attorney and the FBI Assistant Director in Charge held a meeting on —Becember4,-2001 withirieml^*Me^«s1ffl¥^ audicncc that the Department (1) was not targeting Muslims, (2) was intent on {Conducting the interviews in a consensual, non-confrontational manner, and (3) was interested in hejtring about any complaints the Muslim community might have about the manner in -which interviews were 'The overwhelming majority of state and local law enforcement agencies enthusiastically participated in the Interview Project However, in Oregon, despite the ruling of the Oregon Attorney General mat nothing in Oregon law prevented investigators from participating in the interviews, the Portland Police Bureau nonetheless refused to participate. There were a handful of other jurisdictions where certain police department! declined to participate, citing concerns that the project amounted to racial profiling or that aspects of the Project were inco asistent with local laws or regulations that restrict their participation in the enforcement of fedend immigration laws. In those jurisdictions, the other members of the ATTF simply made up for the absence of those departments by performing a greater share of interviews.

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conducted. In the Eastern District of Michigan, the Acting United States Attorney participated in five meetings with police chiefs and Middle Eastern community leaders to discuss their concerns about the Interview Project. Shortly after his confirmation on December 7*. the newly swom-in United States Attorney followed up with a meeting with Arab-American and Muslim community leaders and representatives of the offices of Senators Stabenow and Levin. In the District of Oregon, two Assistant United States Attorneys met with representatives of the Muslim Community in Eugene, Oregon, took some suggestions from the community as to how best to approach interview subjects in a non-threatening manner, and then passed those suggestions along to the officers conducting the interviews. These outreach efforts were quite successful in convincing many community leaders that law enforcement was acting in good faith and in soliciting the active cooperation of the Muslim communities in the government's war on terrorism. A good illustration of that success is the experience of the Chief of die Criminal Division of the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Michigan whenhe and police officials attended ameeting hi December with four Imams and other leaders of the local Middle Eastern community. At the end of the meeting, nearly all of the community leaders presented him with their business cards, and told him to call if he needed interpreters to assist in the interviews and the war on terrorism. m.

Results of vie Interviews

The Interview Project produced results in a number of ways. Besides achieving its primary purposes of netting intelligence and sowing disruption, the project had the effect of significantly strengthening our relationships with the country's Muslim communities and with our state and local law enforcement partners - relationships that will be critical to the success of our long-term antiterrorism effort. This section will summarize the numerical results of the Interview Project and then describe these other benefits. >

a.

Number of Interviews Conducted

Based on our review of the Computerized Reporting System and the weekly reports submitted by the Anti-Terrorism Coordinators, it appears that investigators located and interviewed approximately half of those on the list The original list, minus any double entries;, totaled 4793 individuals. Ofthatnumber,681 were determined, after investigation and extensive efforts to locate them, to have left the United States. Another 1097 individuals could not be verified as having left the country, but simply could not be located. Approximately 785 individuals could not be located within the assigned district, but were determined to have moved to another district. In those instances, the individual's name and any information derived from the investigation in the original district was referred to the ATTF in the .district to which he had moved. Those "referral" cases required close coordination between the ATTFs, and they account for the interviews that have taken the longest to complete. To date, investigators have conducted approximately 2261 interviews, a number which will

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)/ll Law Enforcement Sensitive :"•>>..

probably increase slightly as ATTFs finish the final interviews, many of which arc referrals from other districts or college students who left school for winter break and only recently returned. Only a small percentage of the persons interviewed declined to answer questions. In the JBastem District of Michigan, for example, only eight out of 313 individuals refused to be interviewed In Oregon, it was only one out of 69, and in Minnesota, it was one out of 59. Those numbers an: representative of the experience of districts around the country.2 b.

Terrorism-Related Leads

The first goal of these interviews was to obtain information about terrorist activities. While most of the interviewees had no information relating to specific terrorists or terrorist acts, some provided leads that may assist in the investigation of PENTTBOM or other potential terrorist activities. The following are examples of such leads: Sal

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| an interviewee provided investigators with the name acid address of a

I with one of the nineteen Setember llttl hijackers.

In the! I an urtemewee indicated that he recalled seeing one of the September 11* hijackers ati I Intfae[\. interviewee acknowl '••I

(an organization terrorist groups. The individual reported thai

One interviewee id minded friends and[going to| In the]

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few arrests were made in connection with the interviews. Reports from the United States Attorneys indicate that fewer than twenty interview subjects were taken into custody. Most of those arrested were charged with immigration violations, and three individuals were arrested on criminal charges. None of the criminal cases appears to have any connection to terrorism. There arc a small number of individuals who remain under investigation by the INS for immigration violations, but have not yet been charged.

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Law Enforcement Sensitive •

At least two other interviewees identified acquaintances who had taken flight training in Florida.

In addition, the interviews yielded reports of criminal activity of the sort that has been linked to foreign terrorists in thepast. In I x \° interview produced a lead relating to a person manufacturing fraudulent! [cards. One interviewee in tfaej taiat offered to produce ralsA

Inl previously possessedl int

^\Jprovided information regarding I passports.

\n interviewee identified a I

I raale who had

land is allegedly wanted

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Another individual in the | [ p r o v i d e d information about at I who produces] Ifor luie in soliciting financial assistance and justifying alien requests for visa extensions.

In the\ an interviewee reported that he knew of a person dealing in counterfeit!_ i The interviewee agreed to assist in an investigation of the counterfeiter. c.

Disruptive Effect

Over and above our search for tcrrorism-related intelligence, the interviews were intended to disrupt potential terrorist activities. While our success in adueving this objective: is impossible reasontG4)eUowthfltthe^

course of conducting these interviews, investigalors fanned out across the United States and made contact with thousands of people. In the course of locating and interviewing each person on the list, investigators generally had contact with many of Ac person's neighbors, friends and relatives. These contacts, combined with the widespread media attention the project received, ensured that potential terrorists sheltering themselves within our communities were aware that law enforcement was on the job in their neighborhoods. AH of this investigative activity certainly must have caused concern for those :in this country who are associated with AJ Qaeda. Any AI Qaeda-trained terrorist living in this country was on notice that someone he associated with might well be on a list to be interviewed. Even if that terrorist had not confided his plans to anyone, he could not be sure whether his activities had generated suspicion in his community, suspicion that might have prompted an interviewee to mention his name to investigators. The unease caused by that uncertainty would likely have caused

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that terrorist to pursue his plans less boldly, and possibly to. scale back, delay or abandon his plans

d.

Effect on Community Relations

This project had the effect of increasing the level of contact between law enforcement and communities of immigrants from countries with a significant Al Qaeda presence, and it gave our federal and local law enforcement officers the opportunity to demonstrate, on a; person-to-person \, their professionalism and their interest in these immigrant communities. Contrary to the

predictions of some in the media that the project would produce greater friction between law enforcement and these coramunities,reports from the Anti-Terrorism Coordinator:: indicate that the contact resulting from the project has forged stronger ties between law enforcement and these \. This is borne out by the cooperative response from most of the interviewee. Not only did very few of those contacted for interviews decline to answer questions, most expressed a strong desire to help law enforcement in its campaign against terrorism. In! I for example, an \e claimed knowledge of groups in his native country oil Ithat may ba. sympathetic to terrorists, and he/ I I | Many others agreed to act as sources for law enforcement in this country and others, and a large number volunteered their services as interpreters. •• '•

The willingness of these non-citizens to volunteer their time and efforts in ihe fight against terrorism demonstrates the enhanced feeling of kinship between these communities and law enforcement that was generated by this project. While some members of these communities certainly continue to distrust the government, a significant number are now less suspicious of law enforcement, and, as the Anti-Terrorism Coordinator for the Middle District of Florida noted in a report to EOUSA, law enforcement now has a "much better feel for the Middle Eastern community hi the District." This higher level of mutual understanding will pay dividends as we continue to c.

Effect on Working Relationships in Law Enforcement

The Interview Project required the assistanceofapproximately 250 different la wenforcement agencies. While the FBI and other federal agencies in some districts completed the interviews on their own, the majority of districts called upon their state and local partners on the ATTFs to assist in the project. Besides being critical to the timely completion of the interviews, the participation of these agencies laid the groundwork for closer working relationships in the future. In the course of the project, police officers and detectives routinely teamed up with FBI agents to locate and interview individuals. This collaboration gave state and local law enforcement agencies an opportunity to demonstrate their competence hi anti-terrorism investigations, a relatively new field for many of these agencies. At the same time, me federal law enforcement agencies established that they can work hi good faith as partners with their state and local counterparts in the war against

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terrorism. The positive experience and interaction between agencies during this project bode well for future cooperation and information-sharing among the agencies involved in the: long-term battle against terrorism. f.

The ATTFj

This project also had the effect of establishing the ATTFs as a vital and effective component of our anti-terrorism strategy. As explained above, the Attorney General established the ATTFs soon after the September 11th attacks to serve as an operational entity for the implementation and coordination of the Department's anti-terrorism plan, to be a conduit for the dissemination of information about terrorists between federal and local agencies, and to provide a standing organizational structure for a coordinated response to a terrorist incident in the district The success of the ATTFs in undertaking and successfully completing this complicated project has demonstrated their capacity and willingness to perform these important responsibilities, which hi is in turn further integrated them into the national anti-terrorism network and the local law enforcement community in each district. A good example of this phenomenon is the experience in the Western District of Michigan, where a joint task force of federal, state and local officers located and interviev/ed 98% of the individuals on their list, developing useful information and cultivating potential source relationships with a number of interviewees. As the United States Attorney wrote in her report to ECUSA: The success of the effort in Western Michigan is attributable to the federal agents and state and local officers who volunteered to conduct the interviews. This has been an excellent example of federal, state and local partnership. Some of the Western District's most seasoned and experienced agents and officers knocked on doors and treated the interviewees with courtesy and respect The outcome has been consistently positive.

g.

Precedent for Future Operations

When this project was first announced, some commentators quickly labeled! it a "dragnet" or a "round-up" based on an ethnic or religious profile that would unleash our police officers to harass members of minority communities throughout the country. This prediction wiis proved false by the sensitive and respectful manner in which the investigators conducted these interviews, and by the absence of any credible allegations to the contrary by those who were interviewed. This project demonstrates that, contraryto the predictions, our law enforcement community can undertake aggressive and wide-ranging anti-terrorism measures with full respect for legal safejjuards and the dignity of individuals who might be touched by the measures. This legacy will help to quell resistance to and criticism of future such operations.

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