T5 B61 Condor Fdr- 6-3-03 Memo Re Briefing- Non Immigration Visa Process- 5 Pgs 221

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Memorandum for the Record Event: Briefing: Nonimmigration visa process and procedures; visa waiver program; visa process pre- and post-9-11; CLASS and TIPOFF and post 9/11 namechecks Date: June 3, 2003 Classification: unclassified Prepared by: TE, JKR, SG Team Number: 5 Location: U.S. Dept. of State - Room 6811 Washington, D.C. 20520 Phone: 202-647-9584 Fax: 202-647-9622 Email: [email protected] Participants - Non-Commission: Janice Jacobs, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, Consular Affairs, DOS Lisa Ritter, TIPOFF program officer, INR Participants - Commission: M.E. Swope, Leader Team 5 Tom Eldridge, Team 5 Susan Ginsburg, Team 5 Janice Kephart-Roberts, Team 5 Documents/handouts received by the Commission: Powerpoint hard copy: Briefing for the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks blank visa forms Visa Office organizational chart Paper: classes of aliens ineligible to receive visas Additional contacts mentioned: CA coordinates with INS Lisa Custer on visa revocations. FBI TIPOFF contact: David Hardy DOJ policy contacts: Chris Kobach; Stuart Levy DHS contact: Laura Baxter CIA contact: | "] US VISIT - Jim Williams - 90 days to set it up.

9/11

Closed by Statute

The Visa Process JJ handed out a slide presentation attached hereto. "Border security begins at the visa." Security has always been the number one priority for visas. This is why the DOS has always sought information for inclusion in watchlists, and why DOS participates in an interagency border group. Visa officers have a dual responsibility: "Protect US border security while facilitating legitimate travel." Visa Waiver Program (VWP) Facts and figures: Now available to 27 countries; 40% of arrivals are from VWP countries, they bring in $39.6 billion in tourism and travel $. BBS Act of 2002 amended statute to not only require review of every country every two years, but also and to require implementation of biometrics, and machine-readable passports by October 2004. Uruguay and Argentina dropped from program. Argentina for economic reasons. [Uruguay for concerns of tri-border area?] In order to promote security, the CA has incorporated significant anti-fraud features such as photos that are hard to substitute, and document integrity that makes "washing" of the visa very difficult. In 1993-1994, following World Trace Center I and the entry of the Blind Sheik, a change was made requiring all COs to check CLASS system before a visa could be issued. The Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) has been shared with the INS since 9/11. JJ emphasized that the phrase "overstay of visa" is a misnomer since, under our system, it is the INS at the POE who determines for how long a foreign visitor may stay on a visa, and the overstay is a violation of that INS determination, not of the visa itself.

The Visa Application A visa does not guarantee entry. No visa processing is done electronically. All on paper. Forms have evolved based on requests from agencies for certain kinds of information, e.g., FBI, CIA. The AULOS system evolved into the CLASS name check system. Several forms apply: DS-156 - Standard Nonimmigrant Visa Application form (2 pages) — Asks for 25 new data points since 9/11

DS-158 - For all students (F (school)/! (exchange)/M (vocational))(2 pages) DS-157 - Supplemental NIV application (1 page) - for all males ages 16-45 from every country, and all applicants over 16 from state sponsor countries. 1-20 -- Sent to student by the school and put into the SEVIS system Applicants must submit: (1) applicable forms (above), (2) passport, (3) photos, (4) supporting documentation showing ties to country of origin (varies, but includes job, school, family, house). Info from above is input into CCD before review by CO. Consular Officer checks this information, and checks to see (if student) that 1-20 is in the SEVIS system (and correlates with the school info.), interviews applicants (under guidelines), checks CLASS, and makes non-reviewable decision on application. Since 9/11 • • • • •

05-156: 25 additional fields since 9/11 16-45 Supplemental appendices to visa forms, males since 9/11, all applicants 16+ from state sponsors of terrorism FSNs will have limited access to CLASS because of FBI sensitivity to NCIC data Consular associates (family members) at post are being fazed out of adjudicating visa decisions. There are new guidelines on when interviews can be waived (State 139545). Backlogs have ranged from a few weeks to several months. It will take two to five years to fill new positions in the field for the new interview policy.

CLASS/CCD

9/11 Agency Internal Matters

If CLASS check results in a "hit," then the post must get a 10 print fingerprint card from the applicant, charge them $85, and request background check from FBI. The CCD system is currently being modified to allow it to track the timing of processing, including namecheck processing. Entries doubled after 9/11. The PATRIOT Act required NCIC and VGTOF data to be included in CLASS. Lost and stolen passports are also included. One problem with FBI data (per the FBI) is that their records are on paper and sometimes can't be put into the VGTOF file. Primary persons get put in the VGTOF file but secondary persons do not.

TIPOFF. Started because a known Palestinian terrorist got a visa in Singapore. There was no watchlist. Got permission from intel agencies to declassify four data fields for inclusion in the system: (1) Name, (2) DOB, (3) Passport number, and (4) country of passport. Experienced a tremendous increase in volume of individuals for watchlisting from CIA post 9-11. |

9/11 Agency Internal Matters

I

CONDOR namechecks by FBI and CIA, initiated January 2002. /

9/11 Agency Internal Matters

During an initial backlog, "a lot of cases just went missing." Automated indices began in June 2002. They still use very old technology. 80% clear in the first round (about a week); 5-10% are cleared by the name check unit. 10-15% are "farmed out" sometimes to field offices where derogatory information on these individuals may exist. The FBI has asked for 120 days from their receipt of these names to clear them. The field clearances compete with other field work by FBI agents. FTTTF did the namechecks for a awhile. Checks now done in FBI/CT. There is a new MOU with FBI on counterintelligence and counterterrorism. FTTTF proposes creating a system to "score" visa applicants based on a variety of data points and deny them based on the "score". Fraud prevention CA, FPP, and Forensic Document Lab are all involved. 9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

issue visas.

• ~nn

200 posts

In some locations, the posts could spend all day fighting fraud, so they focus on trends and busting fraud rings. The Diversity Visa Program is a major source of fraud. Biometrics DOJ and DOS did a joint report for Congress. They could not agree on a standard. The issue demands coordination. Otherwise there will be multiple systems which do not speak to one another. A visa biometric is required by October 2004. For Visa Waiver Program countries, by 2005, the law requires: • Travelers must have a biometric passport • If a student applicant for a visa, they must be fingerprinted by State, • At the FOE, get fingerprinted by DHS/BICE State has already collected 250,000 fingerprints (two finger sets?). US VISIT - Jim Williams - 90 days to set it up. Training After 9/11: FSI added 5 days to their consular course FSI now has specialists from other agencies address it FSI spends more time on name check/clearance processes

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