T5 B5 W Hempel's Files 1 Of 2 Fdr- 2-20-04 Mfr- Bill Yates- Don Concetti- Karen Fitzgerald 179

COMMISSION SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Current Immigration Benefits Fraud issues Type of event: Briefing Date: Friday, February 20, 2004 Special Access Issues: none Prepared by: Janice Kephart-Roberts and Walt Hempel Team Number: 5 Location: DHS Citizenship and Immigration Services, 20 Massachusetts Ave., Washington, D.C. Participants - Non-Commission: Bill Yates, Director of Operations, CIS Don Concetti, Fraud czar Karen Fitzgerald Participants - Commission: Janice Kephart-Roberts Susan Ginsburg Walt Hempel NOTES: (Handwritten to fill in) In 1999, our first reqmt was to reduce naturalization backlog. In feb 99 had 1.8 million pending in N400s. Our average filings had been in the mid to late 80s and been about 225,000. By 90s, in millions per year. In new receipts, 1.6 million in '96 and '97. That began backlog elimination. Because we shifted so much into naturalization, and in 96 moved to service centers, but by moving all naturalization, with no more staff, their processing times started to slip. Had issues with processing beginning then. But our backlog reduction did work: ided types of resources needed to adjudicate each application and started to attack the backlogs. When 9/11 hit, and we started to look at vulnerabilities in the program and the quality of other security checks, that's when backlog elimination stopped and once went to IBIS checks on every app; pre 9/11 did it only on select cases.

When Ziglar was coram'r, we did a risk assessment. That was done with a variety of teams doing specific things. No one document would show where holes were. Issues: 1. fingerprint from ink role to live electronic with FBi,and increased response time from FBI and reject rate went down to 3 or 4 percent unreadable by FBI. We don't fingerprint every applicant. 10 print checks: Naturalization applications, adjustment of status to permanent resident, temp protected status, asylum, refugees, adoptions, and waivers (criminal nonimmigrant waivers). NO nonimmigrant fingerprints. IN IBIS, only get wants and warrants, but no crim history info from FBI. Patriot Act says we should get it for visa issuance purposes. FBI says not a law enforcement agency, no. We're working on with DOJ on it. ICE can get crim history, but only for conducting an investigation. We draw the minimum level at fraud. 2. Namecheck division with FBI. Subject of investigations? Should be in US or removed? Used to have MOUs that they'd respond within a certain amount of days. Before 9/11, we began tracking FBI responses to INS queries, APIS implementation. And created the FBI queries and determined that before doing nautralization interview, have to query FBI screen and if there is a record need to have a supervisor. Pre 9/11, was looking a at 60 days. If there maybe was a case, could take 180 days. But with the live fingerprint scan, getting vetting back within 2 hrs to 48 hrs. 3. With hijackers, 255 variations of the names and spelling of the hijackers names. With NSU, ran the 255 vairations ran v. auatomated caseload and determined we'd have to review 3.2 million files to see if they related to the 19. 4. In Nov 2002, we naturalized a person and then the FBI said person subject to a terrorist investigation. Found out that they'd said no record twice on individual. We talked with FBI and could tell we weren't getting all the info. Records on individuals only checked on names, but if there is an ongoing investigation on others, those don't turn up. Naturalization was automated in the 90s and the G325 info sent to FBI on tapes. Biographic info, and FBI would run v. namecheck system. This enabled us to start tracking. Anywhere from a couple of weeks to a year and a half. Post 9/11, asked FBI to rerun 3.2 million names, and most got back to them in a month. While working off the backlog cases of the 2002... Target emigre unit in CIA does the namecheck process, |

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

9/1L Law Enforcement Sensitive Doherty is not very positive about the TSC. We think the TSC could replace the CIA process. I would hope in time TIPOFF and TSC become one. 1

J We've been unable to id ANY case where CIA info = a denial of an application. Post 9/11, Dan Cadman and I got together that we didn't have any tracking system with the CIA and we didn't have any national tracking on these cases. I said considering national security info of those cases, if they have such info, and then you call service ctr to hold it, do an investigation, and then send it back to me for further adjudication, and then could also track responses from CIA. A lot of info from CIA was very vague without real info. Given the sensitivity on these cases, I wanted NSU to be the vetter and would make a recommendation as well as to whether to grant the adjudication or not. US VISIT, we're building a CIS management system to track cases that will link with US VISIT. They started with entry and exit, and we're in the middle. We now have the green lite from investment review board at Deputy Secretary on developing biometric applications. Right now, have cases where a terrorist applying for a benefit, but info is all under intel, but no hard info to arrest them. We took it upon us that we will hold in abeyance these benefits. Our attorneys say we shouldn't hold them b/c we can't use the info that the FBI currently investigating b/c we have limited authority: you have to let applicant respond to derogatory information, and can hold in court. We also have adjustment of status cases under the AG, green card permanent residents. These people are removable and can apply to judge to have adjustment to a LPR, and if married to an LPR or US citizen. So judges are granting these adjustments, and then we are refusing the green cards. ICE attorneys are acting as prosecutors, but won't do the checks. We've tracked a lot of IBIS hits, and we've been able to id criminals and suspected terrorists and been able to id wants and warrants. On I-129s, we had an executive involved in baby smuggling. Even in back log elimination, national security, and improving customer service. ICE true belief is that enforcement is theirs and only theirs, and although can't undertake that activity and know they can't take care of their needs. When comes to verification and validation of information, that's us. What we want to do is develop the capability of fraud, then belongs to ICE and handles the prosecution. We have a need to give info to our adjudicators all info necessary to adjudicate. Line crossed to ICE and they take over. ICE wants to focus on conspiracy. ICE wants to have first cut at any min threshold fraud case, we do all the work up to it, and then we refer to ICE to determine wh they will take the case, and then we get back the file. Now an administrative matter, and we can deny

or grant the benefit. If we deny and removable, then will remove. If we don't have the information, we will access various systems, choicepoint, and via an interview, or through add'l info, or in verification compliance way, to make determination is : marriage sham, true school, true church verification. So now we reserve the right to take the case back to ICE if develop more information. We can now do the link analysis on petitions. When I was Vermont Service center director, we had successful prosecutions on large cases (7000 asylum cases). ICE will reject or accept within 30 days. In big conspiracy cases, principals get taken out and scheme gets broken down, NOTHING happens to aliens in the schemes. We need to be able to follow-up. If a denial, with fraud, we want to pursue a denial through removal. April 15 we're offering E filing on H-Ib,o, p. 1-140 (iimmgrant job), extension of stay, application for temp protected status. Biometrics: 10 print where needed. Now doing photo, signature and index print flat. It is a verification face to face at an office. Now have that identity throughout the process. We will be in sync eventually with US VISIT. We will be working with FDL on new stds with the cards. Fraud detectors at 44 FTEs for all the service centers. Contractors will come from a new fee. No appropriated funds. Ridge said wanted to make 200 of 9600 FTEs and convert them. Now working 6 to 10 parallel mulit conspiracy fraud cases to show how important fraud is. EOUSAs is much more proactive since 9/11. How determine fraud: 1. fraud detectors

.2. Building proactive database to continually bounce against daily receipts. We are already looking for rule based queries like FBI. / 3. Work closely with DOD. I offered NSU to run addresses and can tell you how many of that nationality are in a / building. ICE hasn't taken me up on the offer. ICE will track cases. To measure benefit adjudication fraud, none in the 90s. We don't profile. We do give access to our intel units] With namecheck system checks, can only do 1.2 applications per hour. Namecheck databases don't get cleaned up, and hurting adjudication time.

9/11 Law Enforcement

Sensitive

Made request to Admiral to have a policy shop for all immigration policy. GAO says organizational crossworks that CIS and ICE do.