T3 B9 Hurley Sources For Final Report Sec 9-2 3 Of 3 Fdr- 1-11-02 Transcript- Balz-woodward Interview Of Sr Admin Offical (hadley)

RECEIVED THE WHITE HOUSE

JUN

w

7 2003

Office of the Press Secretary National Commission on Terrorist Attacks

Internal Transcript

A J

January 11, 2002

INTERVIEW OF SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL (Deputy National Security Advisor, BY DAN BALZ AND BOB WOODWARD Stephen Hadley)

West Wing Office 2:30 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Have you talked to Rumsfeld and Shelton and you got that end of it? Q

Yes, yesT

- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good. Because I was a little concerned about some of the things I was hearing, that you didn't quite have -- I wanted to make sure you got that piece from them. Because you, I think, had a little distorted view, was my sense, about what happened at Camp David and what the military did, and why CIA and DOD seemed to be in different phases of preparation. And there's a clear reason for that, and I'd be glad to, sort of, go into it. Q

Yes, __that would be a good place to start.

—

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can you tell me what's the ground rules that you've been doing this under? Q record.

Well, with the President and the Vice President, on the With Condi, on background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION administration official.

OFFICIAL:

Which is senior

Q Which is even better. We're just going to use it if it all fits together. We're trying to put together a narrative, so there's no -SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would prefer that. I'll just talk. You can use the substance and don't do an attribution. If you need an attribution, you can always come back and I would say. I don't know what you want to do about all of this, because you'll say this is sort of self-serving and all this, and I suppose it is, but it goes to an explanation of why George was at

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the state he was in at the time. And that is, when we came in, one of the things we identified pretty early was we needed a more robust strategy to deal with al Qaeda than we had. And that was for a lot of reasons. And so we started an interagency process to develop one. And it really -- it was one of the things, actually, that the President tasked out -- no, he did not -- in the January time frame, actually, January 25th, Condi -- basically, Dick Clarke said to us, and he had talked to us in the transition, and he said, we need a much -- you know Dick Clarke? Dick said, we need a much more robust strategy on al Qaeda; I've been doing some thinking about it, here are some things I think we ought to be looking at. And we got a brief in the transition and then, literally, in the first or second week he came back to us and said, time to start moving, and we agreed.

Q

Who is "he"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He is Clarke. And the sort of January to March-time frame, he started sort fleshing out some of his ideas. And by April we started -- we had the first deputies meeting to look at a policy on our approach to al Qaeda, our approach to Uzbekistan, of course, was at that point struggling with a kindred insurgence, terrorism. Q

What was the date of that deputies meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Q

so, in of to have review which,

The 23rd~.

April 23rd.

And you chaired

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I did. We talked about what to do about the Taliban in Afghanistan and how could we strip away the Taliban from giving protection to al Qaeda. And we had another deputies meeting -Q Were there any concrete recommendations at that point about. how do you deal with the Taliban? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There were three things at that point: a series of measures about putting more pressure on al Qaeda; secondly, some measures that we could undertake to give more support to the Uzbeks and get more cooperation from the Uzbeks in dealing with al Qaeda and the sister insurgency; and some initial discussion about what do we do on the Taliban. And we basically had the two options you would expect, one which is kind of continuation of the old policy, which was to try and wean them away; to say, we will leave you alone with your backward-looking regime if you will turn over al Qaeda and disassociate you from al Qaeda.

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And the other alternative was to argue based on the premise that there was no real difference and if you wanted to go after the one, you had to go after the other. And that was declare war, effectively -- I mean, I'm using shorthand, but you can get it -- put pressure directly on both al Qaeda and Taliban. What ~we decided to do and what we developed was a strategy that blended the two; that would say, make an approach to the Taliban, indicate that it is time for them to separate themselves from al Qaeda, that we're going to deal more seriously with al Qaeda- than has been done in the past. We're giving you a chance to turn over al Qaeda. But at the same time, begin a -- and asked the CIA to develop an approach to tribal leaders and other non-Taliban in Afghanistan, to begin developing contacts and making some investments with those groups so if the Taliban did not turn on al Qaeda, we had already begun to lay an infrastructure that would allow us to begin to bring pressure on the Taliban directly. Q -Just so we're clear, Steve, some of that was already in place, though, before you came in? — SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Some of it. George had started some of that. There's no question about that. He had felt -- the problem George had was that was really the sum total, in some sense, of the policy. And those guys are very articulate that the way a covert action program can be effective, if it's part of a broader policy that has political, diplomatic, and other, perhaps even military aspects. So he had some ideas on the shelf. And what we said -- gave him wa~s a policy context, an indication that we were going to give some broader support, and asked him to sort of accelerate and be more serious about those efforts. So the strategy was going to be, give the Taliban an opportunity to turn against al Qaeda; make it clear that we were serious about that; but to begin to accelerate efforts to develop instruments so we could put pressure on the Taliban directly and, if necessary, break the hold of the Taliban on Afghanistan. And we sort of developed that thinking, and there was a companion piece about Pakistan, which we had to, in some sense, also wean away from the Taliban. And that was a question of both positive and negative incentives. So during the period of April, May, and into June -- and, really, we were sort of developing this kind of strategy for al Qaeda, Afghanistan and Pakistan. We go into, sort of, July and August, continue doing some refinements. There are some initial conversations with principals. Oddly enough, there's finally a formal principals meeting -Q

September 4th?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: September 4th, where the al Qaeda strategy gets adopted and blessed. And then, of course, September llth. So George, at this point, has got something in the can when he comes into office, is getting a lot of pressure and support to develop something more ambitious in this spring'-to-summer time frame. And we have basically the necessary documents that authorize -- we have an NSPD that basically directs him to develop all the infrastructure he needs, and direct DOD to develop military options. And that is all in the can and a lot of that activity is already going on in terms of planning by September. So when we have the Camp David meeting and the President says, do you have a plan, George has a plan. Q How much, if any of that, had gotten to the level of the President -Q

He said, none.

He said, none, to us.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: paper to him? Q

In terms of a piece of

Yes, correct, right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL;• None. Condi does a lot of talking with him: Is he aware that this work is going on? Yes. Ha-s any been formally presented to him at that point? No. Q Something you could help us withy you mentioned an NSPD -- going to the llth now and beyond. Condi wasn't sure, when was the NSPD signed for -- you know, after September 17th he makes decisions. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President signed the Memorandum of Notification, which I think is a term we actually don't use publicly, so I've sort of walked over the line -- on September 17th. Q

That's essentially the finding?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is the finding that authorizes George to execute the program he's already developed. Q

That was the afternoon of the 17th, or do you not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

I don't know, I just have a

date. And the NSPD -- the NSPD is formally signed on the 25th of October.

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Q

Not until then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not until then. And it effectively -- it's the document we're working off of. The Memorandum of Notification that is prepared pursuant to that is already signed. In some sense, operationally, we've moved down the NSPD, and at that point -Q And does that Memorandum of Notification -- that's the term that's used to inform the intelligence committees, isn't it? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Yes, that is correct.

Q But there also is a new finding, is there not, on that day, that afternoon? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think^what you're getting is people being confused. The Memorandum of Notification is pursuant to a May '86 counterterrorism finding. People refer to it loosely. What George -- and you can go back to him -- what George would-say is, look, we have the umbrella finding Tor al_ Qaeda; what we do when we want to be more precise and make clear that we have authority to pursue new avenues under that finding, we will do Memorandum of Notification. And there were a number of them. And so this was styled -we didn't need a new finding. We did need a new Memorandum of Notification. Q Then the '86 finding is just a basic counterterrorist finding, isn't it? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: it's been a while since I read it.

Correct.

Correct.

Though

So, in some sense, we're already operationalizing the NSPD. Part of the reasons for the holdup is we don't want to, at that point, just to an al Qaeda NSPD, because the President said it is a global war on terrorism. So we've got all the work for the al Qaeda; we need to put in a little bit of an umbrella finding that reflects the broader principles of the President's approach against the global war against terrorism. Q

And that's in the NSPD?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. And the structure of the NSPD actually is an outline of goals, objectives and strategy for defeating the terrorist threat to the United States. Basically, the global war against terrorism-. Q

How many pages is that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

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A couple pages.

Q

Just a couple of pages.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. And then there is an annex, and what is envisioned is an annex for each of the kinds of major undertakings we -Q

Financial, intelligence, military --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Q

No.

By region.

By country?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: By region. And Annex A is, surprise, surprise, Afghanistan. So that's how we did it and -Q

What's Annex B?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: go for, for today. Q

Nice try.

(Laughter.)

That's all we're going to —

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And interestingly enough, the goals, objectives and strategy that are in the NSPD are something that are developed --~first draft is sort of on the 12th of September. It's looked at at Camp David -- let me just be clear-. It's drafted on the 12th of September, and it's looked at at Camp David on Saturday, the 15th, and finalized thereafter. And that, then, sort of gets rolled into the NSPD as the basic approach to the overall war against terrorism. And then all the specific work that has been developed jwith respect to al Qaeda is in the Annex A. — Can I go into the other room just for a minute. (Interruption to interview.) SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wanted to make two points that would help you on it and understand this, I think. One is Q

That's why Tenet and the CIA were ready.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because one of the things that wasn't part of the plan was launching military operations from the get-go. So we had not -- we had, by the end of that process, were beginning to task DOD to develop some options. But it lagged, as you would expect, what Tenet was doing. So at Camp David, Tenet has a plan, and basically the military has some options, and it's not a surprise. That's where they should have been.

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Q Can we go to September llth? of a small group meeting about -Q NSC -Q

The evening they had kind

What we've come to call the War Cabinet. What would you call it?

It was the

Did you guys call it anything?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We didn't call it the War Cabinet. We basically -- this is the afternoon when the President gets back, we're down in the PEOC. It's basically -Q

So this is after his speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Right.

Q And there's an NSC meeting at 9:00 p.m., and that breaks up, and then there's a small group meeting after that. Rice, Powell -~Q~

Down in the PEOC.

Were you there?

SENIOR ADMINfSTRATION OFFICIAL:

Yes.

Q We have gone through with people and there are some notes -- do you take the notes for these things? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do. I have to tell you that I have notes for all of them, and I have no notes for September llth. And I don't know whether it's -Q

Who took them, then, because --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's not -- I guess I have to sort of say -- you can sort of think of sort of state of mind, where we were in terms of September late. We were pretty operational at that point. And there's still a fair amount going on during that meeting. I know I'm in and out. It would be very uncharacteristic for me not to have taken notes, but I have to tell,-you I don't know where they are. I have notes on everything from the 12th on. But I don't have a set of notes for that meeting, for the llth, to be perfectly honest. If I do, I can't find them. Q What do you remember about that meeting? Because we've gone through and found some notes of the meeting. The President began: This is a time for self-defense; we have made the decision to punish whoever harbors terrorists, not just the perpetrators. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have notes for that. I have notes -- and I think I can do this for you. Can I ask you who you got those from? Did they come from the President?

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Q

They came from here.

They came from here, from --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have a set. It's possible Scooter had some notes. It's possible Karen had some notes. I may have some, but I haven't been able to find them, to be perfectly honest. Q

Are those your notes or the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I'm trying to find something I can't find. Did someone talk to you about the meeting on September 12th? Q

The morning meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Q

The morning after.

Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: meetings on September 12th.

Okay.

There's two NSC _ _

Q Go through those in as much detail as you can. would be --

That

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And I went through these -I went through my notes and kind of tried to distill out what happened on that day. What's interesting is that it's from 9:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. in-the morning -Q—

On the 12th.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: the-12th. .It's an NSC meeting -Q

On the 12th, on Wednesday,

Where --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the Cabinet Room. The President is in the chair. And he says, look, I want to outline the challenge we face. And he then talks. And the phrases that come out are these. This is not in the order they came out. I went through and sort of pored it out, because what I was trying to figure out is how soon did the President lay out the basic parameters of what we were going to do, going forward. We're trying to do that -- (laughter.)

Q

We're on the same waveleng-feh.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. And these are the things I culled out of my notes: We are at war; we will win this war; but it's a different kind of enemy, and we need to fight a different kind of war. We need to prepare the public without

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alarming the public. We need to develop a logical, coherent strategy to achieve our goal and, if we do, the world will rally to our side. And one of the things the President says in that meeting is, I want you to -- I want to make sure I've got this here -- I want you to develop a statement of goals, objectives and strategy for the campaign against terrorism. And so the deputies go off, we have a little meeting and we develop one. And it's effectively -- we then bring it back to the NSC, circulate it, because the NSC resumes in the afternoon -Q

What time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have to get my notes. I think it's about 4:30 p.m. Hold on, I can get that. Yes, I can give you a little more on the meeting. There's the things I culled up. Q

From the morning meeting.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: From the morning. And after that meeting, but still in the Cabinet meeting, the President makes some remarks to the media. And you want to get those -- you probably already have those. Q

Yes, we have those.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: those. Q

Then I won't go through —

Where he first talks of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- NSC meeting at 4:00 p.m., also in the Cabinet meeting. And he gets some updates. And he reviews and revises the draft statement of goals, objectives and strategy. Q Is this where he added that part? part he added himself.

Because there was a

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. to you about that. Let me get it from here. Q

Let me talk

-- and all freedom-loving nations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we sent into him is: eliminate terrorism as a threat to our way of life. And then, somewhat inelegantly: including terrorist organizations, networks, finances, and access to weapons of mass destruction.

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And the President says: It's not just us. This is a cause on behalf of all our friends and allies around the world. And how do we capture that? And there's a debate, and some people say, well, let's talk about threat to our way of life and U.S. interests. The President says, no, that doesn't quite get it. How about: and to all nations that love freedom? And so it becomes -- the goal becomes, eliminate terrorism as a threat to our way of life, and to all nations that love freedom. And later on, somewhat inelegantly, in some versions we tagged back on, "including terrorist organizations, networks, finances, and access to WMD" -- which is too bad. It's triumphs of bureaucracy over good prose. Q

Sometimes simplicity is best.

(Laughter.)

Q But there was one point when the President -- something came to the President, I guess at Camp David, and he said, you've added something in, this is different than the day before. Right? ~ SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that's exactly right. We gave it to him in a revision on the 15th, on Saturday at Camp David. And the version he gets there says: eliminate terrorism as a threat to our way of life, and to all nations that love freedom. And he says, that's not what I approved on Tuesday -on Wednesday. And I didn't-get to say, that's exactly right, Mr. President, we improved it based on your language. But that's why we added back in: including terrorist organizations, networks, finances, and access to WMD -- because that's what he saw was missing. _ _ So what he picked up was, not that he added something -- he added it, that was there. What he picked up was there was something more missing to show the comprehensiveness of what we were doing. So, in response to that, figuring out that that's what he's talking to, the goal then becomes: eliminate terrorism as a threat to our way of life, and to all nations that love freedom, including terrorist organizations, network, finances, and access to WMD. And that gets picked up in the NSPD as the goal of the campaign against terrorism. Q I think it was on the 12th because -- get to the 17th, and then the speech -- I've done a number of these things over decades, and this really is -SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And the goal that is in the NSPD, which, as I say, doesn't get signed until the 25th of October, is as I just described. Q

What number is it?

NSPD what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: him that, right?

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I probably shouldn't tell

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Q

No.

I don't think so.

You've printed these for years.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Would you tell Condi that I think we should do this and just get -Q

Why don't you give it to us off the record, and then we'11 check. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Q

Absolutely.

~

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Q

You're an honorable person.

And we won't use it unless --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION^OFFICIAL: Q

Is that all right with you?

It's nine.

-

So that would be the 9th_that he'd signed off on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The 9th of a series. me give you a little more both from my notes and from -Q point?

Are we back in the morning or the afternoon at this

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: morning. We're in the afternoon. Q

Let

That's all I've got on the

Go through that if you would --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The second NSC meeting, it's in the afternoon. It's 4:00 p.m. It's in the Cabinet meeting. The President gets an update on where we are on the diplomacy from Powel.l, where we are on intelligence from- Tenet, as you'd expect. And we review this draft statement on goals, objectives and strategy. He revises it the way we described. And one of the things that's interesting is that in that document, reflecting the discussion we've had in the morning at the 9:30 a.m. meeting, he's already sort of fleshing out what the strategy is. And one -- there's sort of three aspects to that. One, we are mentioning that it is a comprehensive approach -Q

Is he saying this now, or is this in the document?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is in the document, but it reflects the discussion of the morning. It's going to be a comprehensive approach employing all instruments of national power and influence, diplomatic, financial, military,

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intelligence. He's on that very early. You can see it in his public statements. It's clearly how he thinks about it. And initially, he thinks that the military element is going to actually be fairly lower profile. Q

Does he say that or --

Q

Was that reflected --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's in the discussion, in the discussion of the morning. And one of the things clearly he wants to say is, don't let the measure of the campaign be just what we're doing militarily. It has other aspects. And you see that coming out when, in the public statements when he announces the executive order on financing, he says, we've begun the war on terrorism today -- I think you can get it -- with this document. The war on terrorists begins with -- the opening shot is to go at the finances of terrorist groups. It wasn't a military operation, it was a financial operation. And that's one of examples of how this campaign was going to be different. Q Wasn't that in part because the military piece of it wasn't ready and the President was anxious to move? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But it's also partly because -- I'm sure that's right, he wants to show some motion. But it's also because the President believes, and still believes, that the financial piece is going to be an important piece of this campaign. And, indeed~r I will tell you that in the threat reporting we get, we see evidence that the financial squeeze is impairing and delaying and disrupting terrorist operations, even now, that are being planned against the country. Second point. He says, we're going to seek our objectives in coalitions with countries genuinely committed to the goal, while being prepared to act alone, if necessary. So, again -Q Is this him talking in this case, or this is in the document? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is in the document. In the document, we, as deputies, sit down and try and come up with goals and objectives and a strategy that reflects the discussion we've heard in the morning, where the President has taken the lead in the way that I described. So, again, he's very early saying, other countries are going to be involved.

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And, finally, of course, what has become the hallmark of it, the third element of our strategy is, we will hold responsible any country that harbors or supports terrorists. Q So by that afternoon of the second day you've got, essentially, the broad outlines of the policy. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's the whole point. And the thing that's interesting, being sort of policy wonk, is it doesn't come from lengthy meetings and interagency papers and all the rest. It's coming out of the President's head in conversations with his principals.

Non-Responsive Material

__ What I have found here in this job, at least with this President, isTiow much of the basic architecture and strategy and basic principles, comes from the President. He's got these smart advisors and they discuss -- but, again, the 9:30 a.m. meeting is very interesting because the President sits down and he says, let me tell you how I see it. And he lays out the things I describe for you. — Q Do you remember -- I'm sorry to go to the llth, but this is exactly -- we're trying to do the audit trail, of how- you get to the speech from the beginning. And there is, on the night of the llth in the small group, the President -- Rumsfeld actually talked about they needed to apply pressure, not just militarily, but totally, through financial, diplomatic and covert fronts. The President liked the idea very much. It's not clear what he said. And Tenet said, we have a 60-country problem. And the President said, let's pick them off one at a time. Now, that's, in a sense, the plan. And then, Rumsfeld said, the problem is not just bin Laden and al Qaeda, but countries that support terrorism everywhere. And then the President says, we have to force countries to choose. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. But if you put all those together -- one of the things about that, I think, is, yes, pick them off one at a time, but remember, he declares it's a global strategy. It's not just against terrorists, it's those who give them aid and comfort. And the military -- the diplomatic pieces and the financial pieces are all global from

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the get-go. Initially, only against al Qaeda, but against al Qaeda, globally. When you get to military action, you start out with Afghanistan. But when people say, well, the campaign has phases -- phase one is Afghanistan, phase two is fill in the blank -- I say, you've misunderstood the campaign. The campaign was global in the get-go in terms of diplomacy, financial pieces, making it clear to countries that they would have to choose, and the intelligence piece. It's all global. The military piece is beginning to roll out initially in Afghanistan. But the strategy and fehe campaign is global from the get-go. Q

That's what people don't understand.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And what does the President say? He says over and over again, he says, when we come to the military prece, if we can score a decisive win in Afghanistan, it will make the other stops easier, because we will have showed a will and a capability. And, finally, why is boots on the ground as talked about in Camp David so important? It is because -- and consciously, the President says, I want to show a commitment to the_ cause of combatting terrorism that will be different from before and will cause people to take notice and recognize that we're serious. And that's in tandem, notions if we do make it clear we're serious and we succeed in Afghanistan, then everything else we do subsequent will be easier. — So it's a global campaign from the get-go. In terms of military, he starts with Afghanistan, but he's already thinking about, if I succeed here in Afghanistan, the rest becomes easier. And, finally, he says over and over again, and the biggest beneficiary in the end of this will be Israel because we will -of our.effort on the global campaign -Q

When did he first say that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't tell vou. that early on. Earlv on he saw that link.

He said

Non-Responsive Material Q Did that come up at Camp David at all, about the beneficiary is going to be Israel? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

No, that did not.

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J

Q

At one of the earlier meetings?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: David.

I don't recall it at Camp

Q Could I take you back to the afternoon of the 12th, because -SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: if I could -Q

And I have one other thing,

Absolutely.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's a 4th element of strategy I didn't mention to you which is important. It points out that one of the high priorities is to deprive terrorists and countries that support them of access to weapons of mass destruction. So, again, as of the 12th of September, as a fourth element of the strategy, it is already concern about WMD and access of terrorists to WMD. And you've seen_that. Q That leads exactly to the question I wanted to ask. that meeting at some point -- and it may be that -SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

In

What's the time frame?

~Q This is that afternoon, as we understand it. In that same NSC meeting. And Powell ventures the opinion that the U.S. public at this point isn't focused on Iraq. What we are trying to understand better is where Iraq came in and out of the debate and discussion over the several days. Because from our interview with the President, it was clear that by Saturday afternoon it wasn't part of the discussion, and that he had -Q Q

- Maybe even earlier -And maybe even earlier.

Q He said that he was worried that there were --" I mean, he was quite explicit about this. We told Condi about it, that he said he was concerned that people like Cheney and Powell, from their decade-ago experience with Iraq, were bringing a little something to the table. And he wanted to make sure that that didn't figure in his decision. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: you --

The President told

Q

The President told us that, yesT

Q

He couldn't have been clearer.

Q

He was quite explicit.

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(Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION other --

Q

OFFICIAL:

Let me look at one

Yes, because contemporaneous documentation is golden.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will also go back one more time and see if I can come up with those notes of the llth. Let me do one other thing, if I can real quick.

Q

Now, that's a labor of love.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it's my job, you know. I'm a lawyer, and lawyers take notes. Q

Which one is this now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

I'm looking at the 12th.

Q Rumsfeld poses -- this is a question -- is there a need to address Iraq, as well as bin Laden? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it's very interesting. Actually, the discussion goes in a very interesting way. Q Could you take -- I think the President is committed to us getting this right. I know Condi is, and we know he is, too. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me see if we can do this part. I don't have -- my notes don't read quite the same as you, but mine basically -- and I don't write that fast -Rumsfeld asked, Are we going_ against terrorism more broadly than just al Qaeda? Do we want to seek a broader basis for support? And my guess is that's where you have notes saying he talks about in terms of Iraq. That may be right. I don't show it, but that may be right. The President's reaction is, just what I said actually -- if we start with UBL and the al Qaeda organization -- and the organizations that aid and abet al Qaeda, that will strike a great - blow against terrorism and everything thereafter will get easier. So at the very point when Rumsfeld says, how about a broader approach, the President is saying, if we get Afghanistan right, we get UBL and al Qaeda, it gives us leverage to pursue. And then what follows is, Rumsfeld says, well, we need a coalition not just against al Qaeda -- if we put together a coalition just to get al Qaeda, then once al Qaeda is gone, the coalition is over. And he's speaking about coalition, but I think he's also talking about the effort more broadly. And then Powell says, the goal is terrorism generally. But we can initially organize and rally a coalition by capitalizing on the focus of al Qaeda.

536

That's what -- we can get a U.N. resolution against terrorism generally by focusing on al Qaeda. Q The we have the President saying, Rumsfeld had wisely pointed out the threat is bigger than al Qaeda. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. And the Vice President says, to affect terrorists and those that support it gets to state-sponsorship. And that, of course, is useful because it's -- in some sense, it is a target, and in some sense, a better target, in some sense, than the networks, themselves. But then the President comes back and says, but let's not make the target so broad that it misses the point and fails to draw support from normal Americans. What normal Americans do -feel is that we're suffering from al Qaeda. So, basically, what comes out of this is, because of the Rumsfeld discussion about, as the President says, wisely doing it more broadly, the notion that it is a campaign against terrorism of strategic reach, globally, that begins with al Qaeda and Afghanistan, in terms of the military operations. And that feeds into what we were talking about before. It's a global operation, global diplomacy, global intelligence, global financial. But the first piece militarily is going to be Afghanistan. The President says, if we can get that right, everything else becomes easier. Q

Keep going there, if you would.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Q

That's it.

That' s^ the end of the meeting?

That's it. ~

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In terms of this discussion -- and there's also something that is said that's important. There's a discussion that makes clear that, yes -- there's a discussion about the coalition, and two points come out. One is a point the Vice President makes about the coalition is a means to an end, it's not an end in itself. And a point that Rumsfeld makes-that says, we've got to be kind of narrow in our focus on the coalition; it's got to be people who are really committed to the cause. And then Powell makes his sort of variable geometry, the coalition is a broad group, but what we ask of countries will vary, depending on their capabilities and depending on where the campaign against terrorism goes. So in this first meeting, in those sort of three interchanges, you also have the gist of what the approach is to the coalition. Hardcore that's going to be with us, people have to be really committed; you've got to have chosen, as the President says; means to an end, not an end to itself; and then sort of variable geometry -- we're going to ask different things of different people, depending on what they can do. And later

537

on, the President talks about some will be acknowledged, some will not be acknowledged. (End of side one of tape.) Q -- President .says, need a realistic scorecard, a list of thugs. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: meeting?

This is the morning

Q This is the afternoon meeting: The American people want a big bang. I have convinced them that this is a war that will be fought with many steps. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Yes.

One of the things --

yes. Q

Hope we don't have that wrong, for the 12th.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:- Yes, I've got it -- this is a turn discussion here. What have you g_ot,_Bob? Q The President said: We need a realistic scorecard, a list of thugs. The American people want a big bang, and I have to convince them that this is a war that will be fought with many steps. Sounds like the end, near the end. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Let me see if I can find

that. Q See, if you guys would just reactivate Nixon's taping system, it would solve all these problems. (Laughter.) SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One of the things the President says, interestingly -- I forgot -- in this afternoon session, is he talks about -Q

How early in the session?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Late in the session. Because there's an initial session with a broader group of people when he talks about what we're doing to increase our ability to protect against further terrorist attacks. And there's a broader group of people, and then some of those people leave. And there's a smaller group that then focuses on the war. One of the things the President says is -- he says: want a photo op war. — Q

I don't

Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When we hit militarily, we want to do it effectively. It needs to be something that meets

538

our goals and that will be successful. want a photo op war" rings out.

But that sort of "I don't

Q Right, we do have that, too. And the way we have it, that's shortly after this issue of Iraq being raised by Rumsfeld and Condi actually having some comments about both Iraq and Iran. Q

And we don't know what those are.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. Rumsfeld raises the issue of Iraq, why shouldn't we go against Iraq, not just al Qaeda. Q

_

Wait, say that again.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Rumsfeld raises the issue of Iraq, why shouldn't we go against Iraq and not just ai Qaeda; let's have a sustained, serious campaign. It's a disjointed discussion, actually. Q

Is this at a different point than --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

This is in the afternoon.

Q~ No, but a different point than what he was talking about, because there is specific reference to Iraq here. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President talks about no photo op war, something that is going to be successful. And Powell says -- and somebody, and I don't have it clear -- says, how soon should we begin to do plans about Iraq? And Powell says, we're focused on al Qaeda because the American people want us to do something about al Qaeda -- which" is the echo of the morning conversation, which was the President's instinct. And: If we expand the focus beyond_al Qaeda now, I don't want to trip over -- we don't want to trip over each other. I don't quite know what that means. Q

Is this the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is the President. "Any action needs public support," and he's echoing Powell's point and the President's point of the morning that he needs to take into account what the American people are focused on. It's not just what the international coalition supports, what the American people want to support. The American people want us to do something about al Qaeda. And that leads to the President saying, if we can do al Qaeda and Afghanistan, we get leverage on everything else. — So any action needs public support: I want a scorecard, a list of thugs. I want to show how we're making progress to reduce the risk to the American people.

539

Q Keep going, bang, is that there?

What else?

The American people want a big

Q I have to convince them that this is a war that will be fought -SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'll tell you what I've got. There's some talking about -- there's some extraneous stuff. And the President says, we've got to get the pressure up; we've got to get the host countries scared; we've got to get UBL and al Qaeda on the run -- and something we've heard the President say a long time -- we're going to get them out of their holes and get them on the run, and then we're going to get them. Q

Smoke 'em out.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Smoke 'em out, and then we're going to get them. And that's where he is right there.

Q

Keep going.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: mostly what I've got.

That's really -- that's

Q What's the most important point in this 10 days? If you were in your leisure sitting around writing your memoirs and saying, you know, -this is where I began -- that really shows what happened or decision points, particularly -- because we're writing about the President in this, where he said, you know, this is the way we're going to do it. Is there anything that jcomes off the top of your head? _ SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Sure, there are a number of

them. Q

They're most helpful if you can place the date and the

time. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My problem with September is I don't have notes from September llth. For me, when I went back to this stuff to try and reconstruct it -- what I found most surprising, and everybody else had forgotten, the meeting on the 12th, the morning meeting and the afternoon meeting on the 12th. Everyone was focused on September llth, the night of September llth. And what I found most interesting was the meetings on the 12th. Because the President has had a night to think about it. He's had some discussions, but the discussions are pretty operational and pretty unfocused -- you know, people have had a pretty long day. And he comes up on the 12th -- and, you know, it's almost like this in terms of the notes I was just looking at -- we're at war, we're going to win, but it's a different kind of

540

enemy, it's going to be a different kind of war and we've got to prepare the public without alarming the public. So what are the three things -- the President conceptualizes what he's about, and the last thing of that trilogy is if we have a strategy the world will rally to our side. He's got the basic outline of it. So what has he done? He's decided this is a defining moment for his presidency, right off. I mean, he sees the significance of this event right off. Secondly, he frames it in the way I just described, right off, very early. He makes a couple, I think -- and so, in terms of critical things the President did, it's that. And he starts off the NSC meeting and says, let me tell you how I see it, and he rolls this out. Well, you know, that transforms a meeting. Everybody else then operates within this frame. Second of all, the decision to say we're going to hold those who support terrorism to the same standards of the_ terrorists. That is transformational, because it basically says -- Q That's all decided between the speechwriters, the President and Condi and you, essentially, that night of the llth? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. And that is transforming, because what is says is, no more free ride -countries had been using terrorism as a tool of policy and getting away with it because they paid no cost. And the President said: that ends now; you've got to choose and if you support, you'll pay. That changes everybody's calculation around the globe. ~~ The third thing is, his grasping the symbolism of Afghanistan, resisting the notion of using military force globally at the beginning; but saying, if I do Afghanistan, having said that hosts will be held accountable with terrorists, if I then show it in Afghanistan -- both defeating terrorism in Afghanistan and punishing the Taliban for supporting it --- then people will say not only have I articulated my principle, but I showed I've got the guts and the means to enforce it. And that, he said, will change -- understands will change the calculation on terrorism. And that's what -- you know, in my earlier comment, that's what Presidents do. That's not what staff does, that's not even what Cabinet Secretaries -- that's what Presidents do when the Q Let's test your memory on a couple of critical things at Camp David. Somebody said that at one point -- it's not clear -- Cheney, and you know Cheney better than anyone -- because it kind of seems like everyone has presented their view -- and at

541

some point Cheney says, okay, suppose this doesn't work, then what are we going to do? (Laughter.) Q

You remember this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't. I went through my notes on the Camp David discussion and it's very interesting, because almost everything is discussed at some point in time. It is a very open and free falling discussion. Q

Particularly the morning?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Particularly the morning. I want to stop for a minute because I have one other thing I wanted to mention on this, which was actually pretty important, but I think it's probably gone from my head. I don't remember that. Q

You don't remember Cheney said --

(Interruption to interview.) Q You know, everything seems to be moving one way, and he just says, okay, let's suppose this doesn't work. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can I give you two other things thaJt are -- of the things that the President does that are very important. One of the most important things is the decision -- which is not at Camp David, because it worked out in the sort of two or three weeks afterwards -- is the basic decision on the strategy, which is this very, I think, innovative notion that says, yes, we're going to put boots on the ground to show seriousness, but we're not going to do a conventional military operation. There was very early a notion that this could not be a campaign against Islam, but had to be against terrorism. And if it wasn't -- but we can't fall into making a jihad, making it the crusades, notwithstanding the slip of the lip at one point. Q

Which you all jumped him on.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Which is what bin Laden wants. Bin Laden wants to show this is, you know, the western world attacking Islam. And so the notion of saying our goal is to say that it is not we the invaders, but it is al Qaeda that is the invaders of Afghanistan and we are helping the Afghan people throw out these foreign invaders. And that's .our principle, that's our story line and we have a strategy that shows it, because we basically empower the tribal groups to throw out al Qaeda, itself. Q

Steve, at what point --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And that is basically the President's creation. And if you ask the other things that he contributes -- that. Because that makes it all go. - Q At what point does the"idea go from punishing the Taliban to removing the Taliban? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's the point I actually wanted to make. Remember I talked about the strategy we developed on al Qaeda and the Taliban before, and it was: give the.Taliban a chance, but develop the infrastructure through George's activities, so if they-turn us down we can break the hold on Afghanistan. If you think about it, the President does the same thing in his speech to the Joint Session of Congress. He says, we have the demand on the Taliban: 'if you meet our demands, turn over al Qaeda, by implication is, we won.'t go after you. Q

You get another chance.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You get another chance. He waits three weeks, the Taliban does whatever he does, and basically the decision is, okay, they've made their choice, now we're going to go after them. So in some sense, on an accelerated basis, he did what -Q Was it really open in his mind or others' mind at the time he gives the ultimaturn ^that there is any -likely prospect that the Taliban would meet those demands? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: People were very skeptical that the Taliban would meet those demands. People understood what had happened in '98 and '99. People were very skeptical. The President felt we had to give them a chance. Q

And was that, in part, for the purposes of coalitions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Partly, but not entirely; but I think partly. And there was also a question at that point whether the Taliban might fragment and we would have a portion with Mullah Omar that would go down with the ship; but that there might be a portion of the Taliban that would fragment and be willing to turn over not only al Qaeda, but the Mullah. And there's that debate, and that's in the discussion of, you know, coAald the Taliban be part of a post-Taliban Afghanistan government, if you will. But it's pretty clear that they aren't going to fragment. So there is that piece -- it's a test, in some sense, about whether how cohesive the Taliban is going to be.

tfo

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And that is basically the President's creation. And if you ask the other things that he contributes -- that. Because that makes it all go. Q At what point does the idea go from punishing the Taliban to removing the Taliban? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's the point I actually wanted to make. Remember I talked about the strategy we developed on al Qaeda and the Taliban before, and it was: give the Taliban a chance, but develop the infrastructure through George's activities, so if they turn us down we can break the hold on Afghanistan. If you think about it, the President does the same thing in his speech to the Joint Session of Congress. He says, we have the demand on the Taliban: if you meet our demands, turn over al Qaeda, by implication is, we won't go after you. Q

You cret another chance.

Non-Responsive Material

Q Was it really open in his mind or others' mind at the time he gives the ultimatum that -there is any likely jprospect that the Taliban would meet those demands? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: People were very skeptical that the Taliban would meet those demands. People^ understood what had happened in '98 and '99. People were very skeptical. The President felt we had to give them a chance.

Non-Responsive Material

543

Q

Do you have your notes of Camp David?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do. They're in a separate notebook and they're -- they're very -- I mean, it'll be hard to find anything, because the discussion sort of moves all over. But go ahead with jyour -Q After Shelton presents the options -- the, essentially, three options. The President compliments him. Do you remember what the President said? And then the question of basing and over-flight rights triggered an extended discussion of the 'Stans? And somebody made the point with relief, this won't be like the Balkans? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Bob, where did you get these? Are these things people have given you, or is this stuff you've gotten clandestinely? So I am doing this sort of officially consistent with what my President has asked or -—

Q

Everything is officially consistent on this..

SENJOR-ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Did you get these --

Q I moved the flower pot and now one showed up. (Laughter.)

~

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did you get these, sort of, officially, someone who's authorized to talk to you has given you these things? Q Let's be --_ yes, that particular part of it, definitely. I mean, obviously, we've talked to lots of people. There are no surprises in this. We're operating on the nosurprise rule of we're not going to have somebody give us something that we haven't gone over -- if that makes sense. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Let me see if I can find

that. Q A nice summary of Camp David would be useful. (Laughter.) Somebody says, this won't be like the Balkans, and Condi says, we're going the wish this was the Balkans. (Laughter.) that right? got?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Where are you?

Is

Okay, now what have you

Q

Right after the chairman presents his options, Shelton.

Q

What is Bush's response?

544

said.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have what you just I've got a thing that says, options, brief. Q

Right.

And there are three, basically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: problems is -Q

Well, you know, one of the

They have sub-options, too.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have sub-options, and I didn't take notes. But I've also not been able to locate the briefing charts. So I have a recollection that they are three basic options, but there are sub-options. Q

-- the President say at the end?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Q

Pardon?

-

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: what you said. It's not -Q

I don't have what you said.

I don'jt have him saying

Just complimenting him, you don't have it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: _ I don't have it. But it's not the kind of thing I would have written down, to tell you the truth. Q

Okay.

What happened next?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me see. Interesting. The President does -- one of the things that might be interesting, actually, is -- hold on just a minute, make sure I'm at the same point you are. After the discussion that follows the military discussion, I have the President saying, the boots on the ground is certainly an interesting idea; I want the CIA to help us think about what they would do when they're there, the boots on the ground -- what would we do with them, what's it for? I want to give the Taliban a right to turn over al Qaeda; if they don't, there have to be consequences that show the United States is serious. We need to continue what we're doing through covert action and other instruments, perhaps militarily. That's your point. then -Q

It is, we'll give them a chance, but —

Keep going.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's kind of a set of steps, the things that we're going to do to -- all things that we did, in terms of our own planning. And then the President says, we're all going to go take a nap and we'll come back and we'll talk some more. The discussion, you know -- it's a very diffuse discussion. Q

And a lot of people said it wasn't clear how you're going to get a plan out of this, because it was so -Q Condi, in particular, talked about that, that she left the meeting wondering how do we bring it back to -SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But, you know, part of it, when we talked about the Camp David, you know, this is September. Everybody knows that the game has changed, that this is going to be a serious business. Part of it was not to get a plan out of Camp David; part of it was to get the President to sit down with the core people that were ge-ing to help with this huge challenge in his presidency and get comfortable with them and to him to get comfortable with what was ahead of him; and to have him hear some things and to be able to rack to them and chew them over. In some sense it was so that -- it was really, I think, two things: so he could begin to-think about in a setting all dimensions of the problem in a systematic way with some time, rather than having to result, boom, boom, boom. And so it really, get him comfortable with what he was going-to have to deal with going forward and to have an opportunity for this team to spend a fairly intensive time together and to bond, because it's going to be a fairly intensive go, going^forward. So I never really thought we were really going to get "the plan" out of Camp David. Camp David was really for a very different persons; it had a lot more to get the President comfortable with what was going to lead. Now, as it turns out, the President got his plan out of it - and I know Condi has talked to you about that and the document and all that stuff.

Q

Yes.

But --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: less --

But that really was

Q But when he called her on Sunday and gave her -- and there are 11 or 12 things, do you have that list? Because she's given them to us all, and the President gave it. I'm not sure we have them in the right order.

546 J

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have that list. I've got the document that, you know, a day later becomes the formal decision document and signed. Q

Which is just one page, apparently?

Q

"No, it's --

Q

Oh, it is?

Oh, that's the CIA part.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. There's some confusion about -- I've heard that you were looking for this one-page list. Q

- Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know what it is, to be honest. (Laughter.) And I'm not sure it exists in the form that you think it exists. Q — Well, at a minimum, it must be notes that Condi took -the President -— SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's what it is. I think it's some notes, and then I think there's a document that gets generated from those notes. ~ Q

What is the document that he signed on Monday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me. He signs a document that's three pages, that is the conclusions of the activities of the weekend. Which is basically the way forward. Q

Is that what it's called?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Nope. It's conclusions of the National Security Council meeting, one of the most unprepossessing titles you can come up with. Q And this is the document that he used at the morning meeting on the 17th, to give instructions? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION Q

OFFICIAL:

Yes.

So he was basically reading from that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's basically got that, and then it gets signed off, and I don't know whether it was signed before or signed after, basically. Q Could you go through it, in essence? I mean --

Because we have,

547 _L

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me see. I want to see what Condi has done about this. I don't want to get out in front of Condi on this. Let me check. (Interruption to interview.) SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: the NSPD thing, using the number?

Q

I've got my notes.

One, on

Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

She does not want to use

that. Q

Okay, good.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Because it raises the issue

of -Q

It's outside our time line, anyway—

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It raises many there were and when and this is not a good secondly, on this document signed out, she also away from going through a document, telling you think what I can safely say to you is that -Q

That's the reduction of the points from Camp David?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Q

Exactly.

Give us a sense of what it is. ~

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION Q

the issue of how precedent. And, wants to stay what's in it. I

OFFICIAL:

Well, in some sense --

Who does it go to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a series of taskings to follow-up on Camp David and it reflects the principles and the approach to the campaign that you already know about, because we've talked about it in the context of discussions and other documents. But a formal presidential document like this signing, she doesn't want to go through. And she's right about that. Q

And he did, he signed it that morning?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He signed it sometime on the 17th. I don't know whether he signed it in the morning or the afternoon. — Q And where does it go, then? distributed?

548

I mean, does it get

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me talk generally. Generally, documents like that, that the President signs, go to everybody, all the Cabinet Secretaries who are tasked or who otherwise are interested in it. It's a pretty standard -- it's just exactly what you would expect. Q that?

Is there a code word for this operation, Steve, for The "enduring freedom" for the military.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's really Operation Enduring Freedom. That's it. There are various pieces of it that are compartmented. And compartments, as you know very well, have names that attach to them for way of protection. But in terms of, what are we going to call this? It's Operation Enduring Freedom.

Q

That's not decided on the 17th, though?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: know all about that. Q

No, it is not.

And you

What other specific --

Q The morning NSC meeting on the 13th, was there -- do you have anything in your -- we have a little bit that this, Powell gives a report on Pakistan and that President Musharraf had accepted al-1 of the U.S. requests. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Yes.

_ Q The President requested a similar list be prepared for the Taliban. — SENIOR ADMINISTRATION

OFFICIAL:

True.

I recall that.

Q If the Taliban does not comply in a relatively short time frame, the U.S. will respond. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Right.

Q And then there's some discussion about whether there should be, in fact, a deadline given to the Taliban, apparently, at that meeting. And the conclusion is, apparently, no, just issue -- the demands would be issued. And O'Neill indicates that there's a draft executive order being prepared to provide authority to go after the financial institutions. The President gives strong support to that.

me.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

That all sounds right to

Q Okay. And at some point there is a meeting -- maybe a principals committee in the Sit Room -- where the Vice President

549

says, this is not business as usual, six weeks to figure out what to do is six weeks too long. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

What's the context?

Q That's what I don't know. context is on that.

We're not sure what the

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When is this?

When does this happen?

Q This is sometime on the 13th. It's either at the NSC meeting or, if there is a small group principals meeting. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. The President said -- the Vice President -- this is a meeting that occurs, there's a PC meeting in the morning, before the NSC meeting. The NSC meeting, I think, is in the afternoon. This is a principals meeting in the morning. And the Vice President says: We need to be—aggressive in how we impose pain on the guilty parties; this is not business as usual; we need to tell others that if they do business with al Qaeda, they'll get hurt -- in their financial assets, in logistic support, travel arrangements, everything else; we've got to cast our net broadly; a state that provides support to terrorists in any way^will be a target for U.S. pain; they don't-understand the depth of the feeling in this country. Q

This is all Cheney?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION Q

OFFICIAL: ~This is all Cheney._ Okay?

All right.

Q You know, I mean, we've got basics. The question is, are we missing something? Is there a kind of -Q Let me ask this. What is it that we're -- I'm buggy on Iraq.. And the reason is because there has been so much written about it in the press. That anything we do that is this detailed cries out for some explanation of where Iraq fit into this. We know Wolfowitz was raising it, we know others were, apparently. But the question is, what was it really like inside on that issue? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My recollection is -- look, one of the things you have to understand is when principals are meeting, particularly with the President, deputies generally don't say a whole lot and tend to ask -- speak when spoken to. Or if there's a factual thing to help clarify something, you volunteer it.

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So this notion that Paul was somehow actively raising Iraq is just not a fair description of what happened at Camp David. Don Rumsfeld is a pretty formidable guy, and is running the show when he's in the meeting. So I didn't go through my notes, I have recollection of Paul raising, sort of, questions a couple times, but he's not actively pushing Iraq. Rumsfeld is clearly saying, are we going to do Iraq in the first go-round; you know, I'm concerned about Iraq. Rumsfeld very early -- as your notes say -- said, this needs to be a broad war against terrorism generally, not just about al Qaeda. We're going to use this to go against terrorist organizations with global reach and those who support them. The President adopts that and he's pushing on an-open door. And so the question, logically, becomes, is Iraq part of that? And, basically, Rumsfeld raises the issue a couple times and, for the reasons we've described, all the parties -including the Vice President and the President -- say, basically, Iraq^is unfinished business -and we'll get to it, but for now, the focus is al Qaeda and Afghanistan. And in the end of the day, there is no dissent about that. I mean, it's not that Rumsfeld keeps coming back. They have a good discussion about it. The President is very clear about how he sees it, for pretty good reasons. And that's it. Q And Rumsfeld did raise it again at Camp David? that was part of the morning discussion at Camp David?

I mean,

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And it was raised again at Camp David. So, in some~sense, he raises it on the 12th, in the morning and the afternoon. He raises it again at Camp David. And that's -- it is discussed in the kind of free form way. The President is pretty clear, that he knows where he is. And at that point, you know, with this President, when you know where he is, that's where he is. And there you are. (Laughter.) Q On the 17th, on Monday, that tasking, when the President is giving everyone their tasks -- because, apparently, a lot of the Cabinet people went in and didn't know that there were going to be tasks assigned at that point, because he had worked it out. And according to what we have very authoritatively and officially, the President turns to Iraq and says, "I believe Iraq was involved, but I don't have the evidence at this point." This is on Monday, the 17th. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can look in my notes and -see if I can find that. There are a lot of people who think that -- there's a lot of questions about state sponsorship and are there some state sponsors involved.

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Q This isn't for our piece, but I understand there is, kind of, growing concern about Iranian involvement maybe in this at the end. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There sure is. Completely off the record. We may find there's a lot more of Iran in this than there is in Iraq. And one of the ways I think it's going to" come out -- it's not in any sort of dramatic smoking gun. But, you know, if you think about it, these guys are all in the same business. They're in the terror business, they've all got their networks, they all know what each other is doing. And it would not be surprising if there's various marriages of convenience. At the same time these guys are sort of jockeying for power, there's probably marriages of convenience, where one organizationgoes to another for something they need -- whether it's false passports, whether it's transportation, whether it's whatever. So I think when we really -- and John McLaughlin is very good on this, and I'm sure he'll talk to you about it. His assessment is, in the end of the day, when we get through all of— this, we'll find there are a lot more inter-connections among these groups than we expected. That doesn't mean_ to^say necessarily they were in on September llth; it doesn't mean to say they had fore knowledge on it, particularly. But these folks are all in the business and it's a pretty dirty business. Q See what you have on -- because that becomes important on the -SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: statement, right?

This is a presidential

Q This is a presidential statement. you have it blocked off in time frames. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: what's he saying?

Look under the 17th,

And what am I looking for,

Q This is the 9:35 a.m. meeting in the Cabinet Room. It was six days almost to the minute since American Flight 77 struck the Pentagon. This is us writing here, I'm sorry. And he said, the purpose of this meeting is to assign tasks for the first wave of war against terrorism; it starts now. I want to sign a finding today. I want the CIA to be first on the ground. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Yes.

Q The Attorney General, CIA and the FBI will assist in protecting America from further attacks. He picks the, we'll attack with missiles, bombers and boots on the ground; let's hit them hard. Does that sound -Q We want to cause other countries like Syria and Iran to change their views. We want to hit as soon as possible.

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Q And going on, there is some talk about Pakistan, by Powell. Because he says he'd need time to work on the ultimatum. The President said he wanted a plan to stabilize Pakistan and protect it against adverse consequences of dealing with the U.S. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Right.

Q Right after that, I believe Iraq was involved, but I don't have the evidence at this point. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe they're involved, but I'm not going to strike them now. Q Is that what he said? I believe they're involved, but I'm not going to strike them now? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's my notes, but my notes are pretty shorthand. You know, I'm not a stenographer. It is interesting. There'-5- more than what you've got. I'm not going to give you more, but he really, in a very comprehensive way, lays out what needs to be addressed and what questions need to be asked. Q

- About Iraq, you mean, or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, in terms of the overall campaign against terrorism. I mean, I'll just -- my notes are here. The first three and three-quarters of my notes are all in rapid fire what the President is putting out, in terms of guidance points and questions. And it's—pretty impressive, because it's got everything; he didn't miss anything. Again, you know, he sits down and he says, all right, let me tell you -- for all these people who say it's the advisors who do everything -- boom. Q Is there any part we're not -- it sure would help, Steve, if you could give us this. I mean, we've gone through it and we know he barked out orders and, you know, this is the way it is; asked Andy Card and Dr. Rice to develop a plan for notifying Congress; very important to move fast, this is a new way; Shelton said it should take four days to a week to establish an air bridge. What's an air bridge? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's four days to set up the air bridge. He's -- let me think about what he probably means there.

Q means?

Longer to actually get the troops in place.

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Air bridge

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know what he means exactly. In the early days of the planning you have these kinds of problems. You can do bombers either from the United States or close-in bases. Q We can get that answer from somebody else. Is there anything else about what the President said that you can give us that -SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: through and see.

All right.

Let me go

Q It's critical to us to have the scope of this, because this is called decision day, and Rumsfeld ends it saying, this is chess, not checkers. (Laughter.) SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me go through. I'm just going to go through them page-by-page and see what we've got. He says he wants a legislative plan from the FBI. He wants a- plan to safeguard our facilities overseas -- that's in addition to the safe at home. So one of the things I would add is, the President is also thinking about locking down facilities overseas. You've got the MON, he says he's going to sign it. He wants the state to develop the modalities and the ultimatum -- is it unilateral, to do with others, how do we deliver it, do we do it today, is it public, is it private? I mean, again, these are the questions the President has answered. Powell, you give them to me. He says -- it's kind of interesting -- my goal is to -- a goal is to compel them to render the UBL network to give us access to it so we can destroy it. If they don't comply -- this is about the Taliban -- we'll attack them. Our goal is not to destroy the Taliban, but that may be the effect. Basically, if they don't go along, it's what's going to be. And over the period of time, there becomes I think-in some sense', as they fail to perform, there's also a sense where people say, well -(End of tape.) END 5:00 P.M. EST

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