T3 B22 9-11 Reading Fdr- Entire Contents- 1st Pgs For Reference 087

1 erronsm ana U

Fage 1 o i l 3

The Age of Sacred Terror Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002). 6: A Paradigm Lost -after WTC 1993, some White House, CIA, and other officials start learning curve -old paradigm on terrorism: • fight terrorists to strengthen deterrence; let no one think U.S. will just take it • work with other states to disrupt • use force when sensible • no concessions, pay-offs, appeasement (unlike Europeans and the one deviation, Reagan's calamitous arms sales to Iran) • no major int'l terrorist group had U.S. as its primary target • most groups are state-sponsored or national-liberation fronts • a second- or third-tier nuisance, not a strategic threat p. 220 -average annual fatalities were 26 -less likely than lightning strikes, bathtub drownings, or poisonous bites p. 220 -didn't threaten either U.S. power or large numbers of citizens -Jan. 25/93: Mir Aimal Kansi, lone Pakistani gunman, shoots AK-47 into cars outside CIA HQ in McLean, killing two -Feb. 26/93: Ramzi Yousef attacks WTC in worst foreign terror attack on U.S. soil -June 26/93: U.S. launches 23 Tomahawks at Baghdad's mukhabarat HQ after April 1993 plot to kill former President Bush with car bomb on Kuwait visit -first U.S. reprisal in 7 years, since Reagan's 1986 raid on Tripoli -1994: 30+ killed in Israel by Hamas and PIJ in rage over Oslo -July 1994: Hizballah bombs Buenos Aires Jewish center, killing almost 100 -CT aides see state sponsors as greatest threat -after Pan Am 103, Bush tries U.N. sanctions and int'l pressure to get out of cycle

Search - 1 Result - ("barton gellman" and "was mostly ambition")

Page 1 of 10

' Form: All Guided Search Forms > News Terms: ("barton gellman" and "was mostly ambition") (Edit Search)

The Washington Post, January 20, 2002 Copyright 2002 The Washington Post

washingionpost.com The Washington Post January 20, 2002, Sunday, Final Edition SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A01 LENGTH: 5414 words HEADLINE: A Strategy's Cautious Evolution; Before Sept. 11, the Bush Anti-Terror Effort Was Mostly Ambition BYLINE: Barton Gellman, Washington Post Staff Writer BODY: On a closed patch of desert in the first week of June, the U.S. government built a house for Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden would have recognized the four-room villa. He lived in one just like it outside Kandahar, Afghanistan, whenever he spent a night among the recruits at his Tarnak Qila training camp. The stone-for-stone replica, in Nevada, was a prop in the rehearsal of his death. From a Predator drone flying two miles high and four miles away, Air Force and Central Intelligence Agency ground controllers loosed a missile. It carried true with a prototype warhead, one of about 100 made, for killing men inside buildings. According to people briefed on the experiment, careful analysis after the missile pierced the villa wall showed blast effects that would have slain anyone in the target room. The Bush administration now had in its hands what one participant called "the holy grail" of a three-year quest by the U.S. government — a tool that could kill bin Laden within minutes of finding him. The CIA planned and practiced the operation. But for the next three months, before the catastrophe of Sept. 11, President Bush and his advisers held back. The new national security team awaited results of a broad policy review toward the al Qaeda network and Afghanistan's Taliban regime, still underway in a working group two and three levels below the president. Bush and his top aides had higher priorities — above all, ballistic missile defense. As they turned their attention to terrorism, they were moving toward more far-reaching goals than the death of bin Laden alone. Bush's engagement with terrorism in the first eight months of his term, described in interviews with advisers and contemporary records, tells a story of burgeoning ambition without the commitment of comparably ambitious means. In deliberations and successive drafts of a National Security Presidential Directive approved by Bush's second-ranking advisers on Aug. 13, the declared objective evolved from "rolling back" to "permanently eroding" and eventually to "eliminating" bin Laden's al Qaeda organization.

Page 2 of 34 8/12/02 TIMEMAG 28 8/12/02 Time Mag. 28 2002 WL 21959747

Page 1

Time Magazine Copyright 2002 Monday, August 12, 2002 Vol. 160, Issue: 7 Special Report: The Secret History They Had A Plan ; Long before 9/11, the White House debated taking the fight to al- Qaeda. By the time they decided, it was too late. The saga of a lost chance Michael Elliott Reported by Massimo Calabresi, John F. Dickerson, Elaine Shannon, Mark Thompson, Douglas Waller and Michael Weisskopf/ Washington; Hannah Bloch and Tim McGirk/Islamabad; Cathy Booth Thomas/Dallas; Wendy Cole and Marguerite Michaels/Chicago; Bruce Crumley/Paris; James Graff/Brussels; David Schwartz/Phoenix; and Michael Ware/Kabul

Sometimes history is made by the force of arms on battlefields, sometimes by the fall of an exhausted empire. But often when historians set about figuring why a nation took one course rather than another, they are most interested in who said what to whom at a meeting far from the public eye whose true significance may have been missed even by those who took part in it.

One such meeting took place in the White House situation room during the first week of January 2001. The session was part of a program designed by Bill Clinton's National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, who wanted the transition between the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations to run as smoothly as possible. With some bitterness, Berger remembered how little he and his colleagues had been helped by the first Bush Administration in 1992-93. Eager to avoid a repeat of that experience, he had set up a series of 10 briefings by his team for his successor, Condoleezza Rice, and her deputy, Stephen Hadley.

Berger attended only one of the briefings--the session that dealt with the threat posed to the U.S. by international terrorism, and especially by al-Qaeda. "I'm coming to this briefing," he says he told Rice, "to underscore how important I think this subject is." Later, alone in his office with Rice, Berger says he told her, "I believe that the Bush Administration will spend more time on terrorism generally, and on al-Qaeda specifically, than any other subject."

The terrorism briefing was delivered bureaucrat who had served in the first during the Clinton years to become the terrorism. As chair of the interagency

by Richard Clarke, a career Bush Administration and risen White House's point man on Counter-Terrorism Security

Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

//--:-.<.

1.1

.— r^lA,

ATLANTIC MONTHLy:

THE LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

r

First youfeel nervous about riding the bus. Then you wonder about going to a mall. Then you think twice about sitting for long at your favorite cafe. Then nowhere seems safe. Terrorist groups have a strategy—to shrink to nothing the areas in which people movefreely—and suicide bombers, inexpensive and reliably lethal, are their latest weapons. Israel has learned to recognize and disrupt the steps on the path to suicide attacks. We must learn too

BY BRUCE HOFFMAN

N

>. :•.-;$

1 •li3

early everywhere in the world it is taken for granted that one can simply push open the door to a restaurant, cafe, or bar, sit down, and order a meal or a drink. In Israel die process of entering such a place is more complicated. One often encounters an armed guard who, in addition to asking prospective patrons whether they diemselves are armed, may quickly pat them down, feeling for die telltale bulge of a belt or a vest containing explosives. Establishments that cannot afford a guard or are unwilling to pass on the cost of one to customers^simply keep their doors locked, responding to knocks with a quick glance through the glass^and an instant judgment as to whether this or that person can safely be admitted. What would have been unimaginable a year ago is now not only routine but reassuring. It has become the price of a redefined normality. In the United States in the twenty months since 9/11 we, too, have had to become accustomed to an array of new, often previously inconceivable security measures—in airports and other transportation hubs, hotels and office buildings, sports stadiums and concert halls. Although some are more noticeable and perhaps more inconvenient dian odiers, the fact remains diat diey have redefined our own sense of normality. They are accepted because we feel more vulnerable dian before. Widi every new threat to international security we become more willing to live widi stringent precautions and reflexive, almost unconscious wariness. Widi every new threat, that is, our everyday life becomes more like Israel's. The situation in Israel, where last year's intensified suicidebombing campaign changed die national mood and people's personal politics, is not analogous to that in die United States today. But die organization and die operations of die suicide bombers are neither limited to Israel and its conflict widi 40

die Palestinians nor unique to its geostrategic position. The fundamental characteristics of suicide bombing, and its strong attraction for die terrorist organizations behind it, are universal: Suicide bombings are inexpensive and effective. They are less complicated and compromising dian odier kinds of terrorist operations. They guarantee media coverage. The suicide terrorist is die ultimate smart bomb. Perhaps most important, coldly efficient bombings tear at die fabric of trust that holds societies together. All these reasons doubdess account for die spread of suicide terrorism from die Middle East to Sri Lanka and Turkey, Argentina and Chechnya, Russia and Algeria—and to the United States. To understand die power diat suicide terrorism can have over a populace—and what a populace can do to counter itone naturally goes to die society diat has been most deeply affected. As a researcher who has studied die strategies of terrorism for more dian twenty-five years, I recendy visited Israel to review die steps the military, die police, and the intelligence and security services have taken against a direat more pervasive and personal dian ever before. was looking at x-rays widi Dr. Shmuel Shapira in his office at Jerusalem's Hadassah Hospital. "This is not a place to have a wristwatch," he said as he described die injuries of a young girl who'd been on her way to school one morning last November when a suicide terrorist detonated a bomb on her bus. Eleven of her fellow passengers were killed, and more than fifty odiers wounded. The blast was so powerful diat die hands and case of die bomber's wristwatch had turned into lethal projectiles, lodging in die girl's neck and ripping a major artery. The presence of such foreign objects in the bodies of his patients no longer surprises Shapira. "We have cases with a nail in die neck, or nuts and bolts in the thigh ... a ball bearing in the skull," he said.

I

Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse David C. Rapoport

O

N 20 MARCH 1995, AUM Shinrikyo startled the world by launching a nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway. Many felt that terrorists finally crossed a threshold by producing and using an apocalyptic weapon, the "poor man's atomic bomb" as the literature so often suggests.' A second conclusion was that Aum confirmed a belief widespread among students of terrorism that religious groups are particularly attracted to these weapons. The first conclusion, that a threshold has been crossed, runs wildly against the facts. No one in the near future is going to see cities destroyed where tens of thousands die. Conventional explosives, like those used to create the Nairobi or Oklahoma City atrocities, will continue to inflict the overwhelming bulk of the casualties. The plain fact is neither chemical nor biological weapons presently are truly weapons of mass destruction in the way atomic weapons are; and they are certainly not so in the hands of terrorists.2 Misreading the Aum Shinrikyo experi-

ence, inter alia, could waste tens of billions of dollars. 1 With respect to the second conclusion, we have closed the book too quickly on who might be attracted to these weapons. The historical record indicates secular groups have sought to use such weapons more often t h a n religious groups. This will likely continue into the future too.

DIFFICULTIES IN DISCUSSING THE PROBLEM Before we turn to the reasoning, it will be useful to explain why this issue is so difficult to discuss. First, one cannot say much that is either new or certain about the matter, partly because there have been so few incidents, and we know so very little about those events. Groups gathered materials and sometimes made threats to use them but they did not employ them, and we do not know why.4 Beyond the absence of information, there is a second problem. We are dealing with

David C. Rapoport is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, Las Angeles, and Editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence. Professor Rapoport is also Fomulmjj Director of the Center for the Study of Religion at UCLA.

49

Studies in Conflict & Terronsm, 25:303-316, 2002 Copyright © 2002 Taylor & Francis 1057-610X/02 $12.00 + .00 DOI: 10.1080/105761002901223

Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11 BRUCE HOFFMAN RAND Arlington, VA, USA This article examines what has been learned since 11 September 2001 about the nature of twenty-first-century terrorism, the challenges that it poses, and how it must be countered. It attempts to better understand Usama bin Laden and the terrorist entity that he created and to assess whether we are more or less secure as a result of the U.S.-led actions in Afghanistan and the pursuit of the al Qaeda network. The article considers these issues, placing them in the context of the major trends in terrorism that have unfolded in recent months and will likely affect the future course of political violence.

A few hours after the first American air strikes against Afghanistan began on 7 October 2001, a pre-recorded videotape was broadcast around the world. A tall, skinny man with a long, scraggily beard, wearing a camouflage fatigue jacket and the headdress of a desert tribesman, with an AK-47 assault rifle at his side, stood before a rocky backdrop. In measured, yet defiant, language, Usama bin Laden again declared war on the United States. Only a few weeks before, his statement would likely have been dismissed as the inflated rhetoric of a saber-rattling braggart. But with the World Trade Center now laid to waste, the Pentagon heavily damaged, and the wreckage of a fourth hijacked passenger aircraft strewn across a field in rural Pennsylvania, bin Laden's declaration was regarded with a preternatural seriousness that would previously have been unimaginable. How bin Laden achieved this feat, and the light his accomplishment sheds on understanding the extent to which terrorism has changed and, in turn, how our responses must change as well, is the subject of this article. The September 11 Attacks by the Numbers The enormity and sheer scale of the simultaneous suicide attacks on September 11 eclipsed anything previously seen in terrorism. Among the most significant characteristics of the Received 29 March 2002; accepted 29 May 2002. A version of this article was presented at the "Workshop on the New Dimensions of Terrorism," sponsored by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 21-22 March 2002. Address correspondence to Dr. Bruce Hoffman, RAND, 1200 S. Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

303

Martha Crenshaw is the Colin and Nancy Campbell Professor of Global Issues and Democratic Thought in the Department of Government. Wesleyan University.

Hie United States and Coercive Diplomacy edited by Robert J. Ait and Patrick M. Crouin

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE PRESS Washington, D.C.

Coercive Diplomacy and the Response to Terrorism IVLVKTIIA CHENS 1 1 AW

KHKOKISM II \,s |'HO\KI> TO UK A DIIT'K.Ii(T TK.ST for coercive diplomacy. U.S. counlcrlerrorism policy cannot routinely meet the basic requirements ol the slralegy. When coercive diplomacy is applied, (he conditions (hat would make it successful are rarely met. \\hile (he United Slates has sometimes been effective in changing (he policies ol slates (hat instigate or assist terrorism, it has not found an appropriate mix of threat and reward (hat could constrain (he behavior of nonstate adversaries. This chapter Ionises on the U.S. response to terrorism from 1993 to the "war on terrorism" launched in 2001. It first outlines the general contours of the threat as il developed after the Cold War. Tin's overview is followed by analysis of (he general concept of coercive diplomacy in relation to terrorist strategies. The propositions thus generated are then ((-sled against (he instances of post-Cold War counterterrorism policy that most closely lit (he definition of the concept of coercive diplomacy. These cases, when military force was used or threatened, provide (he best basis lor evaluating (be success or failure ol (be slralegy. They include the retaliatory strike against Iraq in 1993, threats against Iran following (he bombing of U.S. military facilities in Saudi Arabia in 1996, cruise missile attacks against Sudan and Afghanistan in I99M, and efforts to compel the Taliban to yield Osama

The Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us? by Fareed Zakaria

Pagel of 12

Fareed Zakaria com About

Articles

Books.

Contact

Interviews, Etc

The Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us? To dismiss the terrorists as insane is to delude ourselves. Bin Laden and his fellow fanatics are products of failed societies that breed their anger. America needs a plan that will not only defeat terror hut reform the Arab world By Fareed Zakaria

A o the question "Why do the terrorists hate us?" Americans could be pardoned for answering, "Why should we care?" The immediate reaction to the murder of 5,000 innocents is anger, not analysis. Yet anger will not be enough to get us through what is sure to be a long struggle. For that we will need answers. The ones we have heard so far have been comforting but familiar. We stand for freedom and they hate it. We are rich and they envy us. We are strong and they resent this. All of which is true. But there are billions of poor and weak and oppressed people around the world. They don't turn planes into bombs. They don't blow themselves up to kill thousands of civilians. If envy were the cause of terrorism, Beverly Hills, Fifth Avenue and Mayfair would have become morgues long ago. There is something stronger at work here than deprivation and jealousy. Something that can move men to kill but also to die. Osama bin Laden has an answer—religion. For him and his followers, this is a holy war between Islam and the Western world. Most Muslims disagree. Every Islamic country in the world has condemned the attacks of Sept. 11. To many, bin Laden belongs to a long line of extremists who have invoked religion to justify mass murder and spur men to suicide. The words "thug," "zealot" and "assassin" all come from ancient terror cults—Hindu, Jewish and Muslim, respectively—that believed they were doing the work of God. The terrorist's mind is its own place, and h'ke Milton's Satan, can make a hell of heaven, a heaven of hell. Whether it is the Unabomber, Aum Shinrikyo or Baruch Goldstein (who killed scores of unarmed Muslims in Hebron), terrorists are almost always misfits who place their own twisted morality above mankind's. But bin Laden and his followers are not an isolated cult like Aum Shinrikyo or the Branch Davidians or demented loners like Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber. They come out of a culture that reinforces their hostility, distrust and hatred of the West—and of America in particular. This culture does not condone terrorism but fuels the fanaticism that is at its heart. To say that Al Qaeda is a fringe group may be reassuring, but it is false. Read the Arab press in the aftermath of the attacks and you will detect a not-so-hidden admiration for bin Laden. Or consider this from the Pakistani newspaper The Nation: "September 11 was not mindless terrorism for terrorism's sake. It was reaction

http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweelc/101501_why.html

6/7/2004