T3 B16 Dos-dod Statements On Terrorism 2 Of 2 Fdr- Entire Contents- Pdd- Reports- Articles- Excerpts- Withdrawal Notice- 1st Pgs For Reference

Extract frcmiiN'SDD 286

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd286.htr

[[Presidential Directives and Executive Orders!

UNCLASSIFIED Extract from NSDD 286

I. INTRODUCTION A. The Policy Context In discharging his constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations and for ensuring the security of the United States, the President may find it necessary that activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad be planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. Such activities, the failure or exposure of which may entail hiqh costs, must be conducted only after the President reaches an informed judqment regarding their utility in particular circumstances. To the extent possible, they should be conducted only when we are confident that, if they are revealed, the American public would find them sensible. This Directive ... sets forth revised procedures for presidential approval and review, through the National _ Security Council (NSC) process, of all "special activities" as defined by section 3.4(h) of Executive Order No. 12333 (December 4, 1981). These procedures are designed, inter alia, (1) to ensure that all special activities conducted by, or at the direction of, the United States are consistent with national defense and foreign policies and applicable law; (2) to provide standards ensuring the Secrecy of such activities even when the results become publicly knownror the activities themselves are the subject of unauthorized disclosure; and (3) to implement section 501 of the National Security Act of T947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 413), concerning notification to Congress of such activities. B. The Role of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the National Security Council Staff Within the framework and in accordance with the requirements set forth in NSDD 266, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (the "National Security Advisor") shall serve as manager of the NSC process and as principal advisor on the President's staff with respect to all national security affairs including special activities. The NSC staff, through the Executive Secretary of the NSC, shall assist the National Security Advisor in discharging these responsibilities. The National Security Advisor and the NSC staff themselves shall not undertake the conduct of special activities.

H. APPROVAL AND REVIEW OF SPECIAL ACTIVITIES A. Presidential Findings And Memoranda of Notification 1. Presidential Findings 6

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In all cases, special activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in foreign countries require, under the terms of section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2422), Findings by

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6/6/03 11:57 AM

/|j\n Bar Association

Volume 25, Number 1 STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY

May 2003

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National Security Lawin a Changed World: J/'i ' The Twelfth Annual Review of the Field 7^5 ^/ V Edited by Matthew Foley On November 2 1-22, 2002, the Standing Committee on Law and National Security of the American Bar Association; the Center foHtfational Security Law of the University of the Virginia School of Law; and the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security of the Duke University School of Law; cosponsored the twelfth annual conference devoted to the review of developments inthe field of national security law. This conference summary is our best pt to summarize the conference proceedings without confirming the remarks with each speaker. This document only a summary. This year also marked the 40th anniversary of the Standing Committee. One of the founding members of the Standing Committee is R. Daniel McMichael. Although his schedule prevented him from being with us, he sent a letter on the occasion of the Standing Committee's anniversary. In it, he described "the imperative upon which the Committee was based: the absolute necessity of building consensus among people of varying political and intellectual hues as to how our nation is to preserve its liberty under law in the face of those forces (and they never seem to go away) that would have it otherwise. " In closing, Mr. McMichael noted that "there is no single site upon which to erect a monument commemorating the founding of the Committee,~yet a monument does exist. It is the Committee, itself, its members and what they do. The monument still stands unblemished - and long may it be so. " I would extend the "monument" to include all of you who participate in the activities of the Committee through attendance at our conferences, panels, breakfasts, and other programs, or just by reading this newsletter. Your commitment to examining the important issues at the intersection of law and national security validates and sustains the vision of the Committee's founders. It is with these thoughts in mind that we continue the tradition of hosting the annual review of the field of national security law. -Suzanne E. Spaulding, Chair

Opening Remarks Suzanne Spaulding, Chair, ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security Suzanne Spaulding welcomed everyone to this conference marking the 40th Anniversary of the establishment of the Standing Committee on Law and National Security. She noted that the nation is still grappling with the implications of the changes highlighted by the attacks of September 1 1, 2001. At the Annual Review Conference at year, participants sought to define the relatively new term "homeland security." Yet, less than a year later, the '.cision was made to establish an entirely new Department for Homeland Security in what many have characterized as the greatest government restructuring since 1947. Similarly, for years the Annual Review conferences have included discussions on the relationship between law enforcement and intelligence. Shortly before the 2002 conference, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review determined that the "wall" that had been erected between these two communities within the FBI was never constitutionally required. The Court upheld a plan to bring the two communities closer together. Yet, at the same time, the National Security Advisor had convened a meetine to discuss erowint£ calls for pullin-cLxlomestic intelligence QUJ of FBI altogether and establishing a sepa-

Terrorism and U

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Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy Paul Pillar Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001). 1: Introduction -Clinton 1998 to UNO A: "terrorism is at the top of the of the American agenda—and should be at the top of the world agenda." 1 -successes: • frequency of attacks worldwide halved from mid-1980s to 1990s [but the attacks were deadlier]; • speed of solving big attacks such as Oklahoma City, WTC 1993, 1998 embassies; • cooperation bw. law enforcement and intell; • disrupted terrorist operations, such as FBI 1993 success in stopping Sudanese terrorists' plot to blow up NYC landmarks -1995-98: U.S. intell focus on UBL helps make 1998 case -narrow focus on body count ignores other costs of terrorism -mistake to focus on CBRN attacks; sensationalism -Clinton read a novel about terror attack on NYC w. bioengineered virus and asked U.S. experts to evaluate the real risk p. 4 -"If counterterrorism is conceived as a war, it is a small step to conclude that in this war there is no substitute for victory and thus no room for compromise." p. 5 -but still need finesse, accomodation, creativity; avoid absolutism -caricature of conventional school: "confrontational, fight-don't-fmesse stream of American thinking about terrorism" p. 8 -esp. on state sponsors, engagement may be shrewder over long haul, however easy to slam as soft -June 2000 National Commission on Terrorism: • rising danger to U.S., so step up efforts, esp. in intell and law enf. • "firmly target" state sponsors • direct "full force and sweep" of law to terror financing • prepare for WMD attacks

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Terrorism and U

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The Age of Sacred Terror Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002). 6: A Paradigm Lost -after WTC 1993, some White House, CIA, and other officials start learning curve -old paradigm on terrorism: • fight terrorists to strengthen deterrence; let no one think U.S. will just take it • work with other states to disrupt • use force when sensible • no concessions, pay-offs, appeasement (unlike Europeans and the one deviation, Reagan's calamitous arms sales to Iran) • no major intl terrorist group had U.S. as its primary target • most groups are state-sponsored or national-liberation fronts • a second- or third-tier nuisance, not a strategic threat p. 220 -average annual fatalities were 26 -less likely than lightning strikes, bathtub drownings, or poisonous bites p. 220 -didn't threaten either U.S. power or large numbers of citizens -Jan. 25/93: Mir Aimal Kansi, lone Pakistani gunman, shoots AK-47 into cars outside CIA HQ in McLean, killing two -Feb. 26/93: Ramzi Yousef attacks WTC in worst foreign terror attack on U.S. soil -June 26/93: U.S. launches 23 Tomahawks at Baghdad's mukhabarat HQ after April 1993 plot to kill former President Bush with car bomb on Kuwait visit -first U.S. reprisal in 7 years, since Reagan's 1986 raid on Tripoli -1994: 30+ killed in Israel by Hamas and PIJ in rage over Oslo -July 1994: Hizballah bombs Buenos Aires Jewish center, killing almost 100 -CT aides see state sponsors as greatest threat -after Pan Am 103, Bush tries U.N. sanctions and intl pressure to get out of cycle

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WH 0300615 Interview of the President by Bob Woodward and Dan Balz of The Washington Post, December 20, 2001. (2 hours) (000242) • President Bush says he'd asked the CIA (& NSC?) "to start thinking about how to get "them"" in June, 2001, starting w/ UBL and al-Q. Says "I hadn't seen a report yet, interesting enough," but that they'd been getting "some intelligence hits" throughout the summer, mainly focused on overseas. • Implies that at least one of the reasons he kept Tenet on as DCI was that he brought a lot of knowledge on terrorism and on UBL and al-Q to the administration.

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(000244) • "I know there was a plan in the works" before 9-11, though doesn't cite when it was to be presented (interviewers suggest 9-10), and "I don't know how mature the plan was." Mentions how impressed he was with Tenet's local knowledge presented immediately after 9-11, however, ie. "My point is that they had in their mind a plan. There's no question about it." • Re-Question on whether Bush wanted to have UBL killed before 9-11: /*STell, I hadn't seen a v\o that. IknewJhalw^jgjtejjyo—^ word is bring him to ' ^'/.justice." Statesjhat there was a significant diff^^^^ & after 9-TT. PreSTC]-?

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ancfothers]. And[Ijwaspregaredjto look at ajlanJhat WQuJdJxj a thoughtfj^plan that would Bring hirjiifijijui^ to do that." But didn't feel the —~^~ sense of urgency, angqr a (000248) » Immediately after the 9-11 attacks, looking toward a response: "I remember watching in frustration as American tried to wage a conventional war against a guerilla force in Vietnam. And I.. .just instinctively knew that we were going to have to think differently about how we're going to fight." • "The military strategy was going to take a while to unfold. I became frustrated—and let me say this on this point. Early on, the history will show that I asked for all options on the table, and knew that we were going to have to have what they call boots on the ground, knew we were going to have to have troops deployed.. .{But] it took a lot longer for us to get the appropriate air and rescue mission in place and the appropriate boots on the ground." • Confirms that at the Camp David meetings immediately after 9-11, Rumsfeld really didn't have any good instant options: "The whole focus was on the fact that there was limited—it was not a target-rich environment.. .1 took from that discussion that we were not going to be able to bomb our way to victory. That we were going to have to wage a different kind of war, which included—I wanted all options discussed. We discussed Cruise missiles only; Cruise missiles and bombers; Cruise missiles, bombers being B-2s, B-ls and B-52s; as well as Special Forces troops.

Page 1 of4 Created by A. Albion June 23, 2003

NSC 03000832 Interview of Dr. Condoleezza Rice by Bob Woodward (on deep background) October 24, 2001 (70 mins.) (368) • Rice: "Wejhiad.jnjhg late summer [nfMOl^-beeftworking on r.nnnterferrnrisrn and working onjal Qaeda, and working on trying to get serious about going after al Qaeda. And so, th6 principals and the President had abase of knowledge about this organization that probably three months earlier we wouldn't have had, because we'd been through this drill of how were we going to deal with al Qaeda. It was a major threat. We knew that they had done the embassy bombings, suspected they had done the Cole. We'd been through a summer where there was a lot of noise in the system." • Rice comments that Tenet had been very concerned about chatter, and it looked like an attack would occur abroad. "And, in fact, what we did was to button up abroad pretty effectively." Eg. mentions the Genoa G8, where a lot of security precautions had been taken; a couple of warnings about the President's security, one very serious. "And so we had done a lot abroad. One of the things that struck me is that the protocols for what you do abroad are pretty clear..." • Rice: "So the only point I'm making is that everybody was kind of on the same page about al Qaeda, having come out of this review that had been done." (369) • Woodward asks Rice if there was an action plan pending from this review—Rice responds that there was. "There was an action plan that probably would have been dated September 10th." States that it was a directive that would have gone to the President if not for 9-11. "So people were working the problem, and so there was a common basic knowledge about al Qaeda." (373) • Rice says Bush was thinking of a military response to 9-11 from the start: ".. .the President, I think, never even considered that he wouldn't at some point use military force." No consideration of negotiation with the Taliban. (378) • Rice (on recognition early on that this was a worldwide problem): ".. .because we had a database about al Qaeda, everybody knew it was worldwide. I think it wasn't until the intelligence briefing the next morning [9-15] by George that we actually knew it was 60 countries. I mean, that was news to people. But that it was widespread—I mean, we'd been dealing with it in the Philippines because of the kidnappings of those people. So we knew that this organization was worldwide." (379) • Rice re. Discussion at 9-15 War cabinet meeting, Camp David: "The financial piece was underway [—Rice says she thinks this had already been gotten underway at one of the earlier meetings]. The diplomatic piece was underway. And everybody was starting to think what Page 1 of 2 Created by A. Albion June 26, 2003

Testimony before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States July 9, 2003 The Rise and Decline of Al Qaeda By Rohan Gunaratna Introduction Five factors contributed to the rise of Al Qaeda: • First, the inevitability of history - Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, US assistance to the anti-Soviet multi-national Afghan campaign, and the resultant growth of Islamism. The defeat of the "communist army" by the ideology of Islamism (and material support from the West and the Middle East) reinforced the belief that the United States, the remaining superpower too could be defeated through guerrilla warfare and terrorism.1 As the proclaimed vanguard of the struggle, Al Qaeda attacked America's most outstanding economic, military and political landmarks on September 1 1, 2001, to show the way to the Islamic movements, that the US too could be attacked and destroyed. • Second, the international neglect of Afghanistan, especially by the US after Afghanistan, the frontline state had won the free world the greatest victory after the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War n. After the gravity of terrorism shifted from the Syrian controlled Bekka Valley in Lebanon to Afghanistan, the war-ravaged country evolved into a "terrorist Disneyland" hosting training and operational infrastructure for three-dozen Islamist groups. Until US led coalition intervention in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, Afghanistan trained several tens of thousands of terrorists and guerrillas. • Third, the US policy of disengagement and at times isolation frnm wnrlH affairs facilitating terrorist groups to grow in strength, size and influence worldwide qnH their state sponsors a free reign. When critical, US government engaged other governments not publics. The US government is reluctant, unable, and unwilling to engage in public diplomacy especially in the Muslim World. The American leaders must understand that future threats to the United States will be primarily from non-state actors spawned, strengthened and influenced by virulent ideologies preached non-governmental leaders/

1

While guerrilla groups target combatants, terrorist groups target non-combatants.

r.

CIPANTS Enacting a National Security Agenda February 23, 2000 St. Regis Hotel Washington, D.C. KIM R. HOLMES

CHAPTER V: ENACTING A NATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA

Vice President and Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies Presenters ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI Former National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter CASPAR WEINBERGER Former Secretary of Defense to President Ronald Reagan Commentators HELLE BERING Editor of the Editorial Page, The Washington Times ROBERT KAGAN

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER Syndicated Columnist PETER RODMAN

Former Deputy Assistant to President Ronald Reagan for National Security Affairs FAREED ZAKARIA Managing Editor, Foreign Affairs

"If there is going to be a new foreign policy by a new administration, it will have to begin with a vision, and it will have to be sold to the American people. " —Charles Krauthammer From the founding of the American republic until the middle of the 20th century, Presidents formulated and conducted the nation's foreign, defense, and national security policies through the Secretaries of State and War. After World War II, with pas1 sage of the National Security Act of 1947, the White House began I to exert greater control over the nation's security policies. The I legislation put the military services under a new umbrella, the I Department of Defense, created the Central Intelligence Agency "\) out of the wartime Office of Strategic Services, and estab' lished the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC's intended purpose was to "advise the President with | respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies related to the nation's security" and to compel the President to consult regularly with military experts. In recent years, the term "security" has expanded to include economic and trade ; issues, energy dependence, globalization, and other matters. President Harry S. Truman used the NSC as international situations warranted, Truman's successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, incorporated it fully into his decision-making apparatus, upgrading the position of Executive Director to Special Assistant for National Security. Eisenhower also used the NSC as he did his Cabinet; that is, as a deliberative body that assembled all parties with an interest in a particular matter to air and resolve differnces. In naming banker Robert Cutler to head this operation, isenhower established a precedent: The NSC director funclloned as a coordinator rather than as a policymaker. I Under President John F. Kennedy, NSC director McGeorge lundy operated as an advocate and operative rather than as a

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Campaign 2000 — Promoting the National Interest [Free Republic]

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FreeBspKbiic.com "A Conservative News Forum" [ Last I Latest Posts I Latest Articles I Self Search I Add Bookmark I Post I Abuse I Help! ] Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials sted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.

Campaign 2000 -- Promoting the National Interest Government Front Page Miscellaneous Keywords: CONDOLEEZZA RICE, NATIONAL SECURITY, BUSH CABINET, RUSSIA, CHINA Source: Foreign Affairs Published: January/February 2000 Author: Condoleezza Rice Posted on 12/14/2000 16:30:09 PST by Luther T. LIFE AFTER THE COLD WAR The United States has found it exceedingly difficult to define its "national interest" in the absence of Soviet power. That we do not know how to think about what follows the U.S.-Soviet confrontation is clear from the continued references to the "post-Cold War period." Yet such periods of transition are important, because they offer strategic opportunities. During these fluid times, one can affect the shape of the world to come. The enormity of the moment is obvious. The Soviet Union was more than just a traditional global competitor; it strove to lead a universal socialist alternative to markets and democracy. The Soviet Union quarantined itself and many often-unwitting captives and clients from the rigors of international capitalism. In the end, it sowed the seeds of its own destruction, becoming in isolation an economic and technological dinosaur. ^it this is only part of the story. The Soviet Union's collapse coincided with another great revolution. Dramatic changes in information technology and the growth of "knowledge-based" industries altered the very basis of economic dynamism, accelerating already noticeable trends in economic interaction that often circumvented and ignored state boundaries. As competition for capital investment has intensified, states have faced difficult choices about their internal economic, political, and social structures. As the prototype of this "new economy," the United States has seen its economic influence grow — and with it, its diplomatic influence. America has emerged as both the principal benefactor of these simultaneous revolutions and their beneficiary. The process of outlining a new foreign policy must begin by recognizing that the United States is in a remarkable position. Powerful secular trends are moving the world toward economic openness and — more unevenly — democracy and individual liberty. Some states have one foot on the train and the other off. Some states still hope to find a way to decouple democracy and economic progress. Some hold on to old hatreds as diversions from the modernizing task at hand. But the United States and its allies are on the right side of history. In such an environment, American policies must help further these favorable trends by maintaining a disciplined and consistent foreign policy that separates the important from the trivial. The Clinton administration has assiduously avoided implementing such an agenda. Instead, every issue has been taken on its own terms ~ crisis by crisis, day by day. It takes courage to set priorities because doing so is an admission that American foreign policy cannot be all things to all people ~ or rather, to all interest groups. The Clinton administration's approach has its advantages: If priorities and intent are not clear, they cannot be criticized. But there is a high price to pay for this approach. In a democracy as pluralistic as ours, the absence of an articulated "national interest" either produces a fertile ground for those wishing to withdraw from the world or creates a vacuum to be filled by parochial groups and transitory pressures. THE ALTERNATIVE American foreign policy in a Republican administration should refocus the United States on the national http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3a396611057d.htm

7/24/03

.omoting the National Interest (PART TWO) [Free Republic]

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itC.com "A Conservative News Forum" Latest Posts I Latest Articles I Self Search I Add Bookmark I Post I Abuse I Help! ] claimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials — ..ted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.

Campaign 2000 -- Promoting the National Interest (PART TWO) Government Miscellaneous Keywords: CONDOLEEZZA RICE, BUSH CABINET, FOREIGN RELATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY, RUSSIA, EUROPE, CHINA

Source: Foreign Affairs Published: January/February 2000 (volume 79, number 1) Author: Condoleezza Rice Posted on 12/14/2000 16:35:10 PST by Luther T.

This Is The Second Part Of Condi's Article In Foreign Relations Part One IsLHere, There is work to do with the Europeans, too, on defining what holds the transatlantic alliance together in the absence of the Soviet threat. NATO is badly in need of attention in the wake of Kosovo and with the looming question of its further enlargement in 2002 and beyond. The door to NATO for the remaining states of eastern and central Europe should remain open, as many are actively preparing to meet the criteria for membership. But the parallel track of NATO's own evolution, its attention to the definition of its mission, and its ability to digest and then defend new members has been neglected. Moreover, the United States has an interest in shaping the European defense identity — welcoming a greater European military capability as long as it is within the context of NATO. NATO has a very full agenda. Membership in NATO will mean nothing to anyone if the organization is no longer militarily capable and if it is unclear about its mission. America and our allies, the most daunting task is to find the right balance in our policy toward Russia and China. Both are equally important to the future of international peace, but the challenges they pose are very different. China is a rising power; in economic terms, that should be good news, because in order to maintain its economic dynamism, China must be more integrated into the international economy. This will require increased openness and transparency and the growth of private industry. The political struggle in Beijing is over how to maintain the Communist Party's monopoly on power. Some see economic reform, growth, and a better life for the Chinese people as the key. Others see the inherent contradiction in loosening economic control and maintaining the party's political dominance. As China's economic problems multiply due to slowing growth rates, failing banks, inert state enterprises, and rising unemployment, this struggle will intensify. It is in America's interest to strengthen the hands of those who seek economic integration because this will probably lead to sustained and organized pressures for political liberalization. There are no guarantees, but in scores of cases from Chile to Spain to Taiwan, the link between democracy and economic liberalization has proven powerful over the long run. Trade and economic interaction are, in fact, good — not only for America's economic growth but for its political aims as well. Human rights concerns should not move to the sidelines in the meantime. Rather, the American president should press the Chinese leadership for change. But it is wise to remember that our influence through moral arguments and commitment is still limited in the face of Beijing's pervasive political control. The big trends toward the spread of information, the access of young Chinese to American values through educational exchanges and training, and the growth of an entrepreneurial class that does not owe its livelihood to the state are, in the end, likely to have a more powerful effect on life in China. Although some argue that the way to support human rights is to refuse trade with China, this punishes isely those who are most likely to change the system. Put bluntly, Li Peng and the Chinese nservatives want to continue to run the economy by state fiat. Of course, there should be tight export controls on the transfer of militarily sensitive technology to China. But trade in general can open up the Chinese economy and, ultimately, its politics too. This view requires faith in the power of markets and economic freedom to drive political change, but it is a faith confirmed by experiences around the globe.

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UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Background interview with Len Hawley Type of event: Briefing Date: July 30, 2003, 12:30pm Prepared by: Bonnie D. Jenkins Team Number: 3 Location: 2100 K Street Participants - Leonard Hawley, interviewee Participants - Commission: Mike Hurley, Scott Allan, Alexis Albion, Daniel Byman, Bonnie D. Jenkins, Chris Kojm Classification: This was an unclassified briefing Background on the interviewee: Mr. Hawley provides advice on current policy issues in the executive branch including the NSC, State Department, and the US Joint Forces Command. Such policy advice includes CT issues. From 1999-2001, he was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for foreign policy engagement and political-military preparations regarding Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Eritrea-Ethiopa and the Congo. From 1997 - 1999 he was the Director of Multilateral Affairs at the NSC. He has worked with Benjamin, Simon and Clarke. Below are the highlights of his comments. Summary: Overall Policy Considerations The US must do two things to better prepare itself for CT: 1. Ensure there is unified direction on CT matters; and 2. Develop a coherent strategy to do intrusive, coercive action or for trying to do reform Policy makers need options. They require options up to the last point before using the military. Hawley supported getting the military more and more involved and becoming more intrusive. However, this raises a lot of questions. On the policy level, a lot of judgement calls must be made and there are many complex issues raised when there is intrusive action contemplated. The DoD military complained that the civilian policy makers were unwilling to make decisions regarding intrusive, quick operations. Policy makers did not want to make judgments because they would be held accountable. There is a great deal of risk aversion. Many civilians had no history with military planning and operations before and so did not feel comfortable in that environment. They did not want to sign off to kill someone. The policy process must go through so many hurdles and the quick timing needed to carry out operations often evaporates. The lesson is that we can no longer retain a cold war mentality or early 90's structure at the top level.

UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 3 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

52100

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/21/2008

BOX: 00005

FOLDER: 0010

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 2

DOC ID: 31207564

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RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS and DOD Statements on Terrorism... DOCUMENT DATE: 07/29/2003

DOCUMENT TYPE: Handwritten Notes

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Lunch with Len Hawley

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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THE BROOKINGS REVIEW

A New Organizing Principle !j for American National | Security? by James B. Steinberg |

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In his address to Congress nine days after the September 1 1 attacks, President Bush declared war on global terrorism and announced his intent to deploy "every resource at our command" to defeat terrorist networks and to treat states that harbor and support terrorism as "hostile regimes." The speech appeared to presage a political reorientation of U.S. foreign and security policy on a scale not seen since the early days of the Cold War, comparable in scope to the Truman Doctrine and the adoption of the strategy of containment in the late 1940s. •!

We helped reconstruct Europe and Japan and provided foreign aid ;j based on those same criteria. We supported a defense-industrial > Bookstore ! establishment to assure the wherewithal to sustain our technological edge. We even sent a man to the moon to demonstrate the superiority > Executive Education jj of Western democracy over Soviet totalitarianism and the command j> About Brookings :| economy. / Publications

• Syed Qutb - John L the Islamic World • Central Asia: Terro Religious Extremisi Regional Stability • Countering the Cal U.S., Hizb-ut-Tahri Religious Extremisi Central Asia Policy Briefs • The New National ! Strategy: Focus on States • The New National '. Strategy and Preer • The Bush National Security Strategy: Evaluation

Books & Journal To the extent that counterterrorism becomes a comparable, new organizing principle, it will have similarly widespread consequences for a broad range of U.S. policies. Nearly nine months after the September 11 attacks, it is now possible to see the extent—and the limits—of counterterrorism as an organizing principle for U.S. foreign policy. New Friends

© your view

After reading this opinion, The clearest impact of this strategic shift can tell us what you think. be seen in the reorientation of U.S. relations We'll post the most with key international partners, particularly in interesting comments. connection with the military operations in send YOUR VIEW Afghanistan. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration is Pakistan. Just before September 11, U.S. relations with Pakistan had sunk to unprecedented lows. Pakistan's nuclear weapons program had led to strict sanctions; formerly close military ties had been cut off; and further sanctions had been imposed when General Pervez Musharraf ousted the elected government of Nawaz Sharif in 1999. Pakistani support for Islamic militants in Kashmir threatened to land Pakistan on the U.S. terrorism list, and persistent economic mismanagement imperiled Pakistan's relationship with the International Monetary Fund.

• America Unbound Events • Balancing Civil Libe and National Secur the Post-9/11 Era: Challenge of Inforr Sharing • Phase III in the \Ni Terrorism? Challen Opportunities • The United States , France After the W Iraq

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Scholars • James M. Lindsay • Kenneth M. Pollack • Shibley Telhami

What a difference a day makes. Following the September 11 attacks and Musharraf's decision to provide political and military support to the U.S. effort to oust the Taliban, Musharraf became a welcome interlocutor, and a meeting was arranged with President Bush in New York. Sanctions were quickly lifted, and new aid totaling $1 billion was offered along with promises of more debt relief. In the war against

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Martha Crenshaw is tbe Colin and Nancy Campln tvofessor of Global Issues and Democratic Thought in the Department ol Government. Wesleyan University.

The United Slates and Coercive Diplomacy edited by Robert J. Ait and Patrick M. Crouin

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE PRESS Washington, D.C.

Coercive Diplomacy and the Responseto Terrorism MAKTIIA CR ENS HAW

M n \ i'i!o\i;n 'in in; \r TI:.ST for convive diplomacy. U.S. counferterrorism policy cannot routinely meet (lie basic requirements ol (lie strategy.When coercive diploinacy is applied, (be conditions that would make it successful are rarely met. \\bile (be United Slates lias sometimes been effective in changing (be policies of stales (bat instigate or assist terrorism, it bas not loimd an appropriate mix of (breat and reward (bat could constrain (be bebavior of nonstale adversaries. This cbapler locnses on (be U.S. response to terrorism from 1993 to (be "war on terrorism" launcbed in 2001. It first outlines the general contours ol (be (breat as it developed alter (be Cold War. This overview is followed by anal)sis ol (be general concept of coercive diplomacy in relation to terrorist strategies. Tbe propositions (bus generated are (hen tested against tbe instances of post-Cold War counterterrorism policy tbal most closely lit (be definition of tbe concept ol coercive diplomacy. These eases, wben military force was used or (breatened, provide (be best basis lor evaluating (be success or failure of tbe strategy. Tbey include tbe retaliatory strike against Iraq in 1993, (breats against Iran following tbe bombing of U.S. military facilities in Saudi Arabia in 1996, cruise missile attacks against Sudan and Afgbanistan in 1998. and efforts to compel tbe Taliban to yield Osama