T3 B14 Allan Afghan Fdr- 7-20-01 Letter From Peter Thomsen To Christina Rocca-dos Re Afghanistan 902

Center 'or Afghanistan Studies Cm,-ha. Necry.iKa 53132-0006 (402) 554-2375 FAX: [402) 554-3631 WorlaWice 'Wen- http:.. www.anomaha.edu/~world Internet: [email protected]

^ersity of Nebraska ai Omaha Office of international Studies and Programs

July 20, 2001 Christina Rocca Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Room 6254 Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520-6258 Dear Christina, Thank you for receiving me and for suffering through my debriefing on the trip James Ritchie and I took with Abdul Haq to visit Masood in Dushanbe, and our subsequent visit to Rome to meet Zahir Shah and his entourage. All indications are that fighting in Afghanistan this year will once again be inconclusive. Tragic as the situation is, the continuing stalemate will permit some beneficial trends to mature before the Taliban's departure leaves a political vacuum. One positive trend—the most important one— is slow movement among anti-Taliban Afghans towards more cooperation inside Afghanistan in both political and military areas. The Vendrell organized meeting in Berlin has turned out to be a venue where key Afghans with influence inside Afghanistan are, on the sidelines, discussing a mechanism for such coordination. They include Abdul Haq, Abdullah, Haji Kadir and one of the Karzais. In the June meetings with Abdul Haq and Masood, I stressed the importance of a countrywide network of commanders and tribal leaders inside Afghanistan to complement whatever evolves from the project of a Loya Jirga office in Rome. Masood agreed, but (as Abdullah later reiterated over dinner in Washington) said that the members of the network inside Afghanistan must qualify through an active presence on the ground inside Afghanistan. Membership cannot be extended to the many Afghan talking heads outside the country who profess to have a base inside Afghanistan but do not. The Rome office, even if it achieves thirty percent of its potential (five percent?) can prove useful in the short and medium run. Zahir Shah's imprimatur could provide a loose University oi NearasKa at Omjrj

Un, ^r;,i;y ,-,! M.-nr i-> i M> r.\-, :~;i—-::

.y^.-y •;.'.. -• \:".".-'.:.k >.-'_ v.i.n

_.-. •.^•\::i\ v iecra^k^ .it Ksarnev

umbrella for Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns to cooperate together on a national plane. The Loya Jirga office and the anti-Taliban grouping inside Afghanistan could liaise with each other. The office, if it succeeds under Rome's aegis, or if it is re-established without any direct ties to Rome, could evolve into a Loya Jirga council and interim government representing Pashtun and non-Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. Needless to say, experience has proven that Rome is unlikely to deliver. Still, the Loya Jirga office concept is worth pressing to see if at least some part of Zahir Shah's potential as a symbol of national unity can be mined. Inconclusive fighting this year will allow these trends to develop, leading to a political entity which will replace the Taliban when it collapses. It may emerge from the Loya Jirga office or directly from the mechanism created inside Afghanistan which Abdul Haq, Masood and others are discussing. To quote a prominent American's wordsmithing last July, the United States no longer has the luxury to ignore Afghanistan. Indeed, in the Balkans-to-India arc of crisis, an Afghanistan settlement is perhaps the only area where the Bush administration can score a foreign policy triumph, including on bin Ladin. To be frank, it is unfortunate that we still lack a comprehensive foreign policy on Afghanistan, with a clear set of policy goals and implementary tracks to achieve them. I hope you and others in the Bush administration can launch and direct such a policy. Also, hopefully, the fresh policy will not, unrealistically, depend on Pakistan voluntarily changing its approach. That just will not happen, and was one of the hang-ups that paralyzed the Afghan policy of the two Clinton administrations. It would also be a mistake to go the ca route. The moderate Afghans who can ultimately turn things around in Afghanistan rightfully resent what the Agency did in past years. The Agency on its part harbors negative views of Abdul Haq and other nationalistic Afghans. Despite our strenuous efforts at the time, the Agency stubbornly adhered to its counterproductive tactics which have helped produce the present extremist ascendancy inside Afghanistan. They should not be "unleashed" again. It is in American interest to implement a much more active and effective Afghan policy geared to assisting the Central Asia region, as well as Afghanistan, out of the current mess. The policy should address the outer circle, centered on an international conference. I tried to provide some ideas in this direction in the July 20,2000 congressional testimony, Foreign Affairs and Fletcher Forum articles. Regarding the inner circle, I would suggest that the U.S.G. retain at least part of the FY 2001 funds earmarked for assisting Afghan peace to bolster the Loya Jirga Office if it gets off the ground in the next two months.

Again, let me express my thanks to you for the meeting in Washington. I also appreciated the opportunity to spend time with Al, Jeff and Steve.

Warm regards,

Peter Tomsen Ambassador in Residence