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THE WHITE HOUSE

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January 16Jer8>(Jgjattacks

INTERVIEW OF SENIOR ADMINISTRATION BY

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9^^ Nrfional Security AdvIS>, / Stephen Hadley) / J '

BART GELLMAN, WASHINGTON POST 2:20 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Why don't you tell me what you're looking for, and then we'll go from there. I think I know, but you may want to just -Q Sure. Regarding what amounts to par-t three of the December series. So it's time to look across the gamut of U.S. government functions at what was the war on terror like before 9/11. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Q

Got it.

This one is exclusively during your period.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Right.

Q S_CL military intelligence, Treasury, diplomacy is the key focuses. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. I tried to do a little chronology, and I can walk you through it and you can push it. It is going to be focused on al Qaeda, because in this office with the deputies, when you said terrorism, that was what I was focused on. Q

That's my focus .

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There were other things we were doing in this time frame. I know you're going to see Dick Clarke. He can give you the broader picture of some of the other things that were going on. During the transition we talked to Dick, and he said one of the top priorities of the administration has got to be to focus on al Qaeda; that we need a comprehensive strategy for dealing

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with al Qaeda; that in his view, we hadn't had one and the threat was sufficient enough to warrant it. And he gave us in the transition kind of a, sort of the outlines of what needed to be addressed in that kind of comprehensive strategy, so that -Q

Do you have a date on this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The transition isn't very long, so it's sometime in December to January; but I don't have a date. But it's probably -- it's probably early January in 2001. And then when we get in, on the 25th, I asked the folks w_ho were here functioning to propose a major presidential policy reviews or initiatives, so we could begin to generate the list of things we needed to look at. And Dick came back the same day with a memo saying, we need to look at al Qaeda. And it was, one, we need a comprehensive strategy about al Qaeda; but, also, al Qaeda affects our pelicy about Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia and North Africa and the Gulf States, so we need to look at it_in a broader framework. That was his message. We needed to look narrowly at the issue of further assistance to the opposition in the Taliban, which was mostly the Northern Alliance during that period; Massoud and the Northern Alliance forces were very much on the defensive. The question was, should we be doing something more to keep them alive until we figured out what our overall strategy would be. And, secondly, should we be doing more to assist the Uzbeks as they dealt with^the IMU threat, which was closely linked to al Qaeda. And, therefore, enlist Uzbeks in dealing with al Qaeda, as well. And those were the narrow issues that he posed. Q

Do you know or estimate how long the memo is?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Q

How long the memo is?

Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's three pages, with some attachments. And his strategy paper is dated December 2000. Q

It doesn't have a day on it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It does not. It may; it may. The reference I have -- I don't have a copy of it here in this book -- the reference to it says December 2000. So he chairs a working group and, basically, what we said to him was go develop it and identify the issues we have to address.

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And he begins in the January to March time frame doing so. And in March, he begins work on a draft NSPD, which is a decision document, it's called a National Security Presidential Directive -- signed by the President, that would lay out what the new strategy ought to be, or the more -- the comprehensive strategy on al Qaeda should be. We had a meeting, a deputies committee meeting on April 30th. I told your colleague, Bob Woodward, about this and I told him it was April 23rd. It's actually April 30th, I went back and looked at that, at the date. And we had our first meeting to talk about these issues. And we addressed, as you might expect, what's our overall approach to al Qaeda. We talked about what we could do to increase our aid to the Uzbeks. We talked about what we could do to increase assistance to the Northern Alliance. We talked about going after, more aggressively, al Qaeda's fundraisings. And at that point, the Treasury Department was standing up something -called the Foreign Asset Tracking Center, which you may know about, which was going to help run down the funding. — And we also talked about the need for a public diplomacy strategy to go along with this. And, finally, the need for developing a strategy for dealing withr the Taliban and dealing with Pakistan. Q

Public diplomacy, chiefly in the Arab world?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, largely in the Arab world -- what was VOA doing, what was their programming like? Should we supplement in some way what VOA was doing?

—

We then commissioned a series of papers to sort of get all this -- one of the problems is, early on in an administration_-and we found it, clearly, on this issue -- you didn't have any political level people around who could do this work. So we started some of this work -- Dick Clarke was very active. But we didn't have political level people in State and, particularly, Defense. So it's hard to do a sort of rethinking strategy that reflects the political view of a new administration, when you don't have political appointees to deal with. And the nice thing was in the, sort of the May-June time frame, political appointees start showing up to these meetings. You know, early on, the only political appointees in the room were Scooter Libby and me, and that was it. So in May and June we kind of get this thing rolling. In May, Treasury stands up that Foreign Asset Tracking Center. Q I actually didn't think that was settled. I mean, I know that they were beginning to contemplate it, but it wasn't -557

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This says it was stood up in May, but, you know, I've just got this note that passed from Roger Cressey. I assume he's right about that, but I don't know. It's a second-hand source here. We had taken some decisions in April 23rd -Q

Thirtieth?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: April 30th. We were implementing them in May and June. And then in June, we had a review of the accompanying strategy on Pakistan on June 29th, on Pakistan and with respect to the Taliban on June 29th. And then on July 16th we have a second situation where -- meeting where we sort of bring our Taliban strategy and our al Qaeda strategy together. And at that point, we have sort of brought the pieces together and we've got a draft NSPD on al Qaeda, which we think is pretty good. And we submit that to the principals. And the principals have a meeting on it on August 13th. Sorry, the materials are distributed to the principals on August 13th, and there is_a meeting on the subject on September 4th. And September 4th, the principals basically approve the NSPD on al Qaeda. Q

Basically or -- I mean, it's not done?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's got to be signed by the President. So they approve it~to be sent forward to the President on September 4th. And then we get September llth. Q So there's no further work to be done, they don't ask for amendments or -SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

No, ready to go, in the

can. Now, that document is then -- September llth comes. And during the month of September, basically we -- in some sense, we launched the global war on terrorism. And the al Qaeda NSPD needs to be put in the context of a global attack against terrorism. And what we basically do then is revise the whole package in the following way. We put a front end on it, which is a document, it's an NSPD, which doesn't finally get signed until October 25, but we're — already well into implementing. Q

What's the number?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to give the number. Because if I give you the number, you know how many there are and all that stuff. That's one thing we don't give out; I talked to Condi about that. It's somewhat unpretentiously titled "Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States." And the front of it is a brief document of a couple pages that talks about the goal, the objectives and the strategy of the global war on terrorism. And then, attached as Annex A, is the document for eliminating the terrorist threat posed by al Qaeda. And the theory was, as you go after other terrorist organizations of global reach, you will add other strategy annexes. But this first one was going to be al Qaeda. And that document is, word for word, the document -- or almost virtually word for word the document that was approved by the principals on September 4th. Q So it's not intensified or accelerated or new elements of it taken at that time? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's really not, because the strategy -- and I'm going to sort of take a quick eyeball here and make sure what I told you is just right -- because the strategies actually, we decided, pretty good and pretty appropriate. Let me do just one thing here. Q

But I mean, how big is this document?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION

OFFICIAL:

I'll get that.

Let me water that back. I can see that there are -- it's a little longer; the paragraphs are basically the same; the headings are the same. But the paragraphs are a little longer, so it does get expanded somewhat. But the basic elements are the same. And what's happened is that -- and why it's really ready to go -- is the fact that it's substantially the same, probably 85 to 90 percent the same, same headings, same focus. It has embedded in it a series of tasks to the intelligence community to develop better intelligence sources and to begin to develop ties to potential opposition in Afghanistan. Q

Inside?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Inside Afghanistan. And George and his people have been developing that plan in parallel. So that is why, you know, when the NSPD is finally approved by the principals in early September, George has pretty much got his plan done. So that's why at the much-celebrated meeting at Camp David, George can -- when the President turns to George and says,

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what's your plan for dealing with al Qaeda as an intelligence and covert action challenge, George can basically put it down on the table, because he's developed it already. Q Is this an emphasis on push to an opposition inside Afghanistan? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION just a minute.

OFFICIAL:

I can talk about that in

The other piece I want to say is that there was also an appendix to that NSPD, a tasking to do some military planning, which was not on the same time table as George's, because the assumption implicitly was you'll do the --"George's piece go first, and then if you needed, the military piece will come on after. So, again, at the meeting at Camp David, surprise, surprise, the military presents some options, but doesn't have a full plan. And that's right, ^because our concept was basically phased. And the concept was basically to support opposition and to encourage opposition to the Taliban within the country. But it got phased-in in the following way. The Afghan strategy paper that went with all of this, the sort of Taliban strategy paper, initially started out as two options: you can go to the Taliban and say, turn over the al Qaeda, sever your ties, expel all the terrorists, close the training camps and we're prepared to deal with you -- even though he didn't like that regime much. The alternative option was to begin now to work with opposition groups to try to turn them against the Taliban and overturn the regime or, at least if not overturn the regime, at least begin to pressure the Taliban regime so that they would turn over the al Qaeda, recognizing that you would run the risk or would finally have the opportunity to topple the regime. Those were presented to the deputies as two options, and what we did is we fused them because they were effectively timed. You could go to the Taliban now, tell them to turn over the al Qaeda and get out of the terrorist support business. But at the same time, you could begin extending your ties to these various tribal groups so that should the Taliban not go along, you would have already built an infrastructure of ties to tribal groups that would allow you to encourage them to move against the Taliban, which would either put pressure on the Taliban to get them to go along or, ultimately, overturn them. In a funny sort of way, if you look at the President's statement to the joint session of Congress, he adopts that strategy but in a very telescope way, in light of the events of September llth. He gives the Taliban an ultimatum. He gives them a period of time to respond. They don't. And so early in

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October, we go into phase two and start moving and encouraging the opposition to Taliban. The difference, of course, is that because of September llth, there is a military option that comes in right on top of what George is doing._ And in the period from September llth until early October, you develop what is a new feature of it, which is this integration between what George's people are doing on the ground and what the special operations forces are able to do. Q All right. So now I'm stopping at the llth, and so the stuff you're talking about is good as it reflects the state of play before. ~ SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Right.

Q So, clearly, the large military campaign to oust the Taliban is not contemplated on September 4th? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is -- we've asked them to do some planning for it because we think we may need it. But the notion really is approach the Taliban, tell them they need to get out of the terrorist business. At the same time, through the covert side, be developing your infrastructure of contacts' that would allow you to support opposition of the Taliban_ and put pressure on the Taliban to sever their ties with al Qaeda. And if that doesn't work, have available to you military options that would allow you to take on the Taliban directly. That was basically the plan as of September -- the plan that gets briefed that is in the NSPD and gets briefed to the principals on _ September 4. Q There's a trade-off, analytically, between supporting the internal opposition and supporting the Northern Alliance, Pashtuns don't like. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're the same in our view. In our view, you could -- the opposition was where you found it. And that, indeed, it was important if you weren't going to polarize the country, to be having ties and encouraging revolt both in the Northern Alliance and in the southern Pashtun tribes. And the strategy from the very beginning involved your doing both. Q But there is a trade-off in effectiveness, is the idea that if you're seen to be providing material and other support to the Northern Alliance, you're going to piss off the Pashtuns. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's why you do both from the get-go, and we did do both from the get-go. And the problem was that the Northern Alliance, of course, took to the battlefield a lot quicker than did the southern tribes, because

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they were more oppressed by the Taliban regime than were the southern tribes. But from the very beginning, we wanted to not make a tradeoff, not make a choice. And we, from the very beginning, articulated a vision for a post-Taliban Afghanistan in which all tribes would be able to participate and which would have a central authority, but would have a high degree of autonomy so that the tribes would be able to largely run their own affairs. Because that, in our judgment, was the characteristic of the government during those periods of Afghanistan's history when it was more or less stable. Q As you see it on September 4th, what links and support are you offering the opposition, meaning the range from money, nonlethal, lethal, intelligence, material support? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: those. Q accept?

The plan includes all of

Sequenced or just all at once, whatever they can

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It sort of depends. One of the things you do to George is you say, this is what we want. Now you go to develop a-plan to do it. And the NSPD isn't the plan,"the NSPD is the authorization. Q Is there a corresponding, sort of, you know, name for a plan on George's side? *SENIOR ADMINISTRATION what he called it. Q

But

OFFICIAL:

You need to talk to George,_

he won't.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION MR. ANTON:

OFFICIAL:

-

I don't know.

He did come out to say hello, however. '

Q But you're saying, I mean, in what George produced, all of the above is part of the plan -- lethal and nonlethal aide, and material and money, intelligence? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

Correct.

Yes.

Q And that's directed to commence -- say, had the President signed off on it, it would have been directed to commence immediately? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It had a diplomatic -- as you can tell, because I described to you how he did it, the plan had diplomatic intelligence, financial, military, law enforcement, all aspects to it. It was basically to start

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promptly, immediately, but it was not clear how fast it would all get done.

Q

What would it cost?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We had a line in it, and I am not sure I can tell you what it was. As he signed it, it did not have a number. Q And was there some other place where there's a number? You've seen the figure published of $200 million twice and also $125 to $200? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Q here.

Hold on a minute.

Yes, please.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't have it in You should call Dick Clarke and ask him that question.

Q Will do. I thought the analysis of the Northern Alliance was that since they're getting money and arms from Iran and Russia, that's not their principle constraint. Their principle constraint is men and, perhaps, fighting intensity. So why does giving them those things help them? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION'OFFICIAL: That's not true. When we got into this, we found there was a real shortage of hardware and ammunition in the Northern Alliance forces. And one of the challenges in the opening weeks was to get that"to them, and we did it in two—different ways. We got and moved in and delivered to them large amounts of equipment" ourselves. But, quite frankly, we also gave them money and let them buy it, a good chunk of which came from Russia -- but not just from Russia. So they were outnumbered, sometimes dramatically outnumbered. They were outgunned and short on equipment and ammunition. That's how it started out. Q But, for example, when they lost Mazir e Sharif and the other provincial cities, I thought the analysis was because they were outnumbered, not that they ran out of ammo or that they were outgunned. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All I can tell you -- I can't tell you about the -- I can tell you in the opening days after September 11 and after October, when we started this, there were shortages, and we heard loud and clear from these folks that they needed equipment.

Q

But is that the same analysis you have in the run-up to

9/4?

r

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The analysis we have is that they're going to need all of those things. If you want to get into details about what was going to have to go and which commander, you'll have to talk to George. But the analysis was that they needed all of those things. And the other thing was, of course, we were going to have to encourage them to rise and to give what kind of operational support we could to them.

Q Now, there you're speaking mainly of a Pashtun opposition? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm talking about the Northern Alliance, as well as south. Remember, the Northern Alliance had been largely defeated by this force. People forget, they had been pushed. The Northern Alliance was largely in control of that government ^nd was pushed from power by the Taliban, and had a small sliver of the north. And then bin Laden shrewdly, before he started September llth, killed Massoud. Q

That's 9/9.

What's your reaction here to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION Q

OFFICIAL:

~

To what? _

Massoud's death.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a blow. It's a blow. On the other hand, it was also a polarized victory. So, you know, it's both a blow and an opportunity. I need to check with Condi, just a minute. (Interruption to interview.) SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The other thing I should say -- having just looked at one of these documents -- is, again, in the run-up, the strategy with respect to al Qaeda is as I described: approach them, tell them that they -Q

You're on the Taliban?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Taliban. Q

I'm talking about the

Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Deliver the message that they need to solve the UBL-al Qaeda issue, that said they need to get rid of them -- close the camps, expel them; and the same time develop the ability to increase pressure on the Taliban. If they don't -- and that involved the outreach to the opposition that we talked about. And the thought there as either to split the Taliban away from al Qaeda or to exploit fissures within the Taliban, so that perhaps the leadership would split and some faction would come forward that was prepared to turn over the al

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Qaeda. Or if that didn't work, then we might have to put pressure on the Taliban directly, and we had developed some, as I say, military options to do that. Q More than supporting the opposition? Military options -- essentially, direct U.S. military to attack? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. We asked this military to develop -- to begin -- this is, again, begin developing options to do that. Q What sort of scale are we talking about? presumably, the scale of pro-September ll_th?

Not,

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Options to go against al Qaeda_and their leadership command, control, communications and training facilities. And also to develop options for targets against the Taliban, including leadership, command and control, ground forces and logistics. So at that point we're developing options. So you—ean see the strategy. There's a diplomatic front end. If that doesn't work, we've laid the groundwork to have ties to the opposition from that unrest and uprising within the opposition to press the Taliban. If the Taliban decides to give up al Qaeda, great. If the Taliban fissures and we get al Qaeda that way, fine. If not, we've got military planning underway so we would at that point have the option to use military force against them directly. So it's viewed as kind of a sequence as of September 4th. And, of course, what September llth does is telescope all of that together. But my only point was the basic planning and the basic strategy had been developed. Q So the direction to the military to create these options, both against al Qaeda and against Taliban comes on -well, the decision to make the direction is 9/4, and it's ready for the President's signature? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Q

Correct.

But the options have not yet been developed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: right.

Correct.

That's exactly

Q Okay. I understand more about the pressure on the Taliban than I do about al Qaeda right now. What new is there on al Qaeda? That is to say, the last administration, as I wrote about, was going after, you know, a handful of top leadership, hoping to get enough intelligence for a strike. What are you doing differently in terms of your direction to the military? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: the military?

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In terms of direction of

f

Q Yes. When you direct the military to develop options against al Qaeda, you're hoping for stuff that goes, perhaps, beyond attacks on bin Laden and his lieutenants. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: read it to you again. It's --

I read it to you.

I'll

Q The leadership command, control, communications and training. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I mean, leadership, command and control, training and logistics facilities. That's what we talk about at that point. And I guess I^would say -- and against the Taliban. It's all of those things, including the ground forces^. Q As you sequence it, though, why isn't the al Qaeda part immediate, since they're plainly -- the United States, the sequencing for the Taliban makes sense, because you're trying to exert a decision. But there's- no decision for al Qaeda as to -SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But it's pretty clear at that point that you're not going to get -- you've got -- the Taliban is a protective shield for al Qaeda. And the genius of what the President said shortly after September llth is that this is about the terrorists and those that give them safe haven. And the premise was, you either had to get the Taliban to give up al Qaeda, or you were going to have to go after both the Taliban and al Qaeda, together. That's the premise. But that as long as al Qaeda is in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban, you don't have an al Qaeda-only option, effectively. You're going to have to treat it as a system and either break them apart, or go after them together. Because the relationship is too close and too symbiotic. And to think that you could deal with al Qaeda without dealing with the Taliban didn't make any sense. Q Now, the declared U.S. diplomatic position on Afghanistan, right up until this time -SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: excuse me -Q

And the other thing is,

Please.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Are you really prepared to show some seriousness of going after this, or you're not -- and one of the things -- again, I know it's outside September llth, but -- the planning that we are calling for is, as you can see, as I describe it, you can't do all those things just with cruise missiles. If you're going to do the things I describe and what the military was chosen -- was directed to plan for, you're going

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to have to use air forces and you're going to have to use ground forces. And that's what they were told to do. The belief was that's the only way you can both do the job and also on parallel, it also shows that you're serious about the job, if you're prepared to-make that kind of commitment against terrorism. I think the two things that the President does after September llth that are implicit in this strategy before, it's not just about al Qaeda, it's about the Taliban, because it's not just about terrorists, it's also about those that give them aid, comfort and protection. _ And then, the second is, you've got to be serious about it, you can't say no casualties and stand off weapons only, you've got to go in and put boots on the ground and American young men and women at risk, in order both to get the job done and also to show that you're serious about it. And that's really what the P-r-esident -- those are the two things that I think characterize the approach of the administration. Q Manifestly, they characterize it after September llth. What can I do to, sort of, document that they characterize the _ approach before September llth? - SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I "can't do any better than what I've told you, which was the strategy, which is to say you've got to deal with both Taliban and al Qaeda. And having read to you the tasking that the military was given, you can only do that with all of your military forces. You can't just do it with the cruise missiles. Q

What I hear --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: better than for you, sorry.

I mean, I can't do any

Q What I hear is that they've developed options like that before. The question is, what's your posture on the use of them -- again, in early September? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, I guess, you know, we won't really know, because the strategy doesn't unfold. I mean, you don't -- as I said, it's a phased strategy that we lay out. And in some sense, whether you have to use the military option is going to depend in some sense whether the first part of your strategy fails or succeeds. The other thing I would say is that the covert piece, what George has asked, planned and then prepared to do, is also much more robust and involves putting people in country and putting them at risk. 567

So I guess I can't answer that question, because I can't go through what would have happened if we hadn't had September llth. I can tell you the strategy we had, the sequencing we had in mind and what we were prepared to do, and the planning we did to prepare to do it. I can't show you that we did, because we didn't have the events, and I guess I can't prove to you that we would have done it, other than everybody agreed that this was what we need to be prepared to do. So you know, I can't prove -- I can't prove it to you, because we didn't actually do it until September llth. So I don't know what to tell you. Q Where does all this stand on the administration's, sort of, list of top national security priorities in the period I'm talking about? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's pretty interesting that a lot of people -- I'll give you this -- I'll give you a little flavor for that. Let me help you a little bit. This is the policy thinking that goes along with this. The policy thinking that goes along with it is that it's our policy to eliminate the threat to the United States and to friendly governments posed by al Qaeda. _ Actually, this is a good-point. This is in the -- let me get -- this is in the document. This will help you, actually. I'm sorry, I'm beginning to get a little frustrated that I can't answer you, but I think this will help you. This is in the document that goes to the principals. Q

The 8/13 document?

~

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. It goes to the principals in the package on 8/13, is what it says. It is-the -basically, I'm not going to give you the quotes, I'm going to give you -- I don't want to have this document quoted. Q

No quote fragment.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Q

Okay.

I mean, that's your question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm going to tell you what it says. I'm going to tell you what it said, but I've got to have you agree that you're not going to quote the document. Okay? Q

Okay.

I agree.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Q

I agree.

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Will you do that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It says, the policy of the United States to eliminate the threat to the United States and to friendly governments posed by the al Qaeda terrorist network. And then it also says, that to eliminate the threat, you have to end all sanctuaries given to al Qaeda, specifically the current sanctuary in Afghanistan. So I would say, that is both -- you go after the terrorists and you go after those that aid and give succor to them. And it also says the Taliban bears responsibility attacks carried out by al Qaeda. Q Is that message delivered to the Taliban? I know of is the 29th of June by Milo.

for the

The one time

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And we've delivered that: message in June and July. And we do it, in part, because as you know, the threat reporting goes up in June and July. And we send that message and we say we are both then responsible for anything that happens in that time frame. Q Milo met with the Taliban, Ambassador to Islamabad, on the 29th of June and said that -- I'm told -- I don't know of any other time it was conveyed to them. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: conveyed, I think.

That's when it was

Q Not in July -- I mean, you said July, and I"1 m wondering if there's another —SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:

In June-July -- I've got

it.

Q

Is one time, it's not more than once?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know that. That's our standard guidance. I know it is conveyed in that time frame. We may have used other channels. If you want, the guy who would know is Armitage. Q

I don't think I can get to him.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: say is --

The other thing I want to

Q The reason I ask, it's a fairly low-level. It had been done as high as the level of Pickering the last time, and I'm wondering whether it got to a higher level pre-9/11? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. Let's see if we can find out. You can talk to Dick Clarke about that. There you go.

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Q We haven't talked about the Cole. I'm told that in this time frame, late spring, the USS Cole -- in this time frame of late spring, early summer, there finally is a determination that George can stand behind that al Qaeda did it; it seems obvious it was suspected for a long time. But that's -- I mean, I don't know more precise than that. But that's when you know. What can you tell me about that, and what the reaction was? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me - - when we -- I've got to go in just a minute. I'm not ready for this other interview, by the way. I haven't read all the stuff. So we may have to delay it a little bit. That is one of the factors that animates and motivates the preparation of the strategy that^we're talking about here. It's one of the things that's cited in these kinds of documents that says, what is the nature of the threat and one of the things that cited is the fact that they are behind the attacks and they resulted in the deaths of 29 Americans -- __ Q

Is that 8/13 document?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's in that document. So it's one of the -- I guess on the priority, you know, everybody saying these guys are going to be unilateralists, they're going to~go against Iraq. It is interesting that the plan that came forward and is ready to go, was al Qaeda is. Q Karen said I should really ask you about the Genoa assassination threat and what the President said about swatting __ flies, ancT so on. _ SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know about that, specifically. You ought to go to Dick Clarke. What I will tell you is, in the June and July time period when we're getting a lot of threat reporting, and Condi's talking to -- and one of the things you do when you get this threat reporting, particularly for things overseas, is you button-down the embassies, you button-down military facilities. And we did all of that. But the President seeing all that, on two occasions, says to Condi, we'll plan defense. I'm tired about playing defense. I want to play offense. I want to take the battle to these guys. Q

I'd love to be able to say when.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll have to get that from Condi. Can we ask Condi? And I think~the swatting flies one, which I've heard secondhand, is of the same sort. But we'll need to get that from Condi, as well. Q How serious was the Genoa threat? about it? 570

What did they know

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, Condi's going to need to do that, because she was there and I wasn't. Q The very last thing, because I know you're out. I reported that the last administration forward-based in boxes the submarines and the AC 130, in case they got a lead on where bin Laden was. I also -- what I didn't report, but I now know is they took those off line before they left. And I hear that they were not put back on line before 9/11 and I wonder about that. If I could add, the Predator's ready, the^ armed Predator is shown to work by June, but doesn't get deployed. So that's what I'm trying^to capture here. Strike asset, that's forward-based. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know the answer to that. And let's see if we can find out. But you know, part of it is, it's one of the- fallacies and -- again,~ one of the things that I think characterizes this approach that's different, you have a long discussion about — in- this period of time -Q

Deputies?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Deputies -- if you get UBL, is that enough. And the answer is, it hurts the organization, because he's very visible and charismatic and all the rest; but it doesn't kill the organization. And if you think about what we now learned about this network for 60 to 80 countries, fairly very distributed, we became convinced that_this wasn't about UBL, this was about al Qaeda, and that's why we had to go after the network as a whole, and that's why we had to go after the Taliban, because it wasn't just getting them to turn over UBL. See, that was the approach the prior administration took, if I understand it -- there was a lot of pressure -- turn over UBL and we'll call it quits. In our view, that wasn't going to do it. They needed to take down the infrastructure of terrorism in Afghanistan, get rid of the whole network. And so one of the things I think that would influence us was, they never got the kind of intelligence that would allow you with high confidence to use those prepositioned assets. So there was a real question about effectiveness. And, secondly, there was also a view that that really wasn't going to be enough. That wasn't going to eliminate the threat. Now, the specifics of that, with the -- offer, we'll have to see if we can find out something for you about that. Q And can they give me stuff on -- we didn't get time to talk about -- the change in policy toward Pakistan, which was contemplated in this thing? 571

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is, in parallel with this, a strategy for Pakistan which has also a companion strategy for India, which says that we are going to have to make -- and I'll have to get more of the details -- but basically it says, we've got to support this effort. We're going to need to have them understand that if we go after the Taliban it is a threat to them, that we recognize their interest in having a stable Afghanistan on their border, and we're going to try and be solicitous of that interest. And that in order to pull this off and have Pakistan's cooperation, we've got to restart U.S. relations with Pakistan, and that means both we're going to have to get rid of some of the sanctions -- which we started to do in this time frame -- and we also need to reestablish and give them various kinds of assistance and support. So there is a Pakistan strategy that gets developed in this time frame and is reviewed on June 29, that's part of all this; and then there is, of course, an India strategy that goes with Pakistan, because you can't -- we've also already started this opening to India and a new strategic relationship with India. And so the theory is that we need to bring along these in parallel and make it clear that no longer is it a zero^-sum game, that better relations with India means poor relations with Pakistan and vice-versa; but, in fact, we could progress the relationship with both countries and that would give us leverage on issues like Kashmir, for example, and their nuclear weapons. So what_we're doing in this time frame is we're developing an al Qaeda strategy in Afghanistan, or a Taliban strategy, a Pakistan strategy and an India strategy, trying to get them all Q when --

But it wasn't right yet for conveying to Pakistan, like

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We started it, but it was not right. It was not right. And it had not gone to principals at that point. I think that's fair to say. Q

Thank you so much. END

3:15 P.M. EST

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