T2 B5 Intel Authorization Bills Fdr- Memo- Warning- Thoughts 603

COMMISSION SENSITIVE WARNING - THOUGHTS (4 Aug 03) "Warning is THE mission of intelligence." Rice has commented that she/NSC/President/policy makers got "no warning" before 9/11. She continues they had no specific information as to date, time, place, method of the attacks. The DCI and Armitage have said the DCI declared war on Al Queda in 1998 and went all around town constantly and especially in the spring/summer of 2001 "warning" an attack was imminent. These comments reflect a misunderstanding of "warning" that was fatal. The intelligence community will not be able to provide unambiguous warning and will seldom have specifics as Rice desired. And, strategic and operational "warning" of the kind the DCI promulgated was probably seen by OMB (he claims OMB stymied his attempts to get resources in the President's budget or through Congressional appropriations) and others as simply a play for resources for intelligence and CA. There appears to have been no concerted effort to connect this to the NIO for warning or any organizational change, system, process, or product (NIE, Threat Analysis, vulnerability assessment, etc) to his efforts. His one effort "The Plan" was not comprehensive or "warning" oriented. OUTLINE - Ermarth o We need a new I&W scheme for international, non-state sponsored terrorism (and changes in technology) like we do for the traditional Cold War military system. It must be connected to response options and action plans. o We needed an NIE and an active NIO McCarthy o Need for Analytical rigor and proper communication of the warning (proper analytical training) - Holl '--rw-. o Need for Warning-Response Framework (Why warning is a problem and how to fix it). ~"~ All emphasize accountability of the analysts and 1C as well as policy makers Other - Lani Kass, NWC, Surprise and Denial and Deception Bard O'Neill, NWC, Terrorism/Terrorists and a framework for analysis Ernest May, Historical Failures Note: Phillip and members of Commission mentioned in last meeting something that is important to this discussion. Intelligence officers apn avoided policy (they think it taints their analysis) and "recommendations" and policy makers have typically received their briefings and wait until the analysts leave the room to discuss policy options. As in Holl above, the intelligence officers/analysts should be part of the policy response discussion

since it's an iterative process that includes a dynamic opponent. Analysis is a constant and particularly with technology and this agile opponent, consideration needs to be constant and dynamic.