T2 B18 Memo On Dci Testimony Fdr- 6-18-04 Memo From Lederman Re Tenet Testimony 758

TO: FROM: DATE: RE:

Chris Kojm Gordon Lederman June 18,2004 DCI Tenet's testimony at the worldwide threat hearings

This memorandum responds to your request for information concerning DCI Tenet's testimony at the worldwide threat hearings. This memorandum discusses each of his annual unclassified speeches since 1997. You indicated that you are interested in the relative importance placed on terrorism. You also requested that I include short quotations. In many cases, the DCI did not explicitly prioritize among threats but rather presented them in a 'laundry-list.' The relative of importance of terrorism must be gleaned from its context, order of appearance, and characterization in the statements. To this end, I have detailed where terrorism appears in each statement, and I have included longer quotations to provide you with the flavor of how the DCI characterized the terrorist threat. I am placing a hard-copy of this memorandum, along with print-outs of the speeches, in your mailbox on Karen's desk. I have marked important passages on the printouts. February 5.19971 The core threats of the Cold War have receded, leaving in their wake "at least five critical challenges": (1) Russia and China, (2) North Korea, Iran, and Iraq; (3) "transnational issues that cut across nations and regions" - terrorism, proliferation, narcotics, organized crime, and cyberthreats; (4) regional hotspots such as Bosnia, and (5) states and region suffering from human misery on a large scale. When explicating transnational issues, the DCI discussed terrorism first. The DCI noted that the number of terrorist incidents in 1996 was the lowest since 1971 but that total deaths and injuries from terrorism increased during 1992-1996. He noted the growing sophistication and global reach of terrorist groups and that they could strike at the time and place of their choosing: Indeed, even as our counter-terrorism efforts are improving, international groups are expanding their networks, improving their skills and sophistication, and working to stage more spectacular attacks. International terrorist groups have developed large transnational infrastructures, which in some cases literally circle the globe. These networks may involve more than one like-minded group, with each group assisting the others. The terrorists use these infrastructures for a variety of purposes, including finance, recruitment, the shipment of arms and materiel, and the movement of operatives. With regard to finance, we have seen increasingly complicated channels for soliciting and moving funds, including the use of seemingly legitimate charitable or other nongovernmental organizations as conduits for the money.

The DCI discussed Iran and Sudan's sponsorship and harboring of terrorists and stated that he could not rule out that Iraq or surrogate groups might perpetrate terrorism against U.S. targets.

January 28.1998" Current threats to national security are particularly challenging due to their complexity, scope, and speed. Any issues are linked in unprecedented ways, ranging from terrorism, to WMD proliferation, to societal turmoil, to regional crises. There are "five key challenges." The most important challenge is transnational issues that endanger Americans and particular the U.S. military overseas. These issues include WMD proliferation, terrorism, narcotics, cyberthreats, and fallout from the Asian financial crisis. The second issue is Russia and China, third is rogue states, fourth is regional hotspots, and fifth is humanitarian crises. In explicating transnational issues, the DCI first discussed proliferation, with heavy emphasis on China and Russia. The second transnational issue that the DCI discussed was Asian economic instability. Terrorism was the third transnational issue which the DCI discussed - followed by narcotics, organized crime, and cyberthreats. Regarding terrorism, the DCI said that the threat to U.S. interests and civilians worldwide "remains high." Although the number of international terrorist attacks was the same from 1996 to 1997, the percentage of those attacks that focused on U.S. citizens and facilities increased from 25 percent to 30 percent. The DCI also stated: Moreover, there has been a trend toward increasing lethality of attacks, especially against civilian targets. The most recent examples, of course, are the suicide bombings in Israel in 1996 and 1997 and the attacks on tourists in Luxor, Egypt last November. Perhaps most worrisome, we have seen in the last year growing indications of terrorist interest in acquiring chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. In addition, a confluence of recent developments increases the risk that individuals or groups will attack US interests. Terrorist passions have probably been inflamed by events ranging from the US Government's designation of 30 terrorist groups to the conviction and sentencing of Mir Aimal Kasi and Ramzi Ahmed Yosuf as well as the ongoing US standoff with Iraq and frustration with the Middle East peace process.

Finally, the DCI noted that Iran continues to support Hizballah and Palestinian groups and that Iraq, Sudan, and Libya "also bear continued watching" for sponsoring terrorism. 1999'" U.S. national security is threatened "in many arenas and across a wide spectrum of issues." The DCI divided these issues into three baskets: (1) transnational, (2) Russia and China, and (3) regional "troublemakers." He discussed transnational issues first. "No issue is more emblematic of these new challenges than the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction," he said. He focused on Russia, China, and rogue states.

The next transnational issue he discussed was terrorism. "Americans are increasingly the favored targets," he warned. The percentage of attacks focused on Americans increased to 35 percent. This statement was the first one in which the DCI mentioned Bin Ladin explicitly: [TJhere is not the slightest doubt that Usama Bin Ladin, his worldwide allies, and his sympathizers are planning further attacks against us. Despite progress against his networks, Bin Ladin's organization has contacts virtually worldwide, including in the United States — and he has stated unequivocally, Mr. Chairman, that all Americans are targets. Bin Ladin's overarching aim is to get the United States out of the Persian Gulf, but he will strike wherever in the world he thinks we are vulnerable. We are anticipating bombing attempts with conventional explosives, but his operatives are also capable of kidnappings and assassinations. We have noted recent activity similar to what occurred prior to the African embassy bombings, Mr. Chairman, and I must tell you we are concerned that one or more of Bin Ladin's attacks could occur at any time.

The DCI said that one of his "greatest concerns is the serious prospect that Bin Ladin or another terrorist might use chemical or biological weapons." Finally, the DCI also noted that Iran continues to view terrorism as a legitimate policy tool. Feb. 2.2000iv

The first third of the DCI's statement dealt with transnational issues, and the latter two-thirds covered state-oriented and regional threats. Regarding transnational issues, once again the DCI started by discussing proliferation - an issue that has become "even more stark and worrisome." Among other things, he discussed the ballistic missile threat to the U.S. The next transnational issue he dealt with was terrorism. He discussed the successful renditions of 24 terrorists, more than half associate with al Qaeda. This reference was the first to al Qaeda in his statements that I reviewed: Usama Bin Ladin is still foremost among these terrorists, because of the immediacy and seriousness of the threat he poses. Everything we have learned recently confirms our conviction that he wants to strike further blows against America. Despite some well-publicized disruptions, we believe he could still strike without additional warning. * * * Mr. Chairman, we remain concerned that terrorist groups worldwide continue to explore how rapidly evolving and spreading technologies might enhance the lethality of their operations. Although terrorists we've preempted still appear to be relying on conventional weapons, we know that a number of these groups are seeking chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agents. We are aware of several instances in which terrorists have contemplated using these materials. •

Among them is Bin Ladin, who has shown a strong interest in chemical weapons. His operatives have trained to conduct attacks with toxic chemicals or biological toxins. * * *

Mr. Chairman, to sum up this part of my briefing, we have had our share of successes, but I must be frank in saying that this has only succeeded in buying time against an increasingly dangerous

threat. The difficulty in destroying this threat lies in the fact that our efforts will not be enough to overcome the fundamental causes of the phenomenon—poverty, alienation, disaffection, and ethnic hatreds deeply rooted in history. In the meantime, constant vigilance and timely intelligence are our best weapons.

2001V The DCI followed his overall framework from 2000, with the first third of the statement devoted to transnational issues and the latter two-thirds devoted to state-oriented and regional issues. The DCI opened his statement by noting that U.S. Intelligence has never before dealt with a set of issues as broad and dynamic - and with such a high quotient of uncertainty. However, for the first time, the DCI started his discussion of transnational issues with terrorism and only then turned to proliferation: The threat from terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving. State sponsored terrorism appears to have declined over the past five years, but transnational groups—with decentralized leadership that makes them harder to identify and disrupt—are emerging. We are seeing fewer centrally controlled operations, and more acts initiated and executed at lower levels. Terrorists are also becoming more operationally adept and more technically sophisticated in order to defeat counterterrorism measures. For example, as we have increased security around government and military facilities, terrorists are seeking out "softer" targets that provide opportunities for mass casualties. Employing increasingly advanced devices and using strategies such as simultaneous attacks, the number of people killed or injured in international terrorist attacks rose dramatically in the 1990s, despite a general decline in the number of incidents. Approximately one-third of these incidents involved US interests. Usama bin Ladin and his global network of lieutenants and associates remain the most immediate and serious threat. Since 1998, Bin Ladin has declared all US citizens legitimate targets of attack. As shown by the bombing of our Embassies in Africa in 1998 and his Millennium plots last year, he is capable of planning multiple attacks with little or no warning. His organization is continuing to place emphasis on developing surrogates to carry out attacks in an effort to avoid detection, blame, and retaliation. As a result it is often difficult to attribute terrorist incidents to his group, Al Qa'ida. * **

At the same time, Islamic militancy is expanding, and the worldwide pool of potential recruits for terrorist networks is growing. In central Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia, Islamic terrorist organizations are trying to attract new recruits, including under the banner of anti-Americanism. International terrorist networks have used the explosion in information technology to advance their capabilities. The same technologies that allow individual consumers in the United States to search out and buy books in Australia or India also enable terrorists to raise money, spread their dogma, find recruits, and plan operations far afield. Some groups are acquiring rudimentary cyberattack tools. Terrorist groups are actively searching the internet to acquire information and capabilities for chemical, biological, radiological, and even nuclear attacks. Many of the 29 officially designated terrorist organizations have an interest in unconventional weapons, and Usama bin Ladin in 1998 even declared their acquisition a "religious duty."

Nevertheless, we and our Allies have scored some important successes against terrorist groups and their plans, which I would like to discuss with you in closed session later today. Here, in an open session, let me assure you that the Intelligence Community has designed a robust counterterrorism program that has preempted, disrupted, and defeated international terrorists and their activities. In most instances, we have kept terrorists off-balance, forcing them to worry about their own security and degrading their ability to plan and conduct operations.

Statement by Acting Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Feb. 8, 1997 (online at www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/1997/dci_testimony_020597.html).

I

Statement of Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats, Jan. 28, 1998 (online at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affaks/speeches/1998/dci_speech_012898.html). II

Statement of the Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats, Feb. 2, 1999 (online at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/1999/ps020299.html). III

Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on The Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security, Feb. 2, 2000 (online at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2000/dci_speech_020200.html). IV

Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the "Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World," Feb. 7, 2001 (online at www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2001 AJNCLASWWT_02072001 .html). v