T2 B18 Congressional Oversight 1 Of 2 Fdr- Lederman Memo Re Materials For Congressional Oversight Panel And Notes Re Jeff Smith Thoughts On Oversight 762

FACSIMILE TO:

Jamie Gorelick

FROM:

Gordon Lederman Phone:(202)331-4069

DATE:

May 21, 2003

Three (3) pages, including coversheet. Thank you for meeting with Kevin Scheid and me this morning to discuss the panel on Congressional oversight. We have given a copy of the binder, along with the attached memorandum, to Senator Gorton. Also, attached are my notes concerning Jeff Smith's thoughts on Congressional oversight. ~~ Thank you.

TO:

Senator Slade Gorton, Commissioner

FROM:

Gordon Lederman, Counsel

DATE:

May 21,2003

RE:

Preparation for the May 22, 2003 Congressional Oversight Panel

Attached for your information are materials prepared in response to questions from Commissioner Gorelick concerning the May 22, 2003 panel on Congressional oversight, as follows: (1) What is the jurisdictional overlap between the SSCI and the SASC and between the HPSCI and the HASC? The binder provides the Senate and House rules and resolutions regarding the jurisdiction of committees involved in intelligence oversight. There is considerable overlap between the jurisdiction of the intelligence and armed services committees. It should be noted that the HPSCJLs jurisdiction includes tactical military intelligence, while the SSCI's does not. (2) Given that DCI Tenet testifies annually before Congress concerning national security threats to the United States, what has the DCI testified about terrorism and how did Congress respond? The binder provides the DCI's annual testimony from 1997 to 2001. The DCI's testimony of 2000 and 2001 highlights terrorism as a very significant threat against the United States. Our informal information indicates that the SSCI did not hold any hearings on terrorism despite the DCI's testimony. Commissioner Gorelick requested that we ask the SSCI and HPSCI staff whether hearings on terrorism were held, and we are awaiting a response from these committees. (3) What provisions are contained in the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) regarding the relative authorities of the DCI and the Secretary of Defense? The Act sets forth the DCI's authorities, but the Secretary of Defense's authorities are contained in other legislation that was beyond our purview given time constraints. The Act contains several provisions regarding Congressional oversight, such as the prohibition on intelligence agencies expending any funds that the intelligence committees have not authorized. (4) What did the Aspin/Brown Commission recommend? We have included (1) a summary of the Aspin/Brown Commission's overall recommendations, and (2) the chapters of the Aspin/Brown Commission's report and of a 1996 HPSCI report that concern Congressional oversight. These chapters focus mainly on institutional considerations such as the rotational membership of the SSCI and the HPSCI and whether a joint committee should replace the SSCI and the HPSCI. CC:

Philip Zelikow, Executive Director

•

The Intelligence Community has extensive oversight (e.g. the Executive Branch must report covert action findings and keep the Congress "fully and currently informed"). By contrast, DOD and military operations have almost no oversight. Does that make sense?

•

The way the House and Senate do budgets is different because of different jurisdictions over the military budget. The difference causes confusion. Can that be straightened out?

•

Should we have a two-year authorization and appropriations cycle? That would make it vastly easier to budget and plan. Sen. Nunn wanted to do that, but it did not work very well; there was a two-year authorization, but the appropriators paid no attention to it.

•

Has Congressional oversight resulted in a "risk adverse" intelligence community? Are officers in the field concerned that they'll get punished for taking risks? Is there some way for the DCI and the leadership of CIA to encourage more risks, but with some protection for officers in the field?

•

Is there a better way for the Congress to decide on what is important and what is not? The oversight committees were fixated on DCI Deutch's security issues and asked relatively few questions on terrorism - even after DCI Tenet testified about terrorism. Perhaps the DCI and the Committees jointly should develop an oversight plan. Maybe the DCI (and/or the President) should submit at the start of each session or year a suggested oversight plan, which will guide and set metrics for Congressional oversight.