T2 B15 Meeting W Lee Hamilton Fdr- Points Re Ic Management 745
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Points for Rep. Hamilton concerning management of the 1C: •
The premise of the IC's original design was to avoid centralization in order to preclude a threat to democracy. The 1C has grown and changed considerably due to new technology, new threats, and new political norms, but the IC's structure was never rationalized to account for these changes. The IC's disorganization leads to consistent underperformance and handicaps the U.S. Government in countering terrorism.
•
Mapping the DCI's and DoD's power and influence over the 1C is a difficult task from a social scientific perspective. As a result, we have no conclusions that can be supported with iron-clad evidence. However, we can conclude with evidentiary basis that the division of authority between DoD and the DCI is certainly unclear in practice. And the result of that ambiguity is a fundamental lack of accountability for the leadership of the 1C. Moreover, that ambiguity of accountability is inherent to any division of authority between DoD and the DCI. That ambiguity now obstructs the IC's ability to counter terrorism effectively.
•
Finally, there is a void at the top of the 1C. The DCI has not fully exercised the authorities that he currently possesses to develop a strategic plan for the 1C and to implement it, to develop a management structure to lead the 1C, and to develop a regime to do cost/benefit analysis and to link inputs to outputs.
The premise of the IC's original design was to avoid centralization in order to preclude a threat to democracy. The 1C has grown and changed considerably due to new technology, new threats, and new political norms, but the IC's structure was never rationalized to account for these changes. The IC's disorganization leads to consistent underperformance and handicaps the U.S. Government in countering terrorism.
•
Mapping the DCI's and DoD's power and influence over the 1C is a difficult task from a social scientific perspective. As a result, we have no conclusions that can be supported with iron-clad evidence. However, we can conclude with evidentiary basis that the division of authority between DoD and the DCI is certainly unclear in practice. And the result of that ambiguity is a fundamental lack of accountability for the leadership of the 1C. Moreover, that ambiguity of accountability is inherent to any division of authority between DoD and the DCI. That ambiguity now obstructs the IC's ability to counter terrorism effectively.
•
Finally, there is a void at the top of the 1C. The DCI has not fully exercised the authorities that he currently possesses to develop a strategic plan for the 1C and to implement it, to develop a management structure to lead the 1C, and to develop a regime to do cost/benefit analysis and to link inputs to outputs.
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