T1a B48 Raj De Misc Notes Fdr- The March To War Against The United States (28 Pg Version) 482

Sources (b/hwi) Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc. (ms/c) John Miller and Michael Stone, The Cell, (New York - Hyperon; 2002) (rg) Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002) (bensim) Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, (New York: Random House, 2002) (nydc -- 01) New York District Court: Records of Trial of Usama Bin Laden et al (African Embassy Bombings) beginning 5 Feb. 2001. Opening statements, (fadl) Testimony of Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, 6, 7 Feb. 2001, NYDC [See list of "Players" at end of chron.]

The March to War Against the United States1 The Critical Juncture In February 1989, the last Soviet troops pulled out of Afghanistan. The Islamist leaders of the Jihad confronted the question of "where to go next," where to direct the "Islamic Army" (as bin Laden himself then titled it) that had evolved in the decade-long war with the Soviets. This brought to the forefront a growing split between bin Laden, who had in the recent years become increasingly influenced by a group of militant Egyptians, and his erstwhile mentor Abdullah Azzam. This would prove to be a decisive fork in the path to declaration of war against the United States by the transnational terrorist force we now know as al Qaeda. Both factions affirmed adherence to the long-standing Islamist goal of re-establishing the global Caliphate under pure Quranic law (which as a universal given would require eliminating the Israeli state). Their division was over how to get there. The Egyptian militants had long ago declared the "apostate" Middle Eastern regimes to be the principal obstacle to the ultimate objective of re-establishing a pure Islamic Caliphate, and they saw the emergent Islamic Army as a new force for their long standing Jihad. By the time the Soviets pulled out bin Laden had come to fully espouse this position. He was already creating his own organization, (including the central "foundation" - "al Qaeda") distinct from what he had until then shared with Azzam, and arranging for the movement of operational resources back to the Middle East. Nearly all of the key positions in his new organization were held by present or former members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Azzam did not quarrel with the principal that bringing down these apostate regimes was essential to the ultimate objective. But he strongly opposed what he considered a diversion of forces,' funds and other resources from what he insisted was the more immediate task completing the establishment of an Islamic state in Afghanistan (although the Soviets had withdrawn their troops they had left in place a proxy regime). He also argued that the next priority for the Islamic Army should be expunging the Israeli "occupiers" from the sacred Muslim lands of Palestine. Whatever resistance might have been sustained by Azzam and his remaining supporters was taken care of on 24 November 1989 when he was assassinated, along with two sons, in a car bombing in Peshawar. Adopting the path of Jihad against the apostate rulers of the Muslims lands would have almost certainly led inevitably to attacks on those whom the Islamists viewed as the sources, "the props," of the apostate leaders' power - the U.S. and other western states. The U.S. was in fact charged with being the prop for both the "far enemy" - Israel - and "near enemies" such as the ' Sources: Hwi, Ch.2, p. 40-62; Bensim, Ch. 3, pp. 95-109; rg, Ch. 1, pp. 16-26. ms/c ... ). In addition to the general sources listed above, the debate between Azzam and bin Laden and the Egyptian groups is described in testimony by Jamal al-Fadl, an al Qaeda member who was there at the time. (See details on Fadl in "Players Registry " attached at the end of the Chron) (nydc/6feb01/l 89-95). Re "Islamic Army," see rg 22-24. Contrary to common wisdom, bin Laden did not form his organization under the title of al-Qaeda. It was Azzam who conceptualized it in 1987, and his article describing "Al-Qa'aidah al Sulbah," The Solid Foundation," was laid out in an article of the Arabic Journal Al Jihad in April 1988. Some Arabists have described it as the "founding document" for the organization that has become known as "al Qaeda." See also hwi 60ff. Fadl has said in his testimony that when bin Laden was initially forming his group, the members referred to it both as al Qaeda and the Islamic Army, and only later adopted use of the single term al Qaeda. (Fadel testimony, NYDC 6 February 2001, p.212.)

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Mubarek regime in Egypt. (And by this time bin Laden had put the Saudi regime in the same category.) In this situation, the deployment and ultimately sustained basing of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in 1990 was a match in an already smoking pit, and provided a "billboard" for bin Laden's evocations for Jihad. Thus the evolving "bin Laden doctrine" added a new layer to the hierarchy of targets. Before the apostate regimes could be brought down, the U.S. military forces had to be evicted from the region. And as the focus of the Jihad became the U.S., the objectives of the Jihad would soon expand beyond eviction from the Muslim lands to global attack against the U.S.

The Path The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided a common cause for Islamists whose militancy and motivations had diverse origins. The Afghan battlefield offered a focus for recruitment of "troops," acquisition of weapons, and the development of a command and logistic pipeline, including transnational financial sources and movement channels. Many of the individuals who came from the Middle East to play key leadership roles in the "Afghan Arab" forces had been engaged in some form of their own Jihad movements long before the Soviet invasion. These included bin Laden's initial mentor and partner in Pakistan, Abdullah Azzam, and the Egyptian Islamists that would later comprise most of the inner circle. Bin Laden linked up with Azzam in Pakistan in 1984, where they jointly established the Maktab al-Khidmat (MAK, "Bureau of Services"). The MAK served as a recruiting network hub - bringing fighters to Peshawar, putting them up in guesthouses, and then dispatching them to training camps in Afghanistan. Azzam had already been a prominent figure among Islamists long before he moved to Pakistan, preaching for Jihad to return the historic Muslim lands to the governance of pure Islamic law. He was virulently anti-Israel, having been born in Palestine in 1941, and after receiving a degree at a Damascus university in 1966 he had returned to fight against Israel in the 1967 war. In 1973 he took up studies in Egypt at the al-Azhar University, the most prominent center of Islamic studies, before becoming professor of Islamic law at Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. His experience in Palestine and immersion in the doctrine of ancient Muslim teachers had committed him to Jihad. Bin Laden was a student at Abdul Aziz in 1981 and many believe he began to be influenced by Azzam's doctrine then. Azzam was dropped by Abdul Aziz about this time because of his rhetoric, and migrated to Pakistan where he became a lecturer at the Islamic University in Islamabad. According to most accounts, when the MAK was initially formed Azzam was its doctrinal leader while bin Laden served as his deputy and provided much of the funding. One of the first branch offices of the MAK was set up in the mid-1980s on Atlantic Avenue in Brooklyn, under the title al-Kifa, and would become a hub for many of the participants in the terrorist activities undertaken in the New York area in the early

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Another teacher at Al-Aziz at the time was Muhammad Qutb, brother of Sayyid Qutb, who had been executed by Nasser in 1966, but who, as described below, continued to be the most widely read Islamist in the Middle East and author of what is still considered by many militant Egyptians to be the "manifesto" of their Islamist groups.

1990s. Azzam assigned his protege Mustapha Shalabi as the initial chief of the Brooklyn office.4 Azzam also traveled the globe on recruitment and fundraising missions, which included some 20 trips to US. In 1989, [What month? Must have been before November, for reasons described below] he made a speech in Oklahoma at a convention of the Muslim Arab Youth League and Islamic Association for Palestine.5 This convention was the occasion of an introductory meeting of Wadih el-Hage and Mahmud Abouhalima, both of whom would later be tied to the terrorist cell associated with the MAK branch in New York. Bin Laden, meanwhile, essentially confined himself to shuttling between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (with occasional ventures into Afghanistan to make his bones as a warrior.) (Bensim 99-101) In 1987-89 Bin Laden became increasingly influenced by the leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ).6 Most prominent among these was Ayman al-Zawahiri, a medical doctor, described by some as the leader of EIJ, by others as leader of a "faction" of the EIJ.7 He had been imprisoned for three years on weapons charges following the assassination of Sadat on 6 October 1981, and when released he went to Pakistan to provide medical services to Mujahidin waging Jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Also in Pakistan at this time was Sheikh Omar Ahmad Abdel Rahman (the "Blind Sheikh"), who was generally considered to be the spiritual guide of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). Many accounts claim he simultaneously served as spiritual leader for a parallel, similar organization known as the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG), headed by Rifai Ahmed Taha. Rahman had for many years issued public "Fatawas" justifying the terrorist actions of both groups. He publicly praised the assassination of Sadat in 1981, and was subsequently arrested and tried for his role, but ended up being acquitted. (Mubarak apparently viewed imprisoning a/the top Muslim cleric as likely to incite more trouble that it would solve.) Both the EIJ and the EIG were in effect "rebellious offspring" of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood had emerged in the Middle East in the late 1920s in the tumultuous post-WWI situation - the Ottoman dominion gone, much of its former territory placed under control of League of Nation "mandates" (seen by much of the populace in the region as extension of European colonialism), and Palestine erupting into what would prove to be an unending conflict. The Muslim Brothers propagated the doctrine that only "Salafiyya" Islam - Islam purged of impurities and Western influences — could save Muslims from the colonial powers. By the 1950s, as the colonial powers begin pulling out, the focus of animosity turned on leaders of Muslim states who were seen as having accepted western law as a substitute for the Sharia, ~ "abandoning God's law" and submitting to "man-made law." (These "apostate" leaders were labeled as "Jahiliyya," a term originally used to described the "barbarians" existing before the Prophet's message began to be propagated.) Some scholars framed this issue in terms of the need to deal first with the "near enemy" in their own lands 4.

One of Shalbi's early aides was Jamal al-Fadl, who would later go to Afghanistan, and become one of the early member of al-Qaeda in 1989. 5. A videotape of another of Azzam's recruitment lectures in the U.S., given in 1988, was described in the New Yorker in 1995. 6. Many who have studied the history of the emergence of al Qaeda have pointed out that the evidence suggests that the organization was as much a product of the Egyptians Islamists drawing in bin Laden as is was a matter of his incorporating them into his inner circle. See, for example, rg 25, hwi 199-204; bensim 103. 1'. The "faction leader" description is by Benjamin and Simon, p. 103.

before moving to combat the "far enemy" in Israel. While the "Brothers" first emerged in Palestine/ Jordan, their doctrine had its most potent appeal and attracted most followers in Egypt. The Al-Azhar Islamic study center in Cairo became the main site of its transnational gatherings. The Brotherhood doctrine nominally did not call for violence, but rather preached a "bottom up" approach, in which conversion of the masses was seen as the way to create power that would eventually topple the "Jahili" leaders. Nonetheless, this declared position did not prevent the movement from engaging in significant incidents of violence in the ensuing decades. By the late 1960s factions within and outside the Brotherhood were explicitly rejecting the "bottom up" concept, declaring that experience demonstrated there was no way the apostate leaders in the historical Muslim lands would accede to a peaceful transition to a true Caliphate. This fueled the break off the groups that formed the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Egyptian Islamic Group. While the doctrine of these groups started at the same point as the Brotherhood - immersion in the Koran - they described it as a basis for forming a "Revolutionary Vanguard" whose mission was "Jihad" against the existing political leaders in the lands of the Prophet. (The most influential preacher in this development was Sayyid Qutb, who was eventually executed by Nasser in 1966, but whose books are still the most widely read in the militant Muslim world. His "Signpost" treatise is generally considered to be the manifesto of the militant Egyptian movements. As noted above, his brother was teaching at Al-Azziz University in Jeddah at the time bin Laden was a student there.) Bin Laden and his Egyptian colleagues saw the Islamic Army that matriculated from the Jihad against the Soviets as having created this "vanguard," and the main question was where to employ it next. (Bin Laden, in fact referred to his organization as the Islamic Army, of which al Qaeda was only a central leadership "foundation.") With the defeat of the Soviets, the Egyptians not surprisingly wanted to take the army back to pursue their fundamental objective of ousting the apostate leaders in the lands of Islam, starting in Egypt, but extending through the region. Azzam's insistence on focusing the Islamic Army's resources on finishing the job in Afghanistan and then turning to the enemy in Palestine presumably was at least in part because of his experience in Palestine. According to some sources he also was skeptical about the reality of prospects - at least under the existing circumstances - for ousting the Middle Eastern rulers through militant actions. This was a form of the debate among the Islamists that scholars had in earlier years described as contesting priorities between the "near enemy" and the "far enemy." Bin Laden was conveniently back in Saudi Arabia at the time Azzam was assassinated. He has since routinely praised Azzam, but many suspect he was behind the killing. (Or perhaps it was the Egyptians who initiated and pulled it off, while bin Laden adopted a "don't ask, don't tell" position.) By this time bin Laden was already well down the road in forming his organization. Its inner circle was dominated by members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Zawahiri was his principal deputy. Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, former Egyptian police officer and prominent participant in the Jihad battlefield in Afghanistan, was the first "military chief," while

Muhammed Atef, (aka Abu Hafs al Masry) another EU member, was deputy chief of operations, and ultimately would succeed Banshiri after his death a few years later. According to several sources with direct access, at the same time Zawahiri held this principal deputy position in al Qaeda's Shura, he continued to run EIJ,8 and the two organizations pursued a common agenda in Egypt. (Members of al Qaeda who have since defected or been apprehended have said many key players belonged simultaneously to both al Qaeda and a terrorist entity in their countries of origin.) According to an al Qaeda defector who formally joined the organization in its founding stages,9 other members of the initial inner circle or "Shura," whom the source knew only by their pseudonyms, included: • An additional Egyptian - Sheikh Sayyid el Masry. • Three Saudis (in addition to bin Laden - Abu Musab al Saudi, Abu Saad al Sharif Abu Mohamed Saudi, and Abu Fadl al Makkee).. • Three Iraqis - Mamudh Salim, aka Abu Hajer who managed finances and weapon procurement; Abu Ayoub and Abu Burhan. • A Yemeni (Abu Farij); a Libyan (Saif al Liby); an Omani (Khalifa al Muscat), and a Nigerian (Qaricrpt al Jizaeri). Beneath the Shura were a series of committees, usually chaired by one or more members of the Shura. These included • The military committee, initially chaired by Banshiri with Atef as his deputy (and ultimate successor). • A finance or "business" committee, initially chaired by Abu Fadhl al Masry. • A Fatawa Committee, chaired by Abu Saad al Sharif Abu Mohamed Saudi. This composition, and the linkages and affiliations that the organization has since demonstrated suggest that the most apt title for it would the one under which it has issued its "Fatawa" enjoining it Muslim "brothers" to holy war against the "crusaders" - "The International Islamic Front." Meanwhile, at the same time that the contest over the future of the Afghan Arab Islamic Army is taking place in Afghanistan/Pakistan, a cell was cementing its ties in New York and contesting the same issues.

1989 July 89; In New York, law enforcement officials had received a tip that a "Palestinian group" associated with the al-Kifah Center was planning bombings of Atlantic City casinos. [Bensim say the group was identified as fellow-worshippers of the Farouq Mosque, but this is not a significant distinction because the mosque was the "spiritual office" of al-Kifa.] A Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF, established by the FBI and NYPD in 1980, according to ms/c 34) assigned an NYPD group (headed by Tom Corrigan) to put the al-Kifah/Farouq subjects under surveillance. This led to the observation, and photographing, of a dozen of them engaging in shooting exercises at Calverton range on eastern Long Island. Photos were *. Testimony of Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, NY District Court, 6 February 2001, p221. Jamal al Fadl Testimony, pp. 193-211.

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taken on four consecutive weekends. The participants, whose identities were not all determined at the time the photographs were obtained, included El-Sayyid Nosair, Mohammed Salameh (Palestinian), Nidal Ayyad, Clement Hampton-El (aka "Dr. Rashid because of his job as a hospital worker) Mahmud Abouhalima (Egyptian, aka "Mahmud the Red" because of his hair). Some participants wearing T-shirts with Jihad slogans, some with title "Services Office," and some with a map of Afghanistan. One of the instructors [according to ms/c] was a tall African-American identified a year and a half later as Richard Smith, who in late 1990 became a suspect in a gun running investigation. Another instructor, not identified at the time, was AH Mohamed, who had been a sergeant at Fort Bragg, N.C. [Was he still in the army at that time?] The weapons being used included AD-47s, 357 and 9mm pistols, shotguns, and other rifles, (ms/c 51, 58; Bensim 5.) • This group [according to ms/c, p. 50] began to be pulled together by Nosair as early as 1987. In addition to those seen in the photos at the firing range, the group included a person named Bilall Alkaisi, a Palestinian who had also trained in Afghanistan. The weapons training, (again according to ms/c) had already begun a year earlier, in various upstate NY sites. • Nosair was by this time already having regular conversations with the Blind Sheikh, informing him of the Nosair group's training, and he would later assistjhe Sheikh in settling into New York. (Tapes of some conversations, that had been played in the Farouq mosque, reportedly are in possession of NYPD or JTTF.). The contacts had begun a year earlier, (1988) according to the same sources, (ms/c 50ff; bensim 3-6.) [How did Nosair initially get in contact with Rahman ?] October 89, Bin Laden bribed Pakistan parliamentarians to support a no confidence resolution against Benazir Bhutto. She narrowly survived the vote on 1 Nov. In a later interview, Bhutto said some parliamentarians who had been offered money told her the money was coming from come from Saudi sources. She said she queried the Saudi government and they told her bin Laden put up the money. She said that was the first she had heard of bin Laden. She believed the scheme had been set up by chief of Pakistani intelligence (ISI)., who had been running the CIA support channels to the Afghan mujahidin and who had both the motivation and the necessary connections to set up the scheme, (hwi 61-62) 24 November 89: Azzam assassinated. Bin Laden has returned to Saudi Arabia. [Note: Another person in Pakistan at this time for whom there is no record of a role in the debates then taking place, but who would subsequently emerge as a significant operative in the al Qaeda organization, was Wadih el-Hage. He had in fact been there on previous stints, e.g. living there in 1983-84 at the time the MAK was formed, when he is said to have been Azzam; back in 86-87, then back in late 89-90. (nydc/5febO 1/32-37, 57-58)] Late 1989/early 1990: The Sudanese National Islamic Front, which had come to power in collaboration with a military junta in mid-1989, sent a small delegation to bin Laden to invite him to move his organizational base to Sudan. Jamal al-Fadl, (joined al Qaeda in 1989 but later broke with it and sought asylum in the US) says he attended a meeting with this delegation, and later learned that it had connections to Sudanese intelligence services.) Fadl says that bin Laden and the Shura members saw some clear advantages to the offer - e.g., support from Hassan al-Turabi, Emir of what was in effect the most successful effort, outside Iran, of establishing an Islamist state, and proximity to the middle eastern states which were the focus of the Jihad against apostate regimes. Some Shura members, including bin Laden, felt a need to learn a bit more before making a final decision. So bin Laden dispatched a

reconnaissance team to Sudan (Abu Hamman al Saudi, Abu Hajer al Iraqi, Abu Hassan al Sudani, and Abu Rida al Suri, a Syrian). They gave a favorable report on their return, according to what Fadl says he heard in the guesthouse discussions. (nydc/6feb01/219, 233)

1990 Early 1990: Bin Laden is in Saudi Arabia, already laying groundwork for move to Sudan. Fadl is one of those sent there to begin renting houses, etc. (Discussed at length in Fadl testimony, described below re end 90/beginning 91. Also versions given in hwi 78-79 rg29, bensimllO) July 1990; Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, spiritual leader of EU, GAI, arrives in the US, on visa obtained in Sudan. Has initial welcome from Shalabi, [rg says Rahman's visa was in fact sponsored by Shalabi] but the two soon split over where the Alkhifa money should be devoted - essentially the same debate as taking place between Azzam and bin Laden/Egyptian groups. Shalabi wanted the money to go to Afghanistan refugees, while Rahman - and the Nosair group, who had in fact had been clashing with Shalabi even before Rahman arrived - wanted if to go to a global jihad. Nosair and his supporters, and had been lobbying Rahman since his arrival to change the al-Kifah leadership. Rahman moves to Jersey City, (ms/c 53, 64; bensim 6. rg 101) 5/7? August 1990. Following Iraq invasion of Kuwait, bin Laden offers himself and his holy warriors to fight Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, turned down by Saudi regime. Launches verbal attack on US presence, supported by some Islamic preachers, (hwi 77) 5 November 1990: Rabbi Meir Kahane, founder of Jewish Defense League, assassinated at Marriott Hotel in Manhattan, by Nosair. Nosair was accompanied by coconspirator Bilall Alkaisi who chickened at last minute and ducked out. Getaway car was to be driven by Mahmoud Abouhalima ("red"). Missed connection because of parking confusion, Nosair hijacks taxi, but it quickly runs into blockage, Nosair wounded in shootout, arrested. Alkaisi meanwhile gets to Nosair's own car in lot, where Mohammed Salameh waiting. Escape. » Within hours, JTTF agents Napoli and Anticev review photos of training at Calverton range, recognize Nosair. (No others identified for some months.) Early morning, NYPD arrive at what they believe is Nosair's apt.in Jersey City (also by then saying they knew Nosair had accomplices. [How did they know that soon? Did they have a record because of earlier suspicions? If so, what led to that? ms/c claim Napoli and John Antichev reviewed Calverton photos within hours of shooting, recognized Nosa, r, but did not then ID others.] At Jersey City apartment, find Abouhalima and Salameh, who are not yet identified as the accomplices but who are nonetheless taken in for questioning. Admit they had been at hotel at time of shooting, say Nosair no longer lives at their address. (The records would subsequently confirm that in 1988, when Nosair got his janitor job in Brooklyn, he had changed his address to his cousins apt. (Cousin name Ibrahim elGabrowny, who would later also be identified as a player.) Abouhlima and Salameh were released next day on grounds evidence insufficient to charge them, (ms/c 42-43) * 6 November 90: NYPD identify Nosair's true address (Cliffside, N.J.) [Again, how?] Find and remove 16 boxes of materials, including training manuals from Fort Bragg, teletypes between high-level US officials, all believed [when?] to have been provided by Ali Mohamed. [When?]. Bomb making manuals, maps of landmarks like Statue of

Liberty, Times Square, Rockefeller Center and World Trade Center. Also in apartment was notebook on Jihad objectives, "attacking all those who waged war against Allah," and passages alluding to destruction value of big buildings versus "symbols." Also included were tapes of various speeches by Azzam. Boxes taken to 17th Precinct, (ms/c 45, bensim 100, 235) [Check press coverage?] [rg 101-02 says assassination done under Rahman's orders, and that Rahman convicted of this in NY.] * 8 November 90: The 16 boxes that had been found by NYPD in Nosair's apartment are picked up by FBI, and returned to Manhattan DA three days later. Most documents were not translated, nor were the taped speeches by Azzam reviewed, for next 3 yrs, until the TERRSTOP trial, (ms/c 45-46; bensim 100, 235; hwi 131ff) End 1990/Beginning 1991: Preparations well along for move to Sudan. Many of bin Laden's troops already moved from Pakistan, much of logistic and support structure in place. By this time Fadl, using money from Zawahiri, has purchased a farm north of Khartoum for $250,000 and a salt farm near Port Sudan for $180,000 with money given him finance committee chairman Abu Fadhl al-Makkee. The instructions for these purchases were from Banshiri. Fadl says the process of setting up the move was facilitated by Sudanese intelligence officers who provided letters enabling things to be brought in without customs inspections. Says bin Laden told him Sudanese were "opening doors." (nydc/6feb01/234-39) • There are also reports that in this time period bin Laden dispatched equipment, money and training materials to assist the MILF in the Philippines, and helped set up there the Abu Sayyaf Brigade, named after one of the dominant Afghan Jihadists. (Bensim 112) Other sources (Philippine police tape of Abu Sayyaf member's confession) say Ramzi Yousef was one of those whom bin Laden sent to the Philippines for this purpose. (See Manila Times, 26 April 2002.)

1991 .Tan.-Feb. 1991: NY JTTF beginning to identify others in photos of Calverton shooting range. Is at this time that they identify one of trainers as Richard Smith, who is by that time a suspect in gun running case in Brooklyn black Muslim community. Gun running case had been underway since fall of 1990, about time of Kahane assassination. Early 1991, NYPD leam Smith tied to Brooklyn gun dealer Edward Ransom, security operator at a radical mosque (al-Taqwa) located near Farouq mosque where al-Kifah based, and obtain a picture of two together. Poses question for police of extent of association between black Muslim gunrunners and militants, and Arabs from al-Kifah Services center. Within next few months, would tie the gunrunners to a robbery crew known as the "forty thieves" led by person named Marcus Robinson, who would later be discovered to have connections with "Dr. Rashid," a person also photographed at Calverton shooting range, (ms/c 60-63) 1 March 1991: Al-Kifah Emir Shalabi found dead. Last seen alive 26 February, the day before he had been slated to leave for Egypt. A few days before the body was found, Wadjh al-Hage had arrived there from [Tucson according to hwi and ms/c, Texas according to bensim, and nydc trial record] and assisted in the taking over of Alkhaifa by bin Laden loyalist. [According to ms/c] a Yemeni named Abdul Wali Zindani also had already arrived in Brooklyn to "investigate" Shalabi's handling of finances, and would ultimately take charge of running Alkhifa. (Hage would depart for Sudan about a year later.) (ms/c 64, hwi 134-135, bensim 104, rg p. 24)

10 April 1991. Bin Laden leaves Saudin Arabia for Pakistan. Stage in move to Sudan, (hwi 79) May 1991: Group of Saudi Islamic scholars that became known as "the Awakened Sheikhs" send "Letter of Demands" to Saudi regime, includes demand for return to Sharia and shedding western influence. Many jailed in ensuing years. Bin Laden would later (e.g. in CNN interview of May 1997) express support he said he felt at the time. (Bensim 107-08. Note below that Bergen p.88 identifies this as having been sent in the "summer of 1992, and becoming the catalyst for formation of Advice and Reformation Committee.) Summer 1991: Bin Laden arrives Sudan. Reportedly quickly establishes "symbiotic relationship" with Turabi. Engages in multiple economic ventures, building roads, etc. Global bank accounts, mega bucks. Simultaneously setting up training camps, while keeping guest-houses operating in Pakistan. Sources put number of al Qaeda members in Sudan at this time at 1,000 to 2,000. [Seems high, but depends on definition of "member."] • Process begins of establishing companies under bin Laden aegis to serve both as sources of revenue and as channels for holding and moving financial support for terrorist operations. [Following is Fadl description of what was established over the next few years. Does not give dates for individual companies so this list should be read as what unfolded beginning about this time and was filled out by about 1994.] • "Mother company" is Wadi al-Aqiq. Others included Bin Laden International, used for importing and exporting materials, Taba Investment, one of whose functions was conversion of currency for the operators, Hija Construction for building roads and bridges (as part of the deal with the Sudanese regime for providing the base) and that served as a channel for buying explosives:Themar al Mubaraka. a farming enterprise earning revenues and at the same time providing turf for training camps, including for production and employment of explosives; also a vegetable company which would eventually have five farms; and the Al Qudurat Transportation company, serving as a means for buying and dispensing trucks. Among individuals involved at the camps for training in weapons and explosives were Salem al Masery, Saif el Adel, [most recently identified as the primary suspect in masterminding the multiple bombing attacks in Saudi Arabia on 12 May 2003] and Abu Talha al Sudani. (nydc/6feb01/240-246) • Also actively setting up Khartoum guesthouses, offices and residences for al Qaeda members, eventually will purchase building in the Riyadh City section of Khartoum. (nydc/6feb01/pp. 243-249) • Assigns Harun Fazil. a Camoran islander and head of the Nairobi cell, to prepare ground for "militarizing" East African cells. Farms used as bomb training bases. • Sets up office in Baku to support Chechens; sends fighters to Tajikistan; supports Philippine Moro group, smuggles arms to Yemen and Egypt. Linked to Vienna-based Third World Relief Agency, which funneled money to Bosnians, and sets up NGO in Baku. Bin Laden established a branch of the "Services Office" in Zagreb. Forged alliances with other Egyptian groups, Algerian Armed Islamic Group, Libyan group, Yemen's Saif Islamic Jannubi, and Syrian Jamaat al-Suri. (hwi 79-86; rg 32-33; bensim 27, 111-13) [Note: the descriptions by all three authors are sufficiently general as to time that they could also be interpreted as summarizing developments over the next few years. The unambiguous "done by' date is mid 1995, based on Fadl testimony described below.]

11 Also in Summer 1991: JTTF agents Napoli and Anticev find evidence that Abouhalima is working on bomb making materials in his apartment, (ms/c 65) At this time the FBI has on its payroll an informant named Emad Salem, (bensim 17) [Note: Bin Laden contributed $20,000 for Nosair's trial defense, presumably sometime in this period.1 End 1991/beginning 1992: Fadl told by Banshiri, "need you to work in Nairobi," Kenya. Told to take his family along and settle in. Told he would meet two persons, (incl. Abu Oaidba al Masrv) who would provide him a house and help settle in. Was given envelop for delivery, and was asked for it on his arrival in Nairobi. Shortly after that, was told by Abu Qaidba that after a phone conversation with bin Laden it had been decided he should proceed to Pakistan. Returned for a few months, with wife, and was then told by Atef that bin Laden and Abu Fadl al Makkee had decided that they "need [him] in Sudan." Returned to Sudan but was told not to take his wife with him. (nydc/6feb01/310-13) 1992 Early 1992: Discussions are beginning to be held in Sudan guesthouses on forming a Fatawa calling for the eviction of the U.S. forces from the Gulf area, according to Fadl. (nydc/6feb01/266) Summer of 1992. Sometime in this period Hage leaves NY for Sudan to become bin Laden's secretary, (hwi 135.) [Note: This according to Bergen p.88 is when "letter of Demand" is sent.] Also about this time, according to bensim p. 26-27, the various front companies and money moving channels bin Laden has been setting up includes an off-shore subsidiary in Nairobi, Kenya. [Check statements of Fadl, et al.] August 1992: Fadl instructed by bin Laden and Shura to travel to Budapest, meet with person there named Abdallah Izzeldine. Has now Hungarian visa, and thus is jailed for five days upon arrival, until Izzeldine shows up with visa. Is then sent to Zagreb to study some "business," and bring back report. (nydc/6febO 1/314-16) August 1992: Rahman dials number (810604) in Pakistan. (Bensim 7. [How and when did we know this?]) 1 September 1992: Ramzi Yousef arrives at Kennedy Airport, from Peshawar via Karachi. Iraqi passport arouses suspicions. (See Mylroie for details of passport inconsistencies.) Responds to questions by immediately asking for asylum, is taken aside for an interview, fingerprinted, given a court appearance date, let go. (Obviously did not meet court date.) * Accompanied by person named Ahmad Ajaj whose poorly forged Swedish passport results in a search of luggage, discovery of bomb manuals, video of instructions, includes statements about waging "war" against "enemies of God," and depicting demolition of an American building. Ajaj was a Palestinian who had been deported from Israel to Jordan in April 1991. In September of that year he went to the U.S. and applied for asylum, taking residence in Houston. In April 1992, with the asylum request still unresolved, he went to Pakistan, worked at the MAK. July 1992 traveled to Islamabad seeking a visa to return to U.S. Encountered Yousef, who said he too was going to the U.S., offered to help him., (bensim 7-8, 235; 1m 95) [Get more detail from Ajaj trial and appeal hearing.)

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1 September 1992: Ramzi Yousef arrives at Kennedy Airport, from Peshawar via Karachi. Iraqi passport arouses suspicions. (See Mylroie for details of passport inconsistencies.) Responds to questions by immediately asking for asylum, is taken aside for an interview, fingerprinted, given a court appearance date, let go. (Obviously did not meet court date.) * Accompanied by person named Ahmad Ajaj whose poorly forged Swedish passport results in a search of luggage, discovery of bomb manuals, video of instructions, includes statements about waging "war" against "enemies of God," and depicting demolition of an American building. Ajaj was a Palestinian who had been deported from Israel to Jordan in April 1991. In September of that year he went to the U.S. and applied for asylum, taking residence in Houston. In April 1992, with the asylum request still unresolved, he went to Pakistan, worked at the MAK. July 1992 traveled to Islamabad seeking a visa to return to U.S. Encountered Yousef, who said he too was going to the U.S., offered to help him., (bensim 7-8, 235; 1m 95) [Get more detail from Ajaj trial and appeal hearing.) » "Within two days" (bensim 7, compare with ms/c) Yousef moves into Salameh's Jersey City appartment, contacts Abouhalima. Shortly thereafter gatherings are also joined by Ayad and Eyad Ismoil, and an upstairs neighbor named Abdul Yasin, who is of Iraqi origin. * Yousef has frequent phone conversations with Sheikh Rahman and both regularly dial the Pakistan number 810604. (How and when did we know this?) (Bensim 8-9) Fall 1992: Salem role as informant suspended over dispute with FBI over his unwillingness to agree to testify in court, and reportedly some suspicions that he was manufacturing some of the information he was passing on. He is thus off the payroll at time ofWTCI. (bensim 18) November 1992: Over a 12-day stretch, Yousef and team purchase from City Chemical company in Jersey City some 1500 Ibs. of Ureal [check what this is], 30 gallons of nitric acid, other chemicals. Process of building the bomb, bringing together the crew, and surveying the target was underway, (bensim 9-11) Late 1992: A Fatawa is again formulated on the need to evict the U.S. from the Islamic lands, according to Fadl. This was followed by another after the U.S. troops deployed to Somalia. ((nydc/6febO 1/266) December 1992: Bombing outside hotels in Aden where US troops are staying enroute to Somalia. Bergen says al-Qaeda "affiliates" carried it out One source says person who managed bombings was Tariq al-Fadhili, son of deposed sultan of a region near Aden. Fadhili fought in Afghanistan in 1980s, reported to have linked up with bin Laden then. Returned to Yemen in 1989, known as leader of affiliation of Afghan Arabs. Got funding from bin Laden. Initially arrested by Yemen authorities after December 92 bombing, but no action taken. Later, following 1994 North Yemen defeat of communist south, Afghan Arabs folded into new regime. Fadhili now holds position in Yemeni government, (hwi 81-82, 17273.)

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1993 Early 1993: Bin Laden sets up cell in Nairobi, channel for sending weapons trainers into Somalia. One trainer sent at this time was Mohamed Odeh, who had joined bin Laden organization in early 90s, trained in Afghan camps on explosives, weapons, and guerilla combat operations. Also deeply involved in supporting the Somalia efforts was Atef. (Abu Hafs) (nydc 5feb01/26-27; 6feb01/281-83) • About this same time yet another Fatawa discussion takes place, this time on the presence of U.S. forces in "the land of the two sacred sites." • Also discussions on the longstanding duty to attack apostates who cooperate with the occupiers. Includes discussion of killing civilians, which is said to be justified if in the larger cause. (nydc/6feb01/266-68) Also Early 1993: After returning to Sudan to deliver his report from the Balkans, Fadl is sent to Jordan to deliver $100,000 cash, drawn from a bin Laden account in the Shami Bank in Sudan, to someone named Abu Akram Urdani (Urdani means Jordanian). Cash was to go to the Abu Ali group, which Fadl describes as an "al Qaeda member" working inside Palestine and Jordan. Says when he arrived at Amman, Akram arranged for bag not to be checked at customs. (nydc/6feb01/316-19) ~ Also somewhere in this time frame, Fadl was involved in using camels to smuggle AK-47 rifles to EIJ in Egypt. (nydc/6feb01/316 February 1993: WTC I > Mid-February: Bomb nearly complete, vehicles being rented. > 23 February: Ayyad uses corporate account of employer Allied Signal to rent getaway car (to be driven by Salameh, who has already had two driving accidents in the past 30 days) and Salameh rents bomb delivery van from Ryder in Jersey City. > 25 February: Explosives, loaded into three cylinders, delivered to storage bin, then loaded onto ban. Yousef and Ismoil move into Motor Inn, Brooklyn, to be closer, with van parked out front. Meanwhile, Salameh reports to police that van he rented has been stolen > 26 February: Van parked in delivery lane at WTC, Yousef and Ismoil get in getaway car, bomb goes off at 12:18. Six killed, over 1,000 injured, $.5 billion in damages. That evening, Yousef boards Pakistani international Airways to Karachi [according to Mylroie, under name and passport of Basil. Check her source.] Couple hours later, Ismoil flies to Amman, (bensim 10-11) • Earlier same day: (about 1500) Salameh goes to DIB Ryder leasing, informs of "theft," asks for rebate of $400 deposit. Told to present police report. Meanwhile, investigators find vehicle identification number on piece of demolished van frame, begin tracing that leads to DIB leasing. (Bensim 12) > 27 February: Ayyad calls NY Daily News, claims responsibility [under name of 5th Battalion, Liberation Army] mails letter to NYT. > 1 March: Salameh again goes to Ryder rental, again turned away. By now FBI knows of rental. (Meanwhile, Ajaj is mistakenly released because he has served his six months incarceration for illegal entry.) > 4 March: Salameh (has plane ticket to depart next day to Germany) again returns to Ryder rental, again turned away. By now, under surveillance. Arrested as leaves Ryder office. • Same day, FBI interviews Abdul Rahman Yasin (upstairs neighbor of Salameh), conclude he is cooperative, do not detain.

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> 5 March: Yasin flies to Amman. (Same day Salameh had planned to leave. (Bensim 12-13) > 10 March: Ayyad arrested. > 12 March(approx.) At request of FBI, who had been tracking Abouhalima, Egyptians arrest him and, after some torture interrogation, turn him over to U.S. (Picked up by FBI aircraft and returned to U.S.) (ms/c 109; bensim 15) Shortly after attack and arrests, Salem put back on informant payroll. [See Miller.] April/May 1993: Investigators begin to link Ajaj to conspiracy, arrested and charged along with the others. (Im95) 23 June 1993: FBI TERRSTOP operation, pre-empts scheme for bombing multiple NY landmarks, sweeps up Blind Sheikh, 10 other members of plot. By this time the plotters had already begun mixing the explosives. In a pre-emptive move, the FBI (with benefit of Salem info, sweeps them up. (Bensim 18-19) In months following WTC 93, Rahman entourage seeking to design follow-up. Consultations with Nosair in Attica prison. (How and when did we know this?) Players include Nosair cousin Ibrahim el-Gabfowny, Clement Hampton-El (aka Dr. Rashid who had fought in Afghanistan and had been wounded in leg), Sudanese Siddiq AH, another Sudanese Amir Abdelgani. Latter two begin casing targets. Salem, back in the informant role, had been an Egyptian army officer and used his experience with arms and a means of ingratiating himself with the plotters, and thus was able to provide necessary info to FBI. Lincoln and Holland tunnels among targets selected. More volunteers: Fares Khallafalla; Mohammed Saleh; Victor Avarez, Puerto Rican convert. Four more for total of 11.

Mid-late 1993: Al Qaeda operatives begin casing U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Par e-salaam. Plan would be called "Operation Kaaba," (Nairobi) and "Operation al-Aqsa" Dar eSalaam). Acquisition of bomb vehicles asigned to Sheikh Ahmad Slim Swedan [when?]. Bomb making actions under supervision of Abdel Rahman [not Sheikh] an Egyptian with long experience in Afghanistan and Somalia. Ali Mohamed and Anas al-Liby go to Nairobi to take photos. [Discs of surveillance photos discovered years later, after bombings. Where found? Where are they now?] (According to testimony of Mohamad in NY. Also Bensim 2728) Late 1993: Fadl says he was told sometime in the last part of 1993 that he should be prepared to be sent to Somalia, to "cut off the head of the snake (the U.S. army) who has come to the Horn of Africa. (nydc/6feb01/281-83) 3-4 October 1993: "Black Hawk Down" incident in Somalia, 19 U.S. troops killed. Bin Laden would later tell Bergen and Arnett in CNN interview aired 10 May 1997 that his "Afghan Arabs" had played a major role in training, equipping Somalis who carried it out. Al Qaeda operational planner Atef said to have traveled to Somalia twice in 1993 to case options, (hwi 81-82, citing his own interview of Fadl and Fadl testimony Feb 2001, and court record May 2001) [When?] 1993 Bin Laden named as "unindicted co-conspirator" in WTC attack. although not much known of his connection, because his name "cropped up" several times.

15 Name not included in that year's report for Congressional Task Force on Terrorism, (hwi 115; DM check of CTF list.) 1993: Egyptians initiate pressure on Pakistan to crack down on militants. Ultimately leads to retaliatory attacks in 1995. See below.(hwi 90-91)

1994 Feb/March 1994: . Saudi regime freezes Bin Laden assets, ((hwi 89 March, rg34 Feb.) March 1994: U.S. completes withdrawal from Somalia. Odeh has been sent back to Kenya (perhaps as early as the end of 1993) where he sets up a fishing business (cover op) in Mombasa. Atef also there, and Banshiri is already established in Nairobi (arrived late 93/early 94?]. (bensim 130; nydc5feb01/pp20-27, 30-31) [Note: hwi 106 has all of this taking place around mid-1995.) 1994 FWhen?1: Muslim north Yemen attacks, defeats secular socialist south Yemen. Spiritual leader is Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani, who with Tariq al-Fadhili become part of the new Yemen under President Salih's government. Bin Laden ties close. At one time in 1997 considered moving his base back there, (rg 27 says bin Laden financed Fadhili from start in 89-90) April 1994; Group of Saudi exiles sets up in London the "Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, " which becomes a major voice of criticism of Saudi regime. Bin Laden gives support, follows soon with his own organization in London. (Bensim 131.) July 1994: Bin Laden forms Advice and Reformation Committee (ARC) "only for Arabs" [according to Fadl] as platform for propagating opposition to Saudi regime. Main office in London, Khalid al-Fawwaz. who had been in Nairobi, is appointed to head it. Fadl knew him only under alias, but did know that his first name was Khalid. the firstr (hwi 88; rg 34; bensim 131.) [When?11994: Ali Mohamed returns to U.S. from Sudan in response to summons for interview in connection with trial of Blind Sheikh et al in Landmarks case. Afterward, Atef tells him not to return to Sudan to avoid leading American authorities to al-Qaeda's "front step." (Bensim 131, 236. note: 236 gives date of return as 1993 - apparent error as it doesn't fit with other records of Ali Mohamed movements, and is contradicted by bensim's own statements on p. 131.) Late 1994: Hage sent to Sudan to set up support base as businessman, heads office of a relief agency called "Help African People," bankrolled by German muslim money. (Bensim 130; nydc5feb01/30-31) [Kenya cell will remain in place after bin Laden leaves Sudan.] Hage works for relief agency "Help African People," bankrolled by German Muslim money. (nydc5feb01/61) (Court statements make reference to some document that Hage presented in 1997 calling for "military activity?" p62. Check)

16 14 December 1994: Bomb explodes on Philippine airlines flight from Manila to Tokyo, killing one Japanese businessman. Parts include Casio watch wiring device (Yousef signature technique) found. (Bensim 23)) 1995

7 January 1995: Manila, Philippine police respond to fire in apartment on President Quirino Avenue, discover "bomb factory," papers indicating terrorist targeting of Pope (scheduled to visit Manila 20 January), also a schedule of various airline flights. Deduce plan to attack some 12 commercial flights. Initially thought to be Abu Sayyaf plot. Following days US FAA notified. Apartment rented by Yousef. Papers found include business card of Jamal Khalifa, Saudi businessman, NGO official, brother-in-law of bin Laden; learn he had paid for Yousef s apartment. Plot would become known as "Bojinka." .[In following days, Philippine authorities would deduce that the December 94 aircraft bomb was carried out by Yousef, as an experiment. Carried bomb on plane in Manila, left it when he got off airplane at stopover in Cebu.] (Bensim 21-22. Much detail left out - see DM paper for Australia venture.) 25 February 1995: Combined U.S. - Pakistani forces in Islamabad raid apartment, capture Yousef, go straight to airport and fly him to U.S. (One source says tip came from Yousef associate assigned earlier in February to deliver explosives to aircraft leaving Bangkok, saw that a rigorous baggage check was underway, left and dispensed explosives, called in tip re Yousef. (Bensim 25) 8 March 1995: ARC issues communique charging Saudi regime with array of sins, especially use of "Man made laws" not part of sharia. (hwi 89) May 1995 attempt at Mubarak assassination at meeting in Abbas Ababa. [Believed to have been generated by Egyptian pressures on Pakistan to crack down on terrorist entities.] [rg 38 says it was June 95?] 1995. Reports that bin Laden meets with Imad Mughniyeh, Iran-based head of Hizballah (some say member of Iranian intelligence) that had arranged 1983 truck bombing of marines in Lebanon (killing 241) and leading to the American pull out of Lebanon. Witness says Bin Laden said he wanted to follow that model, (hwi 85, citing Ali Mohamed plea agreement in NY, October 2001; and Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance, [NY: Columbia University Press, 1997) pp. 115-20)

17

Connections and collaborative relationships. [nydc/6feb01/290-295, 299, ] By this time frame, according to Fadl, discussions were underway among al Qaeda leadership circles on the need to persuade Sunni and Shiites to put aside differences to fight the common enemy, "the westerns." Fadl said the two senior al Qaeda members, Saif al Islam el Masry and Abu Talha Sudani, told him they had already gone to Lebanon to receive training from Hizbollah Shiites there on how to use explosives, and that he knew that others trained there included Abu Jaffer al Masry, Salem al Masry, and Saif al Adel. Fadl also describes ongoing collaborative relations with other Islamist groups. He claims that from the early days of al Qaeda's foundation it and the Egyptian Islamic Group (GAI) helped each other in carrying out their agendas. (Says in early 1990, the GAI leadership base was in Sudan, and that at that time Sheikh Rahman was its spiritual leader, succeeded by Abu Talal el Masry. Also, the Emir, or operational leader, of GAI organization in Sudan was Abu Yasser al Masry (spelling used by rg, p. 38 is Yasir. GAI signature on '98 Fatawa is Rifia Ahmed Tana? Need to sort out) Other groups that were part of the al Qaeda consortium included the Algerian GIA, and an entity he called the Libyan Fighting Group, some of whose members, including Jaffer al Liby, Abu Anas al Liby, Abu Abdel Qader al Liby, and Ham/allah al Liby (who had worked in Pakistan helping with passports and travel documents), held dual membership. Fadal also said Zawahiri headed a separate group of Egyptians called Talah e Fatah. Fadel also claims he was at one time being considered as one of the persons to be dispatched to join efforts underway to support the rebels in Chechnya with training and weapons. The support channel for this, according to Fadl, ran through Turkey and Baku, Azerbaijan, where al Qaeda had a relief organization. Hage made visits to the Baku relief agency, and to one on Cyprus. Al Qaeda also incorporated the Eritrea Jamaat e Jihad, which was seeking to change the regime there. Fadl says he accompanied Banshire in funneling money to this group. (nydc/6feb01/328-327)

1995: Bin Laden's name comes up in trial of Sheikh Rahman, and nine others for plot to blow up WTC, other NY landmarks. Bin Laden's name comes up in passing, at least one of witnesses asked if he knows name. Concerns about bin Laden at that time were based on his public statements - soliciting violence against American soldiers, (hwi 115) [When?] 1995: Kalafan Kamis Mohamed. Tanzanian national, returns to Dar eSalaam after having gone to Afghanistan the previous year to join the Jihadist movement and undergoing training and "vetting." When departing Afghanistan he is told to leave a "contact number." (nydc5feb/108-09) 13 Nov. 95: Car bomb outside US-Saudi joint facility in Riyadh, the National Guard building, killing five Americans and two Indians. Perpetrators confessions indicate influence of Bin Laden, (hwi 116) [Executions prevent further inquiries.] 20 November 1995: Bombing of Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, killing 15, injuring 80. Yet again retaliation for Egyptian pressures for terrorist crackdown.

By late 1995/early 1996: As bin Laden's name keeps popping up in investigations of various incidents, CTC forms special branch to focus on him. (hwi 116, DCI open testimony 11 June 2002) May 96: Bin Laden is discovered to have moved to Afghanistan. By this time, is on the U.S. list of terrorist threats. A NY Grand Jury has been impaneled to investigate him.

18

21 May 1996: Banshiri dies in ferry accident on Lake Victoria, (hwi 106, rg 26.) 25 June 1996. Khobar Towers in Dhahran, kills 19 American troops . 23 August 1996: Bin Laden issues "Declaration of Jihad on the Americans occupying the country of the two sacred places." Says "Muslims have realized they are the main target of ... Jews and Crusaders ... God willing, I will expel the Jews and Christians from Arabia." September 1996: Taliban takes over Kabul. US initially makes no objection [Bergen makes much of US efforts, Unocal energy corporation, to set up oil line through to Indian ocean] but by early 1997 SecState Albright in visit to Pakistan makes public statement of opposition. 1996ff: After bin Laden's move back to Afghanistan, Hage traveling back and forth from Nairobi to meet with him and members of his top circle. (nydc01/5feb/20-27) [Note: hwi 135 says back and forth to Arlington, Texas, where he was nominally employed at Lone Star Tires. Both could be correct.] 1997: Haroun Fazil dispatched to Nairobi to replace Banshiri and continue preparations on embassy bombing plot. Shares house there with Wadjh al-Hage. (hwi 106) February 97: Another Fatawa? (See rg 42-44) March 1997: Bin Laden interviewed by CNN (Arnett a'nd Bergen). 21 August 97: As Hage returned from one of his trips to Pakistan/Afghanistan, JTTF agents stopped him at Nairobi airport and, informing him that they were fully aware of his activities in Kenya, "recommended" that he return to the U.S. Meanwhile, FBI accompanies Kenyan police search of his apartment, finds laptop with letter describing existence of Kenya cell and knowledge of call for attacks on Americans. Nothing specific, (ms/c 200-01, hwi 117, citing court testimony of 21 Feb. 2001.) [What led to the search? What were the leads? Fadl information? ] fdate?1 September 97: Hage returns to U.S. after selling his properties in Kenya, is picked up by U.S. authorities at entry airport in U.S., questioned at length and then sent before a Grand Jury next day. [Unofficial accounts that JTTF objective was to "turn" him. He made no disclosures, however, and in fact a year later his statements to the Grand Jury would result in his conviction of perjury.] (See nydc/5feb01/64; ms/c 201; hwi 135-36) November 1997: Egyptian attack at Luxor, kills 58 tourists, 4 Egyptians. 24 Dec. 97: Egyptian [Mustafa Mahmoud Said Ahmed] walks into Nairobi embassy, says plot being hatched to drive truck bomb into underground embassy garage. US Amb. Prudence Bushnell cables Washington expressing concern over need for additional security in face of threats of terrorists, (hwi 117, citing NYT 23 October 1998) 22 Feb. 98 Fatawa "World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders." Co-signers were Zawahiri, listed as head of EIJ; Rifia Ahmed Taha of Egyptian Islamic Group; Mir Hamzah of Jamiat-ul-e-Pakistan; Fazul Rahman, emir of Jihad Movement of

19 Bangladesh (also identified by other sources as head of Harrakat ul-Mujadin, militant Pakistani group involved in Kashmir fighting). (Printed in London, Al-Quds al'Arabia, on 23 February. See FBIS doc. Have text.) This is followed by many similar public statements and Fatawas by other groups including Afghans, Pakistan and Saudi clerics. Some published in western press, esp. in London Al-Quds Al-Arabi. Message had been phoned in to Al-Quds alArabia in London the evening of 22 Feb., through channel of ARC chief Khalid al-Fawaz. (Bensim 26) April 1998: Kalafan Kamis Mohamed. (KK) who had been living in Mombassa for the past year [and whose travel record is something that seems worth further scrutiny) was contacted by a "friend" [whom he knew only by the name "Hussain." Hwi 110-12)] about a "Jihad job," [claims in testimony he did not know what job was]. Was subsequently told to rent an apartment in Dar e-Salaam, was given money to pay for it, and did so under his own name. He and his "friend" and their families together moved into what was envisaged as a site for assembling the explosive devices for the embassy attack in Dar e-Salaam four months later. (nydc5feb/112-14) 26 May 98 Press conference at camp in Afghanistan. Says there would be "good news in the coming weeks." (hwi 186, who attended.) The press conference was attended by Mohamed Rased al-Owhali. He would later testify that he had by this time already approached the top al Qaeda leadership volunteering for a "martyr mission," and that by the time of the press conference he had already been informed of the general nature of a mission to which he was being assigned against U.S. facilities in Africa. He also had been videotaped declaring himself a martyr, (hwi, quoting court testimony of 7 March 2001. Check original.] 28 May 98 ABC interview in Afghanistan. Bin Laden made clear was calling for death of Americans. "...Do not differentiate between those ... in military uniforms and civilians... ." (hwi 110-112) May 29,1998: On or about this date, UBL issues statement entitled "The Nuclear Bomb of Islam" under the banner of the "International Islamic Front for the Fighting the Jews and the Crusaders" in which he states that "it is the duty of the Muslims to prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God." (May 2003 indictment in US v. Al-Badawi & Al-Quso).] June 1998: Kalafan Kamis Mohamed is told to buy a truck, again with money given him by the person who told him to do so. Same month, people start bringing TNT into apartment. (nydc5feb/114) July 1998: Kalafan Kamis Mohamed told to rent another apartment in Dar e-Salaam, because a "better site" is needed. Again, with money provided by the person who issued the instructions. (nydc5feb/114) 1 August 98: Another person delivers a new truck to the newly rented Dar e-Salaam apartment. Vehicle has already been altered to enable explosives to be inserted "around it." At about the same time a "technical expert" arrives at the apartment, gives KK instructions on "grinding" the TNT into powder. Explosive efforts joined by designated driver.(nydc5feb/116.)

20 2 August 98: Mohamed Rashed al-Owhali, who is assigned to carry out the suicide bombing in Nairobi, arrives there from Afghanistan. Joined by person he had said he met in Afghanistan named Azzam All gathered at the Hilltop Hotel, from which they could case the embassy. (nydc5feb01/36) * According to Bensim Fp. 29-301 Azzam was aware that al-Owhali asked for a martyr mission and approached him in Afghanistan in March 98 offering his services for a whatever mission was undertaken. After some additional training the two of them went to Yemen for a short while, then were called back to Afghanistan in the summer, given a full brief on their mission, and then left for Nairobi at the beginning of August. *

This was also the same time that Hamdan Khalif Alal (Egyptian who had been a trainer in the Afghan camp) turned up in Dar-e-Salaam. [Get details, sources.] ??

3 August 1998: Odeh arrives in Nairobi from Mombasa, from where he had been summoned the previous day. Had already been told several months earlier (nydc5feb/75) that all AQ members must leave Africa by 6 August. Stays in apartment with several others engaged in plot, reconnoiters embassy, works in apartment on 4th 5th, part of 6th August, (nydc 5feb01/36-37) 5 August 98 letter from Zawahari to Egyptian newspaper Al-Hayat saying American interests about to be attacked, (hwi, 109 citing Guardian 12 August 1998.) 6 August 98: Odeh leaves Nairobi in evening night (with false passport from Yemen) for Pakistan, "with another member." [Who?] (nydc 5feb01/37) In Dar-e-Salaam, all but two of the al Qaeda operatives - Kalafan Kamis Mohamed and the "designated driver" - have also departed. (At least all those that Kalafan knew of.) The truck has been fully loaded. When the "leader" departed, he left some money for Kalafan to use "when it's time for you to go." Kalafan also was given a list of three phone numbers to call if needed. Kalafan was needed at this point because the designated driver did not speak Swahili. (Story of truck getting stuck in sand, get it out with help from another rented truck) (nydc/5feb/l 16-21) 7 August 98: Embassy bombings. > Nairobi: At about 10:30 am Owhali and Azzam drive up to embassy parking lot gate. > Owhali jumps out, screws up, (according to some but so far not nydc accounts, forgot gun, throws grenades, et al) Bomb goes off 10:35 , 201 Kenyans and 12 Americans killed. (Bensim 29-30) > Par es Salaam: Truck bomb hits at 10:39 am, kills 11 Tanzanians, no Americans. Kalafan rode part way to the embassy, then got out and remained in Dar e-Salaam for the day to perform what authorities charge is "clean-up" of apartment, trail, etc. (nydc/5feb/120-21) Same morning, Mohamed Odeh . who had fled Nairobi the night before the bombing, stopped as arrived at Karachi airport because of irregularities in Yemen passport photo. Turned over to intelligence, confessed, (hwi 113, bensim 29-30.) 8 August 98: Kalafan departs for Capetown, South Africa. For travel, uses false papers he had been given ahead of time, but once in Capetown he lives under his own papers. [Soon gets job there in Burger World.] (nydc/5feb/124).

21 12 August 98 Owhali. who backed out of the suicide move but was nevertheless seriously injured in the blast, is captured. He had checked into a hospital, where he was subsequently arrested by Kenyan authorities. He also confesses. Also tells of Bin Laden group desire to bomb US ship in a Yemen port, (hwi 118, citing court record 7 March 2001, and affidavit of David Coleman 25 August 1998.) 20 August 1998: U.S. air attacks on Sudanese chemical plant, Khost camp in Afghanistan. 25 August 1998 Sanctions are imposed by the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act on UBL, the Islamic Army (aka Al-Qaida, Islamic Salvation Foundation, The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, and The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites), Abu Hafs al-Masri, and Rifa'I Ahmad Taha Musa. September 1998: Ali Mohamed also arrested. He also will go on to spill beans. 29 December 1998: Kidnapping of 16 western tourists in Yemen by Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) which had trained with al-Qaeda. Group was headed by Abu Hassan and Egyptian Abu Hamza [who resided in London]. Botched rescue results in deaths of 3 Brits and 1 Australian. Hassan later arrested, makes some confession, then executed. Secrets die with him. (bergen - get page refs, source citations.) February 1999: Because recruits/trainees are having difficulty getting to landlocked Afghanistan after embassy bombings, bin Laden confers with Hashim Salamat, leader of MILF in Philippines, makes a deal whereby al Qaeda will provide additional trainers for camps in Abu Bakr complex and MILF will set aside some space for al Qaeda training, (rg 6) Summer 1999: Millennium plots underway: Jordanian authorities detect unfolding plot for multiple bombings on millennium eve, centerpiece Radisson Hotel, booked mainly with Americans, Christians for 2,000th anniversary of Christian calendar. Large Jordanian cell of approx 30 people. * Ahmad Ressam preparing construction of bomb to be delivered at LA airport. (Algerian who had been illegal immigrant in France, moved to Montreal [when?] where petty thief and welfare liver, eventually heads to Afghanistan, trained at Khalden camp - Yousef's alma mater - and then in advanced bombs and chemicals at Derunta camp outside Jalalabd. [Any details re when, etc.?] [Bensim talk about experiments with dogs - is this connected to films captured in Afghanistan later?] Sent back to Canada on mission, [when?] was given $12,000 for operating costs [from whom?] * Preparations by Yemeni cell for attack on US vessel scheduled to arrive in Aden for refueling (a recently initiated US practice.) USS Sullivans becomes specific target [when?] (Bensim 30-31) * Abu Zubaida (Palestinian living then in Peshawar) in overall ops command, (according to Bensim 32) 5 October 1999: Dar e-Salaam bomber Kalafan Khamis Mohamed requests political asylum in Capetown, under false identification, arrested, questioned on 5th, 6th 7th' jailed. (nydc/5feb/125] [Four months earlier, in June, had tried to use the "emergency numbers" given to him just before the bombing. All three fail to have anyone on other end. )nydc/05feb01/124]

22

8 October 1999: Al Qaeda officially designated for the first time as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) by the Secretary of State under 8 USC 1189. December 1999: Jordanians intercept Zubaida message to carry out millennium plan, roll up conspirators. * 14 December 1999: Ahmed Ressam arrested at Washington State border crossing. Found carrying pile of explosives and maps with circles around airports in Los Angeles, Long Beach, and Ontario (CA). After convicted, started to talk. [Bensim 32] 26 December 1999: Hijacking of Indian airliner by Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, and Jaish? By 30 December Indian government makes deal for release of Azhar, Ahmal Omar Saeed Sheikh, and Mustak Ahmed Zargar [leader of lesser known Kashmir group Al-Umar]. [Not evidence of al Qaeda involvement, but included on chron as reminder tobe on lookout for any evidence of support.] 3 January 2000: Attempt at bombing USS The Sullivans fails because boat overloaded with explosives, begins to sink, forced to turn back to shore. (Bensim 32) 12 October 2000: Cole bombing. Attackers from group led by Omar al-Harazi, Afghan fighter of Yemen family but born in Saudi Arabia. [Like Bin Laden.] [YT Note: I did not get sense of al-Harazi leading the attack from the indictment.] Other attempt in Jan. 2000 failed. [YT: According to 2003 indictment, unindicted coconspirator al-Nasheri indicated that UBL had planned the attack. Prior to the attack, al-Nasheri had tested the explosives"and refitted the boat that had sunk in January; other, uncharged coconspirators included Saif Adel and Tafiq Bin Attash, aka Khallad. (May 2003 indictment in US v. Al-Badawi and Al-Quso.)

23 PLAYERS Osama bin Laden: Born 1957. Exact date in dispute. Bergen, drawing on press interview, says 10 March. Gunaratna says 30 July but acknowledges in footnote that there is not formal registration. "Osama" means "young lion." Son of the "rotating" wife slot, mother Syrian. Osama has roughly 50 siblings, of which he is 17th in birth sequence. At age 24, (1981?) attended Abdul Aziz university in Jedda, came under "spell" of two teachers Abdullah Azzam and Muhammad Qutb. (hwi 44,47) Accounts differ on studies, achievements. Some say he studied economics and engineering, and received a degree. (Bensim 98) Some say he did not, however, study engineering, nor did he complete his degree in economics. (rg!7) Most sources describe his initial activities in Pakistan in the early 1980s as essential a "rich kid" helping with supplies and money. Several sources cite a battle with the Soviet forces in 1987 near his first Afghanistan base, Jali, as the occasion when he earned his credentials as a warrior. Another participant in that battle was senior EIJ figure Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri. (See also bensim 96-97) Abdullah Azzam Osama teacher, later partner in Peshwar, where he set up the Mekhtab al Khadamat, or Services Office in 1984. Born in Palestine in 1941, Graduated 1966 from University in Damascus, fought in 1967 war. Early 70s was student [doctorate] at al-Azhar University in Cairo, at same time as Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. Also befriended family of Sayyid Qutb, "sage" of Islamist doctrine, who had been executed by Nasser in 1966. (His brother was on faculty of Al Azhar at the time in 1970s.) Late 1970s taught for a while in Amman, later dismissed, met with Afghan mujahidin members, moved to Pakistan where he became lecturer at Islamic University. Assassinated in car bombing 24 November 89. Late 70s taught for a while in Amman, later dismissed, met with Afghan mujahideen members, Early 1980's met with Afghan mujahidin members, moved to Pakistan where he became lecturer at Islamic University in Islamabad. Exponent of Jihad as absolute necessity to restore Caliphate. " ... the rifle alone ... no conferences and no dialogues." (hwi 52-53) Muhammad Outb: Teacher at Al-Azhnar in Cairo same time as Azzam and Sheikh Rahman studying there in early 197s. Brother of Sayyid Qutb who wrote a key text of the jihad movement in Egypt and was executed in 1966. (hwi 52) Abdul Rasool Sayyaf: Afghan commander, whose name would later be used by a returning Philippine volunteer to form the Abu Sayyaf Muslim secessionist group, (hwi 52) Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman: "Blind Sheik," jailed as result of 1993 [YT: landmarks plot]. Residing in Peshwar in 1980s, set up a "guesthouse" there, made trips into Afghanistan under aegis Hekmatyar. (hwi 53) Studied in England in early 1980s, entered US [in 1987?] and 1990 under visas granted allegedly by "computer mistake." But one was by CIA officer operating under cover of consular officer in Sudan. Muhammad Abdurrahman Khalifa: Jordanian, head of branch there of Muslim brotherhood, also supporting recruitment for Afghan jihad, later worked in Peshwar as head of Saudi Muslim World league office during Afghan jihad. Married Bin Laden daughter, (hwi 54) Khaled al-Fawwaz: [aka Abu Khalil al Madani; Abu Mahdi] Bin Laden's "London contact,." In July 1994 appointed by Bin Laden as head of London office of ARC, Saudi regime opposition org. Arrested by Brits in Sept. 98

24 Abu Khadija al Iraqi [who is he?] Fadl describes as al Qaeda member with both Israeli and German citizenship. (nydc/6febO 1/307] Hashed al-Owhali, offspring of wealthy Saudi family, born in Liverpool 1977, recruited through Afghan jihad. Goes to Afghanistan in 1996. (NYDC 7 March 2001) Asks to meet bin Laden in [early 1998?] asks for martyr mission. Is given further training (appears background of May 98 filmed press conference). I sent to Nairobi in early August to be part of suicide team, meets person who is to be his partner, Azzam, (not same as Emir) whom he had already met at the camp in Afghanistan. (NYDC 5 Feb. 2001) Mohamed Odeh: African embassy bombings. Jordanian, married Kenyan woman, lived on Kenya coast in town of Witu. (nydc/5feb/75) Studied engineering in Philippines, recruited for Afghan Jihad in part from film by Azzam. Ultimately swore allegiance to bin Laden, (hwi 53) Kalafan Khamis Mohamed: Impoverished family, recruited to Afghanistan training camp in 1994, returned to Tanzania in 1995 as "sleeper." Contacted for "jihad job" about same time as Bin Laden's Feb. 98 fatawa. [Jerry Post testified for his defense, on psychological grounds.] (hwi 110-111) Kalafan Kamis Mohamed (aka KK) rents house in Dar e-Salaam, which is used a bomb-building site. Buys suicide car. (5feb01/38) In months before attack, participates in making bomb, (nydc 5feb01/91. Arrested 5 October 1999. (nydc/5feb01/100) Born 1973 on island of Pemba, off coast of Tanzania, moves to Dar e-Salaam in 1990. (nydc/5feb01/104) goes to Afghanistan 1994 (nydc/5feb01/108) Returns to Dar e-Salaam 1995. Is told to leave a "contact number." Goes to Mombasa in 1997. (nydc/5feb01/109) Then goes to Somalia, to "see if he could help ... in the tribal wars. Goes back second time same year. In 1998, again goes to Mombasa.. Then tries to get passport to "visit bother " in London, uses fake information. (nydc/5feb01/l 11) June 1999 makes phone call on one of numbers he had been given, cut off. Second number says "wrong number." Third doesn't work. (nydc/5feb/125] [Who was he supposed to ask for on these numbers?] All Mohamed: Egyptian, arrested in September 1998 in connection with al-Qaeda's "conspiracy to kill Americans." Has given lengthy information. [Bergen has suspicions as to who he really was.] Joined Egyptian army in 1971 at age 19, served to 1984, reaching rank of major. (During this service he got BA in psychology from U. Alexandria in 1980.) Contacted CIA as volunteer informant, [sometime in first half of 1980s] shortly dropped because unreliable. After leaving army, took position on counterterrorism for Egyptair. Then came to U.S., got job in surety company in California, married U.S. citizen, sped up application for citizenship and U.S. passport (which facilitated his global travels.) Enlisted in US Army 1986 [age 34] attended Special Forces training facility at Fort Bragg, N.C., became teacher there of ME issues. (Multilingual - Arabic, Hebrew, English, French.) While on leave from army went to Afghanistan to fight with bin Laden's troops. Discharged 1989, became a "sleeper," became connected with the Alkhifa Refugee Center in Brooklyn. "Afghan Refugees Services Inc." created in 1987, ostensibly to help those who suffered from Soviet invasion, in fact a recruitment, money channel for the mujahidin. Mohamed gave training to Islamist militants in NY in 1989. [Among sources Bergen cites court record of Rahman trial, testimony of Khalid Ibrahim. Check also identify of Roger Stavis.] Provided military and weapons training manuals to Nosair, Kahane assassin, [hwi 131, m/s —] He went back to Afghanistan in September 1992, serving as a trainer. Sent to Kenya 1993 to case embassy and report back to bin Laden in Khartoum. [YT: Per The Cell, page 145, had contact with FBI in 1993 in California after Canadians alerted FBI that Mohamed was claiming to work for FBI while

25

trying to get Al Qaeda operative with fraudulent papers into US. Mohamed told FBI that bin Laden was determined to drive US off Arabian Peninsula. DOD Intel, was called in, but NY FBI/JTTF was not informed.] Trained Bin Laden's bodyguards in Khartoum in 1994. All this time, maintained official residence in California. House there (Santa Clara) searched in August 1998, uncovered documents on assassination techniques. Arrested Sept. 1998 on suspicion of being part of bin Laden "conspiracy to kill Americans." [hwi 132-33, drawing extensively on records from NY trials.) Abu Zubaida: reportedly headed al Qaeda's connections with various regional groups. Was identified by confessed conspirator as having been the principal operational planner for the thwarted plot to bomb U.S. Embassy in Paris 1995. Has been tied to many additional attacks, was believed to succeed Atef as main military operations coordinator after the latter's death in Afghanistan. Captured in March 2002 in Karachi, (rg 98, also NYT, 28 Dec. 2001, article by Erlanger and Hedges.) Wadih el-Hage: Born in Lebanon 1960, Catholic family. Converts to Islam while a teenager. Comes to US in 1978 after finishing high school, settles in Lafayette, attends University of South Louisiana. In 1983, goes to Pakistan to assist Afghan mujahidin as a "relief worker." (Infancy defect resulted in shriveled arm, thus could not really be a warrior.) Reportedly (NY/SD Feb. 2001) met with some UBL associates. Returned to U.S. 1985, marries American who converted to Islam. Moves with wife and first child back to Pakistan (Quetta) in 1986. (Hwi says mother-in-law accompanies them, is source for much of hwi info, some of which conflicts with info in court hearings.) In 1987 Hage back to U.S., this time in Tucson. Hwi 135 says Hage makes several trips to Brooklyn 1987-1990, and that he was working for Azzam at this time, and made several trips to Afghanistan. NY court statement says in 1989 or '90 went back to Pakistan with wife and now three children. Then family back to Arlington Texas 1990 or '91. (NY court records do not mention, in preliminary statement, Hage's service at NY al-Kifah.) Called to NY from Texas on 27 Feb. 91 to replace Shalabi. (Before Shalabi body found on 1 March.) In 1992 goes to Sudan to join bin Laden's new set up there, takes cover job as businessman and also serves as bin Laden secretary. In 1994 is assigned to Nairobi cell. After bin Laden moves back to Afghanistan in 1996, Hage travels between Nairobi and Afghanistan for meetings with bin Laden. While on one of his trips to Afghanistan his apartment is searched August 1997. Causes him to pull up stakes and return to U.S. Is stopped at airport entry, taken off for questioning, again the next day, and then in September appears before Grand Jury investigating bin Laden, statements later determined to be perjury. Returns to Arlington, Texas by end of year. (nydcSFebOl, pp20-28; 48-52.) Initially charged with perjury in September 1998, [DM: later superceded by full list of charges relating to embassy bombings.] Trial begins Feb. 2001; hwi 135-36) Mustafa Shalabi: Head of Alkhifa from outset, (rg ... says appointed by Azzam),helped Rahman get settled in US in 1990. Assassinated 1 March 1991, after falling out with Rahman. Jamal al-Fadl: Born 1963 in Sudan south of Khartoum, studied English in middle/secondary school. Lived briefly with friend in Saudi Arabia 1981, caught pot smoking escapes back to Sudan. Moved to US on student visa 1986, married American. Settles in Brooklyn, continues to travel, works at under Shalabi at Alkifa/Farouq Mosque (which he describes in testimony as part of a "larger MAK group under Azzam/bin Laden in Pakistan) to support Afghan Jihad - raising money, recruiting, facilitating acquisition of travel documents. (Fadl/6feb/l 62-65))

26 "Under direction of Shalabi," leaves for Peshawar 1988 with three other "brothers" to join Afghan Jihad. Shalabi provides money, travel tickets. Describes function of "guesthouses" as point where new recruits/volunteers drop off their papers and money, get a pseudonym. (His was Abu Bakr Sudani.) Then proceeded to Afghan camp "Khalid Ibn Walid," for about 45 days training in small arms, rpgs. (Fadl/6feb/166-74). Goes to "front line" at Jaji. Says met Abu Hajer al Iraqi (true name Mamudh Salim. see below) and also bin Laden. After two months on front line returned to Peshawar. Describes guesthouse as "back and forth way station." Several more back and forths, including to Camp Farouq in Khost area, and a bomb making camp called al Jihad, designed for training individuals for specific missions. One person there giving training is Abu Mohamed al Masry. (Fadl/6feb/175-184) In 1989, attends what seems from his description to be a sort of ceremony, at which various individuals swear a "bayat" to bin Laden's new organization, which he understands will be called "al Qaeda." Later would be involved in bin Laden move to Sudan, and subsequent planning for African embassy bombings. Split with bin Laden over money issue, (charged by bin Laden with embezzeling more than $100,000, became star informant and witness for U.S. in embassy bombing trials, (hwi 60) Ihab Ali: American citizen, dead end jobs in Florida at inter alia Disney World. Goes to Peshewar 1989. 1993, assists in purchase of aircraft for al Qaeda, which is flown to Sudan. Studied flying at Norman, Oklahoma. Moves to Kenya in mid-1990s, communicates with elHage. (hwi 139) Essam al-Ridi: Person described by rg in almost exactly the same terms as hwi describes Ihab Ali. Are they reporting the same person under different names? (rg 59) Raed Hijazi: California born 1969, Palestinian heritage. Travels to Afghanistan training camps near Khost in 1990s. Stint in Boston as cab driver, goes to Jordan to work on bomb materials for thwarted millennium plot of December 1999. Arrested in Syria October 2000, still in custody, still no confession [to date?] (hwi 139) Mahmud Abouhalima - WTC I participant. Worked at Alkhifa. Fought in Afghanistan 1990. (hwi 134,136.) El-Sayyid Nosair: Born '55 Port Said, Egypt. Family displaced in 1967 war. Grew up in Cairo. Graduated Helwan U., Cairo, 1978, degree industrial design/engineering. 1981 immigrates US, Pittsburgh. 1982 marries American recently converted to Islam. Becoming more Islamistic. Fired from job as diamond cutter in 1983, part because of job performance, partly because of proselytizing on the job. 1985 two separate charges of rape lodged; charges dropped after intervention of local Iman, but moves to Jersey City address where police would pick up Abouhlima and Salameh 5/6 November. 1988 (spring) gets job in Brooklyn essentially janitor — giving address as that of cousin Ibrahim el-Gabrowny. Becomes "fixture," full time worker, at al-Kifah Refugee Services Center (U.S. Branch of Office of Services set up in Peshawar. Emir is Mustafa Shalabi. Nosair falls under liturgy of Abdllah Assam - "scholar, soldier, orator, organizer, prophet, and propagandist." Azzam frequently traveled to US to raise funds, preach global Jihad. (E.g. speech in 1988 at Farooq mosque where al Kifah located.) (ms/c 50ff.) Ramzi Yousef: Leader of 1993 bombing. Flew to NY from Peshwar in Sept. 92. On arrival, his companion was arrested on immigration charges. Search turned up explosives manual, titled "Al-Qaeda" The Base. [NYT translation.] Uncle had been regional manager of Mercy

27 International Relief, Peshwar based charity working closely with Bin Laden, issued identity cards to Bin Laden, Ali Mohamed. Trained in Afghanistan in camp of Sayyaf, where Fadl claims to have seen him sometime in 1989-90. Moved to Philippines in early 1990s, contacted Abu Sayyaf group, collaborated with group. (Some sources, including the Manila police, say Yousef served as bin Laden's agent in helping to found Abu Sayyaf, and bensiml 12, while not mentioning Yousef by name, also say bin Laden detailed agents and money to found Abu Sayyaf brigade in Mindanao.) Caught after explosives experiment in his Manila apartment went awry, ran away leaving smoke coming out of window. Computer revealed plans for plans to blow up 11 passenger jets and kill Pope. Abu Sayyaf involved. When captured had address of Bin Laden guest house. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: [(hwi 137 calls him Zahid Sheikh) Yousef s uncle (according to hwi, 137) regional manager of Mercy International, in Pesawar, during mid-1990s. Is said to have run Islamic Coordination Council in 1993, which had been established by Azzam to coordinate activities of 20 other charities in city. Own statements and Fadl description have him in 1989-1991 at the Sadda bomb-making training camp in Afghanistan, run by Abdul Sayyaf.. Later info says Yousef had been in Philippines in early 1990s initiating creation of Abu Sayyaf Brigade there. Later, 2000, Abu Sayyaf used hostages to demand Yousef release from NY. (hwi 138-39; also independent sources identified in dm memo.) Ahmed Ressam: Algerian arrested at border crossing in Washington state on 14 December 1999. Another recruit from the mosques. Bounced around in late 80s, early 90s, went to Montreal in 1994, went to Afghanistan in 1998, trained and indoctrinated. Went back to Montreal, met with some fellow Algerians, made preparations for strikes in US, with money from al-Qaeda, meanwhile serving as point for Algerian recruits/volunteers from Montfeal. (hwi 139) Abu Hassan and Mohammed Omar al-Harazi Leaders of Yemeni terrorist groups reportedly cooroperating with al Qaeda on Cole bombing, (hwi 177ff.) Al-FadI al-Makke: One of the top managers of al Qaeda financial channels, (hwi 66) Mamdouh Mahmud Salim; Aka Abu Hajer al Iraqi. Al-Qaeda operative involved in efforts to acquire weapons grade nuclear materials, (hwi 85, citing Grand Jury testimony of Hage, entered into record 22 February 2001.) [YT: Extradited to US from Germany in 1998, convicted of stabbing prison guard in US, I believe he's awaiting trial on East Africa bombings.] Abu Hamza. Egyptian, leader of IAA, met Rahman in UK while as student there in mid1980s. 1987 while on a Hajj to Saudi Arabia met Abdullah Azzam. Spent much of 1989-93 in Afghanistan. After an accident with a land mine, returned to London as a preacher and recruiter in 1993. Operated from there as the "mastermind" behind IAA, had satellite commo and broadcasts. Anas al-Liby: Computer expert for al-Qaeda, escaped London just ahead of police raid. Had made 1993 trip to Nairobi to develop photo surveillance of embassy.

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28 L'Hossaine Kherchtou: Moroccan, attended catering school in France. Went to Afghanistan in 1991, went through camp training, (hwi 89) Later broke with bin Laden in dispute over the latters refusal to provide money for wife's cesarean treatment. (Bensim 114) Harrakatt- ul-Mujahdin of Kashmir led by Fazal-ul-Rehman Khalil. This could be the same person who signed the Feb. 98 Fatawa, listed in the FBIS report as Fazal Rehman, but as Emir of Jihad of Bangladesh. Abu Ayoub al-Iraqi: An early founding member of bin Laden's inner circle, called "Emir" at the time (rg 56) Muhammed Atef true name Subhi 'Abd-al-'Aziz-Sittah (rg26) Haroun Fazil dispatched to Nairobi in 1997 to replace Banshiri and continue preparations on embassy bombing plot. Shares house there with Wadih al-Hage. (hwi 106) Abu Muaz al Masry: EIJ person with double membership in al Qaeda. (nydc/6feb01/323427)Abu Anas al Liby: computer specialist. (nydc/6feb01/3234-27) Usama Azmarai aka al Assad: Known for performance in fighting against Soviets in Afghanistan. (nydc/6febO 1/3234-27) Abu Diiana al Yemeni: Trainer (nydc/6feb01/3234-27) Khalid al Masry: member of both EIJ and al Qaeda, specialist in employment and maintenance of tanks, was member of military committee along with Banshiri and Atef. (nydc/6feb01/3234-27) Some inserts: Other connections: Qater charitable organization run by an al Qaeda member who is alos a member of the NIF and had served in the Afghan Jihad, i