Surigao Mineral Reservation Board.docx

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads. SYLLABUS 1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; STATUS AS OFFICERS OF THE COURT; DUTY OF RESPECT AND OBEDIENCE. — As categorically spelled out in Sec. 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, lawyers should observe and maintain respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The first canon of legal ethics provides that "it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." It is incumbent upon them to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. The attorney's oath solemnly binds them to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts." The duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY NOT TO PROMOTE DISTRUST IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. — A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF DISRESPECTFUL LANGUAGE; CASE AT BAR. — The language of attorney in his motion for reconsideration referring to the Supreme Court as a "civilized democratic tribunal," but by innuendo would suggest that it is not; in his motion to inhibit, categorizing the Court's decision as "false, erroneous and illegal" and accusing two justices for being interested in the decision of the case without any basis in fact; asking the other members of the Court to inhibit themselves for favors or benefits received from any of the petitioners including the President — constitute disrespectful language to the Court. It undermines and degrades the administration of justice.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENSE OF CLIENT, NOT A VALID JUSTIFICATION. — A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that since "lawyers are administrators of justice, oath- bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their client, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their client's success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY TO ABSTAIN FROM OFFENSIVE PERSONALITY AGAINST A PARTY OR WITNESS. — A lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. It is the duty of a member of the bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS; POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS MOTU PROPRIO. — That the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered as offended parties in this case, is unavailing as a defense. The Supreme Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. For, inherent in courts is the power "to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY NOT TO MISLEAD THE JUDGE; USE OF DISTORTED QUOTATIONS, IMPROPER. — The act of intentionally omitting the qualification to the rule quoted is not proper. Canon 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." 8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY TO COUNSEL TO MAINTAIN SUCH ACTIONS OR PROCEEDINGS ONLY AS APPEAR TO BE JUST. — A lawyer has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client take should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics provides that "a lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to de, particularly with reference to their conduct towards Courts, judicial officers, jurors and witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation."

9. REMEDIAL LAW; CONTEMPT OF COURT; INDIRECT CONTEMPT; IMPROPER CONDUCT TENDING TO DEGRADE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE; USE OF IMPROPER LANGUAGE IN MOTION TO INHIBIT. — Where counsel, in his motion to inhibit, called petitioners as "vulturous executives" and spoke of the Supreme Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal," but by innuendo would suggest that it is not; categorized its decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner; warned the Court that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country "although the process had already begun"; mentioned "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent and "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, and that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board — petitioner, or their agents or principals, including that President" should inhibit themselves, which accusations have no basis in fact and in law, he is guilty of indirect contempt for use of language tending to degrade the administration of justice. The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. 10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY DELETION OF IMPROPER LANGUAGE; EFFECT OF. — The deletion of paragraph 6 which contained disrespectful language did not erase the fact that it has been made. The explanation that the deleted portion was included in the motion filed in Court only because of mere advertence, does not make much of a distinguishing difference. It erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. 11. ID.; ID.; ID.; MISBEHAVIOUR OF AN OFFICER OF THE COURT AND IMPROPER CONDUCT TENDING TO DEGRADE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE; USE OF DISRESPECTFUL LANGUAGE IN PLEADINGS. — Where counsel, in his pleadings, accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur"; describing such efforts as "scattershot desperation" and the proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face," laying bare "the immortal and arrogant attitude of the petitioners"; and charging petitioners with opportunistically changing their claim and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case, he is guilty of indirect contempt under Sec. 3(a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for misbehaviour as an officer of

the court in the performance of his official duties and under Sec. 3(d) of the same rule for improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. Such language is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant. It offends the court before which it is made. 12. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR CONTEMPT; FACT OF BEING A NON-LAWYER IS NO DEFENSE. — A person who admitted having prepared the motion for reconsideration which contained contemptuous language is guilty of contempt. The fact that he is not a lawyer is no defense. 13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SIGNING A CONTEMPTUOUS PLEADING WITHOUT READING IT IS NO EXCUSE. — Counsel's insistence that he had nothing to do with the contemptuous motion for reconsideration and had not even read it does not excuse him. As counsel of record, he has control of the proceedings. RESOLUTION* SANCHEZ, J p: After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause order. The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto: "a. `They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately called `scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14). b. `Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners.' (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the page).

c. `The herein petitioners . . . opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case.' (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p. 17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the page)." MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain the following statements: "d. `. . . ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel.' (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). e. `. . . Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud . . . and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner.' (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968)." The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 — after judgment herein was rendered — and signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the aboveentitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent

wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision." The "incidents" cited are as follows: "(a) said decision is in violation of the law; which law has not been declared unconstitutional. (b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above entitled case. (c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature. (d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law — but only served to delay respondent for the benefit of the favored party. (e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at all. (f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct. (g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous decisions, and the main issue `right to reject any or all bids' is being treated on a double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court. (h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has greater understanding than the said decision manifests. (i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said decision — without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation through the trial court, which is elementary." On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates, in Writing pointed out to this

Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context, could be defended, or were comments legitimate and justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts, his client would be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in full reads: "6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved - and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?" And, in addition, he attempted to explain further sub-paragraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof. It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's resolution of November 21, 1968. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. He further elaborated on his explanations made on November 21, 1968. On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still included through inadvertence. On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur, registered an amended motion to inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but

three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience." In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say that the questioned statements he made were also taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20 (f), Rule 138, had been violated. On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one of civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party or witness", as required by law; and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended party or witness." We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2, 1968, as further clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads inquired from him whether he could appear in this case; that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement; that he had not participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other document in connection with this case. On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his aide of the case. In brief, he denied participation in any of the court papers subject of our November 21,

1968 order; claimed that he was on six months' leave of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he was on leave of absence. Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 8, 1969. A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and contained the following paragraphs: "4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the aboveentitled case — which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court — Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: `Justices; who may take part. — . . . only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication . . .' This requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo. xxx xxx xxx 6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1960, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court of grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and/or to the United States Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made."

This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court." On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanito M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned down said request twice on the ground that he did not know anything about the case, much less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion; that "the allegations in said motion were subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon assurance that there way nothing wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was misled in so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the case. Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling. this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be dealt with for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and . . . to direct that the three, Atty. Juanito M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at 9:80 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them will be heard by this Court." On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he thereupon accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and that he never even read it. On August 15. 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago started to read the motion

and in fact began to make some changes in pencil in the first or second paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one. They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling. While Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his name was typed therein. The motion was then filed. According to Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion was filed, the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes. In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court. On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the second contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first and second contempt incidents seriatim. 1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that it is not. In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the

decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority] by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country, "although the process has already begun." It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He explained that he deleted this paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of two judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?" Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism"

for petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or their agents or principals, including the President", should also inhibit themselves. What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any boardpetitioner or their agents or principals, including the president." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court. The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: `To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that `[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against `unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be `with all good fidelity . . . to the courts.'

Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts `can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.'" A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." 1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." 2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." 3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." 4 It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position. 6 From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of justice." 7 The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the

administration of justice 8 — is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court. 2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of petitioners as corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges petitioners with opportunity changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession." 9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged." 10 Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief: "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth, protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court." It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." 11

We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3(a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties; and that he too has committed, under Section 3(d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt. 3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly did Regala insist — and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents — that he had not participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. He is exonerated. 4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should be held exempt from contempt. 5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy. First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has been done. Second. It lifted Section 1, Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices; who may take part. — . . . only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication . . .." However, the provision in its entire thought should be read thus — "SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. — All matters submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission; however, only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration

and adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of submission." 12

was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.

Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point.

7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.

Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about — the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS", which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally omitted. Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably . . . raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965; . . . to the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually . . ." This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet. it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation. 6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it

8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of the case. Caling says that if not for his friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time. Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation." The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice. 9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason, this Court had really no alternative but to decide the main case against

respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond." 13 It would not require the admit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond, contrary to the instructions to bidders. is not entitled to any consideration. It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even if the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this case, the result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed. For the reason given, this Court hereby finds: 1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court; and 2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanito M. Caling guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meals, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling. P200. Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever action he may deem proper to take in the premises against Morton F. Meads who is an alien. Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. So ordered. ||| (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-27072 (Resolution), [January 9, 1970], 142 PHIL 1-23)

ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN, respondents. Ruperto G. Martin and Donardo R. Paglinawan for petitioner. Jose V. Marcella for private respondents. SYNOPSIS Petitioner is the transferee of a lot subject of a complaint for quieting of title and declaration of nullity between private respondents and Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation. A notice of lis pendens was annotated on Petitioner's title. Judgment was rendered in favor of private respondents. It was affirmed by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. When a writ of possession/break open order was issued by the trial court, petitioner opposed the same contending that it was a buyer in good faith and not impleaded as party. The motion, however, was granted. Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari which rendered judgment dismissing the petition as well as its subsequent motion for reconsideration. Its appeal to this Court was denied and attained finality. When an alias writ of execution was issued subsequently by the court, petitioner again filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals arguing among others that it was not a party to the case, that the decision of the trial court in said case never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of the property to the private respondents; and that private respondent's title is being questioned in another case. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on ground of finality of judgment of the lower court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, again this recourse by petitioner. In the meantime the alias writ of possession and alias writ of execution was duly implemented by the Sheriff. cSITDa Once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to the controversy litigated come to an end. Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical effect or consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued

by the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action for the purpose of taking possession of the subject realty. The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the Republic against private respondents will not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition was instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment. Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of the fact that the questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriff's Return," dated March 31, 1995, with the attached "Turn Over Premises" indicating therein that private respondents took possession of the subject property. aCHDST SYLLABUS 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; IN A FINAL JUDGMENT, ALL ISSUES ARE DEEMED RESOLVED. — It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to the controversy litigated come to an end. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALL NECESSARY AND LOGICAL EFFECTS OR CONSEQUENCES INCLUDED THEREIN. — Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical effect or consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued by the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action for the purpose of taking possession of the subject realty. SEAHID 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY PENDENCY OF ANOTHER ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLES BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC AND PREDECESSOR. —

The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the Republic against private respondents will not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition was instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment. 4. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; PETITION RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC WHERE WRIT OF EXECUTION HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED. — Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of the fact that the questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriff's Return," dated March 31, 1995, with the attached "Turn Over Premises" indicating therein that private respondents took possession of the subject property. 5. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; BOUND TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO ASSIST IN SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. — While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. ISEHTa DECISION MARTINEZ, A.M., J p: This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation has come to this Court assailing the execution of the judgment dated August 24, 1989, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C9297. Apparently, hope springs eternal for petitioner, considering that the issues raised in this second petition for review are but mere reiterations of previously settled issues which have already attained finality. We now write

finis to this controversy which has dragged on for seventeen (17) years, for as we ruled in Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City: 1 ". . . litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, it being essential to the effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard themselves against any scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it. Public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium."

Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is completely unaware of the suit between private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true and registered owner of the lot having bought the same from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith. On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents' motion. Another Order was issued on August 18, 1992 by the trial court holding that the judgment was binding on petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of defendant Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Revised Rules of Court.

The facts: The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the name of said corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. cdphil On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, 2 the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null and void. Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement as to costs." The aforesaid decision was affirmed 3 by respondent Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 25989 on June 25, 1991 and eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became final on March 5, 1992. 4 The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private respondents moved for execution which was granted by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the decision was issued.

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition, excerpts of which read: "We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no compelling reason to disturb the same. Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by respondent Judge. cdtai Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee." 5 The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of Appeals on February 18, 1993. 6 On further appeal to this Court, petitioner's petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 109076, was denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993. 7 Upon finality of said resolution, this Court issued Entry of Judgment dated October 21, 1993. 8 Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the issuance of a second writ of execution before the trial court which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994.

Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration. Petitioner's motion was initially granted 9 on August 29, 1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon motion of private respondents, the said order was reconsidered on December 19, 1994 10 by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution were issued: Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for the second time, filed a petition for certiorari 11 with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 36591), arguing inter alia: that the judgment cannot be executed against it because it was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297; that the decision of the trial court in said case never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of the property to the private respondents; that certain facts and circumstances which occurred after the finality of the judgment will render the execution highly unjust, illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers' freedom of religion and worship; and that private respondents' title is being questioned in another case. On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered judgment 12 dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the lower court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory. It ruled, thus: Cdpr "This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the respondent Court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory. The respondent court's writs of execution and possession could have been implemented a long time ago if not for the series of legal maneuvers of petitioner Eternal Gardens. . . . Petitioner Eternal Gardens cannot anymore stop the execution of a final judgment by raising issues which actually have been ruled upon by this Court in its earlier case with Us in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797. To Our mind, the instant petition is a mere continuation of petitioner's dilatory tactics so that plaintiffs, although prevailing party, will not benefit at all from a final judgment in their favor. Thus, the instant petition is obviously, frivolous and dilatory warranting the assessment of double costs of this suit against petitioner Sec. 3, Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court) Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, the instant petition has already become moot and academic as the property in question was already turned over by the Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the

writs of execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus, hopefully, putting the legal battle of this case to rest." (Emphasis ours.) The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on January 30, 1996. 13 Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention reiterating in essence the same line of arguments espoused in their petition before the respondent Court of Appeals. The petition must fail. It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to the controversy litigated come to an end. Petitioner's argument that the trial court cannot order it and the one hundred (100) memorial lot owners to surrender and/or deliver possession of the property in dispute on the ground that they were never parties to the case between private respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been resolved by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797 when it ruled: "Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by respondent Judge. "Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee." 14 The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 109076 and attained finality on October 21, 1993. There is, therefore, no need for us to belabor the same issue here. Further, petitioner's contention that a determination of the issue of possession should first be resolved before the issuance of a writ of possession is untenable. Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical effect or consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-

9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued by the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action for the purpose of taking possession of the subject realty. LLpr Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and circumstances transpired after the finality of judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297 which will render the execution of the said judgment unjust and illegal. It points to the pendency or Civil Case No. C-11337 before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City filed by the Republic of the Philippines against private respondents for nullification of 22 titles which include the title to the subject property. Petitioner argues that the pendency of the said case provides a reasonable justification why execution of the aforesaid judgment and delivery of possession of the subject property should be permanently stayed or at least held in abeyance until after the final resolution of the case. We do not agree. The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the Republic against private respondents will not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition was instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment. Finally, petitioner's fear that the grave lots will be disturbed, desecrated and destroyed once the execution of the judgment proceeds is more imagined than real. A perusal of the Orders of the trial court with regard to the execution of the judgment reveals that the interests of said burial lot owners have been taken into account by the trial court when it took steps and made suggestions as to how their rights could be amply protected. In its Order dated February 13, 1995, the trial court, through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., stated: "The defendant-petitioner are(sic) however not completely without recourse or remedy because they can still go after the original party-defendant or transferor of the property in question which is Central Dyeing and Finishing

Corporation pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. And should it be difficult or nay impossible for plaintiff-respondents to be placed in possession of the subject property, due to defendant-petitioners' arguments that the same have already been sold to burial lot buyers, then it should be incumbent for the defendant-petitioners to negotiate with the plaintiffrespondents for payment in cash of the property subject of their complaint to avoid demolition or desecration since they benefited from the sale of the burial lots." 15 In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following directive was given, to wit: LLjur "The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to the plaintiffs and as proposed by the plaintiffs, they are given authority to destroy a small portion of the fence so that they can have access to the property. But as to the demolition of the burial lots, negotiation could be made by the defendant with the former owner so that cash payment or cash settlement be made." 16 Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his Order dated July 20, 1994, imposed the following limitation on the writ of execution, as follows: "Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas within the Eternal Gardens have been sold to so many persons who now have buried their beloved ones in the grave lots adjoining the lot in question, it is therefore, in the interest of justice and equity, that the enforcement of the writ of possession and break open order should be applied only to the gate of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern side nearest to the parcel of land in question where the factory of the defendant is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace of the resting souls over the graves spread over the parcels of land within the said memorial park." 17 From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the issue as to the status of the burial lot owners has been properly addressed. Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of the fact that the questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriff's Return," 18 dated March 31, 1995, with the attached "Turn Over Premises" 19 indicating therein that private respondents took possession of the subject property.

A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17) years to the prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has thwarted execution, interment on the disputed lot has long been going on, so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the whole lot shall have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents, the real owners of the property. This is a mockery of justice. cdrep We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. 20 In Banogan et al. vs. Cerna, et al., 21 we ruled: "As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts." WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ ., concur.

DIGEST ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSESEELIN, respondents. FACTS : Judgment was rendered against the petitioner ordering it to reconvey the cemetery to the rightful owners, private respondent sps. Seville. Despite the final decision of the SC, petitioner was able to prevent the execution for filing petitions for certiorari arguing that the judgment cannot be executed against it because it was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297;that the decision of the trial court in said case never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of the property to the private respondents; that certain facts and circumstances which occurred after the finality of the judgment will render the execution highly unjust,illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers' freedom of religion and worship; and that private respondents' title is being questioned in another case to the cause that the case to be pending for 17 years, and thus render the judgment ineffectual. They filed several petitions and motions for reconsideration with the trial court and the CA despite the fact that it would never prosper as the trial court’s decision had longbecome final before the said petitions were filed. HELD: Petition denied. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of the clientand zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they are also officers of the court, bound toexert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justiceor unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse courtprocesses. The facts and the law should advise them that a case such as this should notbe permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They donot advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts. The mere continuation of petitioners’ dilatory tactics to that the respondents will notbenefit from the final judgment. The fear of the petitioner regarding the disturbance of thegrave lots was more imagined than true because in the writ of execution, the presiding judge imposed that

the enforcement of the writ of possession and break open order should be applied only to the gate of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern side nearest to the parcel of land in question where the factory of the defendant(Central Dyeing) is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace of the resting souls over the graves the parcels of land within the said memorial park .It has been known that the petition of the private respondents has been moot and academic and that they had took possession of the lot. To the end that: This case delayed the execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17)years to the prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has thwarted execution, interment on the disputed lot haslong been going on, so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the whole lot shall have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents, the real owners of the property. This is a mockery of justice