Summary Of Heuristic Epistemology

DISSERTATION SUMMARY

HEURISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY Limiting Divisiveness – A New Approach to Preventing Conflict

Malcolm Armstrong, PhD [email protected]

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Contents 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 3 2. Rationale for Heuristic Epistemology........................................................................ 5 3. The Desire for Truth .................................................................................................. 6 4. Efficacies of Heuristic Epistemology ........................................................................ 7 5. The Value of Epistemology? ..................................................................................... 8 6. Heuristic Epistemology as an Approach .................................................................. 10 7. Epistemic Mien ........................................................................................................ 12 8. Annexing the Correspondence Theory (CT)............................................................ 14 9. Postulates of Heuristic Epistemology ...................................................................... 16

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1. Introduction With unprecedented access to rapid information, an increase in subversive ideological trenches has emerged. And because of globalization these trenches now weave through every culture. Eventually this divide will stall humanity’s progress or worse cause it to digress. When contrary beliefs collide, adherence can potentially lead to divisiveness and even violence. If truth and, in particular, wisdom is the goal of inquiry, how is truth to be pursued or beliefs adhered to without causing conflict or more division? To address these concerns a distinct approach to epistemology is proffered in the hope the epistemic process of inquiry, deliberation, assent/dissent and adherence is practiced with authenticity.1 The name given to this approach is Heuristic Epistemology (HE). It is comprised of three symbiotic and heuristic modalities—Apperception, Appraisal, Appropriation—undergirded by an understanding that truth is a type of virtue. Despite the academic sounding nature of this approach, HE is not theoretical but instead relational, personal, and practical; it addresses all facets of belief formation as well as serving the purpose of transcending and/or preventing conflict. Traditionally the concentrated effort of epistemology has been examining the so-called nature of truth or lack thereof (cf. Deflationism). Heuristic Epistemology contends this is necessary but insufficient. A balanced approach to the subject of truth is required which equally emphasizes the human dimension of the knowing process as opposed to viewing truth (exclusively) as something only acquired methodically via ratiocination. As the Spanish philosopher Miguel Unamuno asks, “What does it profit thee to know the definition of compunction if thou dost not feel it?” Likewise, what profit does it serve to know the definition of truth or develop an elaborate epistemology if the will is lacking a desire to diligently pursue and know it authentically? Heuristic Epistemology is a radical shift in the understanding and role of epistemology by forming an integral relation between epistemology and moral philosophy (the intellect and will, respectively). It is argued that epistemology cannot be effective in achieving its intended purposes without considering moral philosophy. In addition, HE seeks to understand the contributing causes of divergence and divisiveness over opposing truth claims which in turn hinder the knowing process of moving from error or ignorance to truth appropriated. It is believed an understanding the causes of divisiveness can itself be efficacious in reducing conflict. The goal is to create an appetence for the pursuit of truth as a type of virtue. More specifically, the intent is to change the dynamics of dialogue and enquiry by instilling a desire for appropriation and thereby limit divisiveness. This is accomplished through a process of sublimations and a dispositive paradigm shift in how the subject of truth is approached (via the proposed Triad2 and appropriating the virtue of truth). Given the yearning to make life intelligible and full of meaning, it is not surprising that divergence and divisiveness exist with respect to related truth claims (particularly existential truths). And given the need to find a will to live such beliefs will be cosseted when found. As a result, people 1 These four modalities will be collectively referred to in one of the following five ways: epistemic process; cognitive process; belief formation; process of enquiry; and the knowing process. 2 Apperception, Appraisal, Appropriation.

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will criticize those who do not share their raison d'être or whatever a person defines to be the summum bonum. Because of the existential discord in each person (granted in various degrees), the exigencies of HE is best expressed by Seneca who maintains, “Eyes will not see when the heart wished them to be blind—desire conceals truth as darkness does the earth.”3 The notion of desire conveys the moral/human dimension in the knowing process. The various heuristic modalities comprising HE are expounded below. Note how the Triad is an epistemic shift in emphasis from ratiocination to Apperception, from objective criteria to Appraisal, and from certainty to Appropriation.4 Heuristic Epistemology is also a response to the limitations as opposed to a repudiation of the Correspondence Theory (CT). CT and the idea of epistemic criteria or the notion of warrant do not constitute sufficient benchmarks in being able to say “I know.”5 Truth is not simply arrived at via ratiocination. Just as the accumulation of knowledge does not constitute wisdom, neither is truth a mere product of adding up, as it were, correspondence criteria. Beliefs are in need of appropriation especially since most beliefs are simply borrowed. 1. Apperception seeks to sublimate those factors contributing to divergency and divisiveness, which consequently frustrate the purposes of epistemology and cause conflict. It is the linchpin in the attempt to integrate moral philosophy and epistemology. Apperception seeks to complement the ratiocinative approach of enquiry, however, it also recognizes the limitations of ratiocination. Apperception cultivates a certain disposition throughout the knowing process which serves the other members of the Triad. In short, apperception calibrates the will and intellect towards authenticity because without authenticity and empathy the other two members of the Triad cannot be practiced neither will conflict be prevented. 2. Appraisal’s function is to divert the object of enquiry to the subject. Truth is not something that can always be ‘computed’ by applying various types of criteria. By being attentive to the subject, deliberation will operate more authentically and thereby encourage appropriation. Appraisal approaches truth in a Gestalt manner so that the process of deliberation is less mechanical and more dynamic. This is possible because appraisal acknowledges the role the will plays during the epistemic process. Another function of appraisal is assessing one’s level of apperception and appropriation in order to ensure these two modalities do not become static. 3. Appropriation is an authentic, non-discursive, and intuitive process of moving from knowledge to knowing. It creates a type of awareness that separates one’s beliefs from his or her identity. Second, HE contends the quest for truth does not end once certainty is attained. Just because someone has certitude does not mean, necessarily, s/he is in a position

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Cited in Evans, Wisdom for Life, 34; emphasis added. The key word here is “emphasis.” 5 Heuristic Epistemology is more of a challenge to the limitations of CT as a succinct and holistic understanding of truth than an outright dismissal of the spirit of CT (viz., objectivity). 4

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to say “I possess the truth” or say, for example, “My religion is true.”6 Rather, it is the person who appropriates a particular truth with authenticity who can say “I know.” 4. The desire to know truly is not only an intellectual endeavour. 5. The premise of HE is that the subject of truth is far more nuanced than is commonly cited in the literature of epistemology. To know truly is first and foremost a moral quest. Although the desire to know may sometimes stem from simple curiosity, adherence, for instance, is not always based on the intellect. Sometimes truth requires more of the knower than discursive reasoning. The idea of integrating moral philosophy and epistemology begins with the following working assumption of Aristotle’s principle: “As are a man’s dispositions, so are his judgments.”7 Not only moral judgments but also those judgments that pertain to issues of truth.

2. Rationale for Heuristic Epistemology In general, does epistemology practically answer how to enquire and deliberate or does it merely theorize about the subject of truth? If it does merely the latter, then the role of epistemology needs to be expanded. For over 2500 years, philosophers have been deliberating over the ‘nature’ of truth and knowledge (albeit for different purposes) and yet we live in a world that is as equally violent and equally divided as the past. Much blood has been shed because opposing truth claims could not be resolved or because pride prevented individuals, tribes or nations from empathetically engaging each other’s views. Perhaps, it is for these reasons that many Postmodern writers gave up on the notion of “objective truth.” In the words of Richard Rorty, the goal of epistemology “is to keep the conversation going rather than to find objective truth.”8 As Rorty says elsewhere, the “goal of enquiry is not truth.”9 Heuristic Epistemology does not take this Postmodern tack towards limiting divisiveness nor does it devalue the importance of truth. Pascal observes how, “Truth is so obscure in these times, and falsehood so established, that, unless we love the truth, we cannot know it.”10 Perhaps it is obscured, or perhaps we cannot know it because we do not possess a proper disposition towards truth, which may also explain why appropriation or epistemic empathy is not always sought. Despite the fact we may think we love truth, we often do not value it enough to question our own level of appropriation especially towards our cosseted beliefs. As argued by HE, this may stem from the historic understanding of truth, i.e., the correspondence theory?

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Nor can truth claims be so easily disregarded without appropriation (via the other two members of the Triad). Aristotle, Ethics, 1114a32. 8 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 377. 9 Rorty, Truth and Progress, 3. 10 Pascal, Pensées, XIV, §864; emphasis added. 7

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3. The Desire for Truth The desire to know truly often manifests itself as a desire for certainty with an entrenched need to be right. Despite the fact that truth is valued, it is often pursued as a means to an end. That is to say, enquiry or adherence is not always authentic but rather a means to substantiate other beliefs or, as Nietzsche argues, for example, the desire for truth is often a cloaked manifestation of the “will to power.”11 Consequently, inauthenticity leads to greater divergence which can lead to divisiveness and thus error or ignorance prevails. Why does divergency exist in all subject matters, whether in ethics, politics, religion, science, history, philosophy, or any other area of enquiry? In seeking to answer this question, it is being put forth for consideration that one means to reduce divisiveness, resolve conflict, and judge correctly is by appropriating the proposed heuristic devices of HE (viz., virtue of truth and the Triad). Not only does HE function as a means to limit divisiveness but also abet the process of enquiry with a desire to know veraciously—thus paving the way to move from error/ignorance to appropriation.12 Unless truth is considered a type of virtue (and not simply an intellectual endeavour), the proposed Triad will be futile. What is being offered here is not properly an epistemology or a method per se but rather an approach to epistemology. It is believed, in the order of enquiry, developing an approach takes precedence. Traditionally, epistemology does not provide the navigational tools, as it were, to ensure authenticity or instil a desire for appropriation. Epistemology has rather caged the subject of truth within the narrow walls of ratiocination. Given the reality of divisiveness and violence, what is needed is a more robust understanding and approach to truth than merely arid theories of truth like the Correspondence Theory which may itself contribute to divisiveness by fostering a superficial view of truth. Since HE is an approach to epistemology, it is independent of any worldview, a priori category, or concept. It acts, rather, as a handmaiden for epistemology or for any type of enquiry.13 By attempting to cultivate an epistemic ‘ethos’ (via the virtue of truth and the Triad), HE functions as an aid in the quest to know by instilling a desire for authenticity, empathy, and appropriation, which in turn can allay divisiveness and conflict.

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Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §4. The use of the word ‘veracious’ conveys what the English word ‘truth’ is not able to. The Sanskrit word for truth (satyá), for instance, conveys the idea of being genuine, virtuous and real. Satyá. Although the English word “truth” does not share the connotations of satyá, its etymology does convey a similar idea. In Old Frisian trīuwe connotes “trust and allegiance.” It is interesting to note the Hebrew word for truth (emeth) denotes being faithful (i.e., faithful to what is). 13 Since epistemology is itself a subject of enquiry then it too falls under the rubric of Heuristic Epistemology. 12

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4. Efficacies of Heuristic Epistemology Imagine, for a moment, a world where disagreements still exist, but a world where dialogue is carried out with empathy for the purpose of appropriation and for the love of truth.14 In the current Zeitgeist it appears that we have come back full circle to the intermediate period between the pre-Socratics and the Peripatetics.15 It is like we have entered an epistemic event horizon. Despite the good intentions of many Postmodern thinkers, there is a spirit of anomie in the air. Could the dereliction of truth somehow be indirectly responsible for the apathy towards philosophy, the discipline that once sought wisdom? While recognizing the value of Postmodernism16 it nevertheless entails some type of relativism similar to the Sophists. Is it possible to retain a spirit of objectivity and avoid potential power struggles? Heuristic Epistemology argues that relativism is not the only avenue to take in order to avoid divisiveness, power struggles and violence. On a deeper level those truths which have existential relevance are, in fact, akin to the desire for happiness and/or peace. If this is the case then it is not surprising, in the words of Foucault, that “regimes of truth” exist since people are vying for a will to live. The question is, if the understanding of truth is reduced to mere cognition (an intellectual exercise), is cold rationalism capable of transcending despair in the search for truth and peace. What, then, is the bridge between truth as cognition (i.e., intellectualism, dogmatisms or ideologies, etc.) and its efficaciousness (where applicable)? This is similar to the difference between knowledge and knowing, respectively. A ‘spiritual’ person, for example, adheres to certain doctrines, however, s/he also expects some of these doctrines to be affectively efficacious. Some truths require only intellectual assent and are not meant to be efficacious in the same way as other truths. The point is, the desire to know truly does not end once ‘valid’ knowledge is acquired or warrant obtained. Certainty or warrant does not add closure to truth. Truth, according to HE, is an ongoing process of appropriation—a furtherance of authenticity. The quest for truth and the quest for certainty are not the same quest despite the fact they are often conflated. This may further explain why many Postmodernists either dismiss the importance of truth entirely or embrace some form of relativism.

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Proclaiming an ideal like “we need to love truth” will simply remain an ideal if it is not infused with something to move the will to act on this ideal. HE seeks to find this appetence. 15 In commenting on this era, the historian of philosophy William F. Lawhead remarks: “The wide range of conflicting opinions that developed during this period would lead the next group of philosophers to be very sceptical about whether we could ever arrive at any truths that were more than simply personal opinions.” Lawhead, The Voyage of Discovery, 41. 16 Namely, its intention to overcome power struggles, which, apparently is the result of adherence to the classic notion of truth. Foucault alleges that, “Each society has its own regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the type of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true. . . . ” Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in Power/Knowledge, 131. Whether the classic notion of truth or the desire for objectivity necessarily entails a regime of truth is another question.

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Instead of intellectual assent or dissent being the end of enquiry, HE states that this is only one facet of the knowing process. It is being suggested the proposed Triad and, in particular appropriation, must be an essential component in being able to say, for example, “I believe.” With an intuitive impetus for appropriation, perhaps, polemic dialogue can be avoided and the desire to be right overcome. This change in perspective can eliminate eristic discussions by emphasizing that truth cannot be bantered about simply on the level of the intellect. What is often lacking in dialogue is a healthy exchange of ideas for the purpose of furthering one’s own appropriation and even appropriating someone else’s beliefs (as a means to generate empathy). For HE this is only possible once apperception and the virtue of truth is acknowledged and appropriated. If veracity was measured by one’s level of appropriation, instead of empirical or rational criteria being the sole proprietor of truth, then one might be less assertive and confrontational. The desire for appropriation, undergirded by the virtue of truth, creates respite and frees one to be attentive. Instead of perceiving those with conflicting views as adversaries, dialogue is freed from the ‘need to be right’. This shift in emphasis from persuasion to docility17 signals a radical shift in the process of personal enquiry and dialogue. With HE the will and the intellect are conjoined in the attempt to consummate the theoretical understanding of truth (i.e., epistemology) with its praxis (i.e., moral philosophy and appropriation). In short, if truth is reduced to mere theory then it holds no value. In the words of Epicurus, “Empty is the argument of the philosopher by which no human disease is healed; for just as there is no benefit in medicine if it does not drive out bodily diseases, so there is no benefit in philosophy if it does not drive out the disease of the soul.”18 Heuristic Epistemology contends that epistemology must be concerned equally with the question of “how” as it is with the question of “what”. Instead of exclusively addressing the question of ‘what’, the object of enquiry is subsumed by the subject. This is the role of appraisal. In short, attentive awareness to the cognitive process by the subject, during deliberation, allows the moment of judgment to operate authentically in pursuit of appropriation.

5. The Value of Epistemology? Since epistemology pertains to the subject of knowledge, why have thousands of years of philosophical discourse not concerned itself to find a means to overcome conflict over truth claims? If the history of epistemology and the History of Ideas have taught us anything it is the fact that it is not sufficient to simply possess a cogent epistemology. Just as teaching people about virtue is no guarantee they will be virtuous, likewise having the correct ‘theory’ of truth will not supply the wherefore to move the will to act authentically; nor create empathetic listeners who desire truth, as a 17 To be docile does not mean feeble but rather a willingness to be taught and when applied to HE a desire for appropriation. If appropriation becomes the intention of dialogue then a fortiori people will be docile. Consequently, this proclivity would circumvent the propensity to be defensive or reactionary. The etymology of docile derives from the Latin word docere which means to teach. 18 Epicurus, cited in Wood, ed., Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings, 66.

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virtue. Aristotle conveys a similar sentiment in his Nicomachean Ethics when he writes how most people, take refuge in theory and think they are being philosophers and will become good in this way, behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter will be made well in body by such a course of treatment, the former will not be made well in soul by such a course of philosophy.19 We can philosophize all we want about epistemology but if it does not serve a practical role; if it only theorizes about truth; and if the will is not authentic what value does epistemology serve? Given a cursory reading on texts pertaining to epistemology it appears what is often missing in the literature is an emphasis on the process by which truth is ascertained. Enquiry (to know truly) must not be reduced to mere ratiocination or to the level of the intellect. Consider the following speech delivered by Einstein in 1943, our age is proud of the progress it has made in man’s intellectual development. The search and striving for truth and knowledge is one of the highest of man's qualities – though often, pride is most loudly voiced by those who strive the least. And certainly we should take care not to make the intellect our god; it has, of course, powerful muscles, but no personality. It cannot lead, it can only serve. . . . This characteristic is reflected in the qualities of its priests, the intellectuals. The intellect has a sharp eye for methods and tools, but is blind to ends and values.20 If philosophy still means “love of wisdom,” perhaps philosophy should not limit itself to Postmodern concerns or exclusively concentrate on so-called theories of truth and justification; instead return to its first love of honouring philosophy’s commitment to seek wisdom. If, as the Spanish philosopher Miguel Unamuno, the “appetite of knowledge is exhibited to us as bound up with the necessity of living and of procuring the wherewithal to maintain life,”21 and people “believe themselves to be seeking truth for its own sake, [but instead are] . . . seeking life in truth,”22 then perhaps we need to remember that the “personal and affective starting-point of all philosophy and all religion is the tragic sense of life.”23 Is this not why philosophy was born? For Unamuno, a philosopher is one who “philosophizes not with the reason only, but with the will.”24 This is one account as to why a more integral relation is needed between moral philosophy and epistemology. It is being suggested that the common understanding of the role of epistemology will not bring us any closer in ‘attaining’ wisdom because too much emphasis is placed on the intellect’s ability without due consideration of the role of the will. It is the will that has the ‘final word’ or as Aquinas puts it, the “will wills the intellect to understand.”25 The will also plays a 19

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1105b 11-19. Einstein, Albert Einstein: Out of My Later Years through His Own Words, 260. 21 Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life, 22. 22 Confer Nietzsche's “will to truth.” 23 Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life, 37; emphasis added. 24 Ibid., 28. 25 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, 3, 5. 20

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significant part at the moment of assent/dissent as well as adherence. It is for this reason that epistemology cannot disregard moral philosophy in the quest to know. Consider these final words from Unamuno, In the starting-point of all philosophy, in the real starting-point, the practical not the theoretical, there is a wherefore. The philosopher philosophizes for something more than for the sake of philosophizing. . . . [A]nd as the philosopher is a man before he is a philosopher, he must needs live [sic] before he can philosophize, and, in fact, he philosophizes in order to live. And usually he philosophizes either in order to resign himself to life, or to seek some finality in it, or to distract himself and forget his griefs, or for pastime and amusement.26 A thinking person is a human being before s/he is a philosopher. We seem to forget this during disputations. We are all born within the confines of a labyrinth. Everyone is attempting to navigate through its walls. Is this not what unites humanity—a desire to unravel mystery and find equanimity? Yet, our interpretation out of the labyrinth creates divergent views in the effort to make sense of our condition and to find a will to live. What unites us is sadly what divides us . . . the wherefore. To merely theorize about epistemology without considering the existential dimensions of philosophy is like an architect designing a building without knowing the purpose of the building Heuristic Epistemology works with the assumption that epistemology must not be something which simply appeases the intellect. In short, it is argued that any particular truth, even though justified, is of no consequence if it is not appropriated.

6. Heuristic Epistemology as an Approach Heuristic Epistemology argues that truth is not always ‘arrived’ at by using some type of epistemic formula. Ratiocination may assist in the process of leading up to assent, but it cannot help in the process of appropriation. Truth is not always ‘attained’ discursively by using the same method(s) of enquiry or deliberation for all truths. The process leading up to assent/dissent is demanding. Applying certain criteria for truth and having the ‘correct’ theory of truth or being able to justify one’s belief is epistemically necessary but insufficient for knowing truth. This is one of the main contentions of HE, namely, that historically epistemology offers a narrow approach to truth. In fact, this was a similar concern of Nietzsche’s when he uttered these provocative words, SUPPOSING that Truth is a woman - what then? Is there not ground for suspecting that all philosophers, in so far as they have been dogmatists, have failed to understand women – that the terrible seriousness and clumsy importunity with which they have usually paid their addresses to Truth, have been unskilled and unseemly methods for winning a woman?

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Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life, 29.

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Certainly she has never allowed herself to be won; and at present every kind of dogma stands with sad and discouraged mien.27 In the history of philosophy, epistemology seems to be limited to either the analytic level or to the academic and theoretical level. To continue with Nietzsche’s analogy this would be like writing the Yoga Sūtra in a theoretical and arid manner, despite the fact it is meant to have practical import. Or, consider how Indian epistemology (not unlike western philosophy) is often limited to discussions about pramāa (i.e., means of knowledge, viz., perception, inference and testimony) and prameya (that which is known). Just because someone reads a manual on vehicle maintenance does not mean s/he will figure out why it cannot start (let alone fix the car). In like manner, having the correct epistemic manual, as it were, does not mean one can ‘diagnose’ error or be a good listener (which is required for all serious thinkers after truth). Discussions on epistemology often talk about truth but they do not seem to address the need for an epistemic approach to truth or the need for appropriation. If epistemology is to play a role in limiting divisiveness as well as serve a practical function in judging correctly, then it needs to move beyond its theoretical abstractions. To illustrate this point, the historian Frederick Copleston remarks how Socrates’ purpose for dialectics was not a rhetorical ploy: Socrates [. . . ] saw clearly the importance of knowledge, of true wisdom, if the soul is to be properly tended. What are the true values of human life which have to be realised in conduct? Socrates called his method “midwifery,” . . . [i.e.,] getting others to produce true ideas in their minds, with a view to right action. This being so, it is easy to understand why Socrates gave so much attention to definition. He was not being pedantic, he was convinced that a clear knowledge of the truth is essential for the right control of life. He wanted to give birth to true ideas in the clear form of definition, not for a speculative but for a practical end. Hence his preoccupation with ethics.28 Although HE does not share Socrates’ optimism about the correlation between knowledge and virtue (i.e., correct knowledge will necessarily yield right action) it does, however, acknowledge the prudence of “midwifery” in the attempt to find a balance between epistemology and virtue. Heuristic Epistemology serves to augment epistemology for similar Socratic reasons. As Socrates argues, true wisdom is a result of the soul being “properly tended” to as opposed to only tending the intellect. A corollary of this proposed way of ‘doing’ epistemology is by acknowledging the two conjoint ways of assenting/dissenting, namely, ratiocination and appropriation. Consider the following comparison between knowledge and wisdom. Not all people who are highly intelligent are wise. An accumulation of knowledge does not constitute wisdom. Similarly, even though it may be possible to know a particular truth with certitude, this is no guarantee a person will appropriate this truth.29 A person could argue vociferously for his or her position and although this person’s belief(s) may in fact be true, this does not excuse him or her from appropriating such beliefs. In fact, HE contends 27

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, cited from the Preface, 2; emphasis in the original. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 1, 107; emphasis added. 29 This is not to assume that all truths can be appropriated in the same manner. 28

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that no one is in a position to persuade or defend his or her beliefs until beginning the process of appropriation. A process which begins (according to HE) with apperception and accompanied by appraisal with an understanding that truth is a type of virtue. To speak of truth as a virtue is not a definition of truth. Instead, it expresses one of the features of HE. The problem is that moral philosophy is often divorced from epistemology. No matter what type of truth question is raised, traditionally the answer has been found within the confines of one of two methods (empiricism and/or rationalism). This is problematic for several reasons. Pedantry may offer insight, but does it always yield results? Consider the following from Descartes: It were far better never to think of investigating truth at all, than to do so without a method. [. . .] Moreover by a method I mean certain and simple rules, such that, if a man observe them accurate, he shall never assume what is false as true, and will never spend his mental efforts to no purpose, but will always gradually increase his knowledge and so arrive at a true understanding of all that does not surpass his powers.30 Like Kant, Descartes was in search of certainty. Certainty was the benchmark of truth. Notice how for Descartes the only requirement in attaining “true understanding” is to find a proper method and follow it. This approach to truth is flawed because Descartes views truth as something obtained in the same manner one solves a mathematical problem (i.e., using a formula). Some truths cannot be assented solely via ratiocination like the statement, “I love you.” This truth claim is not on the same level as saying “Your shirt is yellow.” The statement “Your shirt is yellow” is either true or false as is the statement “I love you.” However, the process of coming to the realization of whether these two statements are true or false require different means. There is no single formula to know all truth claims and even if there were this would not preclude the necessity of appropriation which is not a product of cognitive gyrations.

7. Epistemic Mien Heuristic Epistemology seeks to prevent and reduce conflict by promoting empathetic dialogue. As mentioned, this is accomplished by ensuring the cognitive process is conducted with a certain disposition that allows for conducive discussions. This is possible given the distinct approach proffered by HE. This approach is particularly needed because, like a dog to a bone, we are possessive of our beliefs as we are of our possessions. The irony is, most of our beliefs are borrowed and yet we are often defensive. Because many our beliefs are often associated with our identity. And because the will is the rudder of the mind, the will can overrule the intellect. It is not surprising then that during contentious dialogue opponents are not listening to one another. Truth is not valued except for who is right. For HE, instead of disputes bottle-necking, people value other voices at the table because it is recognized that divergent views can offer insight, clarity, deeper understanding, creativity, foresight, wisdom and at moment of decision prudence. 30

Descartes, Rules for Direction of the Mind, cited in Haldaine, ed., The Philosophical Works of Descartes, I: 8; emphasis added.

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In the arena of divergent views, HE creates space for ideas to expand as opposed to feeling boxed in. Consider the following as to why HE promotes a dispositive approach: What we think is true is what we will value.31 What we value is what we will live for. What we live for is what we will die for. What we’d die for is what we will fight32 for. Herein lies the proverbial door to Pandora's Box, which represents conflict, in the name of truth or, to be more precise, in the name of “my truth” (that which provides one’s raison d'être). This is why something more is required of the seeker and the knower than simply appeasing the intellect or the will or attaining certainty.33 Ascertaining truth is a gradation. Something is needed to move from knowledge to knowing. It is being proposed there are certain exigencies (viz., the Triad) that are necessary if epistemology is to be constructive. To ensure authenticity the heuristic devices of Apperception, Appraisal, and Appropriation act as concomitant conditions before, during, and after assent/dissent. Cultivating a proper epistemic attitude and appetence towards truth can reduce conflict because it approaches divisiveness through the door of the heart. Heuristic Epistemology seeks to supplement traditional avenues of speaking about matters of truth and certainty, toward a more intuitive grasp of truth while retaining the necessity of logic. Consider appropriation. It is analogous to the process of translation. Sometimes analyzing truth claims is like translating an inflected language and, thus, demands more of the knower. It is of little help to use a lexicon to translate a sentence from Koinē Greek (an inflected language) to English without a grasp of Greek grammar. Likewise, acquiring knowledge via the intellect does not (necessarily) enable one to say, “I have the truth.” Truth is far more nuanced than finding correspondence as is translating Koinē Greek to English. What certainty is to a lexicon, HE is to grammar. In other words, once people hold their beliefs with certitude they have already closed the door to authentic and empathic dialogue. What HE seeks to encourage is belief with integrity.34 Consider these words of the American political leader Robert Green Ingersoll, It is the duty of each and every one to maintain his individuality. “This above all, to thine ownself be true, and it must follow as the night the day, thou canst not then be false to any man.” It is a magnificent thing to be the sole proprietor of yourself. It is a terrible thing to wake up at night and say, “There is nobody in this bed.” It is humiliating to know that your ideas are all borrowed; that 31

Or, conversely, what we value is often conflated with truth. Referring to verbal or physical fighting. 33 HE does not seek to dismiss the possibility of certainty. Rather, it emphasizes that appropriation needs to supersede the desire for certainty. This will allow dialogue to be less polemical and thereby allows truth to be more freely explored instead of the need “to be right” dominating the conversation which only hinders the knowing process. 34 It is interesting to note that the etymology of integrity, from the Latin integritās, means wholeness. We may claim to be a person of integrity but do we believe with integrity? This means moving beyond intellectual or emotional assent towards appropriation through apperception and appraisal. 32

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you are indebted to your memory for your principles; that your religion is simply one of your habits, and that you would have convictions if they were only contagious. It is mortifying to feel that you belong to a mental mob and cry “crucify him,” because the others do; that you reap what the great and brave have sown. . . .35 Without apperception there can be no integrity. And without integrity neither appropriation or appraisal will be sought. Unfortunately, all too often one’s amour-propre creates conflict and hinders the epistemic process of judging correctly or being able to listen acutely. To move from opinion to truth is to move from belief to appropriation. Yet, appropriation requires apperception, which, in turn, requires appraisal. Likewise, appraisal needs to be appropriated as does apperception. For appraisal to operate authentically, it requires apperception; hence, the symbiotic nature of the Triad. But the Triad will not be pursued unless truth is valued and appreciated as a virtue; a type of duty that enables one to transcend differences during conflict(s). In short, the degree to which the virtue of truth is imbibed and the degree to which the Triad is appropriated will equal the degree differences can be understood with empathy and thereby avoid divisiveness or worse violence and egregious evil. Thus, dialogue will empathically evolve (with compassion) in such a manner that truth (as a virtue) will act as a precedence; sought passionately yet dispassionately, believed confidently yet humbly; adhered with integrity yet with docility. This is the value of appropriation. This is the value of ensuring, in the words of Ingersoll, our “ideas are [not] all borrowed”. Truth is not about being right. Credence to the proposed Triad creates space for genuine dialogue—consequently, divergency is reduced, the causes of divisiveness sublimated and the road paved for truth to be more readily known. It is believed that HE could create a radical shift in how we think about truth, how we dialogue and how conflict is resolved.

8. Annexing the Correspondence Theory (CT) The criticism levelled against CT is mostly a semantic challenge in hope that future discussions on CT will elicit greater clarity. As the so-called ‘theory’ is commonly framed,36 it does not allow for a dynamic and robust approach to truth. An implication of CT is that it creates a superficial understanding of how we come to know37 and, therefore, hinders dialogue or enquiry. For instance, some type of arguments could be avoided if truth was not exclusively perceived as a simple matter of correspondence. It is proposed that something is missing from the ‘equation’ of CT. What complicates matters further is how the word correspondence is misconstrued. This is because CT is falsely attributed to 35

Ingersoll, The Works of Robert G. Ingersoll, vol. 1, Lecture titled “Individuality”; emphasis added. “Truth is what corresponds to reality” or “Truth is a correspond relation between the thought and reality.” 37 By superficial, it is meant that CT reduces enquiry to a methodical approach which only seeks a one-to-one correspondence with ‘reality’. Although this may have its place, the formation of beliefs is far more nuanced than obtaining simple correspondence via ratiocination. 36

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Aristotle. It is assumed that correspondence, as the word is used today, has a univocal meaning; that is, it has the same meaning as it did for Aristotle or the Scholastics. In fact, it does not, hence, the mass confusion this word generates. Heuristic Epistemology considers various figures who have contributed to the notion of truth, for example, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Immanuel Kant. It is with Kant the epistemological landscape is radically altered. In fact, it is because of him the word “correspondence” has two diametrical meanings. His proposed “Copernican Revolution” reversed the meaning of the word ‘relation’ in the CT formula38 as it was used by the Scholastics. After considering the impact of Kant the pragmatic response to CT is discussed, in particular, why William James was not completely satisfied with CT. It is shown that his dissatisfaction with CT stems, primarily, from a lack of clarity as to what CT means and how CT lacks practicality. In fact, James’ did not believe he was proposing a new theory of truth. The CT, as a so-called theory of truth, is a static approach to truth. This does not mean it serves no purpose but rather that it needs to be supplemented. One implication of CT is how it reduces truth to a noun. Perhaps this explains why it is often asked, “What is truth?” However, if we are to be precise, this is not an appropriate question since this is like asking, “What does blue taste like?” Obviously, this is a category mistake as is the question, “What is truth?” Truth has no existent reality like an apple. Heuristic Epistemology does not disregard the commonsense understanding of truth promoted by CT, but rather shows its limitations. What is being challenged is the sufficiency of CT, as a holistic approach to truth. The problem is further complicated by the surprising fact that there is no consensus what correspondence entails. There is no universally accepted definition of CT apart from some type of ‘relation’. This is unacceptable considering that Aquinas, Spinoza, and Kant all use the word differently and yet they are all referred to as correspondent theorists. As a theory, CT is not succinct. As a result, it cannot adequately answer the question: what constitutes a truth claim? This lack of clarity perpetuates unnecessary confusion (hence, the emergence of Deflationary theories of truth or logical positivism of the past). As a means to clear up the ambiguity and indirectly address various criticism of CT by Deflationary proponents, eight points are put forth for consideration. First, CT is not a ‘theory’ per se. Second, the use of the word ‘correspondence’ is unfortunate. The reason why the word is confusing is because it has been incorrectly extracted from its original historical context, i.e., from the intention of Aristotle. Third, CT cannot account for all types of truth claims (e.g., correspondence is not applicable to ideological or aesthetic claims). Fourth, CT suggests that ‘truth’ is a noun. Fifth, rarely is the word ‘relation’ in the formula of CT explicated. Should it, for example, be understood as Kant stated (“objects must conform to our cognition”39) or how Aquinas understood it? Sixth, one implication of CT (which Descartes accepted) is that it implicitly demands certainty. It is argued that this supposition is 38

“Truth is a correspond relation between the thought and reality.” The Critique of Pure Reason, Bxvi-xii.

39 Kant,

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unjustified and causes unnecessary complications. Seventh, CT implicitly limits truth claims to propositions. The problem is that not all truth claims can be reduced to a proposition. Finally, many claim, whether implicitly or explicitly, that CT entails a “copy theory” of truth. This was one of William James’ concerns and it is one of the reasons why he proposed the notion of Pragmatism to augment CT. Many of the criticisms levelled against CT are also applicable to other so-called theories of truth (e.g., coherence, deflationary, redundancy, disquotation, semantic and minimalist theories, etc.). Note, the criticism of these theories is not to argue they are necessarily wrong, but rather incomplete. Heuristic Epistemology acknowledges the necessity of the intellect in ascertaining truth claims, however, it adds another dimension to the knowing process (viz., the Triad and the virtue of truth). Again, the focus of a HE is not what is the correct theory of truth, but rather finding a way to integrate moral philosophy with epistemology and thus affect how issues of truth are discussed (including inquiries into various views of truth). It should be noted that the primary reason CT receives the most attention is because other theories, in some degree, draw on CT either positively or negatively. CT is also the most prevalent in non-philosophical circles. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy states that it is “the most natural and widely held account of truth.”40 And the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy acknowledges that, “if the non-philosopher can be said to subscribe to a theory of truth, it would be likely be a correspondence theory.”41

9. Postulates of Heuristic Epistemology As mentioned, one function of HE is to find a more robust approach to truth by placing greater emphasis on the knower and not just the object of truth. This is because the will plays an equally important role in belief formation. Below is a summary of the basic postulates of HE: 1. The CT (in its modern42 articulation43) is narrow and reduces truth to a product of ratiocinazation. There are different types of truths (viz., existential, aesthetic, ideological, ethical, etc.), which CT cannot account for since these truths do not pertain to “facts” and, therefore, do not directly entail a one-to-one correspondence.44 Heuristic Epistemology’s challenge of CT is not a complete repudiation of CT nor is there a hidden Postmodern agenda here or credence to various forms of Deflationism. Instead, CT requires semantic

40 41

The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., s.v. “truth.” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ver. 1.0, s.v. “truth.” Notice, how this statement assumes the homogeneity

of CT. 42

See points 2, 3, and 5 as to why the adjective “modern” is used. That is, “Truth is what corresponds to reality” or “Truth is a correspondent relation between the thought and reality.” Note, t nhere is no universal agreement as to what the proper ‘formula’ is for CT. 44 In the other words, there are truth claims which do not entail any type of correspondent relation. For example, in what sense does a political theory or an economic theory correspond with reality? If this is a correct analysis, then CT (in its modern formulation) cannot account for all truth claims. 43

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fine-tuning, especially because it leads to confusion (hence the modern movement of Deflationism). 2. The word correspondence has been inappropriately extracted from its original Aristotelian context causing equivocation. 3. The meaning of the word “relation” in the CT formula45 is not clearly explicated. Further clarification is required since the traditional meaning of the word was reversed by Kant. For this reason, CT is not a homogeneous theory as most of the literature in epistemology implies. 4. If CT is independent of metaphysics, the word “reality” in the CT formulation is ambiguous.46 5. The distinction forced by CT between the nature of truth and criteria is not characteristic of Aristotle who is the so-called originator of CT.47 6. The same criticisms that befall logical positivism may also apply to the basic formula of CT (i.e., it is self-referentially incoherent).48 7. The CT is not clear as to what actually constitutes a truth claim.49 8. The CT may entail a vicious circle. How, for example, is correspondence or the relation between thought and reality accurately recognized, i.e., as true? The obvious question is, what is meant by truth? CT states: “Truth is what corresponds with reality.” But, how does one know whether this statement itself “corresponds”? The answer, given by CT, appears to be: correspondence.50 Is this not circular?51 9. The Triad, undergirded by the virtue of truth, is key to finding a balance between the intellect and will. 10. The quest for truth is not to be conflated with the quest for certainty. 45

“Truth is a correspondent relation between the thought and reality.” See Devitt, “The Metaphysics of Truth.” He argues, rightly or wrongly, that, “Any semantic doctrine needs to be disentangled from Realism. In particular, the correspondence theory of truth needs to be disentangled: it is in no way constitutive of Realism nor of any similarly metaphysical doctrine” (94). 47 The fact that Aristotle is claimed to be the originator of CT is also being challenged. 48 The refutation of logical positivism’s “verifiability principle” was that it was either tautological or not empirically verifiable. In like manner, does CT (which itself is a truth claim) correspond with reality? This potential problem may only be applicable to the basic formula given by some correspond theorists. That is, it may be avoided upon further explication. 49 Consider that a theist could state that an ethical claim is either true or false depending on whether it ‘corresponds’ with God’s moral law, whereas a pantheist or an atheist would not be able to say that a moral pronouncement is true in the same way as a theist could. 50 In response, a correspondent theorist may contend that this accusation fails to make a distinction between the “nature of truth” and “criteria for truth.” However, this does not avoid the problem since any criterion must itself, according to CT, correspond with reality. Pulling oneself up by your epistemic bootstraps is not a solution. 51 Of course, if CT is a first principle (i.e., a necessary truth), then it requires no justification. However, it must be established as a first principle like the “law of contradiction.” Aristotle certainly made no such claim. 46

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11. Truth is not a noun. 12. Heuristic Epistemology seeks to give an account of the reasons why truth is not always pursued authentically. It is argued that this examination can itself be efficacious as a means of limiting divisiveness or assist the epistemic process of enquiry. 13. Truth is a type of virtue and not just an intellectual endeavour arrived at via ratiocination. 14. Enquiry should occur concurrently with apperception. 15. For enquiry to be authentic, for the purpose of ‘attaining’ truth, it must not merely be pursued as a means to an end. Pursuit of truth is an ongoing dynamic process requiring appropriation. 16. Given the existential underpinnings of many belief systems, moral philosophy and epistemology need to be integrated. 17. The pursuit of a particular truth does not end with assent or certainty. What is further required is appropriation guided by apperception and appraisal. 18. Enquiry and deliberation is a continual process of appraisal that requires apperception. 19. The CT (along with most other theories) is reductionistic view of truth by implying what is required of the knower is only verification or warrant. This view of truth not only intellectualizes truth but hinders appropriation. 20. In retaining the spirit of Aristotelian epistemology and given the fact that truth is a property of judgement (via the intellect and the will), HE subjugates assent/dissent to the heuristics properties of the Triad. 21. By changing how we think about truth and how we dialogue, HE serves to prevent divisiveness by (A) promoting empathetic dialogue over the desire to be right; (B) encourage the integrity of belief over incredulity; (C) ensuring the knowing process is conducted with authenticity instead of being dictated by one’s pride or insecurities; and (D) instill a certain disposition that creates space for genuine dialogue.

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