Strike Digests.docx

SSS Employee Asso. v CA (July 28, 1989) Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking. Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter. Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so. In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes. Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector LaborManagement Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

BANGALISAN vs. CA (July 31, 1997) Facts: Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 public school teachers who staged “mass actions” on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances concerning the alleged failure of the public authorities to implement certain laws and measures intended for their material benefit. The Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed to comply with said order, thus the Secretary charged petitioners with “grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and absence without official leave in violation of PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines.” They were simultaneously placed under preventive suspension. Petitioners failed to give their answer to the complaint filed against them despite due notice. Thus, the DECS secretary found them guilty of the offenses and ordered their dismissal from service. The secretary, acting on petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, modified its ruling. Instead of dismissal, petitioners would be suspended from service for nine months without pay. Petitioners appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The latter reduced the suspension period from nine months to six months with automatic reinstatement in the service but without payment of back wages. Petitioners appealed the case to CA but dismissed the same for lack of merit. Petitioners’ main argument is that they were merely exercising their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Issue: Whether or not Government employees can engage in a strike. Held: No. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners’ purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term “strike” was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the

substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. “It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient but non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances.” It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the “mass actions,” but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage. As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memorandum Circular No. 6, public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in a work stoppage against a public employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public employees was clearly recognized at common law. Indeed, it is frequently declared that modern rules which prohibit such strikes, either by statute or by judicial decision, simply incorporate or reassert the common law rule. To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike, there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor. In the absence of any express legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, walkouts and temporary work stoppages like workers in the private sector.

National Federation of Sugar Workers vs. Ovejera 1982 FACTS: National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) has concluded with Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC) a CBA effective February 16, 1981 to February 15, 1984 which provided that the parties agree to maintain the present practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus, and amelioration bonus to the extent as the latter is required by law. The Christmas and milling bonuses amount to 1 ½ months' salary. On November 28, 1981, NFSW struck allegedly, to compel the payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851, in addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers. On January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) a notice of strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six days after, NFSW struck. One day after the commencement of the strike, a report of the strike-vote was filed by NFSW with MOLE. CAC filed a petition with the Regional Arbitration Branch of MOLE to declare the strike illegal, principally for being violative of BP 130, that is, the strike was declared before

the expiration of the 15-day cooling-off period for ULP strikes, and the strike was staged before the lapse of seven days from the submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-vote After the submission of position papers and hearing, Labor Arbiter Ovejara declared the strike illegal. On February 26, 1982, the NFSW, by passing the NLRC filed the instant Petition for prohibition. ISSUE: Whether or not the strike declared by NFSW is illegal, the resolution of which mainly depends on the mandatory or directory character of the cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after report to MOLE of the result of a strike-vote, as prescribed in the Labor Code. HELD: When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the dispute "remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the filing of the notice," the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that "in every case," the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period." It must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory cooling-off period. If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed mandatory, but not the waiting periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes for which the filing of the strike notice and strike-vote report is required would not be achieved, as when a strike is declared immediately after a strike notice is served, or when as in the instant case the strike-vote report is filed with MOLE after the strike had actually commenced Such interpretation of the law ought not and cannot be countenanced. It would indeed be self-defeating for the law to imperatively require the filing on a strike notice and strike-vote report without at the same time making the prescribed waiting periods mandatory.

Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc vs. NLRC (July 6, 1995) Facts: Petitioner’s employees stopped working and gathered in a mass action to express their grievances regarding wages, thirteenth month pay and hazard pay. Said employees were all members of the Macajalar Labor Union — Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW) with whom petitioner had an existing collective bargaining agreement. Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services at the port of Cagayan de Oro. The strike paralyzed operations at said port. The strikers filed individual notices of strike (“Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa Pag-Welga”) with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment.

With the failure of conciliation conferences between petitioner and the strikers, INPORT filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction. The National Labor Relations Commission issued a temporary restraining order. Thereafter, majority of the strikers returned to work, leaving herein private respondents who continued their protest. For not having complied with the formal requirements in Article 264 of the Labor Code, 3 the strike staged by petitioner’s workers on April 30, 1985 was found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal. 4 The workers who participated in the illegal strike did not, however, lose their employment, since there was no evidence that they participated in illegal acts. After noting that petitioner accepted the other striking employees back to work, the Labor Arbiter held that the private respondents should similarly be allowed to return to work without having to undergo the required screening to be undertaken by their union (MLU-FFW). As regards the six private respondents who were union officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they could not have possibly been “duped or tricked” into signing the strike notice for they were active participants in the conciliation meetings and were thus fully aware of what was going on. Hence, said union officers should be accepted back to work after seeking reconsideration from herein petitioner. 5 The NLRC affirmed with modification 8 the Arbiter’s decision. It held that the concerted action by the workers was more of a “protest action” than a strike. Private respondents, including the six union officers, should also be allowed to work unconditionally to avoid discrimination. However, in view of the strained relations between the parties, separation pay was awarded in lieu of reinstatement. Upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, respondent modified the above resolution.

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The Commission ruled that since private respondents were not actually terminated from service, there was no basis for reinstatement. However, it awarded six months’ salary as separation pay or financial assistance in the nature of “equitable relief.” The award for backwages was also deleted for lack of factual and legal basis. In lieu of backwages, compensation equivalent to P1,000.00 was given. Issue: Whether separation pay and backwages be awarded by public respondent NLRC to participants of an illegal strike? Held: Reinstatement and backwages or, if no longer feasible, separation pay, can only be granted if sufficient bases exist under the law, particularly after a showing of illegal dismissal. However, while the union members may thus be entitled under the law to be reinstated or to receive separation pay, their expulsion from the union in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement renders the same impossible. Ratio: A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of labor, 13 is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by the

concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. 14 A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. 15 Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action on April 30, 1985 to press for their wages and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by concerted action resulted from a labor dispute. The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved the legality of said strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 264 (now Article 263) paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code. 16 The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not conform to the notice required by the law to be filed since they were represented by a union (MLU-FFW) which even had an existing collective bargaining agreement with INPORT. Neither did the striking workers observe the strike vote by secret ballot, cooling-off period and reporting requirements. A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost their employment status. 20 An ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike. In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the majority of the striking workers, including union officers, back to work. Private respondents were left to continue with the strike after they refused to submit to the “screening” required by the company. Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from his employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost his employment status. Since there appears no proof that these union members committed illegal acts during the strike, they cannot be dismissed. The striking union members among private respondents are thus entitled to reinstatement, there being no just cause for their dismissal. However, considering that a decade has already lapsed from the time the disputed strike occurred, we find that to award separation pay in lieu of reinstatement would be more practical and appropriate. No backwages will be awarded to private respondent-union members as a penalty for their participation in the illegal strike. Their continued participation in said strike, even after

most of their co-workers had returned to work, can hardly be rewarded by such an award. The fate of private respondent-union officers is different. Their insistence on unconditional reinstatement or separation pay and backwages is unwarranted and unjustified. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates that a union officer may be terminated from employment. 34 Notwithstanding the fact that INPORT previously accepted other union officers and that the screening required by it was uncalled for, still it cannot be gainsaid that it possessed the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. The law, in using the word may, grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. 35 Moreover, an illegal strike which, more often than not, brings about unnecessary economic disruption and chaos in the workplace should not be countenanced by a relaxation of the sanctions prescribed by law. The union officers are, therefore, not entitled to any relief.

UNION OF FILIPINO EMPLOYEES vs. NESTLE (Dec. 19, 1990) Facts: UFE filed a notice of strike with the BLR against Filipro (now, Nestle) and later filed a complaint for ULP for violation of the Labor Code on Holiday Pay, non-implementation of the CBA provisions and others. The Minister of Labor and Employment Blas Ople assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. UFE assailed the same by filing a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of TRO. Notwithstanding the automatic injunction and an absence of a restraining order, the union members staged a strike and continued to man picket lines. The union officers and members distributed leaflets to employees and passers-by advocating a boycott. Hence, Nestle filed a petition to declare the strike illegal. The Labor Minister Ople issued another return to work order but the officers and members of UFE continued with the strike. Issue: Whether or not the strike is legal. Held: No. A strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus, illegal, pursuant to Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code. Moreover, the union officers and members who have participated in the said illegal activity, are, as a result, deemed to have lost their employment status. Thus, we held that: UFE completely misses the underlying principle embodied in Art. 263 (g) on the settlement of labor disputes and this is, that assumption and certification orders are executory in character and are to be strictly complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests.

Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-towork orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their actions. . . . One other point that must be underscored is that the returnto-work order is issued pending the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the strike is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to maintain the status quo while the determination is being made. Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike is legal can refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill on the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill. Worse, they will also claim payment for work not done, on the ground that they are still legally employed although actually engaged in the activities inimical to their employer's interest. This is like eating one's cake and having it too, and at the expense of the management. Such an unfair situation surely was not contemplated by our labor laws and cannot be justified under the social justice policy, which is a policy of fairness to both labor and management. Neither can this unseemly arrangement be sustained under the due process clause as the order, if thus interpreted, would be plainly oppressive and arbitrary.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR (1991) FACTS: The 1986-1989 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Philippine Airlines (PAL) and the Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) in addition to pay increases also provided for the formation of a PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel. Accordingly, the PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel was formed in due time and went to work. During the conferences of the panel however, there was no meeting of minds between the parties. As a result, PALEA accused PAL of bargaining in bad faith and consequently filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike on account of: (1) bargaining deadlock; and (2) unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad faith. The PAL filed with the NCMB a motion to dismiss PALEA's notice of strike for being premature as the issues raised were not strikeable since there still existed a PAL-PALEA CBA which would not yet expire until September 30, 1989 or with nine (9) more months to run. On January 6, 1989, the NCMB-NCR Executive Conciliator/Mediator, advised PALEA president, George Pulido, that the issues raised in the notice of strike were "appropriate only for preventive mediation," hence, not valid grounds for a lawful strike. However, when subsequently a representative of NCMB supervised the conduct of PALEA'S

strike vote, PAL's counsel was baffled for it was inconsistent with the NCMB order treating the strike notice as preventive mediation. PAL's counsel sought clarification from the NCMB. He assured PAL that the NCMB representatives could not certify the strike vote. On January 12, 1989, PALEA submitted the strike vote results to the NCMB. The next day, January 13, 1989, PAL petitioned the Secretary of Labor Franklin Drilon to immediately assume jurisdiction over the dispute in order to avert the impending strike. Inexplicably, the Secretary failed to act promptly on PAL's petition for his assumption of jurisdiction. Seven (7) days passed with no reaction from Secretary Drilon. Thus, on January 20, 1989, PALEA declared a strike paralyzing PAL's entire operations the next day, resulting in serious inconvenience to thousands of passengers who were stranded in 43 airports throughout the country, and the loss of millions of pesos in unearned revenue for PAL. Late in the day, at 7:50 P.M., Secretary Drilon issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute which had already exploded into a full-blown strike, ordering the strikers to lift their pickets and return to work, directing management to accept all returning employees, and resolving the issues subject of the strike, by awarding the monetary benefits to the strikers, while prohibiting the company from taking retaliatory action against them. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor has authority to order the petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. to reinstate officers and members of the union who participated in an illegal strike and to desist from taking any disciplinary or retaliatory action against them? HELD: The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from taking disciplinary action against its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding of the strike, but not the company's right to take action against union officers who participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts. The prohibition which the Secretary issued to PAL constitutes an unlawful deprivation of property and denial of due process for it prevents PAL from seeking redress for the huge property losses that it suffered as a result of the union's illegal mass action. Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, the Labor Secretary's authority to resolve a labor dispute within 30 days from the date of assumption of jurisdiction, encompasses only the issues in the dispute, not the legality or illegality of any strike that may have been resorted to in the meantime.

SAN MIGUEL vs. NLRC (March 2, 1999) Facts: San Miguel Corporation (SMC), which allegedly needed to streamline its operations due to financial losses shut down some of its plants and declared 55 positions as redundant. Consequently, the private respondent union (SMCEU) filed several grievance cases for the said retrenched employees, praying for the redeployment of the said employees to the other divisions of the company. During the grievance

proceedings, however, most of the employees were redeployed, while others accepted early retirement. As a result, only 17 employees remained when the parties proceeded to the third level of the grievance procedure. The private respondent filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a notice of strike. Petitioner, on the other hand, moved to dismiss the notice of strike, but the NCMB failed to act on the motion. Petitioner SMC filed a complaint with the respondent NLRC praying for the dismissal of the notice of strike, and an order compelling the respondent union to submit to grievance and arbitration the issue listed in the notice of strike, and the recovery of the expenses of litigation. Respondent NLRC came out with a minute resolution dismissing the complaint. Aggrieved by the resolution, petitioner found its way to this Court via the present petition. In the case under consideration, the grounds relied upon by the private respondent union are non-strikeable. Their grounds appear more illusory than real. The Court held that the violation of the CBA is chargeable against the private respondent union. The Supreme Court granted the instant petition. SMCEUPTGWO was directed to complete the third level of the Grievance Procedure and proceed with the Arbitration proceedings if necessary. Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of a no strike clause. Held: Yes. Collective Bargaining Deadlock is defined as “the situation between the labor and the management of the company where there is failure in the collective bargaining negotiations resulting in a stalemate.” The situation is non-existent in the present case since there is a Board assigned on the third level (Step 3) of the grievance machinery to resolve the conflicting views of the parties. Instead of asking the conciliation decide the conflict, petitioner declared a deadlock, and thereafter, filed a notice of strike. For failing to exhaust all the steps in the grievance machinery and arbitration proceedings provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the notice of strike should have been dismissed by the NLRC and private respondent union ordered to proceed with the grievance and arbitration proceedings. In abandoning the grievance proceedings and stubbornly refusing to avail of the remedies under the CBA, private respondent (union) violated the mandatory provisions of the CBA. Petitioner (employer) having evinced its willingness to negotiate the fate of the remaining employees affected , there is no ground to sustain the notice of strike of the union. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner San Miguel Corporation and private respondent San Miguel Corporation Employees Union - PTGWO are hereby directed to complete the third level (Step 3) of the Grievance Procedure and proceed with the Arbitration proceedings if necessary.

PEPSI-COLA LABOR UNION vs. NLRC June 29, 1982 Facts: On December 11, 1979, a certification election was held at the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company's (PEPSI) plant in Naga City. Out of 131 votes which were cast, the UNION got 128 so it regarded itself as the sole and exclusive bargaining unit. The losing labor group contested the election at various levels but it was unsuccessful. Meanwhile, on April 1, 1980, the UNION filed a notice of strike with MOLE's Regional Office in Legaspi City on the ground that PEPSI refused to bargain. PEPSI countered that it was willing to bargain but there was yet no final decision on the appeal of the other labor union as to who is the EBR. Med-Arbiter Antonio B. Caayao issued a resolution stating that the Notice of Strike under consideration, being premature, is illegal and should, therefore, be dismissed. The Union disregard the resolution and staged a strike. On May 15, 1980, PEPSI filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal strike. Labor Arbiter Fulleros, declared that the strike staged by the respondents herein was beyond doubt illegal and therefore all officers and member of the union whose names appear on the complaint be considered to have lost their employment status effective May 7, 1890. Issue: Whether or not Strike is illegal so as to declare that all the officers and members of the union whose names and positions appear on Annex "A" of the complaint except Romulo Cal, Nilo Bariso and Mauro Nieto be considered to have lost their employment status effective May 7, 1980. " Held: No. It is now settled "that a strike does not automatically carry the stigma of illegality even if no unfair labor practice were committed by the employer. It suffices if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor as the inducing factor for staging a strike." (Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees, Assn. vs. Tandayag, G.R. No. L-29217, May 11, 1978, 83 SCRA 56, 72. And it has also been held that the members of a union cannot be held responsible for an illegal strike on the sole basis of such membership or even on account of their affirmative vote authorizing the same. They become liable only if they actually participated therein. (ESSO Philippines, Inc. vs. Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO (MME), G.R. No. L-36545, January 26, 1977, 75 SCRA 73.) In the case at bar, although the strike was indeed illegal, We cannot discount the presence of good faith on the part of the rank and file members of the UNION considering that in the certification election the UNION obtained 128 out of the 131 votes cast so that they could justifiably consider it as their sole bargaining representative. Moreover, there is no proof that the members of the UNION all participated in the illegal strike. The ones who deserve what Justice Barredo calls "capital punishment" in the Esso Philippines case, supra, are the officers of the UNION who staged the strike in defiance of the ruling of Med-Arbiter Caayao WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the private respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate all of those persons whose names and positions appear in Annex "A" which is mentioned in the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter dated November 20, 1980, under the same terms and conditions of employment existing prior to May 7, 1980, except for the officers of the UNION. No costs.

TIU AND HAYUHAY vs. NLRC (August 18, 1997) Facts: RBS (company) had a CBA with GMAEU (union) which took effect on July 2, 1989. RBS observed that a huge amount of overtime expenses incurred which moved the president to form guidelines on the availment of leaves and rendering of overtime work. On June 11, 1991, RBS furnished GMAEU a copy of the said guidelines and requested the latter to comment thereon. The union did not file any comment. RBS then implemented the said guidelines. GMAEU then send a letter to the president. The union argued that, the union was not consulted in the formulation of the said guidelines which violates their CBA, the guidelines would render nugatory the CBA provision of the same subject and the diminution of benefits being enjoyed by all employees with respect to the mid-year bonuses (from 2-1/2 months to 1-1/2 months constitutes a withdrawal of an existing company policy). RBS management and GMAEU officials met on 3 July 1991 and on 10 July 1991 to thresh out the issues raised by GMAEU in its 26 June 1991 letter. Both talks, however, were short lived as the union refused to hold further talks with RBS. On 12 July 1991, GMAEU filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) based on unfair labor practices allegedly committed by RBS on grounds of violation of existing CBA, employees coercion, union interference and discrimination. The NCMB set a conciliation meeting on 19 July 1991, but as early as 16 July 1991 the Union held a strike vote among its members and submitted the results thereof to the NCMB on 18 July 1991 which showed that majority of the union members voted to go on strike. During the conciliation meeting held on 19 July 1991, RBS, through counsel, informed GMAEU’s officers that RBS did not violate any provision in the collective bargaining agreement since the issuance of the guidelines was a management prerogative duly recognized in their agreement. As regards GMAEU’s charges of coercion, union interference and discrimination, RBS argued that these alleged unfair labor practices were neither raised by the union in its 26 June 1991 letter nor during their 3 July and 10 July 1991 talks. RBS’ counsel requested GMAEU’s officers to name the persons or officers of RBS involved in the alleged unfair labor practices and to state the specific act or acts complained of so that RBS management could adequately refute said allegations or impose appropriate disciplinary actions against its erring officers. GMAEU’s officers, however, ignored both RBS’ and the labor conciliator’s requests for a bill of particulars. In a second conciliation meeting held on 25 July 1991, RBS reiterated its request to GMAEU’s officers to furnish RBS the details of the alleged unfair practices committed by RBS’ officers. Again, the Union denied RBS’ request and refused to hold any further talks with RBS management. On the same day, RBS filed a motion to dismiss GMAEU’s notice of strike and forewarned the Union about the consequences of an illegal strike. On 2 August 1991, the union struck. On the same day, RBS filed a complaint for illegal strike and unfair labor practice against GMAEU and its fourteen (14) officers with the NLRC. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Labor immediately assumed jurisdiction over the case, issued a return-to-work order, and certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. In

the certified case, the labor arbiter found no factual and legal ground to hold RBS guilty of unfair labor practices against the Union. On appeal (docketed as NLRC-NCR CC No 00076-01), the NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision in a resolution dated 31 July 1992. Meanwhile, the labor arbiter continued to hear the illegal strike case filed by RBS against GMAEU. On 18 February 1994, the labor arbiter rendered judgment declaring the strike illegal and the union officers who knowingly participated in the illegal strike to have validly lost their employment status. 10 of them did not appeal. Tiu and Hayuhay appealed. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the labor arbiter’s decision that petitioners staged an illegal strike. Held: The notice of strike filed by the union before the NCMB on 12 July 1991 contained general allegations that RBS management committed unfair labor practices by its gross violation of the economic provisions in their collective bargaining agreement and by alleged acts of coercion, union interference and discrimination which amounted to union busting. It is the union, therefore, who had the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support these allegations. It is not disputed that prior to 12 July 1991, the union treated RBS’ issuance of the “guidelines on the availment of leaves and rendering of overtime services” as “gross” violations of the existing collective bargaining agreement. In its talks with the union, RBS painstakingly explained that the said allegation was unfounded because the issuance of said guidelines was RBS’ management prerogative. Up to that point, the union never raised the issue of unfair labor practices allegedly committed by RBS’ official under Article 248 of the Labor Code. But in its notice of strike filed two days later, the union raised issues of coercion, discrimination, and union interference for the first time. Significantly, the union had two (2) conciliatory meetings arranged by the NCMB at which it could have substantiated these additional allegations. However, the fact that it had submitted the results of the strike vote even ahead of the conciliatory meetings, and continuously refused to substantiate its allegations in its notice of strike thereafter, lends credence to the NLRC’s observation that these charges were indiscriminately hurled against RBS to give a semblance of validity to its notice of strike. The bottom line is that the union should have immediately resorted to the grievance machinery established in their agreement with RBS. In disregarding said procedure the union leaders who knowingly participated in the illegal strike “have acted unreasonably, and, as such, the law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the consequences of their behavior.”