Jurisdiction And Rule 1 Digests.docx

IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDOSANTE vs. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J. Topic: Jurisdiction Nature: Petition for certiorari Facts: 1) In April 2004, private respondent Vita Kalashian filed before RTC Baguio a complaint for damages against petitioners Irene Sante and Reynaldo Sante. Respondent alleged that while she was inside the Police Station in Pangasinan, and in the presence of other persons and police officers, Irene Sante uttered the words, “How many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin’ bitch!” Bert refers to a friend of the respondent and one of her hired security guards in said station, and a suspect in the killing of petitioners’ close relative. Petitioners also allegedly went around Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent prayed for the following: Moral Damages Exemplary Damages Attorney’s fees Litigation expenses

300,000 50, 000 50, 000 20, 000

2) Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of jurisdiction. They claimed that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities instead of RTC Baguio should take cognizance. They argued that the amount of the claim for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total claim. 3) The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the amount of demand P420,000 was above the jurisdictional amount for MTCC’s outside Metro Manila. 4) Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. Meanwhile, respondent filed an amended complaint increasing the

claim for moral damages to P1,000,000. Petitioners then filed a motion to dismiss which was denied. 5) Petitioners AGAIN filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, raising that RTC Baguio committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amended complaint. CA ruled in favor of petitioners, stating that MTCC had jurisdiction because considering ONLY the demand for P300,000 moral damages. The CA held that the demand for exemplary damages was merely incidental. 6) Hence, this petition for certiorari. Issues: Whether RTC acquired jurisdiction of the case Whether RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amended complaint Held: YES. RTC acquired jurisdiction. Hence, there was no grave abuse of discretion. Ratio Decidendi: PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: The claim for moral damages, in the amount of P300,000.00 in the original complaint, is the main action. The exemplary damages being discretionary should not be included in the computation of the jurisdictional amount. Thus, RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amended complaint. RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The nature of her complaint is for recovery of damages. As such, the totality of the claim for damages, including the exemplary damages as well as the other damages alleged and prayed in the complaint, such as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, should be included in determining jurisdiction. The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under B.P. Blg. 129 applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount

of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. In the instant case, the complaint filed is for the recovery of damages for the acts of the petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent. Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that respondent’s main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint. Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

In Irene Sante vs. Hon. Claravall, the Supreme Court stated that since at the time of the filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004, the MTCC’s jurisdictional amount has already been adjusted to P300,000.00, there is no doubt that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction over the case since the total amount of damages being claimed by the petitioner in the case was P420,000.00. Moreover, in the said case the Supreme Court found no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the RTC’s order allowing the amendment of the original complaint fromP300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. The High Court declared that while it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the

amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court (Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132753, February 15, 1999, 303 SCRA 186, 196), the RTC in the case clearly had jurisdiction over the original complaint and the amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right under Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Ergo, the amendment of the complaint was in order

G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014, MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, PETITIONER, vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO, RESPONDENT Facts: Leonardo and Marrieta’s marriage was dissolved by reason of psychologyical incapacity in 1996, hence Leonardo filed a complaint for partition over their property consisting of a house and lot, since according to him, there was no more reason to maintain their coownership. In her defense, Marrieta claimed that the property had been sold to their children Joseph Raymond and Joseph Leo. She also moved for dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC Bacolod City, the action for partition being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Per decision of the MTCC, it ruled in favour of Marrietta and adjudicated the land to her, being the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. It also awarded moral damages in favour of Marrieta.

Leonardo appealed the ruling to the RTC, which reversed the MTCC ruling and ordered the partition of the property, hence Marrieta appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals by petition for review. The appellate court denied Marietta’s appeal, ruling that since the assessed value of the property is only P8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC jurisdiction. Though the RTC applied Art. 129 instead of Art. 147 thereof, it still correctly ordered the partition of the property.

Marrieta elevated her case to the Supreme Court.

Held: The Supreme Court: “Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691) Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely P8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed the required limit of P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.

G.R. No. L-2352 July 26, 1910 ELADIO ALONSO, vs. TOMAS VILLAMOR, ET AL., Overview: Members of the municipal board of the municipality of Placer (defendants) took from Father Alonso (plaintiff), priest in charge, possession of the church and its appurtenances, and also all of the personal property contained therein. Father Alonso then brought an action to recover from the defendants the value of certain articles from the church and the rental value of the premises during the occupation of the defendants. LC decided in his favor. According to the defendants-appellants, the church and the articles within it was owned by the municipality as these were built and purchased by funds voluntarily contributed by the people of the municipality. They also claimed that Father Alonso was not a real party in interest. SC affirmed the ruling of the LC saying that at the time of taking, the property in question belonged to the Roman Catholic Church. SC also declared that Father Alonso is not the real party in interest as he personally has no interest in the cause of action. However, SC ordered that the action be amended by substituting the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the place and stead of Father Alonso as party plaintiff for the reason that the amendment does not constitute change in the identity of the parties but just a formal substitution. Statement of the Case The court below gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P1,581, with interest at 6% from the date of the judgment. Said sum was made up of two items: (1) P741 – value of the articles taken from the church; (2) P840 – rental value of the premises during the occupation by defendants. Statement of Facts December 11, 1901: Defendants (Villamor, et. al) who were members of the municipal board of the municipality of Placer addressed to the plaintiff (Alonso, priest in charge of the church) a letter stating the following:

We have received an order from the provincial fiscal which says: The cemeteries, convents, and the other buildings erected on land belonging to the town at the expense of the town and preserved by it belong to the town, and for this reason the municipality is under the obligation of administering them and of collecting the revenues therefrom, and for this reason we notify you that from this date all of the revenues and products therefrom must be turned into the treasury of the municipality in order that the people may properly preserve them. We notify you that the image of St. Vicente which is now in the church, as it is an image donated to the people by its owner, by virtue of said order is also the property of said people, and therefore the alms which are given it by the devotees thereof must be also turned into the municipal treasury for the proper preservation of the church and for other necessary purposes. We hope that you will view in the proper light and that you will deliver to the bearer of this letter the key of the alms box of the said image in order that we may comply with our obligation in conformity with the dispositions of said order. December 13, 1901: Defendants took possession of the church and its appurtenances, and also all of the personal property contained therein. The plaintiff protested against the occupation but his protests received no consideration so he was summarily removed from possession of the same. An action was brought by the plaintiff to recover of the defendants the (1) value of certain articles taken from the church, and (2) the rental value of the church and its appurtenances, including the church cemetery from December 11, 1901 – April 1904. LC ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Defendants: (1) Plaintiff is not the real party in interest (Action should have been in the name of the bishop of the diocese within the church was located, or in the name of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, as the real party in interest); (2) The church had been erected by funds voluntarily contributed by the people of the municipality, and that the articles within the church had been purchased with funds raised in like manner, therefore, the municipality was the owner thereof.

Applicable Laws: Secs. 114, 110 and 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure (used in this case)

Issues: WON the church and its appurtenances, and personal property contained therein belonged to the municipality of Placer (No) WON the plaintiff, R.P. Alonso, is the real party in interest (No) WON the Court can substitute as party plaintiff the real party in interest (Yes)

Rationale The property sued for was, at the time it was taken by the defendants, the property of the Roman Catholic Church, and that the seizure of the same and occupation of the church and its appurtenances by the defendants were wrongful and illegal. The conclusions of the court below as to the value of the articles taken by the defendants and of the rent of the church for the time of its illegal occupation by the defendants were also correct and proper. The Roman Catholic Church against the municipality of Placer (September 23, 1908): Court ruled that the property belonged to the Roman Catholic Church. Barlin v Ramirez, Municipality of Ponce v Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in Porto Rico It is undoubted that the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church itself is the real party in interest. The plaintiff personally has no interest in the cause of action. Sec. 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure: Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.

This Court has full power, apart from that power and authority which is inherent, to amend the process, pleadings, proceedings, and decision in this case by substituting, as party plaintiff, the real party in interest. Not only are we confident that we may do so, but we are convinced that we should do so.

Formal substitution - Substitution so as to make the form express the substance

Sec. 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure: Amendments in general. — The court shall, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms, if any, as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding and at any stage of the action, in either the Court of First Instance or the Supreme Court, by adding or striking out the name of any party, either plaintiff or defendant, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious, and inexpensive manner. The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be made after the time limited by the rules of the court for filing the same. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

Form is a method of speech used to express substance and make it clearly appear. It is the means by which the substance reveals itself. If the form be faulty and still the substance shows plainly through no, harm can come by making the form accurately expressive of the substance.

Sec. 503: Judgment not to be reversed on technical grounds. — No judgment shall be reversed on formal or technical grounds, or for such error as has not prejudiced the real rights of the excepting party. Such an amendment does not constitute a change in the identity of the parties. The plaintiff asserts in his complaint, and maintains that assertion all through the record, that he is engaged in the prosecution of this case, not for himself, but for the bishop of the diocese—not by his own right, but by right of another. He seeks merely to do for the bishop what the bishop might do for himself. His own personality is not involved. His own rights are not presented. He claims no interest whatever in the litigation. He seeks only the welfare of the great church whose servant he is. Gladly permits his identity to be wholly swallowed up in that of his superior.

No one is deceived for an instant as to whose interest are at stake. The form of its expression is alone defective.

No one has been misled by the error in the name of the party plaintiff. If we should by reason of this error send this back for amendment and new trial, there would be on the retrial the same complaint, the same answer, the same defense, the same interests, the same witnesses, and the same evidence. The name of the plaintiff would constitute the only difference between the old trial and the new. In our judgment there is not enough in a name to justify such action. There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration of justice. The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other purposes than to cure it, does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. Technicality, when it desserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no pvested rights in technicalities. No litigant should be permitted to challenge a record of a court of these Islands for defect of form when his substantial rights have not been prejudiced thereby.

Judgment: Process, pleadings, proceedings and decision in this action is amended by substituting the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the place and stead of Alonso as party plaintiff. Decision of the court below, so amended, is affirmed.