Statcon 228.docx

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987 PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .;" WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Tañada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership"; WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly"; and WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country; NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order: Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette. Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.

PRIMICIAS v. MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA G.R. No. L-26702; October 18, 1979 DE CASTRO, J.: Facts: On February 8, 1965, Juan Augusta B. Primacias (plaintiff), was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, about 200 meters away from a school building, at Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta, when a member of Urdaneta's Municipal Police asked him to stop for violating Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, "and more particularly, for overtaking a truck." The policeman then asked for plaintiff's license which he surrendered, a temporary operator's permit was issued to him and thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed against the him. The ordinance in question provides: SECTION 1- That the following speed limits for vehicular traffic along the National Highway and the Provincial Roads within the territorial limits of Urdaneta shall be as follows: a. Thru crowded streets approaching intersections at 'blind corners, passing school zones or thickly populated areas, duly marked with sign posts, the maximum speed limit allowable shall be 20 kph. SECTION 2 – That any person or persons caught driving any motor vehicle violating the provisions of this ordinance shall be fined P10.00 for the first offense; P20.00 for the second offense; and P30.00 for the third and succeeding offenses, the Municipal Judge shall recommend the cancellation of the license of the offender to the Motor Vehicle's Office (MVO); or failure to pay the fine imposed, he shall suffer a subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with law. Due to the institution of the criminal case, plaintiff initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants: Municipality of Urdaneta, Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman Andrada from enforcing the ordinance. The Court of First Instance rendered the questioned decision holding that the ordinance was null and void as it had been repealed by Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Defendants contend that the Ordinance is valid, being "patterned after and based on Section 53, 5 par. 4 of Act No. 3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law)." Issue: Whether or not the court erred in holding that the ordinance is in conflict with section 35 par. b(4) of Republic Act 4136 and is, thus, null and void. Held: No, the court did not commit an error in holding that the ordinance is in conflict with the Section 35 par. B(4) of R.A 4136. By express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. However, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that it "must not contravene . . . the statute”. It is a "fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state." Thus, whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give way. In the present case, the court stated that the appellants fail to note that Act No. 3992 has been superseded by Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which became effective on June 20, 1964, about three months after the questioned ordinance was approved by Urdaneta's Municipal Council. However, an explicit repeal of the Act 3992 is embodied in Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136: “Act Numbered 3992 as amended, and all laws, executive orders, ordinance, resolutions, regulations or paints thereof in conflict with the provisions of this Act are repealed.” Pursuant to this section, the ordinance at bar is thus placed within the ambit of Republic Act No. 4136, and not Act No. 3992. Therefore, the ordinance being derived from the Act 3992, and the latter being repealed by the 4136, renders the Ordinance void. BAGATSING vs. RAMIREZ 74 SCRA 306 GR No. L-41631, December 17, 1976 "The entrusting of the tax collection to private entities does not destroy the public purpose of a tax ordinance." FACTS: Aside from the issue on publication, private respondent bewails that the market stall fees imposed in the disputed City Ordinance No. 7522, which regulates public markets and prescribes fees for rentals of stalls, are diverted to the exclusive private use of the Asiatic Integrated Corporation since the collection of said fees had been let by the City of Manila to the said corporation in a "Management and Operating Contract." ISSUE: Does the delegation of the collection of taxes to a private entity invalidates a tax ordinance and defeats its public purpose? HELD: No. The assumption is of course saddled on erroneous premise. The fees collected do not go direct to the private coffers of the corporation. Ordinance No. 7522 was not made for the corporation but for the purpose of raising revenues for the city. That is the object it serves. The entrusting of the collection of the fees does not destroy the public purpose of the ordinance. So long as the purpose is public, it does not matter whether the agency through which the money is dispensed is public or private. The right to tax depends upon the ultimate use, purpose and object for which the fund is raised. It is not dependent on the nature or character of the person or corporation whose intermediate agency is to be used in applying it. The people may be taxed for a public purpose, although it be under the direction of an individual or private corporation.

CIR VS. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. - MINIMUM CORPORATE INCOME TAX Category: Income Taxation

FACTS: PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. had zero taxable income for 2000 but would have been liable for Minimum Corporate Income Tax based on its gross income. However, PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. did not pay the Minimum Corporate Income Tax using as basis its franchise which exempts it from “all other taxes” upon payment of whichever is lower of either (a) the basic corporate income tax based on the net taxable income or (b) a franchise tax of 2%. ISSUE: Is PAL liable for Minimum Corporate Income Tax? HELD: NO. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.’s franchise clearly refers to "basic corporate income tax" which refers to the general rate of 35% (now 30%). In addition, there is an apparent distinction under the Tax Code between taxable income, which is the basis for basic corporate income tax under Sec. 27 (A) and gross income, which is the basis for the Minimum Corporate Income Tax under Section 27 (E). The two terms have their respective technical meanings and cannot be used interchangeably. Not being covered by the Charter which makes PAL liable only for basic corporate income tax, then Minimum Corporate Income Tax is included in "all other taxes" from which PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. is exempted. The CIR also cannot point to the “Substitution Theory” which states that Respondent may not invoke the “in lieu of all other taxes” provision if it did not pay anything at all as basic corporate income tax or franchise tax. The Court ruled that it is not the fact tax payment that exempts Respondent but the exercise of its option. The Court even pointed out the fallacy of the argument in that a measly sum of one peso would suffice to exempt PAL from other taxes while a zero liability would not and said that there is really no substantial distinction between a zero tax and a one-peso tax liability. Lastly, the Revenue Memorandum Circular stating the applicability of the MCIT to PAL does more than just clarify a previous regulation and goes beyond mere internal administration and thus cannot be given effect without previous notice or publication to those who will be affected thereby.

US v. Antonio Abad Santos36 Phil 243 FACTS: Abad Santos, the appellant was charged of violating the provision in Internal Revenue Law which states that it shall keep a day book in which one should enter in detail the amount of money received in the conduct of the business(Circular #467 - issued by collector of Internal Revenue). Violation of any provisions of IRL or any lawful regulation of BIR is stated in Sec 185 of RA2339 (Sec 227 of Admin Code) The appellant owns a printing establishment called The Excelsior therefore is bound to the circular that was issued! It was charged in the information that it failed to make an entry for Jan 5, 1915 and therefore violated the said regulation. Appellant employed a bookkeeper that is said to be in charge of the book. ISSUE: Won the appellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue Law. HELD: No. The appellant must be acquitted! It is clear that the appellant had employed a bookkeeper to be in charge, and he took no part in keeping the book in question. Therefore, the appellant knew nothing. Penal Statutes are to be strictly construed and courts will not hold a person criminally responsible for the acts of another, committed without his knowledge or consent, unless there is a statute requiring it. CELIA M. MERIZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. DECISION VITUG, J.: A maxim in statutory construction mandates that penal statutes should be strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. The phrase, truly, may not be a mere clich but, so also, it is not meant to wrongly shield an accused from criminal liability. On appeal to this Court is the decision, dated 06 July 1999, of the Court of Appeals (6th Division), in CA-G.R. No. 18985 affirming in toto the decision of the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 90-5598 to Criminal Case No. 5601, inclusive, which found Celia M. Meriz, herein petitioner, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having transgressed Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 22. Petitioner was engaged in the business of manufacturing garments for export using the name and style of Hi-Marc Needlecraft. During the course of her business undertakings, she obtained a number of loans from Amelia Santos (Santos) and Summit Financing Corporation. Sometime in 1988, petitioner issued in favor of Santos four Pilipinas Bank Checks in the aggregate amount of P188,400.00. Santos deposited the checks with her bank. The checks, however, were later returned, with the notation Insufficient Funds stamped on the dorsal portion of each check,[1] by the depositary bank. On 15 December 1988, Santos, through her counsel, sent a telegram to petitioner, reading Unless your bounced checks for Two Hundred Twenty-Six Thousand Three Hundred Pesos paid in cash in three (3) days, [we] shall institute criminal action.[2] Despite the warning, petitioner failed to settle her account. On 05 January 1990, another demand letter was sent; it read: Your account with Mr. and Mrs. Leonardo G. Santos as of December 1, 1989 has amounted to P285,773.90. In this connection we demand that you settle this account within seven (7) days from receipt hereof. Failing to do so, we might be constrained to take legal action, including damages and attorneys fees.[3] On 12 January 1990, petitioner acknowledged the letter-demand; she wrote thusly: Dear Mr. Santos, RE: OUR OUTSTANDING ACCOUNT OF P285,733.90 With reference to the DEMAND LETTER dated January 5, 1990 [sent] to us by your counsel Vicente P. Fernando, we would like to request from you to please give us a little more time to settle said account with you. Business has not been good the past year and up to now we havent collected yet from our buyer. Weve been doing all possible means to generate funds and be able to settle our account. For the meantime, all we ask from you is give us more time. We thank you for the consideration. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) CELIA M. MERIZ[4]

Still, petitioner did not settle the obligation. In due time, four informations for violation of BP 22 were filed before Branch 147 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City; to wit: Criminal Case No. 90-5598 That on or about the 30th day of September, 1988, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being then the authorized signatory of Hi-Marc Needle Craft, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Amelia A. Santos, to apply on account or for value the check described below: Check No. 01587894 Drawn Against Pilipinas Bank 135 Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. Makati, Metro Manila In the amount of P47,100.00 Dated September 30, 1988 Payable to Amelia Santos said accused well knowing fully that at the time of issue Hi-Marc Needlecraft had no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason Drawn against insufficient funds/Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of dishonor, the accused and or Hi-Marc Needlecraft failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof, within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.[5] Criminal Case No. 90-5599 That on or about the 31st day of October, 1988, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being then the authorized signatory of Hi-Marc Needle Craft, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Amelia A. Santos, to apply on account or for value the check described below: Check No. 01587895 Drawn Against Pilipinas Bank 135 Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. Makati, Metro Manila In the amount of P47,100.00 Dated October 31, 1988 Payable to Amelia Santos said accused well knowing fully that at the time of issue Hi-Marc Needlecraft had no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason Drawn against insufficient funds/Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of dishonor, the accused and or Hi-Marc Needlecraft failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof, within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.[6] Criminal Case No. 90-5600 That on or about the 30th day of November, 1988, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being then the authorized signatory of Hi-Marc Needle Craft, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Amelia A. Santos, to apply on account or for value the check described below: Check No. 01587896 Drawn Against Pilipinas Bank 135 Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. Makati, Metro Manila In the amount of P47,100.00 Dated November 30, 1988 Payable to Amelia Santos said accused well knowing fully that at the time of issue Hi-Marc Needlecraft had no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason Drawn against insufficient funds and despite receipt of notice of dishonor, the accused and or Hi-Marc Needlecraft failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof, within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.[7] Criminal Case No. 90-5601 That on or about the 15th day of December, 1988, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being then the authorized signatory of Hi-Marc Needle Craft, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Amelia A. Santos, to apply on account or for value the check described below: Check No. 01587897 Drawn Against Pilipinas Bank 135 Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. Makati, Metro Manila In the amount of P47,100.00 Dated December 15, 1988 Payable to Amelia Santos said accused well knowing fully that at the time of issue Hi-Marc Needlecraft had no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason Drawn against insufficient funds and despite receipt of notice of dishonor, the accused and or Hi-Marc Needlecraft failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof, within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.[8] Pleas of not guilty were entered by the accused at the arraignment. Trial ensued with both parties submitting their respective cases. On 16 March 1994, the trial court, following the reception of evidence, rendered its judgment convicting petitioner of all the charges; it held: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged, hereby sentences her to suffer an imprisonment of one (1) year in each of these cases, and to indemnify the complainant the sum of P47,100.00 in each case. With costs.[9] Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case, docketed CA-G.R. CR No. 18985, to the Court of Appeals. In its decision of 06 July 1998, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Petitioner, in the instant appeal, would have it that there was an absolute lack of consideration for the subject checks which were issued only as a condition for the grant of loan in her favor and that the requisite element of notice was not complied with. The petition is bereft of merit. The essential elements of the offense penalized under BP 22 are (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[10]

The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason for the issuance of the check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under BP 22. The Court has since said[11] that a check issued as an evidence of debt, although not intended for encashment, has the same effect like any other check and must thus be held to be within the contemplation of BP 22. Once a check is presented for payment, the drawee bank gives it the usual course whether issued in payment of an obligation or just as a guaranty of an obligation.[12] BP 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties,[13] its primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can easily be eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be made. The gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. The act effectively declares the offense to be one of malum prohibitum. The only valid query then is whether the law has been breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a bad check, without so much regard as to the criminal intent of the issuer.[14] The element of knowledge involves a state of mind that obviously would be difficult to establish; hence, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge on the insufficiency of funds or credit coincidental with the attendance of the two other elements. Section 2 of the Act provides: Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. The Court has elucidated in one case[15] thusly To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the time of the checks issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present (Magno vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 471). But such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue, which it supports (People vs. Nuque, 58 O.G. 8442). As pointed out by the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the insufficiency of petitioners funds is legally presumed from the dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds. The prima facie presumption that the drawer has knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit at the time of the issuance, or on the presentment for payment, of the check might be rebutted by payment of the value of the check either by the drawer or by the drawee bank within five banking days from notice of the dishonor given to the drawer. The payment could thus be a complete defense that would lie regardless of the strength of the evidence offered by the prosecution.[16] It must be presupposed then that the issuer receives a notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, he would have failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its payment. Anent the notice of dishonor, petitioner bewails the inaccuracy thereof. She underscores the fact that the questioned checks have not been sufficiently identified. There is nothing in the law, however, that prescribes the contents of a notice of dishonor except that the same be in writing as opposed to a mere oral notice.[17] Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court found that a telegram, dated 15 December 1988, and a demand letter, dated 05 January 1990, were sent to petitioner. The latter, in reply to the 05 January 1990 letter, acknowledged her liability and indeed sought an extension within which to satisfy her account. A review of the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is not a function that the Supreme Court undertakes, and there is here no cogent reason to depart from the rule. All told, the judgment of conviction must be upheld. Given the circumstances, however, the Court deems it appropriate to modify the sentence of the trial court by deleting the prison sentence of one (1) year and, in its stead, imposing a fine of P94,200.00 in each of the cases. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the prison sentence of one year and, in its stead, imposing, as the Court so hereby imposes, a fine of P94,200.00 in each of the cases, herein involved, on petitioner Celia M. Meriz. The award of civil indemnity made by the trial court in favor of private complainant is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.

La Carlota Sugar Central v. Jimenez GR L-12436, 31 May 1961 (2 SCRA 295)En Banc, Dizon (p): 10 concurring, 1 took no part. Facts: Sometime in September, 1955 La Carlota Sugar Central, which was under the administration of Elizalde, imported 500 short tons of ammonium sulphate and 350 short tons of ammonium phosphate. When the fertilizers arrived in the Philippines, the Central Bank imposed 17% exchange tax from the Central in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 601. On 18 November 1955 the Central filed, through the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, a petition for the refund of the P20,872.09paid (the 17% tax), claiming that it had imported the fertilizers mentioned heretofore upon request and for the exclusive use of 5 haciendas owned and managed by Elizalde, and therefore the importation was exempt from the 17% exchange tax in accordance with Section 2, RA 601, as amended by RA 1375. On 2 July 1956, the Auditor of the Central Bank denied the petition. The Central requested the Auditor to reconsider his ruling, but after a re-examination of all pertinent papers the reconsideration was denied. The Central then appealed to the Auditor General of the Philippines. On 18 January 1957, the Auditor General affirmed the ruling of the Auditor of the Central Bank upon the ground that the importation of the fertilizers does not fall within the scope of the exempting provisions of Section 2 of RA 601, as amended by RA 1375; and thus affirming the decision of the Auditor, Central Bank of the Philippines. The Central and Elizalde filed the petition for review in the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether upon the importation of the fertilizers are covered by the exemption (provided by Section 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 601, as amended by Republic Acts 1175, 1197 and 1375). Held :The law is, therefore, clear that imported fertilizers are exempt from the payment of the 17%tax only if the same were imported by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The exemption covers exclusively fertilizers imported by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The word “directly” has been interpreted to mean “without anything intervening”. Consequently, an importation of fertilizers made by a farmer or planter through an agent, other than his cooperative, is not imported directly as required by the exemption. When the issue is whether or not the exemption from a tax imposed by law is applicable, the rule is that the exempting provision is to be construed liberally in favor of the taxing authority and strictly against exemption from tax liability, the result being that statutory provisions for the refund of taxes are strictly construed in favor of the State and against the taxpayer. Exempting from the 17% tax all fertilizers imported by planters or farmers through any agent other than their cooperatives, this would be rendering useless the only exception expressly established in the case of fertilizers imported by planters or farmers through their cooperative. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee, vs. INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, defendant-appellant. MALCOLM, J.: The question involved in this appeal is the following: How should dust shields be classified for the purposes of the tariff, under paragraph 141 or under paragraph 197 of section 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909? These paragraphs placed in parallel columns for purposes of comparison read: 141. Manufactures of wool not otherwise provided for, forty per centum ad valorem

197. Vehicles for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof, ten per centum ad valorem. Dust shields are manufactured of wool and hair mixed. The component material of chief value is the wool. They are used by the Manila Railroad Company on all of its railway wagons. The purpose of the dust shield is to cover the axle box in order to protect from dust the oil deposited therein which serves to lubricate the bearings of the wheel. "Dust guard," which is the same as "dust shield," is defined in the work Car Builders' Cyclopedia of American Practice, 10th ed., 1922, p. 41, as follows: "A this piece of wood, leather, felt, asbestos or other material inserted in the dust guard chamber at the back of a journal box, and fitting closely around the dust guard bearing of the axle. Its purpose is to exclude dust and to prevent the escape of oil and waste. Sometimes called axle packing or box packing." Based on these facts, it was the decision of the Insular Collector of Customs that dust shields should be classified as "manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for." That decision is entitled to our respect. The burden is upon the importer to overcome the presumption of a legal collection of duties by proof that their exaction was unlawful. The question to be decided is not whether the Collector was wrong but whether the importer was right. (Erhardt vs. Schroeder [1894], 155 U. S., 124; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. Collector of Customs [1913], 26 Phil., 647.) On the other hand, His Honor, Judge Simplicio del Rosario, took an opposite view, overruled the decision of the Collector of Customs, and held that dust shields should be classified as "detached parts" of vehicles for the use on railways. This impartial finding is also entitled to our respect. It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the Government and in favor of the citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import. (U. S. vs. Wigglesworth [1842], 2 Story, 369; Froehlich & Kuttner vs. Collector of Customs [1911], 18 Phil., 461.) There are present two fundamental considerations which guide the way out of the legal dilemma. The first is by taking into account the purpose of the article and then acknowledging that it is in reality used as a detached part or railways vehicles. The second point is that paragraph 141 is a general provision while paragraph 197 is a special provision. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to effect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment (25 R. C. L., p. 1010, citing numerous cases). We conclude that the trial judge was correct in classifying dust shields under paragraph 197 of section 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, and in refusing to classify them under paragraph 141 of the same section of the law. Accordingly, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed in its entirety, without special taxation of costs in either instance. Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Serfino v. CA GR L-40858, 15 September 1987Second Division, Paras (p): 4 concurring. Facts: On 25 August 1937, a parcel of land was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor (OCT1839). On 14 December 1945, he sold said land in favor of Nemesia D. Balatazar (TCT No. 57-N, 18January 1946). OCT 1839 was lost during the war and upon petition of Nemesia Baltazar, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental ordered the reconstitution thereof. Pursuant thereto, OCT 14-R(1839) was issued on 18 January 1946 in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. On that same day, TCT57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT 14-R (1839). On15 August 1951, Nemesia Baltazar, sold said property to Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., and the latter did not present the documents for registration until 17 December 1964 to the Office of the Registry of Deeds. Said office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by another certificate of title, TCT 38985, in the name of Federico Serfino. On 19 November 1964, the spouses Serfinos mortgaged the land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan in the amount of P5,000.00; which was inscribed in TCT No. 38985.The Lopez Sugar Central instituted an action to recover said land; and the lower court rendered decision ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 38985; issuance of a new TCT in the name of plaintiff; and the payment of the plaintiff PNB the loan of spouses Serfinos secured by said land. Both parties appealed from this decision of the trial court. Ruling on the assignment of errors, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification in its decision setting aside the decision of the trial court declaring plaintiff liable to PNB for payment, however, ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the Serfino spouses of the sum P1,839.49, representing the unpaid taxes and penalties paid by the latter when they repurchased the property. Hence, the appeal by the spouses Serfino and PNB to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the auction sale of the disputed property was null and void. Held: The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the prescribed procedure in auction sales of property for tax delinquency being in derogation of property rights should be followed punctiliously. Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the protection of the tax payers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer and the public officials called upon to enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent land owners and to the public in general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of which vitiates the sale. In the present case, Lopez Sugar Central was not entirely negligent in its payment of land taxes. The record shows that taxes were paid for the years 1950 to 1953 and a receipt therefore was obtained in its name. The sale therefore by the Province of Negros Occidental of the land in dispute to the spouses Serfinos was void since the Province of Negros Occidental was not the real owner of the property thus sold. In turn, the spouses Serfinos title which has been derived from that of the Province of Negros Occidental is likewise void. However, the fact that the public auction sale of the disputed property was not valid cannot in any way be attributed to the mortgagee’s fault. The inability of the Register of Deeds to notify the actual owner or Lopez Sugar Central of the scheduled public auction sale was partly due to the failure of Lopez Sugar Central to declare the land in its name for a number of years and to pay the complete taxes thereon. PNB is therefore entitled to the payment of the mortgage loan as ruled by the trial court and exempted from the payment of costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision, with modification that PNB mortgage credit must be paid by Lopez Sugar Central