Statcon 2.1-2.5 Digest.docx

2.1. Noscitur a sociis ("a word is known by the company it keeps") When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by reference to the rest of the statute. Aisporna v. CA [GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)] Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with the aforementioned policy. For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfo’s wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing thecertificate of authority from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22 October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Court of Appeals, submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the Insurance Act Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the InsuranceCommissioner; while the second paragraph defines who is aninsurance agent within the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate court’s ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is “any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section.” Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. “Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. In the case of Bolen vs. Stake,19 the provision of Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted as insurance solicitorswithout license, and while acting in such

capacity negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for compensation. It must be noted that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved. After going over the records of this case, we are fully convinced, as the Solicitor General maintains, that accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.” DAI-CHI ELECTRONICS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, Metro Manila and ADONIS C. LIMJUCO, respondents. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the following orders of the RTC, Branch 156, Pasig, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 63448: 1) Order dated September20, 1993, dismissing the complaint of petitioner on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy. On July 29, 1993, petitioner Dai-ichi Electronics Manufacturing Corp. filed a complaint for damages with the RTC, Branch 156, against ADONIS C. LIMJUCO, a former employee for violation of par. five of their Contract of Employment dated August 27, 1990, which provides: That for a period of two (2) years after termination of service from EMPLOYER, EMPLOYEE shall not in any manner be connected, and/or employed, be a consultant and/or be an informative body directly or indirectly, with any business firm, entity or undertaking engaged in a business similar to or in competition with that of the EMPLOYER. Petitioner claimed that LIMJUCO became an employee of Angel Sound Philippines Corporation, a corporation engaged in the same line of business as that of petitioner, within two years from his resignation from petitioner's employ. Petitioner sought to recover liquidated damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), as provided for in their contract.RTC dismissed the case. In its Order dated September 20, 1993, it ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy because the complaint was for damages arising from employer-employee relations. Citing Article 217(4) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by R.A. No.6715, respondent court stated that it is the Labor Arbiter which had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. ISSUE: Is petitioner's claim for damages one arising from employeremployee relations? HELD: We answer in the negative. Article 217, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 6715, provides as follows: Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: xxx xxx xxx 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations; (Emphasis supplied) In San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 161 SCRA 719 (1988), we had occasion to construe Article 217, as amended by B.P. Blg. 227. Article 217 then provided that the Labor

Arbiter had jurisdiction over all money claims of workers, but the phrase "arising from employer-employee relation" was deleted. We ruled thus: While paragraph 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers has been absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. In the first place, paragraph 3 should be read not in isolation from but rather within the context formed by paragraph 1 (relating to unfair labor practices), paragraph 2 (relating to claims concerning terms and conditions of employment), paragraph 4 (claims relating to household services, a particular species of employer-employee relations), and paragraph 5 (relating to certain activities prohibited to employees or to employers). It is evident that there is a unifying element which runs through paragraphs 1 to 5 and that is, that they all refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. This is, in other words, a situation where the rule of noscitur a sociis may be usefully invoked in clarifying the scope of paragraph 3, and any other paragraph of Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended. We reach the above conclusion from an examination of the terms themselves of Article 217, as last amended by B.P Blg. 227, and even though earlier versions of Article 217 of the Labor Code expressly brought within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC "cases arising from employer-employee relations," which clause was not expressly carried over, in printer's ink, in Article 217 as it exists today. For it cannot be presumed that money claims of workers which do not arise out of or in connection with their employer-employee relationship, and which would therefore fall within the general jurisdiction of regular courts of justice, were intended by the legislative authority to be taken away from the jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis. The Court, therefore, believes and so holds that the "money claims of workers" referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces money claims which arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee relationship or some aspect or incident of some relationship. Put a little differently, that money claims of workers which now fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money claims which have some reasonable causal connectionwith the employer-employee relationship (Emphasis supplied). MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP FACTS: P.D. No. 1869 authorized PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance. LGC of 1991, a later law, empowers all government units to enact ordinances to prevent and suppress gambling and other games of chance. STACON: These two should be harmonized rather than annulling one and upholding the other. Court said that the solution to this problem is for the government units to suppress and prevent all kinds of gambling except those that are allowed under the previous law MAGTAJAS VS PRYCE G.R. NO. 111097, JULY 20, 1994 Facts: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season. Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to the establishment for the operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its violation. Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated Presidential Decree No.

1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare. Issue: WON the Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 are valid. Held: No. CdeO is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the LGC. However, ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are merely agents of the National Government.Local Councils exercise only delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance. 2.2. Ejusdem generis ("of the same kinds, class, or nature") When a list of two or more specific descriptors is followed by more general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if any, of the specific words that precede them. For example, where "cars, motor bikes, motor powered vehicles" are mentioned, the word "vehicles" would be interpreted in a limited sense (therefore vehicles cannot be interpreted as including airplanes). PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION vs CA, August 8, 2000; Purisima, J: FACTS:On July 21, 1989, the petitioner received an assessment from the CIR for the paymento f d e f i c i en c y a m us e m e n t t a x i n t h e a m o u n t o f P 5 , 8 6 4 , 2 6 0 . 8 4 ( i n c l u d i n g 7 5% surcharge and 25% interest for 2 years). The petitioner contested the assessment but it was denied by the CIR. The Court of Tax Appeals also dismissed the subsequent petition of PBA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the CTA so the petitioner filed this petition for certiorari. Petitioner’s arguments: -Jurisdiction to collect amusement taxes of PBA is vested with the local government and not the national government. It argues that they should be included in the enumeration provided by Section 13 of the Local Tax Code of 1973. -Commissioner’s issuance of BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 8-88 -- both upholding the authority of the local government to collect amusement taxes -- should bind the government or that, if there is any revocation or modification of said rule, the same should operate prospectively. -Income from the cession of streamer and advertising spaces to VEI should not be subject to amusement taxes -In case they are made liable to pay the deficiency amusement tax, they should not be charged with the 75% surcharge. ISSUES: 1. WON the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games a local tax –NO2.WON BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR RMC No. 8-88 binds the government – NO3.WON income from the cession of streamer and advertising spaces to VEI is subject to amusement taxes - YES4.WON the petitioner should be charged with amusement tax – YES HELD: 1. Sec 13 of the Local Tax Code indicates that the province can only impose a taxo n a d m i s s i o n f r o m t he p r o p r i e t o r s , l e s s e e s , o r o p e r a t o r s o f t h e a t e r s, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement. The authority to tax professional basketball games is not therein included, as the same is expressly embraced in PD 1959, which amended

PD 1456, wherein it is clear that the "proprietor, lessee or operator of. . . professional basketball games" is required to pay an amusement tax equivalent to fifteen per centum(15%) of their gross receipts to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which payment is a national tax. While Section 13 of the Local Tax Code mentions "other places of amusement", professional basketball games are definitely not within its scope. Under the principle of ejusdem generis In determining the meaning of the phrase "other places of amusement", one must refer to the prior enumeration of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses with artistic expression as their common characteristic. Professional basketball games do not fall under the same category as theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses as the latter basically belong to artistic forms of entertainment while the former caters to sports and gaming. Also, a historical analysis of pertinent laws does reveal the legislative intent to place professional basketball games within the ambit of a n a t i o n a l tax. Previous laws (PD 871 by PD 1456 and P D 1 9 5 9 ) s h o w s a recognition that the amusement tax on professional basketball games is a national, and not a local, tax.2 . C o m m i s s i o n e r ’ s i s s u a n ce of BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR M e m o r a n d u m Circular No. 8-88, both upholding the authority of the local government to collect amusement taxes cannot bind the government. The government cannot be never in estoppels, particularly in matters involving tax. It is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not preclude subsequent correct application of the statute, and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents.3 . P D 1 4 5 6 provides that for the purpose of the a m u s e m e n t t a x , t h e t e r m g r o s s receipts’ embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. That definition of gross receipts is broad enough to embrace the cession of advertising and streamer spaces as the same embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place.4.The issue on the payment of surcharge was never posed as an issue before the respondent court so it must necessarily fail. 2.3.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the express mention of one thing excludes all others") Items not on the list are impliedly assumed not to be covered by the statute or a contract term.[3] However, sometimes a list in a statute is illustrative, not exclusionary. This is usually indicated by a word such as "includes" or "such as."

G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994 MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner, vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS : In the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the

group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2602 On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment finding accused Vicente Yco and petitioner Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a fine of P200.00 ISSUE : WON charitable purposes can be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose HELD : Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature, since religious activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions. However, "religious purpose" is not interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations that such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused It does not follow, therefore from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion. Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise SARIO MALINIAS, vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ,ANACLETO TANGILAG and VICTOR DOMINGUEZ, G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002 FACTS: On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who were candidates for governor and congress representative positions, respectively, filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law Department against Victor Dominguez, Anacleto Tangilag and others for their violation of the following laws:1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646; and2. Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881.Dominguez was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Corpuz was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Tangilag was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province. The petitioners said that due to said violations, their supporters were deprived from participating in the canvassing of election returns as they were blocked by a police checkpoint in the course of their way to

the canvassing site at the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, Mountain Province. Among the private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilags ubmitted their joint Counter-Affidavit, wherein they admitted that they ordered the establishment of checkpoints all over the province to enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban and its other pertinent rules pursuant to COMELEC Res. No. 2968 purposive of the maintenance of peace and order around the vicinity of the canvassing site. Also, they said that the presence of the policemen within the said area is to prevent some groups who were reportedly had the intention to disrupt the canvass proceedings. They claimed that such a response was not unwarranted as this has already happened in the past, wherein, in fact, the petitioners were among them. COMELEC’s Ruling: After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the petition against the respondents for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause. Malinias filed an MR but it was also denied for failure of adducing additional evidence thereon. Not satisfied with the same, Malinias filed to SC a petition for review on certiorari on this case. ISSUE: Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause? RATIO DECIDENDI OF SC: No. SC AFFIRMED the decision of COMELEC and found the conduct of its investigation and ruling on the case to be in accord with its jurisdiction and duties under the law. In this case, COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as there is nothing capricious or despotic in the manner of their resolution of the said complaint, hence, SC cannot issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari. On the said violations, the only evidence that was successfully presented by the petitioner is the mass-affidavits of his supporters, which were considered self-serving and cannot be admitted by the court thus, the same are not enough to prove his claims. Also, the allege violation of the respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646and Sec.1. 232 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 are not included in the acts defined as2. punishable criminal election offenses under Sec. 27 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881, respectively. Here, Sec. 253. merely highlights one of the rights of a political party or candidate during elections whereas, the violation of Sec. 232,which enumerates the persons who are not allowed inside the canvassing site, can only be subjected to an administrative disciplinary action and cannot be punished by imprisonment as provided for under Sec. 264 of the same law. Moreover, it is clear in the defense of the respondents that they did not violate Sec. 261 (i), a criminal offense, which prohibits any officer or employee of political offices or police force from intervening in any election campaign or from engaging in any partisan activity except to vote or maintain public order. In the said defense, the respondents said that setting up the checkpoints was done to enforce the COMELEC's firearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968 and not to prejudice any candidate from participating in the canvassing. As such, the actions of the respondents are deemed lawful and not in excess of their authority. Ruling related to Statutory Construction Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius estexclusio alterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act." It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.

The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio uniusest exclusio alterius.The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facitcessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facitcessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORP. vs CIR Statutory Construction – Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) was assessed a 3% tax on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products – this is pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Said corn and edible oil products were sold to United Coconut Chemicals (UNICHEM) who in turn exports these products and sell them abroad. SPMC invoked that it is exempt from the tax as it invoked the same Section of the 1987 Tax Code which provides in part: xxx Provided, however, That this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil, palm oil and the by-product of copra from which it is produced or manufactured and desiccated coconut, if such rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and desiccated coconuts, shall be removed for exportation by the proprietor or operator of the factory or the miller himself, and are actually exported without returning to the Philippines, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products: xxx (underscore added by uberdigests) SPMC’s interpretation of the law is as follows: That there is indeed a 3% tax on edible oil products; But that said tax exempts manufacturers who export these edible oil products; That SPMC is considered to be an exporter because it sells the oil products to UNICHEM, its purchaser, who then exports the oil products. ISSUE: Whether or not SPMC’s interpretation is correct. HELD: No. The legal maxim “Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius” applies. Nowhere in the law was “corn oil” included in the enumeration of tax exempt exported products. Nor did it mention to exempt a manufacturer who, though not directly exporting its edible oil products nevertheless sells said product to a purchaser who does export. Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

2.4.

DISSIMILUM DISSIMILIS EST RATIO The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification.

LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents. G.R. No. 124893 Subject: Public Corporation Doctrine: Qualification of Elective Officers (SK) FACTS: Petitioner Lynette Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent COMELEC en banc suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the SK of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. – On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that she being then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. – On April 2, she filed a “Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter” with the MCTC. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with petitioner. – On April 23, Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, Election Officer Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor, disapproved petitioner’s certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Asperin who set aside the order of respondent Rios and allowed petitioner to run. – On May 2, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. – Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a “Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections National Office, Manila. On May 2, 1996, the same day acting on the facsimile, respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of

petitioner in the event she won in the election. – On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent’s votes of 76. In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996. – On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was “without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested party.” – On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon. ISSUES: 1) WON the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy. (not pubcor) 2) WON cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK is valid HELD: 1) Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the SK elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself and that the jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases. In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996. The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not comply with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must

be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail. In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition were filed with the COMELEC.[19] Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail. 2) The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by PD 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. RA 7160 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old. The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay. A member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office. Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective official… voter must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write. Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan. Petitioner’s age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner, however, argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991. She contends that the Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day. She urges that so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still twenty-one years of age on election day and therefore qualified as a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and as candidate for

the SK elections. Section 424 of the Code sets a member’s maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old “on the day of his election.” The addition of the phrase “on the day of his election” is an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification. The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each. One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. In computing years, the first year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365day cycle begins. The phrase “not more than 21 years of age” means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. “Not more than 21 years old” is not equivalent to “less than 22 years old,” contrary to petitioner’s claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day. The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman. To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to order that the vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves. The member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said office. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member voted by simple majority by and from among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term.

2.5.

CASUS OMISSUS Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally. This needs two laws. In expressio unius, it’s just the enumeration you are looking at, not another law.

COA V. PROVINCE OF CEBU, G.R. NO. 141386. NOVEMBER 29, 2001; FACTS:In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, it appeared that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the province for the extension classes were charged against the provincial SEF. Likewise charged to the SEF were the college scholarship grants of the province. Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for the salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF. ISSUE:Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school teachers appointed by local chief executives in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes; as well as the expenses for college scholarship grants, may be charged to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local government unit concerned. HELD:Undoubtedly, the legislature intended the SEF to answer for the compensation of teachers handling extension classes. Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be compensated for their services. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary and indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of extension classes. Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public schools is lodged principally with the DECS. The SEF may be expended only for the salaries and personnel-related benefits of teachers appointed by the local school boards in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes. With respect, however, to college scholarship grants, a reading of the pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that said grants are not among the projects for which the proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated.