Specpro-rule-75.pdf

22 Cynthia Nittscher v. Dr. Werner Nittscher [G.R. No. 160530. November 20, 2007] Facts: Dr. Nittscher filed with RTC Makati City a petition for probate of his holographic will and for issuance of letters testamentary to Atty. Nogales. The said will was allowed by the probate court. When the former died, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. The petitioner moved for dismissal of the said petition which was however denied by the court and granted the issuance of letters testamentary. Petitioners appealed alleging that respondent’s petition should have been dismissed outright as RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that was denied due process. Such appeal has been dismissed. Issue #1 W/N petition should have been dismissed for lack of certification against forum-shopping. Held: Negative. Certification against forum-shopping is only required for all initiatory pleadings filed in court. In this case, the petition for the issuance of letters of administration is not an initiatory pleading but a mere continuation of the original petition for the probate of Dr. Nittscher’s will. Issue #2 W/N the lower court has jurisdiction over the case. Held: Affirmative. Sec. 1 of Rule 73 states that the estate of a decedent who is an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled at the RTC in the province where he resides at the time of his death. In this case, Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las Pinas, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Hence, he correctly filed the petition for the probate of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent in the RTC Makati City, which then covered Las Pinas, Metro Manila. Issue #3 W/N petitioner was deprived of due process in the probate proceedings. Held: Negative. Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states that “xxx If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his compulsory heirs.” In the present case, records show that petitioner and Dr. Nittscher’s children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the issuance of letters testamentary and of denial of her motion to dismiss. Therefore, petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend her cause. Issue #4 W/N petitioner’s claim of title to the properties of her husband’s estate forms part of the probate proceedings. Held: Negative. The allowance of the husband’s will is conclusive only as to its due execution. The authority of the probate court is limited to ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.

23 Ethel Roberts v. Judge Leonidas [G.R. No. L-55509, April 27, 1984]

Facts: Edward Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died at Makati Medical Center. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine and their two children, Pete and Linda, and by his children on his first marriage, Juanita and Ethel. Edward executed two wills in California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate while the second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. The children on his first marriage were given legitimes in the second will while the other heirs were favored in both wills. The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine and E. Lavar Tate in Utah and were eventually admitted. Juanita and Ethel were notified of the probate proceeding. On the other hand, Ethel through lawyers Reyes and Macaraeg filed for the intestate estate proceeding before the Manila CFI Branch 20. She was named as the special administratrix. Maxine, the second wife of Edward, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss through the Angara law office on the ground of pendency of probate proceeding of Grimm’s will in Utah. However, the latter withdrew its opposition pursuant to a compromise agreement entered into in Utah between the parties and appointed Maxine, Pete and Ethel as administrator. Inventory was submitted and with the authority and approval of court, Palawan Pearl Project was sold as well as their shares of RFM Corp. Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed by Limqueco and Macaraeg, Judge Molina adjudicated ½ of the Philippine estate to Maxine and ½ to his four children. Del Collar replaced Limqueco as lawyer for Maxine and her two children, who moved to defer approval of project of partition but such was considered moot since it has already been approved. There was no movement in the inestate case for more than 5 months. Juanita then filed a motion for accounting so that estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs. Angara law firm in collaboration with Del Collar as counsel for Maxine and her children, a motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding and a petition praying for the probate of Grimm’s two wills were filed in Branch 38. Ethel filed a motion to dismiss but was denied for lack of merit. Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed praying the probate proceeding be dismissed or proceedings be consolidated in Branch 20 and annulment of compromise agreement be heard prior petition for probate. Issue #1 W/N testate proceeding is proper. Held: Affirmative. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed. The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in the intestate proceeding. The intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding.

24 Vicente Uriarte v. CFI Negros Occidental [G.R. No. L-21938-39, May 29, 1970] Facts Petitioner filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite before CFI Negros Occidental alleging that he was the natural son and the sole heir of the latter and that he instituted a case for his compulsory acknowledgment as such during the lifetime of the decedent. PNB was appointed as special administrator but never qualified as such. Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition thereto stating that he was the nephew of the decedent and that the latter executed a will in Spain. He further questions the capacity and interest of Vicente to commence the intestate proceeding. On the other hand, Juan Zamacona, the other respondent, commenced for the probate of the alleged will of the decedent before the Manila court. At the same time, he filed a motion to dismiss the case before the Negros court contending that there was no legal basis for intestate proceedings since the decedent left a will and petitioner has no legal personality. Attached thereto is a copy of the will and of the petition for probated filed before Manila Court. Petitioner opposed the probate of the will contending that the Negros court was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased, therefore it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction. Meanwhile, Negros court sustained the motion of Juan and dismissed the proceeding before it. Petitioner then filed his record of appeal but the same was dismissed for being filed out of time and being incomplete. Therefore, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for mandamus. In addition, he filed motion before the Manila court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and annulment of proceedings but the same was dismissed. After proper proceedings, Manila court admitted to probate the alleged will of the decedent. Issue #1 W/N probate of last will of the decedent should have been filed before CFI Negros. Held: Affirmative. Facts of the case support that the will should have been submitted for probate before the Negros court, either in a special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending intestate proceeding. Firstly, this is in accord with public policy and for an orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation. Secondly, it was known to the respondents that there was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros court for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased person when they filed the petition for probate with the Manila court. Issue #2 W/N petitioner is precluded from raising the defect on the venue of the case. Held: Negative. Wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and in the instant case, petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It was only in April 15, 1963 that he filed his motions before the Manila court despite the fact that he knew of the existence of the will since December 19, 1961 and he was likewise served with notice of existence of the alleged last will and the filing of petition for probate since August 28, 1862; thus, enabling the Manila court not only to appoint an administrator and to admit the said will for probate. Issue #3 W/N petitioner has the legal personality to institute the intestate proceedings. Held: Negative. The petitioner’s supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is of doubtful character pending the final decision of the action for compulsory acknowledgment. He should have intervened in the testate estate proceedings before the Manila court instead of maintaining an independent action.

25 Rafael Maninang v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-57848, June 19, 1982] Facts: Petitioner Maninang filed a petition for probate of the will of decedent Clemencia who died at Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81 before CFI Quezon City. Such holographic will states that all the decedent’s real and personal properties shall be inherited by petitioner and that she does not consider Nonoy as adopted son. On the other hand, herein respondent instituted intestate procedings with CFI Pasig Rizal claiming to be the sole heir of the decedent. The aforementioned cases were consolidated. Respondent filed a Motion to dismiss the testate case claiming the will to be null and void because he, as compulsory heir, was preterited and therefore, intestacy should ensue. Petitioner, however, opposed the said motion stating that the probate proceeding is limited to the examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent was effectively disinherited. The lower court ordered dismissal of the case. Therefore, petitioner resorted to certiorari petition before the CA which the latter denied saying that appeal was the proper remedy. Issue #1 W/N dismissal of testate proceeding is proper. Held: Negative. Generally, the probate of a will is mandatory. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof be given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory. Issue #2 W/N intrinsic validity of the will may be passed upon in the probate proceedings herein. Held: Negative. Normally, probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity, however, it may be passed upon even before probate when practical considerations so demanded. However, such is not so in this case because what is only insisted is the probate of the will and the resolution on its extrinsic validity. Issue #3 W/N respondent has been disinherited. Held: Affirmative. Though the determination of such controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered due to the dismissal of the testate case, the decision of the trial court was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited and not disinherited. However, Supreme Court is of the opinion that from the face of the will, that conclusion is not indubitable.

26 Remedios Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid [G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966] Facts Petitioner filed in CFI Rizal the probate of the holographic will of Rosario Nuguid, her sister, which was allegedly executed 11 years before the latter’s demise with a prayer that letters of administration be issued to her. Such was opposed by the respondents, who were the legitimate parents of the decedent contending that they were illegally preterited – being compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line - upon the institution of petitioner as the universal heir. Respondents also moved for the dismissal of the action which was opposed by the petitioner. The court ordered dismissal of the probate proceedings, hence this appeal before the Supreme Court. Issue #1 W/N the court validly passed upon the intrinsic validity of the will. Held: Negative. In a probate of a will, the court’s area of inquiry is limited – to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented and to be acted upon. The court is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or any legacy therein. However, due to practical considerations, the Court decided to take up the issue on the validity of the provisions of the will in question. Issue #2 W/N respondents were preterited. Held: Affirmative. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited while, disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix’s parents. It simply omits their names altogether which is clearly a case of preterition. Such preterition shall annul the institution of heir but testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies will still be enforced. Issue #3 W/N the will is of complete nullity. Held: Affirmative. The deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents. And the will completely omits both of them. They thus received nothing by the testament; they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Art, 854 of the Civil Code provides that “The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of the heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. X x x” The will in the present case institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir – nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. Therefore, nullity of such is complete and Rosario died intestate. Such sole provision results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir – without any other testamentary disposition in the will – amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.

27 Thelma Aranas v. Teresita Mercado [G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014] Facts Petitoner filed in the RTC Cebu City a petition for appointment of respondent Teresita as administrator of Emigdio’s estate. The latter died intestate leaving his second wife, Teresita, and their five children as well as his two children by the first marriage, Franklin and Thelma as his heirs. Such petition was granted as there was no opposition and letters of administration were issued in her favor. The respondent submitted inventory of Emigdio’s estate stating that there were only personal properties left. Petitioner’s motion that RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory claiming that other properties were excluded was granted. Teresita complied with such order but petitioner opposed the approval of inventory. RTC denied the approval of inventory finding and holding that there are properties that should be included in the inventory submitted. Therefore, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was partly granted by the latter. Issue #1 W/N RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the inclusion of the properties in the estate of the decedent. Held: Negative. Under Sec. 6(a), Rule 78 of Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuance of such, RTC becomes duty-bound to direct preparation and submission of inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the true inventory within 3 months from the issuance of the letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court. No exception is allowed since the rule implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity. The objective of which is to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or administrator and making a final and equitable distribution of the estate. Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the inventory. There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. It cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. It can only determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. It must be given emphasis that the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the administrator. Also, the directive to include the properties in question rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary or capricious. Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory because respondents did not dispute the fact about the shares being inherited by Emigdio. Secondly, Emigdio and Teresita married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, therefore their property regime was the conjugal partnership of gains. In the absence of or pending presentation of exclusive ownership in a specific property, conjugal partnership must be provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners of the properties were and which of the properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. Portions pertaining to estate of Emigdio must be included. Also, despite the sale of lot 3353 to Mervir realty, RTC noted that such had remained registered in the name of Emigdio. Lastly, the inventory of the estate must be prepared and submitted for the important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement of the heirs. Rule 90 expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of the properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.

28 Danilo Aluad v. Zenaido Aluad [G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008] Facts Petitioner’s mother, Maria, and respondent Zenaido were raised by Sps. Matilde and Crispin Aluad. When the latter died, Matilde adjudicated six lots owned by Crispin to her. Thereafter, she executed a deed of donation in favor of Maria covering all six lots. However, when title was issued over Lot 674 and Lot 676, Matilde sold the latter. Subsequently, Matilde executed a will devising four lots to Maria and her “remaining properties” including Lot 674 to respondent. Matilde and Maria died respectively. Then, petitioners who are the heirs of Maria filed before RTC of Roxas City a complaint for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of lots 674 and 676 and damages against respondent. However, respondent answered that lot 674 was adjudicated to him in the will of Matilde while lot 676 was purchased by him. Petitioners later filed an amended complaint citing the donation made in favor of their mother, Maria. But respondent alleged that such deed was forged and falsified; and that if ever said document exists, the same was revoked by Matilde. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs stating that Matilde could not have transmitted any right to the subject lots since she previously alienated them to Maria. Such ruling was however reversed by CA. The latter ruled that the deed was actually a donation mortis causa which did not comply with the formalities of a will. It declared respondent to be the owner of lot 676 but not so with lot 674 since the will of Matilde has not yet been probated. Issue #1 W/N the donation is one of mortis causa. Held: Affirmative. The donation had the following characteristics of a mortis causa: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before death of transferor; (2) transfer is revocable before death of testator; and that (3) transfer should be void if transferor should survive transferee. The phrase in the deed shows that MAtilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to Maria during Matilde’s lifetime and it has a statement showing that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. It is even fortified by Matilde’s acts of possession as she continued to pay the taxes for the said properties which remained under her name; appropriated the produce; and applied for free patents. Issue #2 W/N the donation, being mortis causa, is valid. Held: Negative. The donation was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Art. 805 of the Civil Code. Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause. The execution of such clause is a requirement separate from the subscription of the will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the will. As emphasized by the court, an unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the notary public. Also, the requirement that all pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page was not followed. The Deed of Donation which is one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities of a will is void and transmitted no rights to petitioner’s mother. Assuming arguendo that it complied with such formalities, still no right was transmitted to Maria over the subject lots since the donation was not probated. Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot 674 to respondent by her will, subject to the qualification that the will must be probated.

29 Uy Kiao Eng v. Nixon Lee [G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010] Facts Respondent filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the alleged holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. He allegedly requested the petitioner already but the latter refused to do so without justifiable reason. Petitioner posited that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of action and for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing thereof. She denied having custody of the original holographic will and asserted that photocopies of such were given to respondent and his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent was able to introduced a copy of such in a civil case before RTC of Valenzuela City. Petitioner demurred contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. RTC initially denied such but granted the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent sought review before CA which initially denied the appeal for lack of merit but granted the same upon a motion of reconsideration ruling that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will. Issue #1 W/N issuance of writ of mandamus was proper. Held: Negative. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal or board, or to some corporation of person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed based on operation of law. Such wit is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty. Such is not being issued to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. It is essential that the person requesting the issuance of such has a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. Mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. It is a prerogative writ which is issued only in cases relating to the public and to the government. It is not used for the redress of private wrongs. Also, in order to grant its issuance, there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In the instant case, the Court did not ascertain whether the obligation involved herein is in the nature of a public or private duty. Also, such remedy cannot be availed of because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. Rule 76, Section 1 of Rules of Court however does not prevent him from instituting the probate proceedings whether the will is in his possession or not. An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 7, Sec. 2 to 5 for the production of the original will.

30 Mariano Sumilang v. Saturnina Ramagosa [G.R. No. L-23135] Facts Petitioner filed in CFI Quezon a petition for probate of the alleged will of Hilarion Ramagosa. Said document, written in Tagalog institutes petitioner as his sole heir. However, such was opposed by the respondents questioning the due execution of such claiming that it was made under duress and not really intended to be the decedent’s last will. Saturnina and Santiago also claimed that they were entitled to inherit. Oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate mainly on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because the will was revoked by implication of law 6 years before the decedent’s death when Hilarion sold the parcels of land described therein. CFI Quezon denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the allegations contained therein goes to the very intrinsic value of the will and the other grounds are without merit. Issue #1 W/N petition for probate must be denied due to the alleged implied revocation of the decedent by means of sale. Held: Negative. The alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; validity of testamentary provisions is another. The former decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; while the second relates to the descent and distribution. The petition being for the probate of the will, the court’s area o inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of any devise or legacy is premature. Issue #2 W/N respondents have legal capacity to take part in the proceeding. Held: Negative. It is a well settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate. In their brief, oppositors do not take issue with the court’s finding that “they have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and therefore are totally strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate.” They do not attempt to show that they have some interest in the estate which must be protected. The uncontradicted evidence, consisting of certified true copies of the parties’ baptism and marriage certificates, support the said findingd.

31 Constantino Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. L-72706, October 27, 1987] Facts: Petitioner filed in RTC Cebu City a petition for probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. The decedent died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. The alleged will was written in Bisaya with a translation in English. It contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. The disposition of the decedent’s property as stated in the will was supposed to be given to his brother, Segundo. However, the latter predeceased Nemesio. Thus, it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be the heirs. The respondents (Virginia as the legally adopted daughter and Rosa as the decedent’s widow) herein filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir ; and (3) the respondents are preterited. Such motion was however denied. Respondents filed a petition before the Supreme Court which was subsequently referred to the IAC. The latter granted the respondent’s petition and dismiss the petition for probate of the will of Nemesio. Hence, a petition for review of the IAC’s decision. Issue #1: W/N respondents have been preterited. Held: Affirmative. Art. 854 of the Civil Code provides that preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. However, this only applies within the direct line. Therefore, surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. However, it cannot be denied that Virgina was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator. Being legally adopted, she has given the same rights and duties as if she were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the person a legal heir of the adopter. This is a clear preterition of the legally adopted child. Issue #2: W/N will remains valid despite the preterition of the forced heir. Held: Negative. Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as legitimes are concerned. The universal institution of the petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of heirs – without any other testamentary disposition in the will – amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Issue #3 W/N petitioner has legal capacity to institute the proceedings. Held: Negative. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like the creditor. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive, he appears to have interest in the will as an heir. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of the respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the decedent. Issue #4 W/N filing of certiorari is proper in this case.

Held: Affirmative. As a general rule, certiorari cannot substitute an appeal, except when the questioned order is oppressive exercise of judicial authority and when correcting a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds. ` The case herein is for the probate of the will. The general rule is that the probate court’s authority is limited only to extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Intrinsic validity comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, it is subject to exception for practical considerations especially when there is a probability that the same issue will come up again and it will only result to waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. In the instant case, IAC erred when it tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that Virginia is preterited. The trial court could have denied the probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved. Where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, defendants have the right to resort to more speedy and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case.