Specpro Cases 2019.docx

G.R. No. 203770 MANUELA AZUCENA MAYOR, Petitioner vs. EDWIN TIU and DAMIANA CHARITO MARTY, Respondents DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the October 5, 20111 and September 24, 20122 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 06256, which dismissed the petition filed by Remedios Tiu (Remedios) and Manuela Azucena Mayor (Manuela) for procedural infirmities. The said CA petition challenged the January 20, 20113 and June 10, 20114 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City (RTC-Br. 6), in Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-30, a case for Probate of Last Will and Testament and Issuance of Letters of Testamentary. The Antecedents: On May 25, 2008, Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan (Rosario), the widow of the late Primo Villasin (Primo), passed away and left a holographic Last Will and Testament,5 wherein she named her sister, Remedios Tiu (Remedios), and her niece, Manuela Azucena Mayor (Manuela), as executors. Immediately thereafter, Remedios and Manuela filed a petition for the probate of Rosario's holographic will6 with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary (probate proceedings). The petition was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City (RTC-Br. 9) and docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-30. They averred that Rosario left properties valued at approximately ₱2.5 million. On May 29, 2008, respondent Damiana Charito Marty (Marty) claiming to be the adopted daughter of Rosario, filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC, Branch 34, Tacloban City (RTC- Br. 34), docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-32, but it was not given due course because of the probate proceedings. Per records, this dismissal is subject of a separate proceeding filed by Marty with the CA Cebu City, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 04003.7 On June 12, 2008, in its Order,8 the RTC-Br. 9 found the petition for probate of will filed by Remedios and Manuela as sufficient in form and substance and set the case for hearing. Consequently, Marty filed her Verified Urgent Manifestation and Motion,9 dated June 23, 2008, stating that Remedios kept the decedent Rosario a virtual hostage for the past ten (10) years and her family was financially dependent on her which led to the wastage and disposal of the properties owned by her and her husband, Primo. Marty averred that until the alleged will of the decedent could be probated and admitted, Remedios and her ten (10) children had no standing to either possess or control the properties comprising the estate of the Villasins. She prayed for the probate court to: 1) order an immediate inventory of all the properties subject of the proceedings; 2) direct the tenants of the estate, namely, Mercury Drug and Chowking, located at Primrose Hotel, to deposit their rentals with the court; 3) direct Metro bank, P. Burgos Branch, to freeze the accounts in the name of Rosario, Primrose Development Corporation (Primrose) or Remedios; and 4) lock up the Primrose Hotel in order to preserve the property until final disposition by the court. On July 8, 2008, Remedios and Manuela filed their Comment/Opposition10 to the urgent manifestation averring that Marty was not an adopted child of the Villasins based on a certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tacloban City, attesting that no record of any adoption proceedings involving Marty existed in their records. They also argued that the probate court had no jurisdiction over the properties mistakenly claimed by Marty as part of Rosario's estate because these properties were actually owned by, and titled in the name of, Primrose. Anent the prayer to direct the tenants to deposit the rentals to the probate court, Remedios and Manuela countered that the probate court had no jurisdiction over properties owned by third persons, particularly by Primrose, the latter having a separate and distinct personality from the decedent's estate. In her Reply,11 dated July 15, 2008, Marty cited an order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte (CF! Leyte) in SP No. 1239,12 claiming that as early as March 3, 1981, the veil of corporate entity of Primrose was pierced on the ground that it was a closed family corporation controlled by Rosario after Primo's death. Thus, Marty alleged that "piercing" was proper in the case of Rosario's estate because the incorporation of Primrose was founded on a fraudulent consideration, having been done in contemplation of Primo's death.

Further, on July 22, 2008, in her Opposition to the Petition for the Approval of the Will of the Late Rosario GuyJuco Villasin Casilan,13 Marty impugned the authenticity of her holographic will. Meanwhile, Edwin Tiu (Edwin), a son of Remedios, also filed his Opposition,14 dated June 13, 2008. After a protracted exchange of pleadings, the parties submitted their respective memoranda. The January 14, 2009 Order In its January 14, 2009 Order,15 the RTC-Br. 9 granted the motion of Marty and appointed the OIC Clerk of Court as special administrator of the Estate. The Probate Court also ordered Mercury Drug and Chowking to deposit the rental income to the court and Metrobank to freeze the bank accounts mentioned in the motion of Marty. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was applied in the case considering that Rosario had no other properties that comprised her estate other than Primrose. According to the probate court, for the best interest of whoever would be adjudged as the legal heirs of the Estate, it was best to preserve the properties from dissipation. On January 22, 2009, Remedios and Manuela filed their Motion for Inhibition16 on the ground of their loss of trust and confidence in RTC-Br. 9 Presiding Judge Rogelio C. Sescon (Judge Sescon) to dispense justice. Later, they also filed their Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam,17 dated February 3, 2009, arguing that Rosario's estate consisted only of shares of stock in Primrose and not the corporation itself. Thus, the probate court could not order the lessees of the corporation to remit the rentals to the Estate's administrator. With regard to the appointment of a special administrator, Remedios and Manuela insisted that it be recalled. They claimed that if ever there was a need to appoint one, it should be the two of them because it was the desire of the decedent in the will subject of the probation proceedings. In its Order,18 dated March 27, 2009, the RTC-Br. 9 denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed its January 14, 2009 Order. The presiding judge, Judge Sescon, also granted the motion for inhibition and ordered that the records of the case be referred to the RTC Executive Judge for reraffling. The case was later re-raffled to RTC-Br.6, Judge Alphinor C. Serrano, presiding judge. Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Remedios and Manuela filed a petition for certiorari with the CA in Cebu City, docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 04254, assailing the January 14, 2009 and March 27, 2009 Orders of the RTC-Br. 9.19 Ruling of the CA In its October 16, 2009 Decision,20 the CA reversed the assailed orders of the RTC Br. 9, except as to the appointment of a special administrator insofar as this relates to properties specifically belonging to the "Estate." It held that Primrose had a personality separate and distinct from the estate of the decedent and that the probate court had no jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed orders of the probate court was it stated that its determination of the title of the questioned properties was only for the purpose of determining whether such properties ought to be included in the inventory. When the probate court applied the doctrine of "piercing," in effect, it adjudicated with finality the ownership of the properties in favor of the Estate. The CA stated that RTC-Br. 9 had no jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of a property claimed by another based on adverse title; and that questions like this must be submitted to a court of general jurisdiction and not to a probate court. The CA added that assuming that the probate court's determination on the issue of ownership was merely intended to be provisional, Marty's contentions still had no merit. The properties, which she claimed to be part of the estate of Rosario and over which she claimed co-ownership, comprised of real properties registered under the Torrens system. As such, Primrose was considered the owner until the titles to those properties were nullified in an appropriate ordinary action. The CA further stated that the RTC erroneously relied on the order issued by the CFI Leyte in 1981, in the probate proceedings involving the estate of Primo. Whatever determination the CFI made at the time regarding the title of the properties was merely provisional, hence, not conclusive as to the ownership. By reason of the favorable decision by the CA, Remedios and Manuela filed their Motion to Partially Revoke the Writ of Execution Enforcing the January 14, 2009 Order of the Honorable Court and Manifestation in Compliance with the October 21, 2009 Order (Ad Cautelam),21 dated October 27, 2009.

In its Order,22 dated November 17, 2009, the RTC-Br. 6 partially granted the motion as it revoked the power of the special administrator to oversee the day-to-day operations of Primrose. It also revoked the order with respect to Mercury Drug and Chowking, reasoning out that the said establishments dealt with Primrose, which had a personality distinct and separate from the estate of the decedent. In the said order, Atty. Blanche A. Salino nominated by oppositors Marty and Edwin, was appointed special administrator to oversee the day-today operations of the estate. The same order also upheld the January 14, 2009 Order, as to the conduct and inventory of all the properties comprising the estate. This order was not questioned or appealed by the parties. Omnibus Motion On September 24, 2010, or almost ten (10) months after the November 17, 2009 Order of the probate court was issued, Marty, together with her new counsel, filed her Omnibus Motion,23 praying for the probate court to: 1) order Remedios and Manuela to render an accounting of all the properties and assets comprising the estate of the decedent; 2) deposit or consign all rental payments or other passive income derived from the properties comprising the estate; and 3) prohibit the disbursement of funds comprising the estate of the decedent without formal motion and approval by the probate court. Ruling of the RTC-Br. 6 In its January 20, 2011 Order, the RTC-Br. 6 granted Marty's Omnibus Motion. Although it agreed with the October 16, 2009 CA Decision reversing the January 14, 2009 Order of the RTC-Br. 9, nonetheless, it acknowledged the urgency and necessity of appointing a special administrator. According to the probate court, considering that there was clear evidence of a significant decrease of Rosario's shares in the outstanding capital stock of Primrose,24prudence dictated that an inquiry into the validity of the transfers should be made. A final determination of this matter would be outside the limited jurisdiction of the probate court, but it was likewise settled that the power to institute an action for the recovery of a property claimed to be part of the estate was normally lodged with the executor or administrator. Thus, the probate court disposed: WHEREFORE, for the reasons aforestated, and so as not to render moot any action that the special administrator, or the regular administrator upon the latter's qualification and appointment, may deem appropriate to take on the matter (i.e. Whether or not to institute in the name of the estate the appropriate action for the recovery of the shares of stock), this Court hereby GRANTS Oppositor Marty's Omnibus Motion, dated September 24, 2010, and thus hereby: 1. DIRECTS petitioners, either individually or jointly, to: (a) RENDER AN ACCOUNTING of all the properties and assets comprising the estate of the decedent that may have come into their possession; and, (b) DEPOSIT OR CONSIGN all the rentals payments or such other passive incomes from the properties and assets registered in the name of Primrose Development Corporation, including all income derived from the Primrose Hotel and the lease contracts with Mercury Drug and Chowking Restaurant, both within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order; 2. DIRECTS the Special Administrator to take possession and charge of the properties comprising the decedent's estate, specially those pertaining to the sharesholding of the decedent in Primrose Development Corporation, to determine whether or not action for the recovery of the shares of stock supposedly transferred from the decedent to petitioners Remedios Tiu, Manuela Azucena Mayor should be instituted in the name of the estate against the said transferees and to submit a Report on the foregoing matters to this Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order; and, 3. ORDERS that no funds comprising the estate of the decedent shall be disbursed without formal Motion therefor, with the conformity of the Special Administrator, duly approved by this Court. SO ORDERED.25 [Underscoring supplied] The partial motion for reconsideration of the above order filed by Remedios and Manuela was denied in the other assailed order of the RTC-Br. 6, dated June 10, 2011.26 Dissatisfied, Remedios and Manuela availed of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, and filed a petition before the CA.

Action by the CA The CA, however, in its October 5, 2011 Resolution,27 dismissed the same based on the following infirmities: 1) there was no proper proof of service of a copy of the petition on the respondents which was sent by registered mail; 2) petitioners failed to indicate on the petition the material date when the motion for reconsideration was filed; 3) the copy of the assailed order was not certified true and correct by the officer having custody of the original copy; and 4) the serial number of the commission of the notary public, the province-city where he was commissioned, the office address of the notary public and the roll of attorney's number were not properly indicated on the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Remedios and Manuela moved for reconsideration of the assailed CA resolution, but to no avail, as the appellate court denied the motion in its September 24, 2012 Resolution. Hence, this petition before the Court, filed only by Manuela as Remedios had also passed away, and anchored on the following GROUNDS I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT MISAPPLIED SECTION 13, RULE 13 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND DECLARED THAT THERE WAS NO PROPER PROOF OF SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT MISAPPLIED JURISPRUDENCE AND RULE 65 AND IT HELD THAT PETITIONER MAYOR DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE MATERIAL DATE RULE. III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER MAYOR FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1, RULE 65 FOR FAILING TO ATTACH CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT. IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER MAYOR DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING. V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT ALLOWED TECHNICALITIES TO BE USED TO DEFEAT SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE PARTIES. VI. PETITIONERS HA VE GOOD CAUSE AND A MERITORIOUS CASE AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENTS AS PARAGRAPH l(B) OF THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE FIRST ASSAILED ORDER SHOULD HA VE BEEN REVERSED BECAUSE IT OVERTURNS THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED 16 OCTOBER 2009 WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.28 Petitioner Manuela argued that:

1) There was actual compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The CA petition was accompanied by a notarized affidavit of service and filing of registered mail. At the time the petition was filed, this was the best evidence of the service. The other registry receipts for the other parties were also attached to the petition. Further, the available registry return card was furnished the CA in the motion for reconsideration.29 2) The failure of the petition to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates could be excused because the dates were evident from the records.30 3) The petitioner went to the RTC of Tacloban to secure certified true copies of the assailed orders. Only the stamped name of the Clerk of Court, however, appeared thereon, because the particular branch had no stamp pad which had the phrase for certification. The branch did not even have a typewriter in order to affix the phrase on the copies. These inadequacies could not be attributed to the petitioners.31 4) The lack of information pertaining to the notary public in the verification and certification against forum-shopping should not invalidate the same because, again, it was not attributable to the parties.32 5) Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of a party.33 In its January 23, 2013 Resolution34 the Court ordered the respondents to file their respective comments. Marty, in her Comment, insisted that the petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements as stated by the CA.35 In her Reply to Comment,36 petitioner Manuela clarified that the affidavit of service was executed on August 31, 2011, which was after the petition was signed by the lawyers and after it was verified by the petitioner herself. After contesting Marty's arguments on the alleged procedural infirmities of the petitions with the CA and this Court, Manuela asserted that the final and executory October 16, 2009 Decision of the CA already held that Primrose had a personality separate and distinct from the estate of decedent Rosario. Meanwhile, in his Manifestation,37 dated May 29, 2013, Edwin affirmed that he and Manuela decided to patch up their differences and agreed to settle amicably. Accordingly, he manifested that he was withdrawing from the case pursuant to their agreement. On June 18, 2014, Manuela filed her Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction38 on the ground that a flurry of orders had been issued by the RTC-Br. 6 in the implementation of the assailed January 20, 2011 Order, such as the Order,39 dated May 27, 2013, wherein the probate court vaguely ordered "the inventory of the exact extent of the 'decedent's estate."' Then another order was issued appointing an auditing firm to conduct an inventory/audit of the Estate including the rentals and earnings derived from the lease of Mercury Drug and Chowking Restaurant, as tenants of Primrose.40 According to petitioner Manuela, although an inventory of the assets of the decedent was proper, the probate court ordered an inventory of the assets of Primrose, a separate and distinct entity. Manuela asserts that it was clearly in error. In her Supplement to the Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,41dated June 17, 2013, Manuela informed the Court that the inventory and accounting of Primrose would already commence on June 19, 2013. Marty filed her Opposition,42 dated July 3, 2013, stating that the petition of Manuela had been rendered moot and academic as the probate court had declared her as the sole heir of Rosario and appointed her administrator of the estate. She argued that an injunctive relief would work injustice to the estate because of the total assimilation by petitioner of the shareholdings of the decedent in Primrose and her share in the corporation's income corresponding to her shareholdings. Finding that the requisites for preliminary injunctive relief were present,43 the Court issued the TRO44 in favor of Manuela on October 14, 2013. At the outset, the Court was convinced that the rights of Primrose sought to be protected by the grant of injunctive relief were material and substantial and the TRO was issued in order to prevent any irreparable damage to a corporate entity that could arise from the conduct of an accounting by the court-appointed inventory. The Court's Ruling

The Court now resolves the subject case by the issuance of a permanent injunction, as prayed for by petitioner Manuela. This position is supported by law and jurisprudence, as follows: First. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; and (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. This class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law. Example is the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.45From this pronouncement, it can be gleaned that the estate of the deceased person is a juridical person separate and distinct from the person of the decedent and any other corporation. This status of an estate comes about by operation of law. This is in consonance with the basic tenet under corporation law that a corporation has a separate personality distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it may be connected.46 Second. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has no relevant application in this case. Under this doctrine, the court looks at the corporation as a mere collection of individuals or an aggregation of persons undertaking business as a group, disregarding the separate juridical personality of the corporation unifying the group. Another formulation of this doctrine is that when two business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that two corporations are distinct entities and treat them as identical or as one and the same.47 The purpose behind piercing a corporation's identity is to remove the barrier between the corporation and the persons comprising it to thwart the fraudulent and illegal schemes of those who use the corporate personality as a shield for undertaking certain proscribed activities.48 Here, instead of holding the decedent's interest in the corporation separately as a stockholder, the situation was reversed. Instead, the probate court ordered the lessees of the corporation to remit rentals to the estate's administrator without taking note of the fact that the decedent was not the absolute owner of Primrose but only an owner of shares thereof. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stocks of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.49 Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing cannot be presumed, but must be clearly and convincingly established.50 Third. A probate court is not without limits in the determination of the scope of property covered in probate proceedings. In a litany of cases, the Court had defined the parameters by which a probate court may extend its probing arms in the determination of the question of title in probate proceedings. In Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,51 the Court explained that, as a rule, the question of ownership was an extraneous matter which the probate court could not resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should, or should not, be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate but which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. It can only determine whether they should, or should not, be included in the inventory or list of properties to be overseen by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.52 In this case, respondent Marty argues that the subject properties and the parcel of land on which these were erected should be included in the inventory of Rosario's estate. More so, the arrears from the rental of these properties were later on ordered to be remitted to the administrator of the estate grounded on the allegation that Rosario had no other properties other than her interests in Primrose. To the Court's mind, this holding of the probate court was in utter disregard of the undisputed fact the subject land is registered under the Torrens system in the name of Primrose, a third person who may be prejudiced by the orders of the probate court. In Valera vs. Inserto:53 the Court stated: xxx, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate, land registration,

etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived. xxxx xxx These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedent's names but in others, a situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule.54 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied] Thus, the probate court should have recognized the incontestability accorded to the Torrens title of Primrose over Marty's arguments of possible dissipation of properties. In fact, in the given setting, even evidence purporting to support a claim of ownership has to yield to the incontestability of a Torrens title, until after the same has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself. In other words, the existence of a Torrens title may not be discounted as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. Put clearly, if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, "the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title."55 Additionally, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152956 proscribes a collateral attack on a Torrens title: Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.1âwphi1 It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. In Cuizon vs. Ramolete,57 the property subject of the controversy was duly registered under the Torrens system. To this, Court categorically stated: Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. 58 xxx [Emphasis and underscoring supplied] A perusal of the records of this case would show that that no compelling evidence was ever presented to substantiate the position of Marty that Rosario and Primrose were one and the same, justifying the inclusion of the latter's properties in the inventory of the decedent's properties. This has remained a vacant assertion. At most, what Rosario owned were shares of stock in Primrose. In turn, this boldly underscores the fact that Primrose is a separate and distinct personality from the estate of the decedent. Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of Rosario are in the possession of, and are registered in the name of, Primrose, Marty's claims are bereft of any logical reason and conclusion to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. Fourth. The probate court in this case has not acquired jurisdiction over Primrose and its properties. Piercing the veil of corporate entity applies to determination of liability not of jurisdiction; it is basically applied only to determine established liability. It is not available to confer on the court a jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first place, over a party not impleaded in a case.59 This is so because the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction comes to play only during the trial of the case after the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the corporation. Hence, before this doctrine can be even applied, based on the evidence presented, it is imperative that the court must first have jurisdiction over the corporation.60 Hence, a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the court's process of piercing the veil of its corporate fiction. Resultantly, any proceedings taken against the corporation and its properties would infringe on its right to due process. In the case at bench, the probate court applied the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil ratiocinating that Rosario had no other properties that comprise her estate other than her shares in Primrose. Although the probate court's intention to protect the decedent's shares of stock in Primrose from dissipation is laudable, it is still an error to order the corporation's tenants to remit their rental payments to the estate of Rosario.

Considering the above disquisition, the Court holds that a permanent and final injunction is in order in accordance with Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[i]f after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction." Undoubtedly, Primrose stands to suffer an irreparable injury from the subject order of the probate court. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Temporary Restraining Order, dated June 14, 2013, is hereby made PERMANENT, effective immediately. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City, is ENJOINED from enforcing and implementing its January 20, 2011 and June 10, 2011 Orders, insofar as the corporate properties of Primrose Development Corporation are concerned, to avert irreparable damage to a corporate entity, separate and distinct from the Estate of Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 224144 LOLITA BAS CAPABLANCA, Petitioner vs. HEIRS OF PEDRO BAS, represented by JOSEFINA BAS ESPINOSA and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF CEBU, Respondents DECISION LEONEN, J.: This resolves a Petition for Review1 assailing the Decision2 dated March 12, 2014 and Resolution3 dated March 15, 2016 of the Court of Appeals, Nineteenth Division, Cebu City. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision 4 dated December 26, 2007 of Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and dismissed the petitioner's complaint. The subject matter of this case is Lot 2535 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Land's Estate located in "Biasong, Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu"5 with an area of 6,120 square meters.6 Andres Bas (Andres) and Pedro Bas (Pedro) acquired Lot 2535, "and Patent No. 1724 was issued in their names on May 12, 1937."7 On November 28, 1939, Pedro sold to Faustina Manreal (Faustina), married to Juan Balorio, his portion of Lot 2535 "with a seeding capacity of four (4) chupas of com."8 The sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale dated November 28, 1939.9 After the death of Faustina and her husband, their heirs executed a notarized Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 13, 1963. Lot 2535 consisting of "1,000 square meters, more or less," was conveyed to one (1) of their heirs, Alejandra Balorio (Alejandra). 10 Alejandra sold the land through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 13, 1967 to Edith N. Deen, who in turn sold it to Atty. Eddy A. Deen (Atty. Deen) on March 21, 1968. 11 Upon Atty. Deen's death on December 18, 1978, an extra-judicial settlement of estate, which did not include Lot 2535, was executed by his heirs. Later, or on March 30, 1988, they executed an Additional Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Deed of Sale, which sold the land for ₱l0,000.00 to Norberto B. Bas (Norberto), who took possession of and built a house on it. 12 On December 15, 1995, Norberto died without a will and was succeeded by his niece and only heir, Lolita Bas Capablanca (Lolita). 13 Subsequently, Lolita learned that a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-96676 dated June 6, 1996 was issued in the names of Andres and Pedro on the basis of a reconstituted Deed of Conveyance No. 9600004. 14 In October 1996, Josefina Bas Espinosa (Josefina) represented the Heirs of Pedro Bas to file a complaint for Clarification of Ownership of Lot 2535 against Lolita before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Biasong, Talisay, Cebu. 15 The conflict between the parties was not resolved and resulted to the issuance of a Certification to file Action. 16 On December 16, 1996, a notarized Partition Agreement of Real Property, Quitclaim and Waiver of Rights was executed between the heirs of Andres and Lolita, representing Norberto, whereby they partitioned Lot 2535 among themselves. 17 Lolita sought to register her portion in Lot 2535 but was denied by the Register of Deeds of Cebu, citing the need for a court order. 18 Lolita then learned that TCT No. T-96676 had been partially cancelled and TCT Nos. T-100181, T-100182, T-100183, and T-100185 had been issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented by Josefina, on May 29, 1997. 19

On December 16, 1997, Lolita filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for the cancellation of the titles with prayer for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.20 In their Answer, the Heirs of Pedro Bas claimed that "the sale between Pedro Bas and Faustina Manreal [was] fake, spurious and invalid because [Pedro] who [was] an illiterate never learned how to write his name so that the signature appearing thereon could not have been made by Pedro Bas."21 They further claimed that the cancellation of TCT No. T-96676 was made pursuant to a final judgment in Civil Case No. 840 22 for Partition, Damages, and Attorney's Fees.23 After trial, Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City rendered a Decision24 on December 26, 2007, in favor of Lolita. The trial court held that there was substantial evidence to prove that Lolita had been in long possession of the lot under a claim of ownership as the heir of Norberto and that it was not necessary for her to be first declared as his heir before filing the complaint. 25 It further ruled that to dismiss the case on the ground that Lolita should first be declared an heir would be too late as the Heirs of Pedro Bas did not raise the issue in a motion to dismiss or as an affirmative defense in their complaint. 26 On the substantive issues, the trial court upheld the validity of the 1939 Deed of Sale executed by Pedro in favor of Faustina. It found Josefina's uncorroborated testimony of Pedro's illiteracy as self-serving and unconvincing to contradict the regularity of the notarized deed. Moreover, her testimony was controverted by the notarized Assignment of Sale Certificate 195, which bore the same signature of Pedro, and by the Heirs of Pedro Bas' answers in Civil Case No. R-10602, another case which contained allegations that Pedro sold his share in the lot to Faustina.27 The trial court further held that the object of the sale was determinate, i.e., Pedro's share in Lot 2535 was specified by the boundaries indicated in the Deed of Sale.28 It concluded that Norberto acquired the entire share of Pedro in Lot 2535, which was found only after survey in 1996,29 to actually consist of 3, 060 square meters and not 1, 000 square meters as insisted by the Heirs of Pedro Bas. The trial court gave credence to Lolita's testimony that before the survey, Pedro's portion was estimated to be 1,000 square meters; hence, the area indicated in the successive transfers of the lot from the heirs of Faustina down to Norberto was "1,000 square meters, more or less."30Consequently, with Pedro's sale of his share in Lot 2535, his heirs acquired no portion by inheritance and their titles were null and void and should be cancelled.31 Finally, the trial court affirmed that the Judgement of the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay in Civil Case No. 840 for Partition, Damages and Attorney's fees was not binding on Lolita, who was not a party to the case. 32 The fallo of the Decision read: WHEREFORE, premises considered, a judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring as null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu to cancel the following transfer certificates of title: 1) Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-100181, of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, in the name of Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented by Josefina Bas, covering Lot 2535-J, Psd-07-037377, being a portion of Lot 2535, Flr-133, situated in the Barrio of Dumlog, Mun. of Talisay, Prov. of Cebu, Island of Cebu, containing an area of 304 square meters; 2) Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-100182, of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, in the name of Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented by Josefina Bas, covering Lot 2535-B, Psd-07-037377, being a portion of Lot 2535, Flr-133, situated in the Barrio of Dumlog, Mun. of Talisay, Prov. of Cebu, Island of Cebu, containing an area of 1,554 square meters; 3) Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-100183, of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, in the name of Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented by Josefina Bas, covering Lot 2535-A, Psd-07-037377, being a portion of Lot 2535, Flr-133, situated in the Barrio of Dumlog, Mun. of Talisay, Prov. of Cebu, Island of Cebu, containing an area of 965 square meters; and 4) Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-100185, of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, in the name of Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented by Josefina Bas, covering Lot 2535-A Psd-07-037377, being a portion of Lot 2535, Flr-133, situated in the Barrio of Dumlog, Mun. of Talisay, Prov. of Cebu, Island of Cebu, containing an area of 187 square meters.

Costs against the defendants. 33 The Regional Trial Court subsequently denied the Heirs of Pedro Bas’ motion for reconsideration.

34

Hence, the Heirs of Pedro Bas appealed to the Court of Appeals, making the following lone assignment of error: The trial court seriously erred in not dismissing the case for plaintiffs lack of cause of action pursuant to (the) doctrinal jurisprudential case of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay vs. Del Rosario (304 SCRA 18) considering that plaintiff in her complaint alleged, she is the sole heir of Norberto Bas.35 The Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court Decision and dismissed the complaint. 36 According to the Court of Appeals, Lolita must first be declared as the sole heir to the estate of Norberto in a proper special proceeding. Thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated December 26, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 8, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-21348 for Ownership, Nullity of Deeds, Cancellation of TCT Nos. T-100181, T-100182, T-100183[,] and T-100185, covering portions of Lot No. 2535, damages, etc., ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-100181, T-100182, T-100183[,] and T-100185 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of plaintiff-appellee is hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Norberto Bas and the rights concomitant therewith. 37 Lolita sought reconsideration but was denied in the Court of Appeals Resolution dated March 15, 2016. Hence, Lolita filed this Petition principally contending that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in reversing the Regional Trial Court Decision and dismissing the complaint. Petitioner argues that the 1999 case of the Heirs of Yaptinchay v. DelRosario38 cited in the Court of Appeals Decision does not apply to this casebecause the factual circumstances are different. 39 In that case, the claims of the opposing parties were anchored on their alleged status as heirs of the original owner. 40 "Hence there may have been the need for a previous judicial declaration of heirship in a special proceeding." 41 Here, petitioner does not claim to be an heir of Pedro, the original owner. Rather, her interest over the property is derived from a series of transactions starting from the sale executed by Pedro. 42 Petitioner further contends that respondents neither raised the ground "lack of cause of action" as an affirmative defense nor filed a motion to dismiss before the court a quo. Instead, they allowed the trial to proceed with their full participation all throughout. Petitioner asserts that respondents' action or inaction should be constituted a waiver.43Otherwise, respondents' "failure to properly act on its perceived defect" in the complaint hampers the speedy disposition of the action "and would only promote multiplicity of suits."44 In their two (2)-page Comment,45 respondents contend that the findings of the Court of Appeals were duly supported by evidence and jurisprudence. This Court grants the petition. Contrary to the erroneous conclusion of the Court of Appeals, this Court finds no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of heirship in order to resolve petitioner's action for cancellation of titles of the property. The dispute in this case is not about the heirship of petitioner to Norberto but the validity of the sale of the property in 1939 from Pedro to Faustina, from which followed a series of transfer transactions that culminated in the sale of the property to Norberto. For with Pedro's sale of the property in 1939, it follows that there would be no more ownership or right to property that would have been transmitted to his heirs. Petitioner's claim is anchored on a sale of the property to her predecessor-in-interest and not on any filiation with the original owner. What petitioner is pursuing is Norberto's right of ownership over the property which was passed to her upon the latter's death.46

This Court has stated that no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may assert his or her right to the property of the deceased.47 In Marabilles v. Quito:48 The right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been judicially declared to be so, if duly proven, is well settled in this jurisdiction. This is upon the theory that the property of a deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the property of the heir by the mere fact of death of his predecessor in interest, and as such he can deal with it in precisely the same way in which the deceased could have dealt, subject only to the limitations which by law or by contract may be imposed upon the deceased himself. Thus, it has been held that "[t]here is no legal precept or established rule which imposes the necessity of a previous legal declaration regarding their status as heirs to an intestate on those who, being of age and with legal capacity, consider themselves the legal heirs of a person, in order that they may maintain an action arising out of a right which belonged to their ancestor" ... A recent case wherein this principle was maintained is Cabuyao vs. [C]aagbay.49(Emphasis supplied) The Court of Appeals' reliance on the ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v.Del Rosario50 was misplaced. In that case, the motion to dismiss was filedimmediately after the second Amended Complaint was filed. 51 The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the Heirs of Y aptinchay "have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it-except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the above-named Yaptinchays-that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple."52 Here, respondents never raised their objection to petitioner's capacity to sue either as an affirmative defense or in a motion to dismiss.53 Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states, "[ d]efenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived." Thus, it was erroneous for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was no prior judicial declaration of petitioner's heirship to Norberto.54 Moreover, the pronouncement in the Heirs of Yaptinchay that a declaration of heirship must be made only in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action for reconveyance of property was based on Litam, etc., et. al. v. Rivera55 and Solivio v. Court of Appeals, 56 whichinvolved different factual milieus. The facts of the case in Litam, etc., et. al. v. Rivera 57 show that during the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action. They claimed that as the children of the deceased by a previous marriage to a Chinese woman, they were entitled to inherit his one-half (1/2) share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera (Marcosa).58 The trial court in the civil case declared, among others, that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased and that Marcosa was his only heir.59 On appeal, this Court ruled that such declaration-that Marcosa was the only heir of the decedent-was improper because the determination of the issue was within the exclusive competence of the court in the special proceedings. 60 In Solivio v. Court of Appeals,61 the deceased Esteban Javellana, Jr. was survived by Celedonia Solivio (Celedonia), his maternal aunt, and Concordia Javellana-Villanueva (Concordia), his paternal aunt.62 Celedonia filed the intestate proceedings and had herself declared as sole heir and administratrix of the estate of the decedent to facilitate the implementation of the latter's wish to place his estate in a foundation named after his mother. 63 While the probate proceeding was pending, Concordia filed a separate civil action where she sought to be declared as co-heir and for partition of the estate.64 This Court held that the "separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate."65 This Court further held that "in the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court."66 In Litam and Solivio, the adverse parties were putative heirs to a decedent's estate or parties to the special proceedings for an estate's settlement.1âwphi1 Hence, this Court ruled that questions on the status and right of the contending parties must be properly ventilated in the appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action. Here, as stated, the main issue is the annulment of title to property, which ultimately hinges on the validity of the sale from Pedro to Faustina. Petitioner does not claim any filiation with Pedro or seek to establish her right as his heir as against the respondents. Rather, petitioner seeks to enforce her right over the property which has been allegedly violated by the fraudulent acts of respondents. Furthermore, as found by the Regional Trial Court:

The plaintiff [Lolita] has sufficient interest to protect in the subject portion of Lot 2535. She had been there for around thirty (30) years, and had been in possession thereof under a claim of ownership as an alleged heir of Norberto Bas after the latter's death on December 15, 1993, that is: long before the issuance of TCT Nos. T100181, T-100182, T-100183[,] and T-100185 in 1997, and even TCT No. T-96676 in 1996. Moreover, it is annotated on TCT No. T-96676 (Exhibit "G") that she, together with the heirs of Osmundo Bas, executed a declaration of heirs with partition, quitclaim, etc., dated December 16, 1996, registered on March 3, 1997 ... wherein they adjudicated unto themselves and partitioned Lot No. 2535 .. . She also executed on June 14, 1997 an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir, declaring herself as the sole heir of Norberto Bas and adjudicated unto herself the subject portion pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The existence of the questioned certificates of title, and other related documents, constitute clouds on said interest. There seems, therefore, to be no necessity that the plaintiff should have been declared first as an heir of Norberto Bas as a prerequisite to this action. Her possession of the subject lot under a claim of ownership is a sufficient interest to entitle her to bring this suit. 67 (Citation omitted) This case has gone a long way since the complaint was filed in 1997. A full-blown trial had taken place and judgment was rendered by the Regional Trial Court where it thoroughly discussed, evaluated, and weighed all the pieces of documentary evidence and testimonies of the witnesses of both parties. At this point, to dismiss the case and require petitioner to institute a special proceeding to determine her status as heir of the late Norberto would hamper, instead of serve, justice. In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,68 where the contending parties insisted to be the legal heirs of the decedent, this Court dispensed with the need to institute a separate special proceeding to determine their heirship since the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence. It held: It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case - subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial. In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal's estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners' status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon[.]69 (Citation omitted) In this case, there is no necessity for a separate special proceeding and to require it would be superfluous considering that petitioner had already presented evidence to establish her filiation and heirship to Norberto, which respondents never disputed. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of AppealsDecision dated March 12, 2014 and Resolution dated March 15, 2016 are VACATED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated December 26, 2007 ofBranch 8, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 163504, August 05, 2015 BERLINDA ORIBELLO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER TENTH DIVISION), AND REMEDIOS ORIBELLO, Respondents. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: The surviving spouse of the deceased registered owner of the property subject of this action for partition appeals the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA), reviewing the Judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, in Agoo, La Union on March 30, 1998 in Civil Case No. A-1757 entitled Remedios Oribello, represented by her Atty.-in-Fact Alfredo Selga v. Berlinda P. Oribello,2 disposed as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is VACATED and SET ASIDE and the case REMANDED to the lower court for the second phase of a partition suit without prejudice to the filing, if still available, of either a petition for relief from the decree of adoption rendered in Sp. Proc. No. R-94 of the then Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro (Branch II) or an action for annulment thereof. SO ORDERED.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Antecedents The assailed Decision of the CA summarized the factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Before the Regional Trial Court of La Union (Branch 31) was an action for partition and damages involving twelve parcels of land xxx situated at Sta. Rita, Agoo, La Union. Eight of said parcels are declared for taxation purposes in the name of Toribio Oribello xxx, two in the names of Toribio and Rosenda Oribello, one in the names of Toribio and and Berlinda Padilla Oribello xxx, and one in the names of Toribio and Ma. Emilia Oribello x x x. Toribio was twice married. His first wife was Emilia. On September 10, 1981, Toribio's marriage to Emilia was dissolved pursuant to the decision of the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, U.S.A. On March 10, 1982, Toribio married appellee before the municipal mayor of Agoo, La Union. He died intestate on August 18, 1993. Instituted on May 27, 1997 by Rcmedios Oribello xxx, represented by her natural father Alfredo Selga xxx, against appellee, the action was anchored on the theory that appellant is an adopted daughter of Toribio per decision dated March 26, 1974 xxx of the then Court of First Instance x x x of Occidental Mindoro (Branch II) in Sp. Proc. No. R-94 x x x granting the petition of Toribio and Emilia, who were childless, for adoption of appellant, then eight years old. Denying that appellant is an adopted daughter of Toribio, appellee averred in her answer that the decree of adoption was fraudulently secured by Alfredo; that the proceedings in the first adoption case and the decree of adoption are void ab initio; that Toribio could not have filed the first adoption case in Occidental Mindoro because he was a resident of Agoo, La Union throughout his life; that the Toribio referred to in the first adoption case and appellee's husband, Toribio, are two different persons; that the birth certificate of appellant was simulated; that appellant never lived with nor submitted herself to the parental authority and care of Toribio even after appellee's marriage to him; that Alfredo's fraudulent scheme was shown by his filing of another petition for adoption in 1983 in the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro (Branch 45), docketed as Sp. Proc. No. R-274 xxx, which was archived per order of said court dated December 18, 1986.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Judgment of the RTC On March 30, 1998, the RTC rendered its Judgment after trial, ruling as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiff Remedios Selga is not a co-owner of the properties enumerated in paragraph 5 of the Complaint,

which defendant inherited from Toribio Oribello except those described in subparagraphs 8, 11 and 12 of said paragraph 5. Said three (3) parcels of land are unknown to and not in the possession of defendant (see, Par. 4 of the Answer with Motion to Dismiss). This Court awards defendant TWENTY-FIVE TFIOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) in attorney's fees to be paid by plaintiff. SO ORDERED.5 (Underscoring supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Decision of the CA On appeal, respondent Remedios Oribello sought the reversal of the judgment of the RTC, insisting that the trial court erred:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary I.

IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT BY STATING IN ITS DECISION THAT THE PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT IS NOT A CO- OWNER OF THE PROPERTIES ENUMERATED IN THE COMPLAINT;cralawlawlibrary

II.

IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN SPC. PROC. NO. R-94 WAS OBTAINED THRU FRAUD AND MACHINATION;cralawlawlibrary

III.

IN NULLIFYING THE DECISION IN SPC. PROC. R-94 WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY; and

IV.

IN AWARDING DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ATTORNEY'S FEES.6

On July 31, 2003,7 the CA promulgated its Decision, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is VACATED and SET ASIDE and the case REMANDED to the lower court for the second phase of a partition suit without prejudice to the filing, if still available, of either a petition for relief from the decree of adoption rendered in Sp. Proc. No. R-94 of the then Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro (Branch II) or an action for annulment thereof. SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary The CA pointed out that even if the adoption proceedings had suffered from infirmities, the RTC did not have the authority to annul the adoption decree and to dismiss the complaint for partition for that reason; and that at any rate the petitioner still had the option either to file a petition for relief or an action for the annulment of the adoption decree in the appropriate court.chanrobleslaw Issue Hence, this appeal, with the petitioner asserting that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary x x x THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED IN THE DECISION AS IT WRONGFULLY ALLOWED THE ILLEGAL USE OF A SURNAME BY THE RESPONDENT TO PURSUE A FRAUDULENT CLAIM AGAINST THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER AND OF AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY WHO WAS NOT IMPLEADED AS ANY PARTY TO THE COMPLAINT.9 x x x THERE IS SERIOUS ERROR IN THE DECISION, AS IT IS PREMISED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS WHICH WRONGFULLY SUSTAINED THE MANIFESTLY FRAUDULENT CLAIM BY THE FATHER OF THE RESPONDENT OF HER FILIATION WITH THE HUSBAND OF THE PETITIONER, WHICH IS NOW BEING INTERPOSED LONG AFTER HIS DEATH AND THRU A PETITION WHEREIN HE WAS NEVER A PARTY OR PETITIONER.10 x x x THERE IS ERROR OF LAW COMMITTED IN THE DECISION, AS IT TOTALLY DISREGARDED THE DULY ESTABLISHED RULE AND JURISPRUDENCE THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM IN THE ANSWER OF THE PETITION IS A DIRECT ATTACK ON THE NULLITY OF THE ALLEGED PETITION AND JUDGMENT OF ADOPTION, AND THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO SET ASIDE THE SAID NULL AND VOID JUDGMENT AND TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT.11 x x x THE PETITION HAS TO BE GIVEN DUE COURSE, IN ORDER THAT THE MANDATES OF THE RULES AGAINST MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS SHALL BE UPHELD, PARTICULARLY THE GRANT OF THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE ALLEGED PETITION AND JUDGMENT OF ADOPTION, AS WELL AS FOR THE FULL APPLICATION OF THE RULES ON INTESTATE

PROCEEDINGS UNDER RULE 90 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, FOR A FINAL RESOLUTION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES IN ONE AND SINGLE PROCEEDING, THRU THE INSTANT PETITION.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary In her comment,13 respondent Remedios Oribello insists that she had the right to the partition as the adopted daughter of the late Toribio Oribello; that the petitioner raised a new issue about her failure to implead Toribio Oribello, Jr. despite being an indispensable party for being the alleged son of the late Toribio Oribello; that the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties was not a ground for the dismissal of an action, and could be corrected by a proper amendment; that the petitioner could not successfully assail the decree of adoption by the Court of First Instance in Occidental Mindoro; that unless such decree of adoption was properly annulled or set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction, she could not be barred from enforcing her right as the adopted daughter of the late Toribio Oribello; and that the petition for review should be denied for its utter lack of merit.chanrobleslaw Ruling of the Court The appeal is meritorious.chanrobleslaw 1. The CA correctly held that the validity of the adoption decree in favor of the respondent should not be assailed in an action for partition The petitioner insists that the complaint for partition must be dismissed based on her allegations that the adoption decree issued by the CFI, Branch II, of Occidental Mindoro was void; and that her attack against the adoption decree was akin to the counterclaim allowed in Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago,14 an action for the nullification of a certificate of title, because the counterclaim constituted a direct attack on the title. The petitioner's position is untenable. In Pinausukan Seafood House, Roxas Boulevard, Inc. v. Far East Bank & Trust Company (now Bank of the Philippine Island),15 the Court has traced the evolution of the action to annul the judgment or final order of the CFI, and, later on, of the RTC, and has indicated the proper court with jurisdiction over the action, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary The remedy of annulment of judgment has been long authorized and sanctioned in the Philippines. In Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, of 1918 vintage, the Court, through Justice Street, recognized that there were only two remedies available under the rules of procedure in force at the time to a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI) that had already attained finality, namely: that under Sec. 113, Code of Civil Procedure, which was akin to the petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, Rules of Court; and that under Sec. 513, Code of Civil Procedure, which stipulated that the party aggrieved under a judgment rendered by the CFI "upon default" and who had been "deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence" and the CFI had "finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court" could "present his petition to the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying to have judgment set aside." It categorically ruled out a mere motion filed for that purpose in the same action as a proper remedy. The jurisdiction over the action for the annulment of judgment had been lodged in the CFI as a court of general jurisdiction on the basis that the subject matter of the action was not capable of pecuniary estimation. Section 56, paragraph 1, of Act No. 136 (An Act providing for the Organization of Courts in the Philippine Islands), effective on June 11, 1901, vested original jurisdiction in the CFI over "all civil actions in which the subject of litigations is not capable of pecuniary estimation." The CFI retained its jurisdiction under Section 44(a) of Republic Act No. 296 (The Judiciary Act of 1948), effective on June 17, 1948, which contained a similar provision vesting original jurisdiction in the CFI over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation." In the period under the regimes of Act No. 136 and Republic Act No. 296, the issues centered on which CFI, or branch thereof, had the jurisdiction over the action for the annulment of judgment. It was held in Mas v. Dumara-og that "the power to open, modify or vacate a judgment is not only possessed by, but is restricted to the court in which the judgment was rendered." In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Torres, the Court declared that "the jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a branch of the Court of First Instance belongs solely to the very same branch which rendered the judgment." In Sterling Investment Corporation v. Ruiz, the Court enjoined a branch of the CFI of Rizal from taking cognizance of an action filed with it to annul the judgment of another branch of

the same court. In Dulap v. Court of Appeals, the Court observed that the philosophy underlying the pronouncements in these cases was the policy of judicial stability, as expressed in Dumara-og, to the end that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction could not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. Seeing that the pronouncements in Dumara-og, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Sterling Investment confining the jurisdiction to annul a judgment to the court or its branch rendering the judgment would "practically amount to judicial legislation," the Court found the occasion to re-examine the pronouncements. Observing that the plaintiffs cause of action in an action to annul the judgment of a court "springs from the alleged nullity of the judgment based on one ground or another, particularly fraud, which fact affords the plaintiff a right to judicial interference in his behalf," and that that the two cases were distinct and separate from each other because "the cause of action (to annul judgment) is entirely different from that in the action which gave rise to the judgment sought to be annulled, for a direct attack against a final and executory judgment is not incidental to, but is the main object of, the proceeding," the Court concluded that "there is no plausible reason why the venue of the action to annul the judgment should necessarily follow the venue of the previous action" if the outcome was not only to violate the existing rule on venue for personal actions but also to limit the opportunity for the application of such rule on venue for personal actions. The Court observed that the doctrine under Dumara-og, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Sterling Investment could then very well "result in the difficulties precisely sought to be avoided by the rules; for it could be that at the time of the filing of the second action for annulment, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant resides in the same place where either or both of them did when the first action was commenced and tried," thus unduly depriving the parties of the right expressly given them by the Rules of Court "to change or transfer venue from one province to another by written agreement - a right conferred upon them for their own convenience and to minimize their expenses in the litigation - and renders innocuous the provision on waiver of improper venue in Section 4 (of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court)." The Court eventually ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Our conclusion must therefore be that a court of first instance or a branch thereof has the authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance of, and to act in, a suit to annul a final and executory judgment or order rendered by another court of first instance or by another branch of the same court. The policy of judicial stability, which underlies the doctrine laid down in the cases of Dumara-og, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Sterling Investment Corporation, et al., supra, should be held subordinate to an orderly administration of justice based on the existing rules of procedure and the law. x x xChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary In 1981, the Legislature enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). Among several innovations of this legislative enactment was the formal establishment of the annulment of a judgment or final order as an action independent from the generic classification of litigations in which the subject matter was not capable of pecuniary estimation, and expressly vested the exclusive original jurisdiction over such action in the CA. The action in which the subject of the litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation continued to be under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, which replaced the CFI as the court of general jurisdiction. Since then, the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over an action to annul the judgment of the RTC, eliminating all concerns about judicial stability. To implement this change, the Court introduced a new procedure to govern the action to annul the judgment of the RTC in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Court under Rule 47, directing in Section 2 thereof that "[t]he annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction." The Court has expounded on the nature of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order in Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper. The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the

modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. The remedy is by no means an appeal whereby the correctness of the assailed judgment or final order is in issue; hence, the CA is not called upon to address each error allegedly committed by the trial court.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Based on the foregoing, the RTC did not have the jurisdiction to determine or to review the validity of the decree of adoption issued by the erstwhile CFI of Occidental Mindoro by virtue of the equal rank and category between the RTC and the CFI. The proper court with jurisdiction to do so was the CA, which has been vested by Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 12916 with the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for the annulment of the judgments of the RTC, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. - The [Court of Appeals] shall exercise: xxxx (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and x x x xChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, we join the CA's following exposition, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Even supposing that the first adoption case suffers from infirmities, the lower court is bereft of authority to annul the decree of adoption which was rendered by the CFI of Occidental Mindoro, a court of equal rank. Indeed, no court has the authority to nullify the judgments or processes of another court of equal rank and category, having the equal power to grant the reliefs sought. Such power devolves exclusively upon the proper appellate court. The raison d'etre for the rule is to avoid conflict of power between different courts of equal or coordinate jurisdiction which would surely lead to confusion and seriously hinder the proper administration of justice(Gallardo-Corro vs. Gallardo, 350 SCRA 568).17 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary It is also relevant to mention that the judgment or final order of a court of law can be set aside only through a direct attack commenced in the court of competent jurisdiction. For this reason, any attack in this action for partition against the validity of the adoption decree issued by the CFI of Occidental Mindoro cannot be permitted because such would constitute a collateral attack against the judgment in the adoption case.chanrobleslaw 2. The respondent did not discharge her burden of proof as the plaintiff to show that she was entitled to the partition Even as we uphold the CA's disquisition on forbidding the RTC's interference with the CFI's decree of adoption, we must reverse that part of the decision vacating and setting aside the judgment rendered by the RTC on March 30, 1998. It is our studied conclusion that the RTC correctly ruled against the right of respondent Remedios Oribello to demand the partition of the real property belonging to the late Tomas Oribello on the ground that she had not substantiated her right to the partition by preponderance of evidence. Before going further, it is relevant to relive the nature of the remedy of judicial partition. The proceeding under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is a judicial controversy between persons who, being co-owners or coparceners of common property, seek to secure a division or partition thereof among themselves, giving to each one of them the part corresponding to him.18 The object of partition is to enable those who own property as joint tenants, or coparceners, or tenants in common to put an end to the joint tenancy so as to vest in each a sole estate in specific property or an allotment in the lands or tenements.19 According to American jurisprudence:20 The right of compulsory partition, in the case of coparceners was the gift of the common law, but in the case of joint tenants and tenants in common it was first given by statutes. The common law, having established this right in favor of coparceners, because their relationship being created by it, and not by an act or choice of their own, as in the case of joint tenants and tenants in common, thought it reasonable that it should endure no

longer than the parties should be pleased with it; but at the same time deemed it expedient as well as just, that they should not be placed in worse condition by the partition, than if they had continued to enjoy their respective interests in the lands or property without a division. x x x [T]herefore, after the partition a warranty was annexed by the common law to each part, so that, if any one should be impleaded, she might vouch her sisters, or those who had been her coparceners at the time of the partition, or their heirs, and by this means also have their aid to deraign the warranty paramount, if any existed, annexed to the purchase of their ancestor. (citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary To accord with the nature of the remedy of judicial partition, there are two stages defined under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. The first relates to the determination of the rights of the parties to the property held in common. The second concerns the physical segregation of each party's just share in the property held in common. The second stage need not be gone into should the parties agree on the physical partition. As Justice Regalado discussed in De Mesa v. Court of Appeals:21 The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition either because a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a coownership does in truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties." In either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition shall be effected for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second phase may also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. Such an order is, to be sure, also final and appealable. In the decision ordering partition, the execution of that part of the judgment which will not necessitate any further proceedings may be enforced. Further proceedings, such as the appointment of commissioners to carry out the partition and the rendition and approval of the accounting, may be had without prejudice to the execution of that part of the judgment which needs no further proceedings. Thus, it has been held that execution was entirely proper to enforce the defendant's obligation to render an accounting and to exact payment of the money value of the plaintiffs' shares in the personal property and attorney's fees due defendants, as well as the costs of the suit and damages.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary In this case, the CA has declared that Remedios Oribello, being the adopted daughter of the late Toribio Oribello, was entitled to the judicial partition she hereby demanded by virtue of the decree of adoption of the CFI. Hence, it has remanded the case to the RTC for the second stage of the partition proceedings. The declaration of the CA in favor of Remedios Oribello was factually unwarranted. As the plaintiff, she had the burden of proof, as the party demanding the partition of property, to establish her right to a share in the property by preponderance of evidence, but she failed to provide the factual basis of her right to the partition warranted the dismissal of her claim for judicial partition. In its assailed judgment, the RTC found that Remedios Oribello did not satisfactorily establish her coownership of the properties left by the late Toribio Oribello, cogently observing as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary The combination of all those stated above prods this Court to conclude that Toribio Oribellodid not testify in the court hearing of February 18, 1974 in Special Proceeding No. R-94. As per record of the case, it was a certain Toribio Orivillo who testified on that date. In the earlier part of this Decision (page 12), this Court made the pronouncement that the namesToribio Orivillo, used in Special Proceeding No. R-94, and Toribio Oribello, used in Special Proceeding No. R-274, refer to the same person. Both names refer to the same person as they were meant to refer to the same physical person, but the physical person who physically appeared and actually testified before the Court of First Instance in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro on February 18, 1974 was not Toribio Oribello but one Toribio Orivilloor purporting to be one Toribio Orivillo, a person physically different from the physical Toribio Oribcllo. There are several reasons why. According to Atty. Jaravata, the spouses Orivillo were in a hurry to go back to the United States (TSN, November 17, 1997, page 6) which explained the reason why they were not able to sign the petition for adoption. The petition (Exhibit "J") is a one-page petition, typed double-spaced. It is accompanied by a one-page affidavit of consent to adoption executed by natural

parents Alfredo Selga and Amada Selga, also typed double-spaced. This one-page petition could be prepared within five minutes. It would not take ten minutes to prepare this one-page petition assuming the typist is a slow one. If spouses Orivillo were in a hurry to go back to the United States, a delay of ten minutes will not make much difference considering the fact that they were still in the offices of Atty. Jaravata in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. They were not in the airport about to take their flight to the United States. The second reason is that if both spouses were really there, they could have corrected the spelling of the surname, from Orivillo to Oribello. The third reason is that only one month separated the filing of the petition and its hearing. It would not be economical for the would-be-adopter, who was not shown to have been very rich but merely a sugar worker, to go to the United States in a hurry and then come back here in the Philippines within a period of just thirty (30) days, who, upon facts established in this case, did not show much interest in exercising parental authority over the supposedly-adopted child. She remained in Occidental Mindoro. If this Toribio Orivillo was portrayed as being an eager-beaver childless parent in coming back here in the Philippines within thirty days from departing the country in a hurry for the purpose of testifying in our court of law so that he could adopt said Remedios Selga and have the experience of exercising parental authority, the facts established in this case show that such portrayal was misleading and untruthful in that he never showed interest to such adoption. Neither did he show interest or anxiety over that child, Remedios Selga. The explanation of Atty. Ernesto Jaravata that they were in a hurry to go back to the United States was merely to justify the absence of the signatures of both spouses in the one-page petition. Fourth, in the hearing of February 18, 1974, if the real Toribio Oribello appeared in Court, he would have corrected his surname and he would have stated his citizenship. It would be unnatural for a person not to react when his surname is misspelled. Also, his citizenship was not stated just like in the petition. It is required in adoption cases to state the citizenship of the adopter because there are legal requirements to satisfy in case of a foreigner adopting a Filipino citizen. The petitioner Toribio Orivillo who testified in Special Proceeding No. R-94 was not the real Toribio Oribello who was born on April 16, 1910 in Agoo, La Union and who died on August 18, 1993 in Agoo, La Union. Somebody with the name Toribio Orivillo or purporting to be such stood for him and testified for him in the then Court of First Instance based in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro on February 18, 1974. As plaintiffs natural father said, Toribio Oribello did not know about the second adoption case (TSN, January 14, 1998, page 22). This Court concludes now without an iota of doubt that Toribio Oribello did not know also about the first adoption case (Special Proceeding No. R-94) just like the second one (Special Proceeding No. R-274). While the second part of the Rule on res inter alios actastates that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time, it may be received to prove a specific intent, plan or scheme. Under the circumstances, these were machinations orchestrated by Alfredo Selga as he himself expressly admitted with respect to the second adoption case. This case is an action for judicial partition. As stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, December 22, 1989, a judicial partition has two phases. The first phase is an inquiry as to whether there exists co-ownership of properties by several persons. The second phase is on the actual partition and accounting, if applicable. This Court finds that no-co-ownership exists between plaintiff and defendant. Hence, we cannot proceed to the second phase.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary The foregoing findings by the RTC, that the Tomas Orivillo who had legally adopted Remedios Oribello under the CFI's decree of adoption was not the same person as the Tomas Oribello whose property was the subject of her demand for judicial partition, were supported by the records. In finding so, the RTC did not interfere with the jurisdiction of the CFI as a court of equal rank and category, and did not negate the adoption decree, but simply determined whether or not the claim of Remedios Oribello to the partition of the property of Tomas Oribello was competently substantiated by preponderance of evidence. What the RTC thereby settled was only whether Remedios Oribello was a co-owner of the property with Berlinda Oribello, the widow of Tomas Oribello. The RTC, being the trial court with jurisdiction over the action for partition, undeniably possessed the fullest authority to hear and settle the conflicting claims of the parties. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; REINSTATES the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court rendered on March 30, 1998 dismissing Civil Case No. A-1757 entitled Remedios Oribello, represented by her Atty.-in-Fact Alfredo Selga v. Berlinda P. Oribello; and ORDERS respondent Remedios Oribello to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

G.R. No. 191416 MAYOR WILLIAM N. MAMBA, ATTY. FRANCISCO N. MAMBA, JR., ARIEL MALANA, NARDING AGGANGAN, JOMARI SAGALON, JUN CINABRE, FREDERICK BALIGOD, ROMMEL ENCOLLADO, JOSEPH TUMALIUAN, and RANDY DAYAG, Petitioners vs. LEOMAR BUENO, Respondent DECISION REYES, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC,2 seeking to annul and set aside the Decision3 dated January 18, 2010 and Resolution4 dated March 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 00038, which granted the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo filed by Leomar Bueno (respondent) against Mayor William N. Mamba (Mayor Mamba), Atty. Francisco N. Mamba, Jr. (Atty. Mamba), Ariel Malana (Malana), Narding Aggangan (Aggangan), Jomari Sagalon (Sagalon), Jun Cinabre (Cinabre), Frederick Baligod (Baligod), Rommel Encollado (Encollado ), Joseph Tumaliuan (Tumaliuan), and Randy Dayag (Dayag) (collectively, the petitioners). The Facts On June 13, 2009, the canteen owned by Emelita N. Mamba (Emelita) in Tuao, Cagayan was robbed. Emelita is the mother of Mayor Mamba, then Mayor of the Municipality of Tuao, Cagayan and Atty. Mamba, then a Malacafiang official.5 The Task Force Lingkod Bayan (Task Force), an agency created by the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuao to help the local police force in maintaining peace and order in the municipality, undertook an investigation on the robbery.6 On June 14, 2009, several members of the Task Force, Malana, Aggangan and Sagalon, together with barangay officials Cinabre and Encollado, went to the. house of the respondent, then still a minor, to invite him for questioning on his supposed involvement in the robbery. The respondent and his mother, Maritess Bueno (Maritess ), acceded to the invitation. Thereupon, the respondent was brought to the Tuao police station.7 The parties gave different accounts of what happened after the respondent was brought to the Tuao police station. The petitioners claim that: When they reached the Tuao police station, there were no police investigators or any representative from the local Social Welfare and Development (SWD) office and, hence, the investigation could not proceed. At that time, Raymund Rodriguez (Raymund), allegedly an eyewitness to the robbery, was at the police station. Raymund pointed to the respondent as among those who robbed the store; the respondent then told Raymund that he would kill him for ratting him out.8 The petitioners allege that prior to the robbery of the canteen, the respondent approached Raymund and his brother Robin and proposed to them that they rob the canteen. The latter, however, declined the offer. Later that night, Raymund saw the respondent and Lorenzo Haber (Haber) robbing the canteen. Thereafter, Robin reported the incident to the Task Force.9 The petitioners further claim that at the time of the robbery, Mayor Mamba and Atty. Mamba were not around since they previously left Tuao, Cagayan for Manila on June 10, 2009. Mayor Mamba was on official leave for 10 days, from June 10, 2009 until June 20, 2009, while Atty. Mamba had to report for work in Malacañang. 10 The respondent's custody was then referred to the Task Force. Haber was later invited to the police station for questioning regarding his involvement in the robbery. However, his custody was likewise referred to the Task Force since there were still no police investigators.11 On June 17, 2009, Atty. Mamba arrived in Tuao, Cagayan. While going out of his residence, Maritess approached Atty. Mamba and asked him about her son. Atty. Mamba told her that he does not know her son and that if the respondent indeed committed a crime, she should not tolerate what her son was doing.12 On June 18, 2009, while the members of the Task Force were on their way to bring the respondent and Haber to the police station, they were met by Police Superintendent Joselito Buenaobra (P/Supt. Buenaobra) of the

Philippine National Police (PNP) Cagayan Regional Office. Thereafter, the respondent's custody was transferred to the PNP Cagayan Regional Office.13 Maritess then went to the office of Mayor Mamba, but she was told to come back at later date since Mayor Mamba was still on official leave. When Mayor Mamba arrived in Tuao on June 20, 2009, a conference was immediately held. Maritess requested that the members of the Task Force be brought to Mayor Mamba's office. Almost all of the members of the Task Force arrived. However, Maritess was unable to pinpoint who among them took custody of his son. Mayor Mamba then advised her to file a complaint in court should she be able to identify the responsible persons.14 On the other hand, the respondent alleges that: At around 3:00 p.m. of June 14, 2009, Tumaliuan and Dayag, both members of the Task Force, upon the order of Baligod, then Municipal Administrator of Tuao, fetched the respondent from the police station and brought .him to Mayor Mamba's house.15 Sometime in the evening of even date, the respondent was made to board a white van driven by Aggangan. Inside the van, he was beaten with a gun by Malana, who later threatened him that he would be killed. Thereafter, he was brought back to Mayor Mamba's house.16 That same evening, Haber, likewise a minor, was invited by the barangay captain in his place, accompanied by about 10 barangay tanods and two police officers, for questioning as regards the robbery of the canteen. Haber was brought to the police station where he spent the night.17 On June 15, 2009, Haber was brought to Mayor Mamba's house. The respondent and Haber were then tortured to force them to admit to their involvement in the robbery. They were made to roll on the grass while being kicked and beaten with a cue stick by Malana; hot wax was poured over their bodies to force them to admit to the robbery, but they denied any involvement therein. Thereafter, they were blindfolded and were questioned by Atty. Mamba regarding the robbery of the canteen. When his blindfold was taken off, the respondent saw Atty. Mamba sitting nearby.18 On June 16, 2009, Malana brought the respondent and Haber, together with Robin and Raymund, to the office of the Task Force, where they all spent the night.19 Meanwhile, Maritess went to the Tuao police station to look for her son; she was told that the respondent was brought to Mayor Mamba's house. However, when Maritess went to Mayor Mamba's house, she was not permitted to see her son. Maritess was able to talk to Mayor Mamba who told her that she should not condone the acts of her son. Maritess then sought the assistance of P/Supt. Buenaobra regarding the respondent's disappearance from the police station. The PNP Cagayan Regional Office was then preparing a case for habeas corpus when the respondent was released on June 18, 2009 to the local SWD office.20 Maritess then sought the assistance of the Regional Office of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Cagayan as regards the case of the respondent.21 On August 25, 2009, the respondent, assisted by the CHR, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with the CA.22 On September 14, 2009, the CA, gave due course to the petition and directed the issuance of the writ of amparo. On September 23, 2009, the petitioners filed their verified return.23 A summary hearing was thereafter conducted by the CA. The respondent presented in evidence his own testimony and the testimonies of Dr. Odessa B. Tiangco (Dr. Tiangco) of the Cagayan Valley Medical Center, provindal social welfare officer Elvira Layus (Layus), and Maritess.24 The petitioners, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Cinabre, Encollado, Baligod, and Robin.25 The CA further issued subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to and heard the testimony of P/Supt. Buenaobra.26 On January 18, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision,27 the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Petition for a Writ of Amparo filed by [the respondent] is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly: 1. [The petitioners] are hereby enjoined from doing any act of physical or psychological violence that would harm or threaten [the respondent] and his family, including those who assisted him in the preparation of this present petition, especially the [CHR], Regional Office No. 02, Cagayan and his witnesses;

2. The Head of the PNP Regional Office of Cagayan, whoever is the incumbent, is hereby ordered to continue the investigation on the violation done against [the respondent], and using extraordinary diligence, to furnish this Court with a report regarding the said investigation. The investigation must be commenced as soon as possible but not more than 30 days from the receipt of this Decision. 3. [Mayor Mamba] is hereby ordered to provide assistance to the above PNP investigation including but not limited to the act of furnishing and/or providing the latter a list of the members of the Task Force who had direct involvement in the violation of [the respondent's] rights to life, liberty and security, including their identities and whereabouts, and to allow the investigation to run its course unhindered or influenced. He is further ordered to update and furnish this Court of the actions he has done or will be doing regarding this directive. 4. The Head of the PNP Regional Office of Cagayan and [Mayor Mamba] are ordered to update this Court regarding their reportorial duty under this Decision within ten (10) days from the commencement of the investigation, and thereafter, to make a quarterly report regarding the said investigation. The investigation should be completed within one year from the receipt of this Decision; 5. All findings resulting from the said investigation should be made available to [the respondent] and his counsel should they consider the same necessary to aid them in the filing of appropriate actions, criminal or otherwise, against those who are responsible for the violation of the former's rights. Failure to comply with the above will render the Head of the PNP Regional Office of Cagayan and [Mayor Mamba] liable for contempt of this Court. The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to also furnish the Head of the PNP Regional Office of Cagayan a copy of this Decision. SO ORDERED.28 The CA opined that the respondent's rights to liberty and security were undeniably undermined when he was invited by the members of the Task Force for investigation and was brought to Mayor Mamba's house from the Tuao police station.29 It further pointed out that notwithstanding that Mayor Mamba was not in Tuao when the incident happened, he is still accountable since he· failed to show sufficient action to protect the respondent's rights; that Mayor Mamba failed to acknowledge the irregularity of the acts of the members of the Task Force or to identify those who were responsible for the violation of the respondent's rights. The CA further ruled that it was incumbent upon Atty. Mamba, being a public servant, to ensure that the respondent's constitutional rights are not violated.30 The CA pointed out that the "invitation" extended to the respondent by the members of the Task Force was in the nature of an arrest as the real purpose of the same was to make him answer to the heist committed the night before. The CA ruled that the same amounted to an invalid warrantless arrest since the circumstances of the case do not fall within the purview of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.31 Further, the CA ruled that although the respondent was subsequently released and that he failed to establish that there is an impending danger of physical harm to him or his family, the refusal of the respondent officials of the local government of Tuao, especially Mayor Mamba, to admit and address the irregularities committed by the members of the Task Force is tantamount to a continuing violation of the respondent's right to security. 32 The petitioners sought a reconsideration33 of the Decision dated January 18, 2010, but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution34 dated March 2, 2010. Hence, this petition. The petitioners claim that the CA erred in issuing the writ of amparo in favor of the respondent. They insist that the respondent, who was then the suspect in the robbery of the canteen, was not illegally detained or tortured; that the members of the Task Force merely invited him for questioning as to his involvement in the robbery.35 They allege that the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo is not the proper remedy available to the respondent since the present laws provide ample recourse to him for the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security. They also maintain that the respondent's rights to life, liberty and security are not under threat since he and his mother stated that they are not afraid of the petitioners.36

The petitioners further aver that it was improper for the CA to direct the PNP Cagayan Regional Office to conduct further investigation on the incident since P/Supt. Buenaobra had already testified for the respondent during the summary hearing conducted by the CA.37 They also maintain that Mayor Mamba and Atty. Mamba had nothing to do with the alleged violation of the rights of the respondent since they were not in Tuao at the time of the incident. That when Mayor Mamba returned to Tuao, he immediately met Maritess to discuss the incident, but the latter failed to identify the persons involved in the incident.38 On the other hand, the respondent claims that this petition was filed beyond the reglementary period. He claims that under Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, an appeal from the final judgment or order must be filed with this Court within five working days from notice of the adverse judgment. The respondent avers that the petitioners, instead of immediately filing a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, opted to file a motion for reconsideration with the CA, which is a prohibited pleading since it is dilatory.39 The respondent further maintains that the CA did not err when it directed the issuance of a writ of amparo in his favor. He claims that the writ of amparo is an appropriate remedy in his case since it covers enforced disappearances; that his illegal warrantless arrest is covered by the term "enforced disappearances."40 Issues Essentially, the issues for the Court's consideration are the following: first, whether the petition for review on certiorari before the Court was filed within the reglementary period; and second, whether the CA erred in granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo. Ruling of the Court The petition is devoid of merit. First Issue: Timeliness of the petition The petition for review on certiorari before the Court, which assails the CA's grant of the writ of amparo, contrary to the respondent's assertion, was filed on time. Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides that: Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise question of fact or law or both. The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the adverse judgment.1âwphi1 The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases. There is nothing in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC which proscribes the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the final judgment or order that grants or denies a writ of amparo. Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC only prohibits the following pleadings and motions: Sec. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are prohibited: a. Motion to dismiss; b. Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings; c. Dilatory motion for postponement; d. Motion for a bill of particulars; e. Counterclaim or cross-claim; f. Third-party complaint; g. Reply;

h. Motion to declare respondent in default; i. Intervention; j. Memorandum; k. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and l. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order. What is prohibited under Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC are motions for reconsideration directed against interlocutory orders or interim relief orders, not those assailing the final judgment or order. The pleadings and motions enumerated in Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC would unnecessarily cause delays in the proceedings; they are, thus, proscribed since they would run counter to the summary nature of the rule on the writ of amparo. A motion seeking a reconsideration of a final judgment or order in such case, obviously, no longer affects the proceedings. Moreover, the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to A.M. No. 07-9-12- SC insofar as it is not inconsistent with the latter.41 Accordingly, there being no express prohibition to the contrary, the rules on motions for reconsideration under the Rules of Court apply suppletorily to the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Nevertheless, considering that under Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a party is only given five working days from the date of notice of the adverse judgment within which to appeal to this Court through a petition· for review on certiorari, a motion for reconsideration of a final judgment or order must likewise be filed within the same period. Thereafter, from the order denying or granting the motion for reconsideration, the party concerned may file an appeal to the Court via a Rule 45 petition within five working days from notice of the order pursuant to the fresh period rule.42 The petitioners received a copy of the CA's Decision dated January 18, 2010 on January 20, 2010.43 They, thus, have until January 27, 2010 to either file a motion for reconsideration with the CA or an appeal to this Court through a Rule 45 petition.44 On January 25, 2010, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA.45 The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated March 2, 2010, a copy of which was received by the petitioners' counsel on March 8, 2010.46 Thus, the petitioners had until March 15, 2010 within which to appeal to this Court.47 The petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari on March 12, 2010.48 Thus, contrary to the respondent's claim, this petition was filed within the reglementary period. Second Issue: Propriety of the grant of the writ of amparo The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.49 Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC specifically delimits the coverage of the writ of amparo to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, viz.: Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose rights to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.50 On the other hand, enforced disappearance has been defined by the Court as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.51 In an amparo action, the parties must establish their respective claims by substantial evidence.52 Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person charged.53 After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court affirms the factual findings of the CA, which is largely based on the respondent's evidence. Verily, the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent meets the requisite evidentiary threshold. To corroborate his allegations, the respondent presented the testimony of Haber who, during the hearing conducted by the CA on October 6, 2009, averred that on June 15, 2009, he was brought to Mayor Mamba's house where he and the respondent were tortured. Haber testified that hot wax was dripped onto their bodies while they were handcuffed; that they were kicked and beaten with a cue stick and an alcohol container. Thereafter, Haber testified that he and the respondent were brought to the guardhouse where they were suffocated by placing plastic bags on their heads. He also testified that a wire was inserted inside their penises.54 The respondent's claim was further corroborated by Dr. Tiangco who testified that on June 18, 2009, she examined the respondent and found that he suffered several injuries and multiple second degree bums. Layus also attested that she saw the scars incurred by the respondent on his head, arms, and back when she interviewed him on July 26, 2009.55 In contrast, the respective testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioners merely consisted in denial and the allegation that the respondent was indeed the one who robbed the canteen.56 Clearly, against the positive testimony of the respondent, which was corroborated by his witnesses, the petitioners' allegations must fail. It is settled that denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and without evidentiary value.57 Further, even if the respondent was indeed guilty of a crime, assuming it to be true, it does not justify his immediate apprehension, in the guise of an invitation, and the subsequent acts of torture inflicted on him. What is clear is that the respondent was able to prove by substantial evidence that he was apprehended by the members of the Task Force, illegally detained, and tortured. It was further established that Maritess would not have seen his son if not for the timely intercession of P/Supt. Buenaobra of the PNP Cagayan Regional Office. The members of the Task Force apprehended and detained the respondent to make him admit to his complicity in the heist the night before sans the benefit of legal and judicial processes. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the respondent, after four days of detention, had been released by the members of the Task Force on June 18, 2009. This fact alone, however, does not negate the propriety of the grant of a writ of amparo. In the seminal case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al.,58 the Court emphasized that the writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action.59 Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still issue in the respondent's favor notwithstanding that he has already been released from detention. In such case, the writ of amparo is issued to facilitate the punishment of those behind the illegal detention through subsequent investigation and action. More importantly, the writ of amparo likewise covers violations of the right to security.1âwphi1 At the core of the guarantee of the right to security, as embodied in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, 60 is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person, i.e., houses, papers and effects, against unwarranted government intrusion. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution not only limits the State's power over a person's home and possession, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself.61 The right to security is separate and distinct from the right to life. The right to life guarantees essentially the right to be alive - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned. On the other hand, the right to security is a guarantee of the secure quality of life, i.e., the life, to which each person has a right, is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. 62 In Manalo, the Court further opined that the right to security of person yields various permutations of the exercise of the right, such as freedom from fear or, in the arnparo context, freedom from threat; a guarantee of

bodily and psychological integrity or security; and a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government.63 As regards the right to security, in the sense of the guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government, the Court explained: In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the rights to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. x x x.64 (Citation omitted and emphasis in the original) In this case, it is incumbent upon the petitioners, who all hold positions in the local government of Tuao, to conduct, at the very least, an investigation on the alleged illegal arrest, illegal detention and torture of the respondent. The petitioners, nevertheless, claim that the Office of the Mayor and the police station of Tuao, unknown to the respondent, are conducting an investigation on the incident. However, other than their bare assertion, they failed to present any evidence that would prove the supposed investigation. Mere allegation is not a fact. Absent any evidence that would corroborate the said claim, it is a mere allegation that does not have any probative value. Verily, the petitioners failed to point to any specific measures undertaken by them to effectively investigate the irregularities alleged by the respondent and to prosecute those who are responsible therefor. Worse, the illegal detention and torture suffered by the respondent were perpetrated by the members of the Task Force themselves. Instead of effectively addressing the irregularities committed against the respondent, the petitioners seemingly justify the illegal arrest and detention and infliction of bodily harm upon the respondent by stating that the latter is a habitual delinquent and was the one responsible for the robbery of the canteen. As stated earlier, even if the respondent committed a crime, the petitioners, as local government officials, are not at liberty to disregard the respondent's constitutionally guaranteed rights to life, liberty and security. It is quite unfortunate that the petitioners, all local government officials, are the very ones who are infringing on the respondent's fundamental rights to life, liberty and security. Clearly, there is substantial evidence in this case that would warrant the conclusion that the respondent's right to security, as a guarantee of protection by the government, was violated. Accordingly, the CA correctly issued the writ of amparo in favor of the respondent. The petitioners' claim that it was improper for the CA to direct the PNP Cagayan Regional Office to conduct further investigation on the respondent's allegations deserves scant consideration. There is simply no basis to the petitioners' claim that the PNP Cagayan Regional Office would not be expected to be objective in their investigation since representatives therefrom testified during the summary hearing. It bears stressing that P/Supt. Buenaobra was not a witness for the respondent; he testified pursuant to the subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum issued by the CA. Further, as aptly pointed out by the CA, it would be more reasonable for the PNP Cagayan Regional Office to conduct the said investigation since it has already commenced an initial investigation on the incident. Nevertheless, there is a need to modify the reliefs granted by the CA in favor of the respondent. The CA's Decision was promulgated in 2010.1âwphi1 Since then, Mayor Mamba's term of office as Mayor of Tuao had ended and, presumably, a new individual is now occupying the position of Mayor of Tuao. Accordingly, the incumbent Mayor of Tuao should be directed to likewise provide assistance to the investigation to be conducted by the PNP Cagayan Regional Office. Further, it has not been manifested in this case that the PNP Cagayan Regional Office had commenced the investigation on the incident that was ordered by the CA. WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 18, 2010 and Resolution dated March 2, 2010 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 00038 are hereby AFFIRMED subject to the following terms:

1. Petitioners Mayor William N. Mamba, Atty. Francisco N. Mamba, Jr., Ariel Malana, Narding Aggangan, Jomari Sagalon, Jun Cinabre, Frederick Baligod, Rommel Encollado, Joseph Tumaliuan, and Randy Dayag and the incumbent local government officials of Tuao, Cagayan are hereby enjoined from doing any act of physical or psychological violence on respondent Leomar Bueno and his family including those who assisted him in the filing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo with the Court of Appeals; 2. The Regional Director of the Philippine National Police – Cagayan Regional Office, whoever is the incumbent, is hereby directed to conduct an investigation, using extraordinary diligence, on the violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the respondent when he was supposedly arrested on June 14, 2009 by the members of the Task Force Lingkod Bayan until he was released on June 18, 2009; 3. The petitioners and the incumbent officials of the local government of Tuao are hereby ordered to provide genuine and effective assistance to the investigation to be conducted by the Philippine National Police - Cagayan Regional Office, including but not limited to furnishing and/or providing the latter a list of the members of the Task Force Lingkod Bayan and all those who had a direct involvement in the violation of the respondent's rights to life, liberty and security, including their whereabouts, and to allow the investigation to run its course unhindered; 4. The investigation shall be completed not later than six (6) months from receipt of this Decision; and within thirty (30) days after completion of the investigation, the Regional Director of the Philippine National Police - Cagayan Regional Office shall submit a full report on the results of the investigation to the Court of Appeals; 5. The Court of Appeals, within thirty (30) days from the submission by the Regional Director of the Philippine National Police - Cagayan Regional Office of his full report, is directed to submit to this Court its own report and recommendations on the investigation and furnish a copy thereof to the incumbent Regional Director of the Philippine National Police - Cagayan Regional Office, the petitioners, and the respondent; and 6. This case is referred back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of (a) the investigation to be conducted by the Philippine National Police - Cagayan Regional Office, (b) the actions to be undertaken in pursuance of the said investigation, and (c) the validation of the results. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 211010 VICTORIA SEGOVIA, RUEL LAGO, CLARIESSE JAMI CHAN, REPRESENTING THE CARLESS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; GABRIEL ANASTACIO, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER GRACE ANASTACIO, DENNIS ORLANDOSANGALANG, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER MAY ALILI SANGALANG, MARIA PAULINA CASTANEDA, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHERATRICIAANN CASTANEDA, REPRESENTING THE CHILDREN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CHILDREN OF THE FUTURE; AND RENATO PINEDA, JR., ARON KERR MENGUITO, MAY ALILI SANGALANG, AND GLYNDA BATHAN BATERINA, REPRESENTING CAROWNERS WHO WOULD RATHER NOT HA VE CARS IF GOOD PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION WERE SAFE, CONVENIENT, ACCESSIBLE AND RELIABLE, Petitioners vs THE CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, AND ITS COMMISSIONERS MARY ANN LUCILLE SERING, HEHERSON ALVAREZANDNADAREV SANO; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC) REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE JOSEPH ABAYA; DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) AND THE ROAD BOARD, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE ROGELIO SINGSON; DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE MANUEL ROXAS; DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE RAMON PAJE; DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE FLORENCIO ABAD; METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA), REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, FRANCIS TOLENTINO; DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (DA), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE PROCESO ALCALA; AND JOHN DOES, REPRESENTING AS YET UNNAMED LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE, JURIDICAL ENTITIES, AND NATURAL PERSONS WHO FAIL OR REFUSE TO IMPLEMENT THE LAW OR COOPERATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW, Respondents DECISION CAGUIOA, J.: This is a petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus to compel the implementation of the following environmental laws and executive issuances - Republic Act No. (RA) 97291 (Climate Change Act), and RA 87492 (Clean Air Act); Executive Order No. 7743 (BO 774); AO 254, s. 20094 (AO 254); and Administrative Order No. 171, s. 20075 (AO 171). Accordingly, the Petitioners seek to compel: (a) the public respondents to: (1) implement the Road Sharing Principle in all roads; (2) divide all roads lengthwise, one-half (½) for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling, the other half for Filipino-made transport vehicles; (3) submit a time-bound action plan to implement the Road Sharing Principle throughout the country; (b) the Office of the President, Cabinet officials and public employees of Cabinet members to reduce their fuel consumption by fifty percent (50%) and to take public transportation fifty percent (50%) of the time; (c) Public respondent DPWH to demarcate and delineate the road right-of-way in all roads and sidewalks; and (d) Public respondent DBM to instantly release funds for Road Users' Tax.6 The Facts To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, Former President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued AO 171 which created the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change (PTFCC) on February 20, 2007. This body was reorganized through BO 774, which designated the President as Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries as members of the Task Force. EO 774 expressed what is now referred to by the petitioners as the "Road Sharing Principle." Its Section 9(a) reads: Section 9. Task Group on Fossil Fuels. - (a) To reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) shall lead a Task Group to reform the transportation sector. The new paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For this purpose, the system shall favor nonmotorized locomotion and collective transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered mini-train).

In 2009, AO 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC (as lead agency for the Task Group on Fossil Fuels or TGFF) to formulate a national Environmentally Sustainable Transport Strategy (EST) for the Philippines. The Road Sharing Principle is similarly mentioned, thus: SECTION 4. Functions of the TGFF- In addition to the functions provided in EO 774, the TGFF shall initiate and pursue the formulation of the National EST Strategy for the Philippines. Specifically, the TGFF shall perform the following functions: (a) Reform the transport sector to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. The new paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the manpowered mini-train). xxxx Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate Change Commission which absorbed the functions of the PTFCC and became the lead policy-making body of the government which shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action plans of the government relating to climate change.7 Herein petitioners wrote respondents regarding their pleas for implementation of the Road Sharing Principle, demanding the reform of the road and transportation system in the whole country within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said letter - foremost, through the bifurcation of roads and the reduction of official and government fuel consumption by fifty percent (50%).8 Claiming to have not received a response, they filed this petition. The Petition Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children, who in turn represent "Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if good public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable". They claim that they are entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs due to the alleged failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by environmental laws, and violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos.9 These identified violations10 include: (a) The government's violation of "atmospheric trust" as provided under Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution, and thoughtless extravagance in the midst of acute public want under Article 25 of the Civil Code for failure to reduce personal and official consumption of fossil fuels by at least fifty percent (50%); (b) DOTC and DPWH's failure to implement the Road Sharing Principle under EO 774; (c) DA's failure to devote public open spaces along sidewalks, roads and parking lots to sustainable urban farming as mandated by Section 12(b)11 f EO 774; (d) DILG's failure to coordinate with local government units (LGUs) to guide them on the Road Sharing Principle under Section 9(g)12 of EO 774; (e) DENR's failure to reduce air pollutant emissions; and lastly, (f) DBM's failure to make available Road Users' Tax for purposes stated in Section 9(e)13 of EO 774. In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and executive issuances resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology,14 and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, and air" by the government without due process of law.15 They also decry the "unequal" protection of laws in the prevailing scheme, claiming that ninety-eight percent (98%) of Filipinos are discriminated against by the law when the car-owning two percent (2%) is given almost all of the road space and while large budgets are allocated for construction and maintenance of roads, hardly any budget is given for sidewalks, bike lanes and non-motorized transportation systems.16 Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment seeking the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. 17 Moreover, respondents argue that petitioners are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for. Specifically, respondents assert that petitioners are not entitled to a writ of kalikasan because they failed to show that the public respondents are guilty of an unlawful act or omission; state the environmental law/s

violated; show environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants of two or more cities; and prove that non- implementation of Road Sharing Principle will cause environmental damage. Respondents likewise assert that petitioners are similarly not entitled to a Continuing Mandamus because: (a) there is no showing of a direct or personal injury or a clear legal right to the thing demanded; (b) the writ will not compel a discretionary act or anything not in a public officer's duty to do (i.e. the manner by which the Road Sharing Principle will be applied; and to compel DA to exercise jurisdiction over roadside lands); and (c) DBM cannot be compelled to make an instant release of funds as the same requires an appropriation made by law (Article VI, Section 29[1] of the Constitution) and the use of the Road Users' Tax (more appropriately, the Motor Vehicle Users' Charge) requires prior approval of the Road Board.18 In any event, respondents denied the specific violations alleged in the petition, stating that they have taken and continue to take measures to improve the traffic situation in Philippine roads and to improve the environment condition - through projects and programs such as: priority tagging of expenditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport System which is aimed to decongest major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike Service Programs, and Urban ReGreening Programs. These projects are individually and jointly implemented by the public respondents to improve the traffic condition and mitigate the effects of motorized vehicles on the environment.19 Contrary to petitioners' claims, public respondents assert that they consider the impact of the transport sector on the environment, as shown in the Philippine National Implementation Plan on Environment Improvement in the Transport Sector which targets air pollution improvement actions, greenhouse gases emission mitigation, and updating of noise pollution standards for the transport sector. In response, petitioner filed their Reply, substantially reiterating the arguments they raised in the Petition. ISSUES From the foregoing submissions, the main issues for resolution are: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition; 2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts; and 3. Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue. RULING The petition must be dismissed. Procedural Issues Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases20 (RPEC), respondents argue that the petitioners failed to show that they have the requisite standing to file the petition, being representatives of a rather amorphous sector of society and without a concrete interest or injury.21 Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as citizens, taxpayers, and representatives; that the rules on standing had been relaxed following the decision in Oposa v. Factoran;22 and that, in any event, legal standing is a procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in its discretion.23 The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws. 24 This has been confirmed by this Court's rulings in Arigo v. Swift,25 and International Service for the Acquisition of AgriBioTech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines).26 However, it bears noting that there is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ; 27 and a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission. 28 Respondents also seek the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the petitioners failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, reasoning that since a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan must be

filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals,29 then the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is applicable.30 Petitioners, on the other hand, cite the same provision and argue that direct recourse to this Court is available, and that the provision shows that the remedy to environmental damage should not be limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the lower courts.31 The respondents' argument does not persuade. Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.32 At the very least, the magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is allowed where it is dictated by public welfare.1âwphi1 Given that the RPEC allows direct resort to this Court,33 it is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought directly before it. Requisites for issuance of Writs of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus We find that the petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs prayed for. For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur: 1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; 2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and 3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. 34 It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated.35 In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology. While there can be no disagreement with the general propositions put forth by the petitioners on the correlation of air quality and public health, petitioners have not been able to show that respondents are guilty of violation or neglect of environmental laws that causes or contributes to bad air quality. Notably, apart from bare allegations, petitioners were not able to show that respondents failed to execute any of the laws petitioners cited. In fact, apart from adducing expert testimony on the adverse effects of air pollution on public health, the petitioners did not go beyond mere allegation in establishing the unlawful acts or omissions on the part of the public respondents that have a causal link or reasonable connection to the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules, as required of petitions of this nature.36 Moreover, the National Air Quality Status Report for 2005-2007 (NAQSR) submitted by the petitioners belies their claim that the DENR failed to reduce air pollutant emissions - in fact, the NAQSR shows that the National Ambient Total Suspended Particulates (TSP) value used to determine air quality has steadily declined from 2004 to 2007,37and while the values still exceed the air quality guideline value, it has remained on this same downward trend until as recently as 2011.38 On the other hand, public respondents sufficiently showed that they did not unlawfully refuse to implement or neglect the laws, executive and administrative orders as claimed by the petitioners. Projects and programs that seek to improve air quality were undertaken by the respondents, jointly and in coordination with stakeholders, such as: priority tagging of expenditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport

System which is aimed to decongest major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, AntiColorum, Mobile Bike Service Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs. In fact, the same NAQSR submitted by the petitioners show that the DENR was, and is, taking concrete steps to improve national air quality, such as information campaigns, free emission testing to complement the antismoke-belching program and other programs to reduce emissions from industrial smokestacks and from open burning of waste.39 The efforts of local governments and administrative regions in conjunction with other · executive agencies and stakeholders are also outlined.40 Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue. Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for continuing mandamus as follows: RULES WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus.-When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the respondents to be entitled to the writ.1âwphi1 While the requirements of standing had been liberalized in environmental cases, the general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus.41 Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a principle. It cannot be considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of public respondents to determine the manner by which this principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary,42 and the official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other.43 This Court cannot but note that this is precisely the thrust of the petition - to compel the respondents to act one way to implement the Road Sharing Principle - to bifurcate all roads in the country to devote half to sidewalk and bicycling, and the other to Filipino-made transport - when there is nothing in EO 774, AO 254 and allied issuances that require that specific course of action in order to implement the same. Their good intentions notwithstanding, the petitioners cannot supplant the executive department's discretion with their own through this petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus. In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to perform any act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that specifically enjoins the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the respondents were able to show that they were and are actively implementing projects and programs that seek to improve air quality.1âwphi1 At its core, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act - the manner of implementation of the Road Sharing Principle. Clearly, petitioners' preferred specific course of action (i.e. the bifurcation of roads to devote for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling and Filipino-made transport vehicles) to implement the Road Sharing Principle finds no textual basis in law or executive issuances for it to be considered an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the necessary conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of discretion of the executive as to how the principle enunciated in

an executive issuance relating to the environment is best implemented. Clearly, the determination of the means to be taken by the executive in implementing or actualizing any stated legislative or executive policy relating to the environment requires the use of discretion. Absent a showing that the executive is guilty of "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority,"44 the general rule applies that discretion cannot be checked via this petition for continuing mandamus. Hence, the continuing mandamus cannot issue.1âwphi1 Road Users' Tax Finally, petitioners seek to compel DBM to release the Road Users' Tax to fund the reform of the road and transportation system and the implementation of the Road Sharing Principle. It bears clarifying that the Road Users' Tax mentioned in Section 9(e) of EO 774, apparently reiterated in Section 5 of AO 254 is the Special Vehicle Pollution Control Fund component of the Motor Vehicle Users' . Charge ("MVUC') imposed on owners of motor vehicles in RA 8794, otherwise known as the Road Users' Tax Law. By the express provisions of the aforementioned law, the amounts in the special trust accounts of the MVUC are earmarked solely and used exclusively (1) for road maintenance and the improvement of the road drainage, (2) for the installation of adequate and efficient traffic lights and road safety devices, and (3) for the air pollution control, and their utilization are subject to the management of the Road Board.45 Verily, the petitioners' demand for the immediate and unilateral release of the Road Users' Tax by the DBM to support the petitioners' operationalization of this Road Sharing Principle has no basis in law. The executive issuances relied upon by the petitioner do not rise to the level of law that can supplant the provisions of RA 8794 that require the approval of the Road Board for the use of the monies in the trust fund. In other words, the provisions on the release of funds by the DBM as provided in EO 774 and AO 254 are necessarily subject to the conditions set forth in RA 8794. Notably, RA 9729, as amended by RA 10174, provides for the establishment for the People's Survival Fund46 that may be tapped for adaptation activities, which similarly require approval from the PSF Board.47 That notwithstanding, the claim made by the petitioners that hardly any budget is allotted to mitigating environmental pollution is belied by the priority given to programs aimed at addressing and mitigating climate change that the DBM and the CCC had been tagging and tracking as priority expenditures since 2013. 48 With the coordination of the DILG, this priority tagging and tracking is cascaded down to the local budget management of local government units.49 Other causes of action As previously discussed, the petitioners' failure to show any violation on the part of the respondents renders it unnecessary to rule on other allegations of violation that the petitioners rely upon as causes of action against the public respondents. In fine, the allegations and supporting evidence in the petition fall short in showing an actual or threatened violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology arising from an unlawful act or omission by, or any unlawful neglect on the part of, the respondents that would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 203254 DR. JOY MARGARTE LEE, Petitioner vs. P/SUPT. NERI A ILAGAN, Respondent DECISION PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in SP No. 12-71527, which extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of respondent Police Superintendent Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan). The Facts In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data3 dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter's condominium, rested for a while and thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was missing.4 On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter's office regarding a purported sex video (subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail.5 During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office and walked away.6 Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262,7 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).8 Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.9 Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data10 dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagan’s digital camera, as well as the negative and/or original of the subject video and copies thereof, and to file a verified written return within five (5) working days from date of receipt thereof. In her Verified Return11 dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept the memory card of the digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred that she only did so to utilize the same as evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan. She also admitted that her relationship with Ilagan started sometime in 2003 and ended under disturbing circumstances in August 2011, and that she only happened to discover the subject video when Ilagan left his camera in her condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagan’s petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data should be dismissed because: (a) its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan.12 The RTC Ruling In a Decision13 dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor, and accordingly, ordered the implementing officer to turn-over copies of the subject video to him, and enjoined Lee from further reproducing the same.14 The RTC did not give credence to Lee’s defense that she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan, finding that her acts of reproducing the subject video and showing it to other people, i.e., the NAPOLCOM officers, violated the latter’s right to privacy in life and caused him to suffer humiliation and mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC opined that Lee’s use of the subject video as evidence in the various cases she filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its reproduction. Nevertheless, the RTC clarified that it is only ruling on the return of the aforesaid video and not on its admissibility before other tribunals.15 Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.

The Issue Before the Court The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan. The Court’s Ruling The petition is meritorious. A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances.16 It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals,17 which is defined as "the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself."18 As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as "a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party." Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, "[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party." In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.[[19]] Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. 20 In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.21 In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security.1âwphi1 Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case. In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude22 that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends - say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan' s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan.23 Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the R TC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196049

June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition. The Facts Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3 Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6 The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10SC): Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. – (a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. xxxx Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki. Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12 In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage. Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot preempt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision. On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24 The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27 The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the

verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision. The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. 30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31 The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained: [t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34 The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding. Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41 Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46 The Issues Petitioner raises the following legal issues: (1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy. (3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Ruling of the Court We grant the petition. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48 I. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50 To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59 A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen. A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the

party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62 Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65 There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. II. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." 67 Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied) Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71 Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75— it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage. When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry. III. In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara. Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court. Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.

The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce. The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91 The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry. Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy. In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code. For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1 However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment

nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago." Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision. SO ORDERED.