Spec Case.docx

G.R. No. L-14921

December 31, 1960

DOLORES B. GUICO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. PABLO G. BAUTISTA, ET. AL., defendants-appellees. P.M. Beltran, M.B. Bautista and R.E. Gonzales for appellants. M.H. de Joya, Primicias and Del Castillo for appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.: This is an action for liquidation and partition of the estate left by the spouses Mariano Bautista and Gertrudes Garcia, filed on October 20, 1956 by plaintiffs Dolores B. Guico, et al., against defendants Pablo G. Bautista, et al., legitimate grandchildren and children, respectively, of said deceased spouses. The complaint alleged inter alia that Mariano G. Bautista died intestate on December 5, 1947 and that his properties had already been extrajudicially partitioned among his heirs; that Gertrudes Garcia likewise died intestate on August 31, 1956 leaving as her legitimate heirs plaintiffs and defendants; that said Gertrudes Garcia, during her lifetime, made several deeds of donation of some of her properties in favor of all the defendants, but did not provide that the properties donated would not be subject to collation, so that the donees are legally bound to bring into the mass of the estate by way of collation the value of the properties received by them in order that the net hereditary estate may be divided equally among the heirs; and that the deceased Gertrudes Garcia left outstanding obligations to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and the G.A. Machineries, Inc. On a motion to dismiss filed by defendants alleging, among other things, that the action was premature because it is admitted in the complaint that the deceased left certain debts, the lower court dismissed the complaint on that ground without prejudice and without costs. From the order of dismissal, plaintiffs appealed to this Court, urging that their action for partition and liquidation may be maintained, notwithstanding that there are pending

obligations of the estate, subject to the taking of adequate measures either for the payment or security of its creditors. We are inclined to hold at the lower court that until all the debts of the estate in question are paid, appellants' action for partition and liquidation is premature. There is no question that the law allows the partition of the estate of a deceased person by the heirs, extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for petition, without the filing of a special proceeding and the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of the settlement of said estate, but this they may do only "if the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians" (sec. 1, Rule 74). The reason is that were the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled (Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317; Macalinao vs. Valdez, et al., 95 Phil., 318; 50 Off. Gaz., 3041; Intestate Estate of Rufina Mercado vs. Magtibay, et al., 96 Phil., 383). The situation is different, however, where the deceased left pending obligations. In such cases, such obligations must be first paid or compounded with the creditors before the estate can be divided among the heirs; and unless they reach an amicable settlement as to how such obligations should be settled, the estate would inevitably be submitted to administration for the payment of such debts. As compared to ordinary partition, the regular estate proceeding offer the advantage of requiring all creditors of the deceased to disclose themselves and submit their respective claims within a comparatively short period (12 months under Rule 87, unless claims are contingent), otherwise, they are forever barred; while in ordinary judicial partitions the creditors 1claims are only extinguished by the expiration of the period extinctive prescription. An heir, therefore, may have an interest in making sure that the share allocated to him will be freed from invisible claims, so that creditors may not later appear and initiate the very estate proceeding sought to be avoided, and he may properly object to an action for partition this ground. Unless, therefore, all the heirs are agreeable to assuming personal liability for all the decedent's obligations, those known as well as those undisclosed, regular estate proceedings can not be avoided.

It is no argument that under regular administration, the estate will incur greater expenses. As a matter of fact, plaintiffs-appellants include in their complaint a prayer for the appointment of an administrator during the pendency of this case, in view of the existence of debts of the estate and the lack of agreement among the heirs as to how debts would be paid.lawphil.net Appellants claim that there is nothing that would prevent the trial court from directing and ordering that the pending obligations of the estate be paid first, or that they should constitute as liens on the respective shares to be received by the heirs. In other words, appellants propose that the administration of the estate for the purpose of paying off its debts be accomplished right in this partition suit, with either the Court performing the duties of the administrator, or an administrator appointed to take care of such debts, as prayed for in their complaint. Obviously, an ordinary action for partition can not be converted into a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased, without compliance with the procedure outlined by Rules 79-90 of the rules of Court, especially the provisions on publication and notice to creditors. As we see it, appellants' major objective in filing this action for partition is to have an early determination of the question whether or not the donation inter vivos received by the defendants from the deceased are subject to collation. But there is no reason why this question can not be determined just as expeditiously in special proceeding, because even before the known debts of the estate are settled and paid and pending the expiration for the filing of other claims, the issue can, upon motion of the heirs, be set for hearing, tried, and definitely settled. Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur. G.R. No. L-6044

November 24, 1952

FORTUNATA VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, BENJAMIN RODRIGUEZ, MERCEDES RODRIGUEZ DE HALLARE, LUZ RODRIGUEZ DE CARLOS AND ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, petitioners, vs.

HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and ABELARDO RODRIGUEZ,respondents. Godofredo C. Montesines and Antonio Rodriguez for petitioners. Lorenzo Sumulong, Guillermo Romero and Antonio C. Masaquel for respondent. Ramon Ozaeta as amicus curiae. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the order of respondent Judge dated August 11, 1952, wherein after overruling the opposition to the institution of the intestate estate proceedings of the late Flaviano Rodriguez, he appointed Abelardo Rodriguez administrator of the estate upon filing a bond in the sum of P2,000. It is averred in the petition that Flaviano Rodriguez died on February 8, 1944, at Parañaque, Rizal, leaving an estate with a value of P10,000; that the surviving heirs are the widow, Fortunata Vda. de Rodriguez, and six children who are the petitioners and respondent Abelardo Rodriguez all the heirs, who were then already of age, entered into a verbal agreement whereby they agreed not to make a liquidation of the estate but to place it under the administration of the widow with the understanding that each of the six children would be entitled to receive a portion of the income in equal shares from year to year for the needs of their families provided that they do not exceed the participation to which they are entitled; that on March 19, 1952, or eight years after the death of Flaviano Rodriguez, respondent Abelardo Rodriguez filed a petition for administration of their intestate estate of said deceased in spite of his knowledge that the estate had no debts and all the heirs were of age; that on June 2, 1952, the other heirs, petitioners herein, objected to the petition invoking the rule that if the estate is free from obligations and the heirs are all of age, no administration proceedings shall be allowed; that on August 11, 1952, respondent Judge, after overruling the opposition, appointed Abelardo Rodriguez administrator of the estate upon filing the requisite bond. Respondents herein, in answer to the petition, admitted the existence of a verbal agreement entered into between the heirs in 1944, wherein they agreed not to liquidate the estate and to place it under the administration of the widow in view of the unsettled conditions then prevailing at the time, but they contend

that while that was the understanding the same was not carried out because in reality it was Benjamin Rodriguez, one of the petitioners herein, who took over the administration of the estate and in the discharge of his duties he failed and refused to give to respondent Abelardo Rodriguez his share in the income which he badly needed for the support of his family, for which reason he started the intestate proceedings which gave rise to the present petition for certiorari. The issue to be determined is whether respondent Judge acted properly in maintaining the administration proceedings and in appointing Abelardo Rodriguez as administrator of the estate notwithstanding the fact that the estate has no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all of age. Under section 1, rule 74 of the Rules of Court, if the decedent left no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. Construing the scope of said section 1, (formerly section 596, Act No. 190), this Court repeatedly held "that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317; Utulo vs. Pasion de Garcia, 66 Phil., 302). It, therefore, appears from said section 1, as construed by this Court, that when the estate has no pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration for the reason that it is superfluous or unnecessary, and in most cases long and costly, in which case the way left to the heirs is to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. But, is this pattern mandatory upon the heirs? Should the heirs be unable to agree on a settlement of the estate, do they have

to resort necessarily to an ordinary action of partition? Can they not choose to institute administration proceedings? Our answer is that section 1 does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as was done in other provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word may is used not only once but in the whole section which indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the heirs. The inquiry before us is not new. In a case where one of the heirs chose to institute administration proceedings in court, even if the estate had no debts, and the widow sought to dismiss the case invoking in support of her contention the doctrine enunciated in the cases already adverted to, this Court said: The principal ground of the opposition is that the heirs being of legal age, and their being no proof that there is any valid and effective credit against the deceased, no legal reason exists for the court to appoint an administrator, as prayed for in the petition, citing in support of this contention the doctrine enunciated in the case of Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa (17 Phil., 321); Bondad vs. Bondad (34 Phil., 232); Baldemor vs. Malangyaon (34 Phil., 367). It is true that, under section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whenever all the heirs of a person who died intestate are lawful age and legal capacity, and there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid, the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without court proceedings. But there is nothing in this section which prohibits said heirs from instituting special proceedings for the administration of the intestate estate if they cannot agree on the extrajudicial partition and appointment of the same. (Orozco vs. Garcia, 50 Phil., 149, 151.)

In this particular case, however, we find that the core of petitioners' objection is not that the heirs have erroneously instituted these administration proceedings but that the court erred in appointing Abelardo Rodriguez administrator of the estate. It is claimed that Abelardo Rodriguez was appointed administrator without the petitioners having been given an opportunity to be heard. But this claim has no basis it appearing that the parties had been duly heard before the court issued its order now complained of. It appears that both parties submitted the names of the persons they wanted to be appointed as administrator and the court made its choice only after weighing the fitness and qualifications of the persons recommended. Thus, on this point, the court said: The petitioner in this case appears to be qualified to act as administrator of the estate of the deceased Flaviano Rodriguez and does not possess any of the disqualifications. Moreover, he is one of the heirs left by the deceased. Inasmuch as one of the oppositors appear to be more qualified to act as administrator of the estate, the court is inclined to grant the petition presented by Abelardo Rodriguez. (Annex D) The petition is dismissed with costs. The preliminary injunction issued is hereby dissolved. Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo and Labrador, JJ. concur. G.R. No. L-6829

It appears that Rufina Mercado died intestate on September 20, 1949, survived by her second husband Eulogio Magtibay, her only living daughter Catalina Javier and the descendants of her two deceased daughters — all three daughters being of the first marriage. Shortly after Rufinas' death, these heirs made an extrajudicial partition of her properties. But alleging that there were some properties not included in the partition, one of the heirs, the said Catalina Javier, on August 15, 1952, petitioned the said Catalina Javier, on August 15, 1952, petitioned the court for letters of administration and the appointment of herself as administratrix. The other heirs opposed the petition on the ground that there was not necessity for subjecting the estate to judicial administration since, according to them, the decedent left no debts, all her properties had already been partitioned and the heirs were all of age or represented by guardian. But the Court overruled opposition and granted the petition. Hence this appeal. For the purpose of the appeal, it may be assumed that, as alleged by the appellees, not all the properties of the deceased have been divided among the heirs. But there being no question that the deceased left no debts and the heirs are all of age with the exception of one who, however, is represented by a guardian, the case comes squarely under section 1 of Rule 74, which reads:

December 29, 1954

Intestate Estate of RUFINA MERCADO, deceased. CATALINA JAVIER, petitioner-appellee, vs. EULOGIO MAGTIBAY and SOLEDAD MAGTIBAY DE HERNANDEZ, respondents-appellants. Javier and Javier for appellee. Ozaeta, Roxas, Lichauco and Picazo for appellants.

REYES, A., J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, granting letters of administration and appointing a judicial administratrix for the estate of the deceased Rufina Mercado.

SEC. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are presented by their judicial guardians, the parties any, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of as amended by Act administration within two years after the death of the decedent.

This rule provides for the partition of the estate of the deceased where no debts are due from it and the heirs are all of age or properly represented. But on the theory that the provision is not mandatory and does not prohibit recourse to an administration proceeding, one of the heirs in the present case insists on the issuance of letters of administration notwithstanding the opposition of the other heirs. The question, therefore, for determination is whether in a case like the present where recourse to partition without letters of administration is authorized, the estate — or what remain of it after the part already partitioned has been segregated — and nevertheless be subjected to an administration preceeding despite the opposition of the majority of the heirs. The question is not new. Time and again this Court has had to pass upon it in cases arising under section 596 (as amended by Act 2331) of the old Code of Civil Procedure, from which the precept embodied in the above copied provision of the present Rules of Court was taken Resolving that question in those cases, this Court has repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are bound to submit the property to judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court, "for in such the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superflous and unnecessary proceedings." (Utulo vs. Pasion, 66 Phil., 302 citing Ilustre Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; and Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., Phil., 317.) The words in quotation sum up the doctrine of the cases cited, which, though rendered under section 596 of the former code of civil procedure, has equal validity under section 1 of the Rule 74, because the two sections are fundamentally the same. It is, therefore, our view that, now as before, the rule is that where administration proceeding is unnecessary because the estate has no debts and the more expeditious remedy by partition is available the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit the estate to such proceeding. The rule harmonizes with the law of succession contained in the Civil Code under whose provisions "the right to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death," the heirs succeeding "immediately to all the property of the deceased ancestor . . . as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to

them a deed for the same before his death," so that as co-owners they may immediately, if the property is not burdened with debts, administer it joint or divide it among themselves. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321.) For, as was said in a case, since the property of the deceased belongs, from the moment of his death, to the heirs, "what reason can there be, " if there are no debts, "for the appointment of a judicial administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled" (Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317.) Withholding the inheritance from the heirs by subjecting it to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose, would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered as not infrequently happens.lawphil.net The rule , in our opinion, is fundamentally sound and should be adhered to rather than departed from. We cannot allow it to be overridden by the adverse ruling in Orozco vs. Garcia, 50 Phil., 149, which, as pointed out by counsel for the appellants, would appear to be the result of a misinterpretation of the following quotation from the decision in Castillo vs. Castillo and Quizon, 23 Phil., 364: . . . it is not a principle authorized by law that heirs of legal age may not demand by division of a real property, left them by their predecessor-ininterest and held by a co-heir, without first initiating special interstate proceedings during which a judicial administrator is to be appointed, who alone is vested with the personality to claim the property that belongs to the succession. On the contrary, such heirs are expressly authorized to do so, unless, for the reason of there being unpaid debts, judicial intervention becomes necessary, which was not alleged as a special defense in this suit. The court was in the Orozco case apparently led stray by the use of a double negative in the quotation and without good reason made to deviate from the doctrine repeatedly followed in its previous decisions. In any event, the doctrine was reaffirmed in the subsequent case of Utulo vs. Pasion, supra, and with this admonition: "We conceive of the powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of a doctrine so uniformly applied. We are convinced that if the court had followed it in all cases to which it has application, their files would not have been replete with unnecessary administration proceedings as they are now."

The trial court, however, chose to depart from the accepted doctrine in the mistaken belief that it had already been overruled by our decision in the case of Rodriguez vs. Tan, 92 Phil., 273, where the statement was made that section 1 of Rule 74 "does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons an ordinary action of partition." That statement, it should be noted, sanctions recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts only if, as heren expressly stated, the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition, and is thus a reaffirmance rather than a repudiation of the doctrine being in line with its policy that where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. This adequacy of the reasons given for the issuance of letter of administration in the Rodriguez case because it there found "that the core of petitioner's objection is that the heirs have erroneously instituted his administration proceeding but that the (lower) court erred in appointing Abelardo Rodriguez administrator of the estate "instead of the persons proposed by them. Proof that the doctrine has not been abandoned is its recent application in the case of Macalinao et al., vs. Valdez et al., * 50 Off Gaz., 3041, which is subsequently to the Rodriguez case. It appears that in that case of Macalinao the hearing of a land registration case had been ordered suspended until ownership of the property involved therein could be decided in the interstate proceedings which one of the heirs to the property (which was conjugal) agreed or was directed to institute, but that his heirs, in conjunction with her husband, instead of instituting such proceedings, filed an action for accounting, liquidation and partition. Objected to the defendants on their ground that the directive of the trial court was for the plaintiff to file an intestate proceeding, the action was ordered dismissed, but upon appeal this Court set aside the order of dismissal, saying: Section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 3167, provides that: 'When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered and liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the provisions of this Code relative to the administration and liquidation of the estates of the deceased persons, or in an ordinary liquidation and partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age

and legally capacitated, avail themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an extra judicial partition to them by this Code of proceeding to an extra judicial partition and liquidation of said property.' (emphasis supplied.) Expressly recognized by this legal provision, the ordinary action instituted herein by the appellants is even preferred to an intestate proceeding where the heirs are of age or duly represented, and the estate has no debts. 'When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administration.' (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.) As repeatedly held, 'when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court . . . . It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superflous and unnecessary proceedings' (Utulo vs. Pasion, 66 Phil., 302, 306, citing other cases). The fact that the lower court suspended the land registration case upon appellant' manifestation that an interstate proceeding would be filed, did not legally deprive them of availing themselves of the proper judicial (and for that matter less burdensome) remedy, especially in the absence of any law requiring that the estates of deceased persons must always be brought to the courts for administration and liquidation. At any rate, the essential basis of the order suspending the registration case was the necessity for determining the ownership of controverted land. The theory of the lower court in dismissing the present case, would prefer form to substance. In an attempt to justify these administration proceedings the appellee confesses in her brief that she has been obliged to institute the same in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits, because she proposes to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of conjugal property made by they surviving husband of the deceased in favor of one of the heirs Soledad Sales Magtibay de Hernandez, and the validity of those transfers could be ventilated in these proceedings without need of bringing a separate action before the purpose. But if the aims is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits, that same objective could be achieved in an action for partition, where the validity of those transfers could also be

required into in line with our decision in Monserrat vs. Ibañez et al., G.R. No. L3367, promulgated May 24, 1950 where we said: Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rukles of Court apply', and that in this case 'the parties are at loggerheads as to the Corpuz of the hereditary estate because' respondents' succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate'. The argument is unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir. Moreover, if appellee's purpose is really to avoid a multiplicity of suits, she has herself nullified that objective by actually filing, as reported by the appellants and admitted by her, a separate action for the annulment of the property transfers already referred to. There appearing to be no good reason fore burdening of the estate of the deceased Rufina Mercado with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding, the trial court was not justified in issuing letters of administration. With this ruling, it is no longer necessary to decide which, as between the appellee Catalina Javier and the widower Eulogio Magtibay, should be preferred in the appointment of an administrator. Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, and the appointment of the appellee Catalina Javier as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Rufina Mercado revoked. With costs against the appellee.

DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, 2002[1] Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124[2] which dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations claims of the parties which they sought to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case: On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo.[3] On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.[4] On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.[5] On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli, [6] later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.[7] On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights[8] over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964. [9] In the deed, Portugals siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor.[10] On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo.[11] On February 18, 1984, Paz died. On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur. ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, respondent.

On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person[12] adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172[13] in Portugals name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 159813[14] was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.

Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint[15] against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication. Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondents name and to issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them. Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows: a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid? b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.? c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs. d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint.[16] (Underscoring supplied) After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001, [17] after giving an account of the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.[18]

In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held: The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar. xxx In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein. However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the former is to establish, while in the latter, it is to enforce, a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action. The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs cause to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).[19] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied). Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial courts ratio decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to this Courts following ruling in Cario v. Cario,[20] viz: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of

the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x x[21] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied). The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,[22] thus affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the case. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting the appellate court to have erred when I.

Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court found Cario to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise: To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cario, whose death benefits was the bone of contention between the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cario contracted two marriages with said two women during his lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cario was thus, merely an incident to the question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending parties, herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendantappellee, both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special

. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause of action. II. . . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cario, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render judgment based on the evidence presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied). Petitioners thus prayed as follows: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the pronouncements in Cario apply, a decision be entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the determination of heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila. Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.[25] (Underscoring supplied).

Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cario shows; that Cario allows courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate courts ruling, they had established their status as compulsory heirs. In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name. In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,[26] the therein petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, owners-claimants of the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in this wise: But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of itexcept the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchaysthat they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .[27] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied). On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an improper recourse, found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[29] this Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance of letters of administration before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent. The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on Marcosas request, her nephew Arminio Rivera. While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa. Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa. On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination was whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam. This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found substantially correct the trial courts findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof; and that [t]he other documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children of said decedent.

This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower court should not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding. In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedents maternal aunthalf sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the courts order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said judgment. On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other issues, whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court, this Court held that [i]n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents estate, a court should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal court, citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.[32] This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein private respondentConcordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice, and declared her an heir of the decedent. In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate court directed that the records of the case be archived.

Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her. After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties agreement to suspend action or resolution on Juanitas motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for trial. Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the ground that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion. Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court. The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate proceedings had not been legally terminated as Juanitas share under the project of partition had not been delivered to her. Explained this Court: As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol

vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460461).[34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied). This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to continue because it involves no longer the two lots adjudicated to Juanita. The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased. In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on February 15, 1988 [35] the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.[36] Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.[37]

presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial. In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners,[39] the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit: 1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid; 2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.); 3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs; 4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint.[40] WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.

No costs.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,[38] to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact

Panganiban, JJ., concur.

SO ORDERED. (Chairman),

Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Corona, and Garcia,