Corpo 3.docx

1. HI-YIELD REALTY, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CESAR O. UNTALAN, in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-MAKATI, BRANCH 142, HONORIO TORRES & SONS, INC., and ROBERTO H. TORRES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 168863 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO,* CHICO-NAZARIO,* LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* and BRION, JJ.

Promulgated: June 23, 2009

Stephanie, all surnamed Torres, the Register of Deeds of Marikina and Quezon City, and petitioner Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. (Hi-Yield). It was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-892 with Branch 148 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On September 15, 2003, petitioner moved to dismiss the petition on grounds of improper venue and payment of insufficient docket fees. The RTC denied said motion in an Order[4] dated January 22, 2004. The trial court held that the case was, in nature, a real action in the form of a derivative suit cognizable by a special commercial court pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 00-11-03SC.[5] Petitioner sought reconsideration, but its motion was denied in an Order[6] dated April 27, 2004. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated March 10, 2005, the appellate court agreed with the RTC that the case was a derivative suit. It further ruled that the prayer for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure proceedings was merely incidental to the main action. The dispositive portion of said decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is hereby DISMISSED. However, public respondent is hereby DIRECTED to instruct his Clerk of Court to compute the properdocket fees and thereafter, to order the private respondent to pay the same IMMEDIATELY.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x DECISION QUISUMBING, J.:

SO ORDERED.[7] This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision[1] dated March 10, 2005 and Resolution[2] dated May 26, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83919. The appellate court had dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner and denied its reconsideration.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration[8] was denied in a Resolution dated May 26, 2005.

The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed.

I.

On July 31, 2003, Roberto H. Torres (Roberto), for and on behalf of Honorio Torres & Sons, Inc. (HTSI), filed a Petition for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage and Foreclosure Sale[3] over two parcels of land located in Marikina and Quezon City. The suit was filed against Leonora, Ma. Theresa, Glenn and

Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE AGAINST HI-YIELD FOR IMPROPER VENUE DESPITE FINDINGS BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE ACTION IS A REAL ACTION. 1

II. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AS AGAINST HI-YIELD EVEN IF THE JOINDER OF PARTIES IN THE COMPLAINT VIOLATED THE RULES ON VENUE. III. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ANNULMENT OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE AND FORECLOSURE SALE IN THE COMPLAINT IS MERELY INCIDENTAL [TO] THE DERIVATIVE SUIT.[9] The pivotal issues for resolution are as follows: (1) whether venue was properly laid; (2) whether there was proper joinder of parties; and (3) whether the action to annul the real estate mortgage and foreclosure sale is a mere incident of the derivative suit. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion on the Court of Appeals for not dismissing the case against it even as the trial court found the same to be a real action. It explains that the rule on venue under the Rules of Court prevails over the rule prescribing the venue for intra-corporate controversies; hence, HTSI erred when it filed its suit only in Makatiwhen the lands subjects of the case are in Marikina and Quezon City. Further, petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in ruling that the action is mainly a derivative suit and the annulment of real estate mortgage and foreclosure sale is merely incidental thereto. It points out that the caption of the case, substance of the allegations, and relief prayed for revealed that the main thrust of the action is to recover the lands. Lastly, petitioner asserts that it should be dropped as a party to the case for it has been wrongly impleaded as a non-stockholder defendant in the intra-corporate dispute. On the other hand, respondents maintain that the action is primarily a derivative suit to redress the alleged unauthorized acts of its corporate officers and major stockholders in connection with the lands. They postulate that the nullification of

the mortgage and foreclosure sale would just be a logical consequence of a decision adverse to said officers and stockholders. After careful consideration, we are in agreement that the petition must be dismissed. A petition for certiorari is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[10] Petitioner sought a review of the trial courts Orders dated January 22, 2004 and April 27, 2004 via a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In rendering the assailed decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals was acting under its concurrent jurisdiction to entertain petitions for certiorari under paragraph 2,[11] Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, if erroneous, the decision and resolution of the appellate court should properly be assailed by means of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The distinction is clear: a petition for certiorari seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction while a petition for review on certiorari seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court a quo.[12] Indeed, this Court has often reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[13] In the case at hand, petitioner impetuously filed a petition for certiorari before us when a petition for review was available as a speedy and adequate remedy. Notably, petitioner filed the present petition 58[14] days after it received a copy of the assailed resolution dated May 26, 2005. To our mind, this belated action evidences petitioners effort to substitute for a lost appeal this petition for certiorari. For the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to lie by reason of grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility.[15] We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court in this case. 2

Simply, the resolution of the issues posed by petitioner rests on a determination of the nature of the petition filed by respondents in the RTC. Both the RTC and Court of Appeals ruled that the action is in the form of a derivative suit although captioned as a petition for annulment of real estate mortgage and foreclosure sale. A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action.[16] Under the Corporation Code, where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of directors or trustees. But an individual stockholder may be permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold control of the corporation. In such actions, the corporation is the real party-in-interest while the suing stockholder, on behalf of the corporation, is only a nominal party.[17] In the case of Filipinas Port Services, Inc. v. Go,[18] we enumerated the foregoing requisites before a stockholder can file a derivative suit: a) the party bringing suit should be a shareholder as of the time of the act or transaction complained of, the number of his shares not being material; b) he has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has made a demand on the board of directors for the appropriate relief but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea; and c) the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the wrongdoing or harm having been, or being caused to the corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing the suit.[19] Even then, not every suit filed on behalf of the corporation is a derivative suit. For a derivative suit to prosper, the minority stockholder suing for and on behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all other stockholders similarly situated who may wish to join him in the suit.[20] The Court finds that Roberto had satisfied this requirement in paragraph five (5) of his petition which reads:

5. Individual petitioner, being a minority stockholder, is instituting the instant proceeding by way of a derivative suit to redress wrongs done to petitioner corporation and vindicate corporate rights due to the mismanagement and abuses committed against it by its officers and controlling stockholders, especially by respondent Leonora H. Torres (Leonora, for brevity) who, without authority from the Board of Directors, arrogated upon herself the power to bind petitioner corporation from incurring loan obligations and later allow company properties to be foreclosed as hereinafter set forth;[21] Further, while it is true that the complaining stockholder must satisfactorily show that he has exhausted all means to redress his grievances within the corporation; such remedy is no longer necessary where the corporation itself is under the complete control of the person against whom the suit is being filed. The reason is obvious: a demand upon the board to institute an action and prosecute the same effectively would have been useless and an exercise in futility. [22] Here, Roberto alleged in his petition that earnest efforts were made to reach a compromise among family members/stockholders before he filed the case. He also maintained that Leonora Torres held 55% of the outstanding shares while Ma. Theresa, Glenn and Stephanie excluded him from the affairs of the corporation. Even more glaring was the fact that from June 10, 1992, when the first mortgage deed was executed until July 23, 2002, when the properties mortgaged were foreclosed, the Board of Directors of HTSI did nothing to rectify the alleged unauthorized transactions of Leonora. Clearly, Roberto could not expect relief from the board. Derivative suits are governed by a special set of rules under A.M. No. 01-2-04SC[23] otherwise known as the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing IntraCorporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799.[24] Section 1,[25] Rule 1 thereof expressly lists derivative suits among the cases covered by it. As regards the venue of derivative suits, Section 5, Rule 1 of A.M. No. 01-2-04SC states: 3

SEC. 5. Venue. - All actions covered by these Rules shall be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation, partnership, or association concerned. Where the principal office of the corporation, partnership or association is registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission as Metro Manila, the action must be filed in the city or municipality where the head office is located. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it found that respondents correctly filed the derivative suit before the Makati RTC where HTSI had its principal office. There being no showing of any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals the other alleged errors will no longer be passed upon as mere errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a petition for certiorari. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated March 10, 2005 and the Resolution dated May 26, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83919 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

HENRY CHUA, JOSELITO S. JAYME, ERNESTO S. JAYME, and ELIEZER B. DE JESUS, Respondents. DECISION GARCIA, J.: Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated 19 January 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73827, reversing an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City and accordingly dismissing the derivative suit instituted by petitioner Eliodoro C. Cruz for and in behalf of the stockholders of co-petitioner Filipinas Port Services, Inc. (Filport, hereafter). The case is actually an intra-corporate dispute involving Filport, a domestic corporation engaged in stevedoring services with principal office in Davao City. It was initially instituted with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) where the case hibernated and remained unresolved for several years until it was overtaken by the enactment into law, on 19 July 2000, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code. From the SEC and consistent with R.A. No. 8799, the case was transferred to the RTC of Manila, Branch 14, sitting as a corporate court. Subsequently, upon respondents’ motion, the case eventually landed at the RTC of Davao City where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 28,552-2001. RTC-Davao City, Branch 10, ruled in favor of the petitioners prompting respondents to go to the CA in CAG.R. CV No. 73827. This time, the respondents prevailed, hence, this petition for review by the petitioners. The relevant facts:

2. G.R. No. 161886

March 16, 2007

FILIPINAS PORT SERVICES, INC., represented by stockholders, ELIODORO C. CRUZ and MINDANAO TERMINAL AND BROKERAGE SERVICES, INC., Petitioners, vs. VICTORIANO S. GO, ARSENIO LOPEZ CHUA, EDGAR C. TRINIDAD, HERMENEGILDO M. TRINIDAD, JESUS SYBICO, MARY JEAN D. CO,

On 4 September 1992, petitioner Eliodoro C. Cruz, Filport’s president from 1968 until he lost his bid for reelection as Filport’s president during the general stockholders’ meeting in 1991, wrote a letter2 to the corporation’s Board of Directors questioning the board’s creation of the following positions with a monthly remuneration of ₱13,050.00 each, and the election thereto of certain members of the board, to wit: Asst. Vice-President for Corporate Planning - Edgar C. Trinidad (Director) 4

Asst. Vice-President for Operations - Eliezer B. de Jesus (Director) Asst. Vice-President for Finance - Mary Jean D. Co (Director)

3. re-creation of the positions of Assistant Vice-Presidents (AVPs) for Corporate Planning, Operations, Finance and Administration, and the election thereto of board members Edgar C. Trinidad, Eliezer de Jesus, Mary Jean D. Co and Henry Chua, respectively; and

Asst. Vice-President for Administration - Henry Chua (Director) Special Asst. to the Chairman - Arsenio Lopez Chua (Director) Special Asst. to the President - Fortunato V. de Castro In his aforesaid letter, Cruz requested the board to take necessary action/actions to recover from those elected to the aforementioned positions the salaries they have received. On 15 September 1992, the board met and took up Cruz’s letter. The records do not show what specific action/actions the board had taken on the letter. Evidently, whatever action/actions the board took did not sit well with Cruz. On 14 June 1993, Cruz, purportedly in representation of Filport and its stockholders, among which is herein co-petitioner Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Services, Inc. (Minterbro), filed with the SEC a petition 3 which he describes as a derivative suit against the herein respondents who were then the incumbent members of Filport’s Board of Directors, for alleged acts of mismanagement detrimental to the interest of the corporation and its shareholders at large, namely: 1. creation of an executive committee in 1991 composed of seven (7) members of the board with compensation of ₱500.00 for each member per meeting, an office which, to Cruz, is not provided for in the by-laws of the corporation and whose function merely duplicates those of the President and General Manager; 2. increase in the emoluments of the Chairman, Vice-President, Treasurer and Assistant General Manager which increases are greatly disproportionate to the volume and character of the work of the directors holding said positions;

4. creation of the additional positions of Special Assistants to the President and the Board Chairman, with Fortunato V. de Castro and Arsenio Lopez Chua elected to the same, the directors elected/appointed thereto not doing any work to deserve the monthly remuneration of ₱13,050.00 each. In the same petition, docketed as SEC Case No. 06-93-4491, Cruz alleged that despite demands made upon the respondent members of the board of directors to desist from creating the positions in question and to account for the amounts incurred in creating the same, the demands were unheeded. Cruz thus prayed that the respondent members of the board of directors be made to pay Filport, jointly and severally, the sums of money variedly representing the damages incurred as a result of the creation of the offices/positions complained of and the aggregate amount of the questioned increased salaries. In their common Answer with Counterclaim,4 the respondents denied the allegations of mismanagement and materially averred as follows: 1. the creation of the executive committee and the grant of per diems for the attendance of each member are allowed under the by-laws of the corporation; 2. the increases in the salaries/emoluments of the Chairman, VicePresident, Treasurer and Assistant General Manager were well within the financial capacity of the corporation and well-deserved by the officers elected thereto; and 3. the positions of AVPs for Corporate Planning, Operations, Finance and Administration were already in existence during the tenure of Cruz as president of the corporation, and were merely recreated by the Board, adding that all those appointed to said positions of Assistant Vice Presidents, as well as the additional position of Special Assistants to the Chairman and the President, rendered services to deserve their compensation. 5

In the same Answer, respondents further averred that Cruz and his co-petitioner Minterbro, while admittedly stockholders of Filport, have no authority nor standing to bring the so-called "derivative suit" for and in behalf of the corporation; that respondent Mary Jean D. Co has already ceased to be a corporate director and so with Fortunato V. de Castro, one of those holding an assailed position; and that no demand to cease and desist from further committing the acts complained of was made upon the board. By way of affirmative defenses, respondents asserted that (1) the petition is not duly verified by petitioner Filport which is the real party-in-interest; (2) Filport, as represented by Cruz and Minterbro, failed to exhaust remedies for redress within the corporation before bringing the suit; and (3) the petition does not show that the stockholders bringing the suit are joined as nominal parties. In support of their counterclaim, respondents averred that Cruz filed the alleged derivative suit in bad faith and purely for harassment purposes on account of his non-reelection to the board in the 1991 general stockholders’ meeting. As earlier narrated, the derivative suit (SEC Case No. 06-93-4491) hibernated with the SEC for a long period of time. With the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the case was first turned over to the RTC of Manila, Branch 14, sitting as a corporate court. Thereafter, on respondents’ motion, it was eventually transferred to the RTC of Davao City whereat it was docketed as Civil Case No. 28,552-2001 and raffled to Branch 10 thereof. On 10 December 2001, RTC-Davao City rendered its decision5 in the case. Even as it found that (1) Filport’s Board of Directors has the power to create positions not provided for in the by-laws of the corporation since the board is the governing body; and (2) the increases in the salaries of the board chairman, vice-president, treasurer and assistant general manager are reasonable, the trial court nonetheless rendered judgment against the respondents by ordering the directors holding the positions of Assistant Vice President for Corporate Planning, Special Assistant to the President and Special Assistant to the Board Chairman to refund to the corporation the salaries they have received as such officers "considering that Filipinas Port Services is not a big corporation requiring multiple executive positions" and that said positions "were just created for accommodation." We quote the fallo of the trial court’s decision. WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering:

Edgar C. Trinidad under the third and fourth causes of action to restore to the corporation the total amount of salaries he received as assistant vice president for corporate planning; and likewise ordering Fortunato V. de Castro and Arsenio Lopez Chua under the fourth cause of action to restore to the corporation the salaries they each received as special assistants respectively to the president and board chairman. In case of insolvency of any or all of them, the members of the board who created their positions are subsidiarily liable. The counter claim is dismissed. From the adverse decision of the trial court, herein respondents went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 73827. In its decision6 of 19 January 2004, the CA, taking exceptions to the findings of the trial court that the creation of the positions of Assistant Vice President for Corporate Planning, Special Assistant to the President and Special Assistant to the Board Chairman was merely for accommodation purposes, granted the respondents’ appeal, reversed and set aside the appealed decision of the trial court and accordingly dismissed the so-called derivative suit filed by Cruz, et al., thus: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is GRANTED, the challenged decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 28,552-2001 with no pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Intrigued, and quite understandably, by the fact that, in its decision, the CA, before proceeding to address the merits of the appeal, prefaced its disposition with the statement reading "[T]he appeal is bereft of merit," 7 thereby contradicting the very fallo of its own decision and the discussions made in the body thereof, respondents filed with the appellate court a Motion For Nunc Pro Tunc Order,8 thereunder praying that the phrase "[T]he appeal is bereft of merit," be corrected to read "[T]he appeal is impressed with merit." In its resolution 9 of 23 April 2004, the CA granted the respondents’ motion and accordingly effected the desired correction. Hence, petitioners’ present recourse. 6

Petitioners assigned four (4) errors allegedly committed by the CA. For clarity, we shall formulate the issues as follows: 1. Whether the CA erred in holding that Filport’s Board of Directors acted within its powers in creating the executive committee and the positions of AVPs for Corporate Planning, Operations, Finance and Administration, and those of the Special Assistants to the President and the Board Chairman, each with corresponding remuneration, and in increasing the salaries of the positions of Board Chairman, Vice-President, Treasurer and Assistant General Manager; and 2. Whether the CA erred in finding that no evidence exists to prove that (a) the positions of AVP for Corporate Planning, Special Assistant to the President and Special Assistant to the Board Chairman were created merely for accommodation, and (b) the salaries/emoluments corresponding to said positions were actually paid to and received by the directors appointed thereto. For their part, respondents, aside from questioning the propriety of the instant petition as the same allegedly raises only questions of fact and not of law, also put in issue the purported derivative nature of the main suit initiated by petitioner Eliodoro C. Cruz allegedly in representation of and in behalf of Filport and its stockholders.

controlled and held by a board of directors. Thus, with the exception only of some powers expressly granted by law to stockholders (or members, in case of nonstock corporations), the board of directors (or trustees, in case of non-stock corporations) has the sole authority to determine policies, enter into contracts, and conduct the ordinary business of the corporation within the scope of its charter, i.e., its articles of incorporation, by-laws and relevant provisions of law. Verily, the authority of the board of directors is restricted to the management of the regular business affairs of the corporation, unless more extensive power is expressly conferred. The raison d’etre behind the conferment of corporate powers on the board of directors is not lost on the Court. Indeed, the concentration in the board of the powers of control of corporate business and of appointment of corporate officers and managers is necessary for efficiency in any large organization. Stockholders are too numerous, scattered and unfamiliar with the business of a corporation to conduct its business directly. And so the plan of corporate organization is for the stockholders to choose the directors who shall control and supervise the conduct of corporate business.13 In the present case, the board’s creation of the positions of Assistant Vice Presidents for Corporate Planning, Operations, Finance and Administration, and those of the Special Assistants to the President and the Board Chairman, was in accordance with the regular business operations of Filport as it is authorized to do so by the corporation’s by-laws, pursuant to the Corporation Code.

The petition is bereft of merit. It is axiomatic that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised and passed upon by the Court. Factual findings of the CA are binding and conclusive and will not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal.10 Of course, the rule is not cast in stone; it admits of certain exceptions, such as when the findings of fact of the appellate court are at variance with those of the trial court,11 as here. For this reason, and for a proper and complete resolution of the case, we shall delve into the records and reexamine the same.

The election of officers of a corporation is provided for under Section 25 of the Code which reads: Sec. 25. Corporate officers, quorum. – Immediately after their election, the directors of a corporation must formally organize by the election of a president, who shall be a director, a treasurer who may or may not be a director, a secretary who shall be a resident and citizen of the Philippines, and such other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws. (Emphasis supplied.) In turn, the amended Bylaws of Filport14 provides the following:

The governing body of a corporation is its board of directors. Section 23 of the Corporation Code12 explicitly provides that unless otherwise provided therein, the corporate powers of all corporations formed under the Code shall be exercised, all business conducted and all property of the corporation shall be

Officers of the corporation, as provided for by the by-laws, shall be elected by the board of directors at their first meeting after the election of Directors. xxx 7

The officers of the corporation shall be a Chairman of the Board, President, a Vice-President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, a General Manager and such other officers as the Board of Directors may from time to time provide, and these officers shall be elected to hold office until their successors are elected and qualified. (Emphasis supplied.) Likewise, the fixing of the corresponding remuneration for the positions in question is provided for in the same by-laws of the corporation, viz: xxx The Board of Directors shall fix the compensation of the officers and agents of the corporation. (Emphasis supplied.) Unfortunately, the bylaws of the corporation are silent as to the creation by its board of directors of an executive committee. Under Section 35 15 of the Corporation Code, the creation of an executive committee must be provided for in the bylaws of the corporation. Notwithstanding the silence of Filport’s bylaws on the matter, we cannot rule that the creation of the executive committee by the board of directors is illegal or unlawful. One reason is the absence of a showing as to the true nature and functions of said executive committee considering that the "executive committee," referred to in Section 35 of the Corporation Code which is as powerful as the board of directors and in effect acting for the board itself, should be distinguished from other committees which are within the competency of the board to create at anytime and whose actions require ratification and confirmation by the board.16 Another reason is that, ratiocinated by both the two (2) courts below, the Board of Directors has the power to create positions not provided for in Filport’s bylaws since the board is the corporation’s governing body, clearly upholding the power of its board to exercise its prerogatives in managing the business affairs of the corporation. As well, it may not be amiss to point out that, as testified to and admitted by petitioner Cruz himself, it was during his incumbency as Filport president that the executive committee in question was created, and that he was even the one who moved for the creation of the positions of the AVPs for Operations, Finance and Administration. By his acquiescence and/or ratification of the creation of the aforesaid offices, Cruz is virtually precluded from suing to declare such acts of the board as invalid or illegal. And it makes no difference that he sues in behalf of himself and of the other stockholders. Indeed, as his voice was not heard in

protest when he was still Filport’s president, raising a hue and cry only now leads to the inevitable conclusion that he did so out of spite and resentment for his non-reelection as president of the corporation. With regard to the increased emoluments of the Board Chairman, VicePresident, Treasurer and Assistant General Manager which are supposedly disproportionate to the volume and nature of their work, the Court, after a judicious scrutiny of the increase vis-à-vis the value of the services rendered to the corporation by the officers concerned, agrees with the findings of both the trial and appellate courts as to the reasonableness and fairness thereof. Continuing, petitioners contend that the CA did not appreciate their evidence as to the alleged acts of mismanagement by the then incumbent board. A perusal of the records, however, reveals that petitioners merely relied on the testimony of Cruz in support of their bold claim of mismanagement. To the mind of the Court, Cruz’ testimony on the matter of mismanagement is bereft of any foundation. As it were, his testimony consists merely of insinuations of alleged wrongdoings on the part of the board. Without more, petitioners’ posture of mismanagement must fall and with it goes their prayer to hold the respondents liable therefor. But even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that there was mismanagement resulting to corporate damages and/or business losses, still the respondents may not be held liable in the absence, as here, of a showing of bad faith in doing the acts complained of. If the cause of the losses is merely error in business judgment, not amounting to bad faith or negligence, directors and/or officers are not liable. 17 For them to be held accountable, the mismanagement and the resulting losses on account thereof are not the only matters to be proven; it is likewise necessary to show that the directors and/or officers acted in bad faith and with malice in doing the assailed acts. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill-will partaking of the nature of fraud.18 We have searched the records and nowhere do we find a "dishonest purpose" or "some moral obliquity," or "conscious doing of a wrong" on the part of the respondents that "partakes of the nature of fraud."

8

We thus extend concurrence to the following findings of the CA, affirmatory of those of the trial court: xxx As a matter of fact, it was during the term of appellee Cruz, as president and director, that the executive committee was created. What is more, it was appellee himself who moved for the creation of the positions of assistant vice presidents for operations, for finance, and for administration. He should not be heard to complain thereafter for similar corporate acts. The increase in the salaries of the board chairman, president, treasurer, and assistant general manager are indeed reasonable enough in view of the responsibilities assigned to them, and the special knowledge required, to be able to effectively discharge their respective functions and duties. Surely, factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on this Court. There is, however, a factual matter over which the CA and the trial court parted ways. We refer to the accommodation angle. The trial court was with petitioner Cruz in saying that the creation of the positions of the three (3) AVPs for Corporate Planning, Special Assistant to the President and Special Assistant to the Board Chairman, each with a salary of ₱13,050.00 a month, was merely for accommodation purposes considering that Filport is not a big corporation requiring multiple executive positions. Hence, the trial court’s order for said officers to return the amounts they received as compensation. On the other hand, the CA took issue with the trial court and ruled that Cruz’s accommodation theory is not based on facts and without any evidentiary substantiation. We concur with the line of the appellate court. For truly, aside from Cruz’s bare and self-serving testimony, no other evidence was presented to show the fact of "accommodation." By itself, the testimony of Cruz is not enough to support his claim that accommodation was the underlying factor behind the creation of the aforementioned three (3) positions. It is elementary in procedural law that bare allegations do not constitute evidence adequate to support a conclusion. It is basic in the rule of evidence that he who

alleges a fact bears the burden of proving it by the quantum of proof required. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court.19 The party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.20 Besides, the determination of the necessity for additional offices and/or positions in a corporation is a management prerogative which courts are not wont to review in the absence of any proof that such prerogative was exercised in bad faith or with malice.1awphi1.nét Indeed, it would be an improper judicial intrusion into the internal affairs of Filport were the Court to determine the propriety or impropriety of the creation of offices therein and the grant of salary increases to officers thereof. Such are corporate and/or business decisions which only the corporation’s Board of Directors can determine. So it is that in Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. v. CA,21 the Court unequivocally held: Questions of policy or of management are left solely to the honest decision of the board as the business manager of the corporation, and the court is without authority to substitute its judgment for that of the board, and as long as it acts in good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in the interest of the corporation, its orders are not reviewable by the courts. In a last-ditch attempt to salvage their cause, petitioners assert that the CA went beyond the issues raised in the court of origin when it ruled on the absence of receipt of actual payment of the salaries/emoluments pertaining to the positions of Assistant Vice-President for Corporate Planning, Special Assistant to the Board Chairman and Special Assistant to the President. Petitioners insist that the issue of nonpayment was never raised by the respondents before the trial court, as in fact, the latter allegedly admitted the same in their Answer With Counterclaim. We are not persuaded. By claiming that Filport suffered damages because the directors appointed to the assailed positions are not doing anything to deserve their compensation, petitioners are saddled with the burden of proving that salaries were actually 9

paid. Since the trial court, in effect, found that the petitioners successfully proved payment of the salaries when it directed the reimbursements of the same, respondents necessarily have to raise the issue on appeal. And the CA rightly resolved the issue when it found that no evidence of actual payment of the salaries in question was actually adduced. Respondents’ alleged admission of the fact of payment cannot be inferred from a reading of the pertinent portions of the parties’ respective initiatory pleadings. Respondents’ allegations in their Answer With Counterclaim that the officers corresponding to the positions created "performed the work called for in their positions" or "deserve their compensation," cannot be interpreted to mean that they were "actually paid" such compensation. Directly put, the averment that "one deserves one’s compensation" does not necessarily carry the implication that "such compensation was actually remitted or received." And because payment was not duly proven, there is no evidentiary or factual basis for the trial court to direct respondents to make reimbursements thereof to the corporation. This brings us to the respondents’ claim that the case filed by the petitioners before the SEC, which eventually landed in RTC-Davao City as Civil Case No. 28,552-2001, is not a derivative suit, as maintained by the petitioners. We sustain the petitioners. Under the Corporation Code, where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of directors or trustees. But an individual stockholder may be permitted to institute a derivative suit in behalf of the corporation in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or when a demand upon them to file the necessary action would be futile because they are the ones to be sued, or because they hold control of the corporation.22 In such actions, the corporation is the real party-in-interest while the suing stockholder, in behalf of the corporation, is only a nominal party.23 Here, the action below is principally for damages resulting from alleged mismanagement of the affairs of Filport by its directors/officers, it being alleged that the acts of mismanagement are detrimental to the interests of Filport. Thus, the injury complained of primarily pertains to the corporation so that the suit for relief should be by the corporation. However, since the ones to be sued are the directors/officers of the corporation itself, a stockholder, like petitioner Cruz, may validly institute a "derivative suit" to vindicate the alleged corporate injury, in

which case Cruz is only a nominal party while Filport is the real party-in-interest. For sure, in the prayer portion of petitioners’ petition before the SEC, the reliefs prayed were asked to be made in favor of Filport. Besides, the requisites before a derivative suit can be filed by a stockholder are present in this case, to wit: a) the party bringing suit should be a shareholder as of the time of the act or transaction complained of, the number of his shares not being material; b) he has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has made a demand on the board of directors for the appropriate relief but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea; and c) the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the wrongdoing or harm having been, or being caused to the corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing the suit.24 Indisputably, petitioner Cruz (1) is a stockholder of Filport; (2) he sought without success to have its board of directors remedy what he perceived as wrong when he wrote a letter requesting the board to do the necessary action in his complaint; and (3) the alleged wrong was in truth a wrong against the stockholders of the corporation generally, and not against Cruz or Minterbro, in particular. In the end, it is Filport, not Cruz which directly stands to benefit from the suit. And while it is true that the complaining stockholder must show to the satisfaction of the court that he has exhausted all the means within his reach to attain within the corporation itself the redress for his grievances, or actions in conformity to his wishes, nonetheless, where the corporation is under the complete control of the principal defendants, as here, there is no necessity of making a demand upon the directors. The reason is obvious: a demand upon the board to institute an action and prosecute the same effectively would have been useless and an exercise in futility. In fine, we rule and so hold that the petition filed with the SEC at the instance of Cruz, which ultimately found its way to the RTC of Davao City as Civil Case No. 28,552-2001, is a derivative suit of which Cruz has the necessary legal standing to institute. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the CA is AFFIRMED in all respects. 10

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 3. G.R. No. 85318

June 3, 1991

COMMART (PHILS.) INC., JESUS, CORAZON, ALBERTO, AND BERNARD all surnamed MAGLUTAC,petitioners, vs. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION and ALICE MAGLUTAC, respondents. Monsod, Tamargo & Associates for petitioners. Panganiban, Benitez, Barinaga & Bautista Law Offices for private respondent.

Sometime in June 1984, the two brothers agreed to go their separate ways, with Mariano being persuaded to sell to Jesus his shareholdings in Commart amounting to 25% of the outstanding capital stock. As part of the deal, a "Cooperative Agreement" was signed, between Commart (represented by Jesus) and Mariano, in which, among others, Commart ceded to Mariano or to an "acceptable entity" he may create, a portion of its business, with a pledge of mutual cooperation for a certain period so as to enable Mariano to get his own corporation off the ground, so to speak. Mariano's wife, Alice M. Maglutac (private respondent herein) who has been for years a stockholder and director of Commart, did not dispose of her shareholdings, and thus continued as such even after the sale of Mariano's equity. As broker and indentor, Commart's principal income came from commissions paid to it in U.S. dollars by foreign suppliers of fertilizers and other commodities imported by Planters Products, Inc. and other local importers.

PARAS, J.: Petitioners, in the instant petition for review on certiorari, seek the reversal of the en banc Order of the respondent Securities & Exchange Commission dated September 12, 1988 denying the petition for certiorari (SEC-EB No. 115-117) filed by the petitioners herein and ordering that the original complaint (SEC Case No. 2673) be remanded to the Securities Investigation and Clearing Department for further proceeding, for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction and in contravention of existing laws and jurisprudence. Commart (Phils.), Inc., (Command for short) is a corporation organized by two brothers, Jesus and Mariano Maglutac, to engage in the brokerage business for the importation of fertilizers and other products/commodities. Jesus T. Maglutac (Jesus for short) ran the company as president, chairman of the board, and chairman of the executive committee, while Mariano T. Maglutac (Mariano for short) served as executive vice-president and vice-chairman of the executive committee until April 1984.

Shortly after the sale of his equity in Commart to Jesus, Mariano allegedly discovered that for several years, Jesus and his wife Corazon (who was herself a director) had been siphoning and diverting to their private bank accounts in the United States and in Hongkong gargantuan amounts sliced off from commissions due Commart from some foreign suppliers. Consequently, on August 22, 1989, spouses Mariano and Alice Maglutac filed a complaint (SEC Case No. 2673) with the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC for short) against Jesus T. Maglutac, Victor Cipriano, Clemente Ramos, Carolina de los Reyes, Corazon Maglutac, Alberto Maglutac and Bernardo Maglutac (Jesus as Chairman) and the rest as members of the Board of Directors of Commart). In their Complaint, Mariano and Alice Maglutac alleged, among others, that "Jesus T. Maglutac, by means of secret arrangements with foreign suppliers, embodied in and evidenced by, correspondences and other documents discovered just recently, has been diverting into his private bank accounts and converting to his own personal benefit and advantage substantial portions of the commission income of the corporation, to the prejudice of the corporation, its stockholders and its creditors." (Petition, Annex B, p. 2; Rollo, p. 20) Thus, complainants prayed, among others, that judgment be rendered as follows ––

11

(a) Ordering respondents Jesus T. Maglutac, Corazon Maglutac, and Victor Cipriano to account for and to turn over or deliver to the Corporation the sum of US$2,539,918.97, or its equivalent in Philippine currency, with legal interest thereon from the respective dates of misappropriation or, at the very least, from date of filing of this suit, together with such other and further sums as may be proved to have likewise been misappropriated by them; (b) Ordering all the respondents, as members of the Board of Directors, to take such remedial steps as would protect the corporation from further depredation of its funds and property; (c) Declaring rescinded or annulled the disposition of complainant Mariano T. Maglutac's shares of stock to respondent Jesus T. Maglutac and ordering the restoration to the former of all his executive positions with all the rights and privileges thereunto appertaining; or, in the alternative, ordering that said complainant be paid the equivalent of onefourth of the actual market value of COMMART's present assets including goodwill, taking into consideration also the total sums misappropriated by respondents Jesus T. Maglutac, Corazon Maglutac, and Victor Cipriano which rightfully belonged to COMMART; and (d) Ordering respondents to pay complainants attorney's fees equivalent to twenty (20%) per cent of the total amounts awarded and recovered, plus such further sums as may be proved to have been incurred as and by way of litigation expenses. (pp. 24-25, Rollo) In response to the aforementioned Complaint, two Motions to Dismiss were filed. The records reveal that: (a) On October 17, 1984, Albert and Bernard Maglutac moved to dismiss on the ground that Mariano Maglutac has no capacity to sue and the complaint states no cause of action against them. (b) On October 20, 1984, Jesus & Corazon Maglutac likewise moved to dismiss on the ground that respondent Commission does not have jurisdiction over the nature of the suit.

These motions were opposed by complainants Alice and Mariano Maglutac. While said incidents were pending, complainants filed an Amended Complaint hereby Commart was impleaded as party complainant and praying that Commart be placed under receivership and the properties of Jesus & Corazon Maglutac and Victor Cipriano be attached. It is alleged in the Amended Complaint that complainant Commart is the corporation in whose behalf and for whose benefit this derivative suit is brought; that complainant Alice M. Maglutac is a minority stockholder in good standing of Commart while her husband complainant Mariano T. Maglutac was, likewise, until June 25, 1984 or thereabouts, a stockholder of Commart. Motions to dismiss said Amended Complaint were also filed by present petitioners and were also duly opposed by complainants Mariano and his wife. On May 10, 1985 Commart filed a Manifestation/Notice of Dismissal, manifesting that "it withdraws and dismisses the action taken in its behalf by complainants Mariano T. Maglutac and Alice M. Maglutac against all respondents." (Petition, Annex E, p. 3; Rollo, pp. 42-44) This was opposed by complainants on the ground, among other doctrines, that in a derivative suit the corporation is not allowed to be an active participant and has no control over the suit against the real defendants; that the suing shareholder has the right of control. On May 27, 1985, the Hearing Panel issued an Order denying all the motions to dismiss as well as the so called manifestation/notice of dismissal on the finding inter alia that –– Respondents maintain that the present action is basically one for annulment/rescission of sale with alternative prayer for reinstatement of employment status; that the action is not a derivative suit considering that the nature of the action is one for annulment and the fact that complainant Mariano T. Maglutac being a non-stockholder is not qualified to institute a derivative suit; that the action does not in any way make mention of an actionable wrong against respondents Albert and Bernard Maglutac, Clemente Ramos and Carolina de los Reyes. By way of opposition, complainants alleged that the instant action should be characterized as a minority stockholders' derivative suit; that 12

complainant Alice Maglutac is not merely a nominal party but a real party in interest; that Mariano T. Maglutac's rights as a stockholder have been injured through the machinations and maneuvering of respondent Jesus Maglutac; that the prayer for rescission or annulment of contract is merely the logical consequence of the exercise of jurisdiction by this Commission. Respondents' contention that the Commission has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action is devoid of merit. It is a cardinal principle in legal procedure that what determined the subject matter or the nature of the action are the facts a complaint as constituting the cause of action. A perusal of the complaint, as well as, the amended complaint would show that the action is one for "mismanagement", for the complainants alleged, inter alia, that ". . . respondent Jesus T. Maglutac, by means of secret arrangements with foreign suppliers embodied in, and evidenced by, correspondences and other documents discovered just recently, has been diverting into his private bank accounts and to his own personal benefit and advantage substantial portions of the commission income of the corporation, to the prejudice of the corporation, its stockholders and its creditors and enumerated immediately thereafter the alleged specific acts of mismanagement. Viewed therefrom, the Commission has jurisdiction. (pp. 127-128, Rollo) On June 18, 1985 Commart filed a motion for reconsideration and on August 29, 1985, Jesus and Corazon Maglutac also filed a similar motion to have the Order of May 27, 1985 reconsidered and set aside. These motions were duly opposed by Mariano and Alice Maglutac. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Hearing Panel issued on November 12, 1985, an Order modifying its previous order "by dismissing this case insofar as Mariano T. Maglutac is concerned" but affirming the said order "in all other respects." (Annex F to Petition, pp. 46, 49, Rollo) Not satisfied with such modification present petitioners as respondents in SEC Case No. 2673 went to the SEC en banc on a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction. They contend –– (a) that the Hearing Panel acted with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the case for failure of Alice Maglutac to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, and (b) that grave abuse was likewise committed in not dismissing the case on the

ground that the complaint did not show clearly that Alice Maglutac was a stockholder at the time the questioned transaction occurred. On September 12, 1988, the Commission en banc issued an Order denying the aforesaid petition and remanding the case to the Securities Investigation and Clearing Department for further proceedings. It ruled (a) that exhaustion of intracorporate remedy before filing suit "may be dispensed with where it is clear that it is unavailable or futile" as was the case here. (p. 2, Order of Sept. 12, 1988, Annex A to Petition) citing Everett v. Asia Banking Corp., 49 Phil. 512, and Republic Bank v. Cuaderno, 19 SCRA 671, and (b) that the mere allegation in the complaint that complainant is still a stockholder of Commart "is sufficient to vest jurisdiction to this Commission" but complainant must prove at the time of reception of evidence that she was also a stockholder at the time the acts complained of occurred. (Id., p. 3) Although complainant Alice Maglutac failed to exhaust an intra-corporate remedy before filing this case, the said condition precedent may be dispensed with where it is clear that it is unavailable or futile. Thus it was held that: Where the board of directors in a corporation is under the complete control of the principal defendants in the case and it is obvious that a demand upon the board of directors to institute an action and prosecute the same effectively would be useless, the action may be brought by one or more of the stockholders without such demand (Everett v. Asia Banking Corp., 49 Phil. 512; Republic Bank v. Cuaderno, et al., No. L-22399, March 30, 1967). A stockholder can file a derivative suit provided there is an allegation in the complaint that she is such at the time the acts complained of occurred, and at the time the suit is brought (Hawes v. Oakland, 14 Otto [104 U.S.], 450,456; S.C. 5972, 13 Fletcher 345, cited in Alvendia, The Law of Private Corporations in the Philippines, First Ed., p. 361). The requirement that said facts be pleaded is merely procedural although the necessity of the existence of these facts in order to give rise to the right of action is substantive (Pascual v. Del Saz Orozco, 19 Phil. 97). And equity considerations warrant the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure to the end that technicalities should not stand in the way of equitable relief (Vol. I, Francisco, Civil Procedure, 2nd ed., p. 157, 1973 ed.) Mere 13

allegation therefore that complainant is still a stockholder of Commart is sufficient to vest jurisdiction to this Commission. Complainant must however prove at the time of reception of evidence that she was also a stockholder at the time the acts complained of occurred. (pp. 10-11, Memorandum by public respondent) Hence, this petition. The petitioners invoke two grounds for reversal of the Order under review thereby raising these two issues, to wit: 1. Did the Securities and Exchange Commission err and/or commit "grave abuse of discretion" in denying the petition for certiorari and remanding the case for further proceedings despite the so-called "notice of dismissal" filed by Commart? 2. Did the Securities and Exchange Commission err and/or commit "grave abuse of discretion" in its handling of the "conflict of interest issue?" (Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 81) We find the petition devoid of merit. The complaint in SEC Case No. 2673, particularly paragraphs 2 to 9 under First Cause of Action, readily shows that it avers the diversion of corporate income into the private bank accounts of petitioner Jesus T. Maglutac and his wife. Likewise, the principal relief prayed for in the complaint is the recovery of a sum of money in favor of the corporation. This being the case, the complaint is definitely a derivative suit. Consequently, the SEC correctly held that the case was a minority stockholder's derivative suit and correctly sustained the hearing panel's denial — insofar as Alice Maglutac was concerned — of the motions to dismiss it. A derivative suit has been the principal defense of the minority shareholder against abuses by the majority.1âwphi1 It is a remedy designed by equity for those situations where the management, through fraud, neglect of duty, or other cause, declines to take the proper and necessary steps to assert the corporation's rights. Indeed, to grant to Commart the right of withdrawing or dismissing the suit, at the instance of majority stockholders and directors who themselves are the persons alleged to have committed breaches of trust against

the interest of the corporation, would be to emasculate the right of minority stockholders to seek redress for the corporation. To consider the Notice of Dismissal filed by Commart as quashing the complaint filed by Alice Maglutac in favor of the corporation would be to defeat the very nature and function of a derivative suit and render the right to institute the action illusory. In any case, the suit is for the benefit of Commart itself, for a judgment in favor of the complainants will necessarily mean recovery by the corporation of the US$2.5 million alleged to have been diverted from its coffers to the private bank accounts of its top managers and directors. Thus, the prayer in the Amended Complaint is for judgment ordering respondents Jesus and Corazon Maglutac, as well as Victor Cipriano, "to account for and to turn over or deliver to the Corporation" the aforesaid sum, with legal interest, and "ordering all the respondent, as members of the Board of Directors to take such remedial steps as would protect the corporation from further depredation of the funds and property." (pars. [a] & [b], Annex 2, Comment) On the "conflict of interest" issue, petitioners allege that private respondent Alice Maglutac "is a majority stockholder of M.M. International Sales, a business rival/competitor of Commart and holds only less than one percent (1%) of the entire shareholdings of Commart." According to petitioners, this being the case it is easier to believe that this so called derivative suit was filed because it is to the best interest of the company where she has a bigger and substantial interest, which in this case is M.M. International Sales, Inc. In disposing of this contention respondent SEC ruled that jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the pleas and defenses set up by a defendant in a motion to dismiss or answer, otherwise jurisdiction should become dependent almost entirely upon the defendant (citing Cardenas v. Camus, infra.) But it left the door open to a further consideration of the issue by stating that complainant's ownership of majority stocks of a rival corporation could not at this stage of the proceedings, defeat complainant's claims: Jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the pleas or defenses pleaded by the defendant in his motion to dismiss or answer, for were we to be governed by such rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant (Cardenas v. Camus, 5 SCRA 639). Respondents' assertion in their motion to dismiss of complainant's 14

ownership of the majority stocks of a rival corporation, could not at this stage of the proceedings, defeat complainant's claim. (pp. 83-84, Rollo) In other words, no real prejudice has been inflicted upon petitioners' right to be heard on this matter raised by them, since the same can still be looked into during the hearing of a derivative suit on the merits. There was, therefore, neither error nor grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the Securities & Exchange Commission not to dismiss the case but to remand it instead to the Hearing Panel for further proceedings.

attendance were other members of the Board including one of the petitioners Reginald Villasis. Prior to aforesaid Special Board Meeting, copies of notice thereof, dated May 24, 1986, were distributed to all Board Members. The notice allegedly indicated that the meeting to be held on June 1, 1986 included item No. 6 which states: "Possible implementation of Art. III, Sec. 6 of the Amended By-Laws of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. on compensation of all officers of the corporation." [1]

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, this Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.

In said meeting, the Board of Trustees passed Resolution No. 48, s. 1986, granting monthly compensation to the private respondents as corporate officers retroactive June 1, 1985, viz.:

SO ORDERED

Resolution No. 48 s. 1986

4. G.R. No. 113032. August 21, 1997]

On the motion of Mr. Richard Salas (accused), duly seconded by Mrs. Soledad Tubilleja (accused), it was unanimously resolved that:

WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., HOMERO L. VILLASIS, DIMAS ENRIQUEZ, PRESTON F. VILLASIS & REGINALD F. VILLASIS, petitioners, vs. RICARDO T. SALAS, SOLEDAD SALASTUBILLEJA, ANTONIO S. SALAS, RICHARD S. SALAS & HON. JUDGE PORFIRIO PARIAN, respondents. DECISION

The Officers of the Corporation be granted monthly compensation for services rendered as follows: Chairman - P9,000.00/month, Vice-Chairman - P3,500.00/month, Corporate Treasurer - P3,500.00/month and Corporate Secretary - P3,500.00/month, retroactive June 1, 1985 and the ten percentum of the net profits shall be distributed equally among the ten members of the Board of Trustees. This shall amend and superceed(sic) any previous resolution.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: There were no other business. Up for review on certiorari are: (1) the Decision September 6, 1993 and (2) the order dated November 23, 1993 of Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 for estafa and falsification of a public document, respectively. The judgment acquitted the private respondents of both charges, but petitioners seek to hold them civilly liable. Private respondents Ricardo T. Salas, Salvador T. Salas, Soledad SalasTubilleja, Antonio S. Salas, and Richard S. Salas, belonging to the same family, are the majority and controlling members of the Board of Trustees of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. (WIT, for short), a stock corporation engaged in the operation, among others, of an educational institution. According to petitioners, the minority stockholders of WIT, sometime on June 1, 1986 in the principal office of WIT at La Paz, Iloilo City, a Special Board meeting was held. In

The Chairman declared the meeting adjourned at 5:11 P.M. This is to certify that the foregoing minutes of the regular meeting of the Board of Trustees of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. held on March 30, 1986 is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. (Sgd) ANTONIO S. SALAS Corporate Secretary[2] A few years later, that is, on March 13, 1991, petitioners Homero Villasis, Preston Villasis, Reginald Villasis and Dimas Enriquez filed an affidavit15

complaint against private respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo, as a result of which two (2) separate criminal informations, one for falsification of a public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and the other for estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC, were filed before Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. The charge for falsification of public document was anchored on the private respondents submission of WITs income statement for the fiscal year 1985-1986 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reflecting therein the disbursement of corporate funds for the compensation of private respondents based on Resolution No. 4, series of 1986, making it appear that the same was passed by the board on March 30, 1986, when in truth, the same was actually passed on June 1, 1986, a date not covered by the corporations fiscal year 1985-1986 (beginning May 1, 1985 and ending April 30, 1986). The information for falsification of a public document states: The undersigned City Prosecutor accuses RICARDO T. SALAS, SALVADOR T. SALAS, SOLEDAD SALAS-TUBILLEJA, ANTONIO S. SALAS and RICHARD S. SALAS (whose dates and places of birth cannot be ascertained) of the crime of FALSIFICATION OF A PUBLC DOCUMENT, Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows: That on or about the 10th day of June, 1986, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Treasurer, Secretary and Trustee (who later became the secretary), respectively, of the board of trustees of the Western Institute of Technology, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, to better realized (sic) their purpose, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally prepare and execute and subsequently cause to be submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission an income statement of the corporation for the fiscal year 19851986, the same being required to be submitted every end of the corporation fiscal year by the aforesaid Commission and therefore, a public document, including therein the disbursement of the retroactive compensation of accused corporate officers in the amount of P186,470.70, by then and there making it appear that the basis thereof Resolution No. 4, Series of 1986 was passed by the board of trustees on March 30, 1986, a date covered by the corporations fiscal year 19851986 (i.e., from May 1, 1985 to April 30, 1986), when in truth and in fact, as said

accused well knew, no such Resolution No. 48, Series of 1986 was passed on March 30, 1986. CONTRARY TO LAW. Iloilo City, Philippines, November 22,1991.[3] [Underscoring ours]. The Information, on the other hand, for estafa reads: The undersigned City Prosecutor accuses RICARDO SALAS, SALVADOR T. SALAS, SOLEDAD SALAS-TUBILLEJA, ANTONIO S. SALAS, RICHARD S. SALAS (whose dates and places of birth cannot be ascertained) of the crime of ESTAFA, Art. 315, par 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows: That on or about the 1st day of June, 1986, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Treasurer, Secretary and Trustee (who later became the secretary), respectively, of the board of trustees of the Western Institute of Technology, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, to better realize their purpose, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the said corporation (and its stockholders) in the following manner, to wit: herein accused, knowing fully well that they have no sufficient, lawful authority to disburse--- let alone violation of applicable laws and jurisprudence, disbursed the funds of the corporation by effecting payment of their retroactive salaries in the amount of P186,470.70 and subsequently paying themselves every 15th and 30th of the month starting June 15, 1986 until the present, in the amount of P19,500.00 per month, as if the same were their own, and when herein accused were informed of the illegality of these disbursements by the minority stockholders by way of objections made in an annual stockholders meeting held on June 14, 1986 and every year thereafter, they refused, and still refuse, to rectify the same to the damage and prejudice of the corporation (and its stockholders) in the total sum of P1,453,970.79 as of November 15, 1991. CONTRARY TO LAW. Iloilo City, Philippines, November 22,1991.[4] [Underscoring ours] 16

Thereafter, trial for the two criminal cases, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098, was consolidated. After a full-blown hearing, Judge Porfirio Parian handed down a verdict of acquittal on both counts [5] dated September 6, 1993 without imposing any civil liability against the accused therein. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[6] of the civil aspect of the RTC Decision which was, however, denied in an Order dated November 23, 1993.[7] Hence, the instant petition. Significantly on December 8, 1994, a Motion for Intervention, dated December 2, 1994, was filed before this Court by Western Institute of Technology, Inc., supposedly one of the petitioners herein, disowning its inclusion in the petition and submitting that Atty. Tranquilino R. Gale, counsel for the other petitioners, had no authority whatsoever to represent the corporation in filing the petition. Intervenor likewise prayed for the dismissal of the petition for being utterly without merit. The Motion for Intervention was granted on January 16, 1995.[8] Petitioners would like us to hold private respondents civilly liable despite their acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098. They base their claim on the alleged illegal issuance by private respondents of Resolution No. 48, series of 1986 ordering the disbursement of corporate funds in the amount of P186,470.70 representing the retroactive compensation as of June 1, 1985 in favor of private respondents, board members of WIT, plus P1,453,970.79 for the subsequent collective salaries of private respondent every 15 thand 30th of the month until the filing of the criminal complaints against them on March 1991. Petitioners maintain that this grant of compensation to private respondents is proscribed under Section 30 of the Corporation Code. Thus, private respondents are obliged to return these amounts to the corporation with interest. We cannot sustain the petitioners. The pertinent section of the Corporation Code provides:

ten (10%) percent of the net income before income tax of the corporation during the preceding year. [Underscoring ours] There is no argument that directors or trustees, as the case may be, are not entitled to salary or other compensation when they perform nothing more than the usual and ordinary duties of their office. This rule is founded upon a presumption that directors /trustees render service gratuitously and that the return upon their shares adequately furnishes the motives for service, without compensation[9] Under the foregoing section, there are only two (2) ways by which members of the board can be granted compensation apart from reasonable per diems: (1) when there is a provision in the by-laws fixing their compensation; and (2) when the stockholders representing a majority of the outstanding capital stock at a regular or special stockholders meeting agree to give it to them. This proscription, however, against granting compensation to directors/trustees of a corporation is not a sweeping rule. Worthy of note is the clear phraseology of Section 30 which states: xxx [T]he directors shall not receive any compensation, as such directors,xxx. The phrase as such directors is not without significance for it delimits the scope of the prohibition to compensation given to them for services performed purely in their capacity as directors or trustees. The unambiguous implication is that members of the board may receive compensation, in addition to reasonable per diems, when they render services to the corporation in a capacity other than as directors/trustees.[10] In the case at bench, Resolution No. 48, s. 1986 granted monthly compensation to private respondents not in their capacity as members of the board, but rather as officers of the corporation, more particularly as Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary of Western Institute of Technology. We quote once more Resolution No. 48, s. 1986 for easy reference, viz.: Resolution No. 48 s. 1986

Sec. 30. Compensation of directors.--- In the absence of any provision in the bylaws fixing their compensation, the directors shall not receive any compensation, as such directors, except for reasonable per diems: Provided, however, That any such compensation (other than per diems) may be granted to directors by the vote of the stockholders representing at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock at a regular or special stockholders meeting. In no case shall the total yearly compensation of directors, as such directors, exceed

On the motion of Mr. Richard Salas (accused), duly seconded by Mrs. Soledad Tubilleja (accused), it was unanimously resolved that: The Officers of the Corporation be granted monthly compensation for services rendered as follows: Chairman - P9,000.00/month, ViceChairman - P3,500.00/month, Corporate Treasurer - P3,500.00/month 17

and Corporate Secretary - P3,500.00/month, retroactive June 1, 1985 and the ten percentum of the net profits shall be distributed equally among the ten members of the Board of Trustees. This shall amend and superceed(sic) any previous resolution. There were no other business. The Chairman declared the meeting adjourned at 5:11 P.M. This is to certify that the foregoing minutes of the regular meeting of the Board of Trustees of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. held on March 30, 1986 is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. (Sgd) ANTONIO S. SALAS Corporate Secretary[11] [Underscoring ours] Clearly, therefore , the prohibition with respect to granting compensation to corporate directors/trustees as such under Section 30 is not violated in this particular case.Consequently, the last sentence of Section 30 which provides: xxx xxx. In no case shall the total yearly compensation of directors, as such directors, exceed ten (10%) percent of the net income before income tax of the corporation during the preceding year. [Underscoring ours] does not likewise find application in this case since the compensation is being given to private respondents in their capacity as officers of WIT and not as board members. Petitioners assert that the instant case is a derivative suit brought by them as minority shareholders of WIT for and on behalf of the corporation to annul Resolution No. 48, s. 1986 which is prejudicial to the corporation. We are unpersuaded. A derivative suit is an action brought by minority shareholders in the name of the corporation to redress wrongs committed against it, for which the directors refuse to sue.[12] It is a remedy designed by equity and has been the principal defense of the minority shareholders against abuses by the majority.[13] Here, however, the case is not a derivative suit but is merely an appeal on the civil aspect of Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098

filed with the RTC of Iloilo for estafa and falsification of public document.Among the basic requirements for a derivative suit to prosper is that the minority shareholder who is suing for and on behalf of the corporation must allege his complaint before the proper forum that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all other shareholders similarly situated who wish to join.[14] This is necessary to vest jurisdiction upon the tribunal in line with the rule that it is the allegations in the complaint that vests jurisdiction upon the court or quasi-judicial body concerned over the subject matter and nature of the action.[15] This was not complied with by the petitioners either in their complaint before the court a quo nor in the instant petition which, in part, merely states that this is a petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law to set aside a portion of the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098[16] since the trial courts judgment of acquittal failed to impose any civil liability against the private respondents. By no amount of equity considerations, if at all deserved, can a mere appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal case be treated as a derivative suit. Granting, for purposes of discussion, that this is a derivative suit as insisted by petitioners, which it is not, the same is outrightly dismissible for having been wrongfully filed in the regular court devoid of any jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The case should have been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which exercises original and exclusive jurisdiction over derivative suits, they being intra-corporate disputes, per Section 5(b) of P.D. No. 902-A: In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: xxx xxx xxx b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; 18

xxx xxx xxx. [Underscoring ours] Once the case is decided by the SEC, the losing party may file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals raising questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.[17]It is only after the case has ran this course, and not earlier, can it be brought to us via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising only pure questions of law.[18]Petitioners, in pleading that we treat the instant petition as a derivative suit, are trying to short-circuit the entire process which we cannot here sanction. As an appeal on the civil aspect of Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 for falsification of public document and estafa, which this petition truly is, we have to deny the petition just the same. It will be well to quote the respondent courts ratiocinations acquitting the private respondents on both counts: The prosecution wants this Court to believe and agree that there is falsification of public document because, as claimed by the prosecution, Resolution No. 48, Series of 1986 (Exh. 1-E-1) was not taken up and passed during the Regular Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the western Institute of Technology (WIT), Inc. on March 30, 1986, but on June 1, 1986 special meeting of the same board of trustees. This Court is reluctant to accept this claim of falsification. The prosecution omitted to submit the complete minutes of the regular meeting of the Board of Trustees on March 30, 1986. It only presented in evidence Exh. C, which is page 5 or the last page of the said minutes. Had the complete minutes (Exh. 1 consisting of five (5) pages, been submitted, it can readily be seen and understood that Resolution No. 48, Series of 1986 (Exh. 1-E-1) giving compensation to corporate officers, was indeed included in Other Business, No. 6 of the Agenda, and was taken up and passed on March 30, 1986. The mere fact of existence of Exh. C also proves that it was passed on March 30, 1986 for Exh,. C is a part and parcel of the whole minutes of the Board of Trustees Regular Meeting on March 30, 1986. No better and more credible proof can be considered other than the Minutes (Exh. 1) itself of the Regular Meeting of the Board of Trustees on March 30, 1986. The imputation that said Resolution No.48 was neither taken up nor passed on March 30, 1986 because the matter regarding compensation was not specifically stated or written in the Agenda and that the words possible implementation of said Resolution No. 48, was expressly written in the Agenda for the Special Meeting of the Board on June 1, 1986, is simply an implication. This evidence by implication to the mind of the court

cannot prevail over the Minutes (Exh. 1) and cannot ripen into proof beyond reasonable doubt which is demanded in all criminal prosecutions. This Court finds that under the Eleventh Article (Exh. 3-D-1) of the Articles of Incorporation (Exh. 3-B) of the Panay Educational Institution, Inc., now the Western Institute of Technology, Inc., the officers of the corporation shall receive such compensation as the Board of Directors may provide.These Articles of Incorporation was adopted on May 17, 1957 (Exh. 3-E). The Officers of the corporation and their corresponding duties are enumerated and stated in Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Art. III of the Amended By-Laws of the Corporation (Exh. 4-A) which was adopted on May 31, 1957. According to Sec. 6, Art. III of the same By-Laws, all officers shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by the Board of Directors. It is the perception of this Court that the grant of compensation or salary to the accused in their capacity as officers of the corporation, through Resolution No. 48, enacted on March 30, 1986 by the Board of Trustees, is authorized by both the Articles of Incorporation and the By-Laws of the Corporation. To state otherwise is to depart from the clear terms of the said articles and by-laws. In their defense the accused have properly and rightly asserted that the grant of salary is not for directors, but for their being officers of the corporation who oversee the day to day activities and operations of the school. xxx xxx xxx xxx [O]n the question of whether or not the accused can be held liable for estafa under Sec. 1 (b) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, it is perceived by this Court that the receipt and the holding of the money by the accused as salary on basis of the authority granted by the Articles and By-Laws of the corporation are not tainted with abuse of confidence. The money they received belongs to them and cannot be said to have been converted and/or misappropriated by them. xxx xxx xxx.[19] [Underscoring ours] From the foregoing factual findings, which we find to be amply substantiated by the records, it is evident that there is simply no basis to hold the accused, private respondents herein, civilly liable. Section 2(b) of Rule 111 on the New Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

19

SEC. 2. Institution of separate civil action.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

xxx xxx xxx

Up for review on certiorari are: (1) the Decision September 6, 1993 and (2) the order dated November 23, 1993 of Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 for estafa and falsification of a public document, respectively. The judgment acquitted the private respondents of both charges, but petitioners seek to hold them civilly liable.

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. [Underscoring ours] Likewise, the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 reads: SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment. xxx xxx xxx In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party. [Underscoring ours] The acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-private respondents did not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them.[20] WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED with costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED [G.R. No. 113032. August 21, 1997] WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., HOMERO L. VILLASIS, DIMAS ENRIQUEZ, PRESTON F. VILLASIS & REGINALD F. VILLASIS, petitioners, vs. RICARDO T. SALAS, SOLEDAD SALASTUBILLEJA, ANTONIO S. SALAS, RICHARD S. SALAS & HON. JUDGE PORFIRIO PARIAN, respondents. DECISION

Private respondents Ricardo T. Salas, Salvador T. Salas, Soledad SalasTubilleja, Antonio S. Salas, and Richard S. Salas, belonging to the same family, are the majority and controlling members of the Board of Trustees of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. (WIT, for short), a stock corporation engaged in the operation, among others, of an educational institution. According to petitioners, the minority stockholders of WIT, sometime on June 1, 1986 in the principal office of WIT at La Paz, Iloilo City, a Special Board meeting was held. In attendance were other members of the Board including one of the petitioners Reginald Villasis. Prior to aforesaid Special Board Meeting, copies of notice thereof, dated May 24, 1986, were distributed to all Board Members. The notice allegedly indicated that the meeting to be held on June 1, 1986 included item No. 6 which states: "Possible implementation of Art. III, Sec. 6 of the Amended By-Laws of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. on compensation of all officers of the corporation." [1] In said meeting, the Board of Trustees passed Resolution No. 48, s. 1986, granting monthly compensation to the private respondents as corporate officers retroactive June 1, 1985, viz.: Resolution No. 48 s. 1986 On the motion of Mr. Richard Salas (accused), duly seconded by Mrs. Soledad Tubilleja (accused), it was unanimously resolved that: The Officers of the Corporation be granted monthly compensation for services rendered as follows: Chairman - P9,000.00/month, Vice-Chairman - P3,500.00/month, Corporate Treasurer - P3,500.00/month and Corporate Secretary - P3,500.00/month, retroactive June 1, 1985 and the ten percentum of the net profits shall be distributed equally among the ten members of the Board of Trustees. This shall amend and superceed(sic) any previous resolution. 20

There were no other business. The Chairman declared the meeting adjourned at 5:11 P.M. This is to certify that the foregoing minutes of the regular meeting of the Board of Trustees of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. held on March 30, 1986 is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. (Sgd) ANTONIO S. SALAS Corporate Secretary[2] A few years later, that is, on March 13, 1991, petitioners Homero Villasis, Preston Villasis, Reginald Villasis and Dimas Enriquez filed an affidavitcomplaint against private respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo, as a result of which two (2) separate criminal informations, one for falsification of a public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and the other for estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC, were filed before Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. The charge for falsification of public document was anchored on the private respondents submission of WITs income statement for the fiscal year 1985-1986 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reflecting therein the disbursement of corporate funds for the compensation of private respondents based on Resolution No. 4, series of 1986, making it appear that the same was passed by the board on March 30, 1986, when in truth, the same was actually passed on June 1, 1986, a date not covered by the corporations fiscal year 1985-1986 (beginning May 1, 1985 and ending April 30, 1986). The information for falsification of a public document states: The undersigned City Prosecutor accuses RICARDO T. SALAS, SALVADOR T. SALAS, SOLEDAD SALAS-TUBILLEJA, ANTONIO S. SALAS and RICHARD S. SALAS (whose dates and places of birth cannot be ascertained) of the crime of FALSIFICATION OF A PUBLC DOCUMENT, Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows: That on or about the 10th day of June, 1986, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Treasurer, Secretary and Trustee (who later became the secretary), respectively, of the board of trustees of the Western Institute of Technology, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the

laws of the Republic of the Philippines, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, to better realized (sic) their purpose, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally prepare and execute and subsequently cause to be submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission an income statement of the corporation for the fiscal year 19851986, the same being required to be submitted every end of the corporation fiscal year by the aforesaid Commission and therefore, a public document, including therein the disbursement of the retroactive compensation of accused corporate officers in the amount of P186,470.70, by then and there making it appear that the basis thereof Resolution No. 4, Series of 1986 was passed by the board of trustees on March 30, 1986, a date covered by the corporations fiscal year 19851986 (i.e., from May 1, 1985 to April 30, 1986), when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew, no such Resolution No. 48, Series of 1986 was passed on March 30, 1986. CONTRARY TO LAW. Iloilo City, Philippines, November 22,1991.[3] [Underscoring ours]. The Information, on the other hand, for estafa reads: The undersigned City Prosecutor accuses RICARDO SALAS, SALVADOR T. SALAS, SOLEDAD SALAS-TUBILLEJA, ANTONIO S. SALAS, RICHARD S. SALAS (whose dates and places of birth cannot be ascertained) of the crime of ESTAFA, Art. 315, par 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows: That on or about the 1st day of June, 1986, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Treasurer, Secretary and Trustee (who later became the secretary), respectively, of the board of trustees of the Western Institute of Technology, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, to better realize their purpose, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the said corporation (and its stockholders) in the following manner, to wit: herein accused, knowing fully well that they have no sufficient, lawful authority to disburse--- let alone violation of applicable laws and jurisprudence, disbursed the funds of the corporation by effecting payment of their retroactive salaries in the amount of P186,470.70 and subsequently paying themselves every 15th and 30th of the month starting June 21

15, 1986 until the present, in the amount of P19,500.00 per month, as if the same were their own, and when herein accused were informed of the illegality of these disbursements by the minority stockholders by way of objections made in an annual stockholders meeting held on June 14, 1986 and every year thereafter, they refused, and still refuse, to rectify the same to the damage and prejudice of the corporation (and its stockholders) in the total sum of P1,453,970.79 as of November 15, 1991. CONTRARY TO LAW. Iloilo City, Philippines, November 22,1991.[4] [Underscoring ours] Thereafter, trial for the two criminal cases, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098, was consolidated. After a full-blown hearing, Judge Porfirio Parian handed down a verdict of acquittal on both counts [5] dated September 6, 1993 without imposing any civil liability against the accused therein. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[6] of the civil aspect of the RTC Decision which was, however, denied in an Order dated November 23, 1993.[7] Hence, the instant petition. Significantly on December 8, 1994, a Motion for Intervention, dated December 2, 1994, was filed before this Court by Western Institute of Technology, Inc., supposedly one of the petitioners herein, disowning its inclusion in the petition and submitting that Atty. Tranquilino R. Gale, counsel for the other petitioners, had no authority whatsoever to represent the corporation in filing the petition. Intervenor likewise prayed for the dismissal of the petition for being utterly without merit. The Motion for Intervention was granted on January 16, 1995.[8] Petitioners would like us to hold private respondents civilly liable despite their acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098. They base their claim on the alleged illegal issuance by private respondents of Resolution No. 48, series of 1986 ordering the disbursement of corporate funds in the amount of P186,470.70 representing the retroactive compensation as of June 1, 1985 in favor of private respondents, board members of WIT, plus P1,453,970.79 for the subsequent collective salaries of private respondent every 15 thand 30th of the month until the filing of the criminal complaints against them on March 1991. Petitioners maintain that this grant of compensation to private respondents is

proscribed under Section 30 of the Corporation Code. Thus, private respondents are obliged to return these amounts to the corporation with interest. We cannot sustain the petitioners. The pertinent section of the Corporation Code provides: Sec. 30. Compensation of directors.--- In the absence of any provision in the bylaws fixing their compensation, the directors shall not receive any compensation, as such directors, except for reasonable per diems: Provided, however, That any such compensation (other than per diems) may be granted to directors by the vote of the stockholders representing at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock at a regular or special stockholders meeting. In no case shall the total yearly compensation of directors, as such directors, exceed ten (10%) percent of the net income before income tax of the corporation during the preceding year. [Underscoring ours] There is no argument that directors or trustees, as the case may be, are not entitled to salary or other compensation when they perform nothing more than the usual and ordinary duties of their office. This rule is founded upon a presumption that directors /trustees render service gratuitously and that the return upon their shares adequately furnishes the motives for service, without compensation[9] Under the foregoing section, there are only two (2) ways by which members of the board can be granted compensation apart from reasonable per diems: (1) when there is a provision in the by-laws fixing their compensation; and (2) when the stockholders representing a majority of the outstanding capital stock at a regular or special stockholders meeting agree to give it to them. This proscription, however, against granting compensation to directors/trustees of a corporation is not a sweeping rule. Worthy of note is the clear phraseology of Section 30 which states: xxx [T]he directors shall not receive any compensation, as such directors,xxx. The phrase as such directors is not without significance for it delimits the scope of the prohibition to compensation given to them for services performed purely in their capacity as directors or trustees. The unambiguous implication is that members of the board may receive compensation, in addition to reasonable per diems, when they render services to the corporation in a capacity other than as directors/trustees.[10] In the case at bench, Resolution No. 48, s. 1986 granted monthly compensation to private respondents not in their capacity as members of the board, but rather as officers of the corporation, more particularly as 22

Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary of Western Institute of Technology. We quote once more Resolution No. 48, s. 1986 for easy reference, viz.: Resolution No. 48 s. 1986 On the motion of Mr. Richard Salas (accused), duly seconded by Mrs. Soledad Tubilleja (accused), it was unanimously resolved that: The Officers of the Corporation be granted monthly compensation for services rendered as follows: Chairman - P9,000.00/month, ViceChairman - P3,500.00/month, Corporate Treasurer - P3,500.00/month and Corporate Secretary - P3,500.00/month, retroactive June 1, 1985 and the ten percentum of the net profits shall be distributed equally among the ten members of the Board of Trustees. This shall amend and superceed(sic) any previous resolution. There were no other business. The Chairman declared the meeting adjourned at 5:11 P.M. This is to certify that the foregoing minutes of the regular meeting of the Board of Trustees of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. held on March 30, 1986 is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. (Sgd) ANTONIO S. SALAS Corporate Secretary[11] [Underscoring ours] Clearly, therefore , the prohibition with respect to granting compensation to corporate directors/trustees as such under Section 30 is not violated in this particular case.Consequently, the last sentence of Section 30 which provides: xxx xxx. In no case shall the total yearly compensation of directors, as such directors, exceed ten (10%) percent of the net income before income tax of the corporation during the preceding year. [Underscoring ours]

does not likewise find application in this case since the compensation is being given to private respondents in their capacity as officers of WIT and not as board members. Petitioners assert that the instant case is a derivative suit brought by them as minority shareholders of WIT for and on behalf of the corporation to annul Resolution No. 48, s. 1986 which is prejudicial to the corporation. We are unpersuaded. A derivative suit is an action brought by minority shareholders in the name of the corporation to redress wrongs committed against it, for which the directors refuse to sue.[12] It is a remedy designed by equity and has been the principal defense of the minority shareholders against abuses by the majority.[13] Here, however, the case is not a derivative suit but is merely an appeal on the civil aspect of Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 filed with the RTC of Iloilo for estafa and falsification of public document.Among the basic requirements for a derivative suit to prosper is that the minority shareholder who is suing for and on behalf of the corporation must allege his complaint before the proper forum that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all other shareholders similarly situated who wish to join.[14] This is necessary to vest jurisdiction upon the tribunal in line with the rule that it is the allegations in the complaint that vests jurisdiction upon the court or quasi-judicial body concerned over the subject matter and nature of the action.[15] This was not complied with by the petitioners either in their complaint before the court a quo nor in the instant petition which, in part, merely states that this is a petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law to set aside a portion of the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098[16] since the trial courts judgment of acquittal failed to impose any civil liability against the private respondents. By no amount of equity considerations, if at all deserved, can a mere appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal case be treated as a derivative suit. Granting, for purposes of discussion, that this is a derivative suit as insisted by petitioners, which it is not, the same is outrightly dismissible for having been wrongfully filed in the regular court devoid of any jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The case should have been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which exercises original and exclusive jurisdiction over derivative suits, they being intra-corporate disputes, per Section 5(b) of P.D. No. 902-A:

23

In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: xxx xxx xxx b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; xxx xxx xxx. [Underscoring ours] Once the case is decided by the SEC, the losing party may file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals raising questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.[17]It is only after the case has ran this course, and not earlier, can it be brought to us via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising only pure questions of law.[18]Petitioners, in pleading that we treat the instant petition as a derivative suit, are trying to short-circuit the entire process which we cannot here sanction. As an appeal on the civil aspect of Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 for falsification of public document and estafa, which this petition truly is, we have to deny the petition just the same. It will be well to quote the respondent courts ratiocinations acquitting the private respondents on both counts: The prosecution wants this Court to believe and agree that there is falsification of public document because, as claimed by the prosecution, Resolution No. 48, Series of 1986 (Exh. 1-E-1) was not taken up and passed during the Regular Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the western Institute of Technology (WIT), Inc. on March 30, 1986, but on June 1, 1986 special meeting of the same board of trustees. This Court is reluctant to accept this claim of falsification. The prosecution omitted to submit the complete minutes of the regular meeting of the Board of Trustees on March 30, 1986. It only presented in evidence Exh. C, which is page

5 or the last page of the said minutes. Had the complete minutes (Exh. 1 consisting of five (5) pages, been submitted, it can readily be seen and understood that Resolution No. 48, Series of 1986 (Exh. 1-E-1) giving compensation to corporate officers, was indeed included in Other Business, No. 6 of the Agenda, and was taken up and passed on March 30, 1986. The mere fact of existence of Exh. C also proves that it was passed on March 30, 1986 for Exh,. C is a part and parcel of the whole minutes of the Board of Trustees Regular Meeting on March 30, 1986. No better and more credible proof can be considered other than the Minutes (Exh. 1) itself of the Regular Meeting of the Board of Trustees on March 30, 1986. The imputation that said Resolution No.48 was neither taken up nor passed on March 30, 1986 because the matter regarding compensation was not specifically stated or written in the Agenda and that the words possible implementation of said Resolution No. 48, was expressly written in the Agenda for the Special Meeting of the Board on June 1, 1986, is simply an implication. This evidence by implication to the mind of the court cannot prevail over the Minutes (Exh. 1) and cannot ripen into proof beyond reasonable doubt which is demanded in all criminal prosecutions. This Court finds that under the Eleventh Article (Exh. 3-D-1) of the Articles of Incorporation (Exh. 3-B) of the Panay Educational Institution, Inc., now the Western Institute of Technology, Inc., the officers of the corporation shall receive such compensation as the Board of Directors may provide.These Articles of Incorporation was adopted on May 17, 1957 (Exh. 3-E). The Officers of the corporation and their corresponding duties are enumerated and stated in Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Art. III of the Amended By-Laws of the Corporation (Exh. 4-A) which was adopted on May 31, 1957. According to Sec. 6, Art. III of the same By-Laws, all officers shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by the Board of Directors. It is the perception of this Court that the grant of compensation or salary to the accused in their capacity as officers of the corporation, through Resolution No. 48, enacted on March 30, 1986 by the Board of Trustees, is authorized by both the Articles of Incorporation and the By-Laws of the Corporation. To state otherwise is to depart from the clear terms of the said articles and by-laws. In their defense the accused have properly and rightly asserted that the grant of salary is not for directors, but for their being officers of the corporation who oversee the day to day activities and operations of the school. xxx xxx xxx 24

xxx [O]n the question of whether or not the accused can be held liable for estafa under Sec. 1 (b) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, it is perceived by this Court that the receipt and the holding of the money by the accused as salary on basis of the authority granted by the Articles and By-Laws of the corporation are not tainted with abuse of confidence. The money they received belongs to them and cannot be said to have been converted and/or misappropriated by them. xxx xxx

xxx.[19]

[Underscoring ours]

From the foregoing factual findings, which we find to be amply substantiated by the records, it is evident that there is simply no basis to hold the accused, private respondents herein, civilly liable. Section 2(b) of Rule 111 on the New Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: SEC. 2. Institution of separate civil action.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED with costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. 6. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE G.R. No. 152685 TELEPHONE COMPANY, Petitioner, Present: - versus QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,

xxx xxx xxx

CARPIO MORALES,

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. [Underscoring ours]

NATIONAL TINGA, and TELECOMMUNICATIONS VELASCO, JR., JJ. COMMISSION, JOSEPH A.

Likewise, the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 reads:

SANTIAGO, in his capacity as NTC

SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment.

Commissioner, and EDGARDO

xxx xxx xxx

CABARRIOS, in his capacity as Promulgated:

In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party. [Underscoring ours]

Chief, CCAD, Respondents. December 4, 2007 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

The acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-private respondents did not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them.[20]

RESOLUTION VELASCO, JR., J.:

25

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the

With the denial of the NTCs partial reconsideration of the CA Decision,

Rules of Court. It assails the February 12, 2001 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 61033, which dismissed petitioners special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, and the March 21, 2002 Resolution [3] of the CA denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The petition raises the sole issue on whether the appellate court erred in holding that the assessments of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) were contrary to our Decision in G.R. No. 127937 entitled NTC v. Honorable Court of Appeals. [4]

the issue of the basis for the assessment of the SRF was brought before this Court under G.R. No. 127937 wherein we ruled that the SRF should be based neither on the par value nor the market value of the outstanding capital stock but on the value of the stocks subscribed or paid including the premiums paid therefor, that is, the amount that the corporation receives, inclusive of the premiums if any, in consideration of the original issuance of the shares. We added that in the case of stock dividends, it is the amount that the corporation

This case pertains to Section 40 (e)[5] of the Public Service Act[6] (PSA), as amended on March 15, 1984, pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 325, which authorized the NTC to collect from public telecommunications companies Supervision and Regulation Fees (SRF) of PhP 0.50 for every PhP 100 or a fraction of the capital and stock subscribed or paid for of a stock corporation, partnership or single proprietorship of the capital invested, or of the property and equipment, whichever is higher. Under Section 40 (e) of the PSA, the NTC sent SRF assessments to petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) starting sometime in 1988.The SRF assessments were based on the market value of the outstanding capital stock, including stock dividends, of PLDT. PLDT protested the assessments contending that the SRF ought to be based on the par value of its outstanding capital stock. Its protest was denied by the NTC and likewise, its motion for reconsideration. PLDT appealed before the CA. The CA modified the disposition of the NTC by holding that the SRF should be assessed at par value of the outstanding capital stock of PLDT, excluding stock dividends.

transfers from its surplus profit account to its capital account, that is, the amount the stock dividends represent is equivalent to the value paid for its original issuance. PLDT wanted our July 28, 1999 Decision in G.R. No. 127937 clarified. It posited that the SRF should be based on the par value in consonance with our holding in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission,[7]and that the premiums on issued shares should not be included in the valuation of the outstanding capital stock. Through our November 15, 1999 Resolution in G.R. No. 127937, we elucidated that our July 28, 1999 decision was not in conflict with our ruling in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company since we never enunciated in the said case that the phrase capital stock subscribed or paid must be determined at par value. We reiterated that the term capital stock subscribed or paid is the amount that the corporation receives, inclusive of the premiums, if any, in consideration of the original issuance of the shares.

Thereafter, to comply with our disposition in G.R. No. 127937, for the reassessment of the SRF based on the value of the stocks subscribed or paid including the premiums paid for the stocks, if any, the NTC sent the assailed assessments of February 10, 2000[8] and September 5, 2000[9] to PLDT which 26

included the value of stock dividends issued by PLDT. The assailed assessments were based on the schedule of capital stock submitted by PLDT. PLDT now contends that our disposition in G.R. No. 127937 excluded stock dividends from the SRF coverage, while the NTC asserts the contrary. Also, PLDT questions the assessments for violating our disposition in G.R. No. 127937 since these assessments were identical to the previous assessments from 1988 which were questioned by PLDT in G.R. No. 127937 for

PLDTs motion for reconsideration was denied by the CAs Special Division of Five on March 21, 2002. Hence, the instant petition for review, raising the core issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DISPUTED NTC ASSESSMENTS WERE NOT CONTRARY TO THE PURISIMA DECISION.[12]

being based on the market value of its outstanding capital stock.

The petition is bereft of merit. PLDT wrote a letter protesting the assailed February 10, 2000 assessment which was not acted upon by the NTC. Instead, the NTC sent a second assailed assessment on September 5, 2000. Thus, in an attempt to clarify and resolve this issue, PLDT filed a Motion for Clarification of Enforcement of the Decision dated 28 July 1999 in G.R. No. 127937 which this Court simply noted for the case had already become final and executory. Thus, on October 2, 2000, PLDT instituted the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61033[10] before the CA. To maintain the status quo and to defer the enforcement of the assailed assessments and subsequent assessments, on October 3, 2000, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order. On December 4, 2000, a writ of preliminary injunction was granted. Subsequently, on February 12, 2001, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition. The dispositive portion reads:

PLDT argues that in our Decision in G.R. No. 127937 we have excluded from the coverage of the SRF the capital stocks issued as stock dividends. Petitioner argues that G.R. No. 127937 clearly delineates between capital subscribed and stock dividends to the effect that the latter are not included in the concept of capital stock subscribed because subscribers or shareholders do not pay for their subscriptions as no amount is received by the corporation in consideration of such issuances since these are effected as mere book entries, that is, the transfer from the retained earnings account to the capital or stock account. To bolster its position, PLDT repeatedly used the phrase actual payments received by a corporation as a consideration for issuances of shares which do not apply to stock dividends. We are not persuaded. Crucial in point is our disquisition in G.R. No. 127937 entitled National Telecommunications Commission v. Honorable Court of Appeals, which we quote:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is DISSOLVED.[11]

The term capital and other terms used to describe the capital structure of a corporation are of universal acceptance and their usages have long been established in jurisprudence. Briefly, capital refers to the value of the property or assets of a 27

corporation. The capital subscribed is the total amount of the capital that persons (subscribers or shareholders) have agreed to take and pay for, which need not necessarily by, and can be more than, the par value of the shares. In fine, it is the amount that the corporation receives, inclusive of the premiums if any, in consideration of the original issuance of the shares. In the case of stock dividends, it is the amount that the corporation transfers from its surplus profit account to its capital account. It is the same amount that can be loosely termed as the trust fund of the corporation. The Trust Fund doctrine considers this subscribed capital as a trust fund for the payment of the debts of the corporation, to which the creditors may look for satisfaction. Until the liquidation of the corporation, no part of the subscribed capital may be returned or released to the stockholder (except in the redemption of redeemable shares) without violating this principle. Thus, dividends must never impair the subscribed capital; subscription commitments cannot be condoned or remitted; nor can the corporation buy its own shares using the subscribed capital as the considerations therefor.[13] (Emphasis supplied.)

Two concepts can be gleaned from the above. First, what constitutes capital stock that is subject to the SRF. Second, such capital stock is equated to the trust fund of a corporation held in trust as security for satisfaction to creditors in case of corporate liquidation. The first asks if stock dividends are part of the outstanding capital stocks of a corporation insofar as it is subject to the SRF. They are. The first issue we have to tackle is, are all the stock dividends that are part of the outstanding capital stock of PLDT subject to the SRF? Yes, they are. PLDTs contention, that stock dividends are not similarly situated as the subscribed capital stock because the subscribers or shareholders do not pay for

their issuances as no amount was received by the corporation in consideration of such issuances since these are effected as a mere book entry, is erroneous. Dividends, regardless of the form these are declared, that is, cash, property or stocks, are valued at the amount of the declared dividend taken from the unrestricted retained earnings of a corporation. Thus, the value of the declaration in the case of a stock dividend is the actual value of the original issuance of said stocks. In G.R. No. 127937 we said that in the case of stock dividends, it is the amount that the corporation transfers from its surplus profit account to its capital account or it is the amount that the corporation receives in consideration of the original issuance of the shares. It is the distribution of current or accumulated earnings to the shareholders of a corporation pro rata based on the number of shares owned.[14] Such distribution in whatever form is valued at the declared amount or monetary equivalent. Thus, it cannot be said that no consideration is involved in the issuance of stock dividends. In fact, the declaration of stock dividends is akin to a forced purchase of stocks. By declaring stock dividends, a corporation ploughs back a portion or its entire unrestricted retained earnings either to its working capital or for capital asset acquisition or investments. It is simplistic to say that the corporation did not receive any actual payment for these. When the dividend is distributed, it ceases to be a property of the corporation as the entire or portion of its unrestricted retained earnings is distributed pro rata to corporate shareholders. When stock dividends are distributed, the amount declared ceases to belong to the corporation but is distributed among the shareholders. Consequently, the unrestricted retained earnings of the corporation are diminished by the amount of the declared dividend while the stockholders equity is increased. Furthermore, the actual payment is the cash 28

value from the unrestricted retained earnings that each shareholder foregoes for

the amount of capital stock paid and for which PLDT received actual payments

additional stocks/shares which he would otherwise receive as required by the Corporation Code to be given to the stockholders subject to the availability and conditioned on a certain level of retained earnings.[15] Elsewise put, where the unrestricted retained earnings of a corporation are more than 100% of the paidin capital stock, the corporate Board of Directors is mandated to declare dividends which the shareholders will receive in cash unless otherwise declared as property or stock dividends, which in the latter case the stockholders are

were not disclosed or extant in the records before the Court.[16]

forced to forego cash in lieu of property or stocks.

of February 13, 2000 and September 5, 2000 would show that the NTC based its assessment on the schedule of capital stock submitted by PLDT. PLDT did not dispute this; it only disputed the level of assessment which was the same as before.

In essence, therefore, the stockholders by receiving stock dividends are forced to exchange the monetary value of their dividend for capital stock, and the monetary value they forego is considered the actual payment for the original issuance of the stocks given as dividends. Therefore, stock dividends acquired by shareholders for the monetary value they forego are under the coverage of

Hence, as before, we cannot factually determine whether the assailed assessments substantially followed our Decision in G.R. No. 127937. It is apparent that the assessments are identical and that the NTC in the earlier case asserted that the SRF be based on the market value of the capital stock, yet it assessed it to PLDT.However, a closer look at the assailed assessments

Now, where should the NTC base its assessment? It is incumbent upon PLDT to furnish the NTC the actual payment made on the subscription of its

the SRF and the basis for the latter is such monetary value as declared by the board of directors.

capital stock in order for the NTC to assess the proper SRF. Logically, the NTC would base its SRF assessment of PLDT from PLDT data.

On the second issue, do the assailed NTC assessments violate the ruling in G.R. No. 127937? PLDT contends that these did since the assessments are identical to the previous assessments from 1988 which were questioned by PLDT in the seminal G.R. No. 127937 for being based on the market value of its outstanding capital stock.

PLDT should not bewail that the assailed assessments are substantially the same assessments it protested in G.R. No. 127937. After all, it had not shown the actual figures of the amount of premiums and subscriptions it had received for the original issuances of its capital stock. While indeed it submitted a table of the comparative assessments made by the NTC to this Court, PLDT

A cursory review of the assessments made by the NTC prior to our July 28, 1999 Decision in G.R. No. 127937 and the assailed assessments of February 10, 2000 and September 5, 2000 does show that the assessments are substantially identical. In our July 28, 1999 Decision in G.R. No. 127937, we noted, and similarly true in the petition before us, that, The actual capital paid or

has not furnished the NTC nor this Court the correct figures of the actual payments made for its capital stock. We are not unaware that in accounting practice, the journal entries for transactions are recorded in historical value or cost. Thus, the purchase of properties or assets is recorded at acquisition cost. The same is true with liabilities and equity transactions where the actual loan and the amount paid for 29

the subscription are recorded at the actual payment, including the premiums paid for the subscription of capital stock. Moreover, it is common practice that the values of the accounts recorded at historical value or cost are not increased or decreased due to market forces. In the case of properties, the appreciation in values is generally not recorded as income nor the increase in the corresponding asset because the increase or decrease is not yet realized until the property is actually sold. The same is true with the capital account.The market value may be much higher than the actual payment of the par value and premium of capital stock. Still, the books of account will not reflect such increase; and vice-versa, any decrease of the value of stocks is likewise not reflected in the books of account. Thus, given the general practice that book entries of the premiums and subscriptions for capital stock are the actual value for the original issuance of stocks, then the NTC was correct to follow the schedule of capital stocks submitted by PLDT. Moreover, the Trust Fund doctrine, the second concept this Court elucidated in G.R. No. 127937 and quoted above, bolsters the correctness of the assessments made by the NTC. As a fund in trust for creditors in case of liquidation, the actual value of the subscriptions and the value of stock dividends distributed may not be decreased or increased by the fluctuating market value of the stocks. Thus, absent any showing by PLDT of the actual payment it received for the original issuance of its capital stock, the assessments made by the NTC, based on the schedule of outstanding capital stock of PLDT recorded at historical value payments made, is deemed correct. Anent stock dividends, the value transferred from the unrestricted retained earnings of PLDT to the capital stock account pursuant to the issuance of stock dividends is the proper basis for the assessment of the SRF, which the NTC correctly assessed.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the February 12, 2001 Decision and March 21, 2002 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 61033. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED. 7. G.R. No. L-28120 November 25, 1976 RICARDO A. NAVA, petitioner-appellant. vs. PEERS MARKETING CORPORATION, RENATO R. CUSI and AMPARO CUSI, respondents-appellees. AQUINO, J: This is a mandamus case, Teofilo Po as an incorporator subscribed to eighty shares of Peers Marketing Corporation at one hundred pesos a share or a total par value of eight thousand pesos. Po paid two thousand pesos or twenty-five percent of the amount of his subscription. No certificate of stock was issued to him or, for that matter, to any incorporator, subscriber or stockholder. On April 2, 1966 Po sold to Ricardo A. Nava for two thousand pesos twenty of his eighty shares. In the deed of sale Po represented that he was "the absolute and registered owner of twenty shares" of Peers Marketing Corporation. Nava requested the officers of the corporation to register the sale in the books of the corporation. The request was denied because Po has not paid fully the amount of his subscription. Nava was informed that Po was delinquent in the payment of the balance due on his subscription and that the corporation had a claim on his entire subscription of eighty shares which included the twenty shares that had been sold to Nava. On December 21, 1966 Nava filed this mandamus action in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City Branch to compel the corporation and Renato R. Cusi and Amparo Cusi, its executive vice-president and 30

secretary, respectively, to register the said twenty shares in Nava's name in the corporation's transfer book. The respondents in their answer pleaded the defense that no shares of stock against which the corporation holds an unpaid claim are transferable in the books of the corporation. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. Nava appealed on the ground that the decision "is contrary to law ". His sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred in applying the ruling in Fua Cun vs. Summers and China Banking Corporation, 44 Phil. 705 to justify respondents' refusal in registering the twenty shares in Nava's name in the books of the corporation. The rule enunciated in the Fua Cun case is that payment of one-half of the subscription does not entitle the subscriber to a certificate of stock for one-half of the number of shares subscribed. Appellant Nava contends that the Fua Cun case was decided under section 36 of the Corporation Law which provides that "no certificate of stock shall be issued to a subscriber as fully paid up until the full par value thereof has been paid by him to the corporation". Section 36 was amended by Act No. 3518. It is now section 37. Section 37 provides that "no certificate of stock shall be issued to a subscriber as fully paid up until the full par value thereof, or the full subscription in case of no par stock, has been paid by him to the corporation". The issue is whether the officers of Peers Marketing Corporation can be compelled by mandamus to enter in its stock and transfer book the sale made by Po to Nava of the twenty shares forming part of Po's subscription of eighty shares, with a total par value of P8,000 and for which Po had paid only P2,000, it being admitted that the corporation has an unpaid claim of P6,000 as the balance due on Po's subscription and that the twenty shares are not covered by any stock certificate. Apparently, no provision of the by-laws of the corporation covers that situation. The parties did not bother to submit in evidence the by-laws nor invoke any of its provisions. The corporation can include in its by-laws rules, not inconsistent with law, governing the transfer of its shares of stock (Sec. 137 , Act No. 1459; Fleischer vs. Botica Nolasco Co., 47 Phil. 583, 589).

We hold that the transfer made by Po to Nava is not the "alienation, sale, or transfer of stock" that is supposed to be recorded in the stock and transfer book, as contemplated in section 52 of the Corporation Law. As a rule, the shares which may be alienated are those which are covered by certificates of stock, as shown in the following provisions of the Corporation Law and as intimated in Hager vs. Bryan, 19 Phil. 138 (overruling the decision in Hager vs. Bryan, 21 Phil. 523. See 19 Phil. 616, notes, and Hodges vs. Lezama, 14 SCRA 1030). SEC. 35. The capital stock of stock corporations shall be divided into shares for which certificatessigned by the president or the vice-president, countersigned by the secretary or clerk and sealed with the seal of the corporation, shall be issued in accordance with the by-laws. Shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be transferred by delivery of the certificate indorsed by the owner or his attorney in fact or other person legally authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however, shall be valid, except as between the, parties, until the transfer is entered and noted upon the books of the corporation so as to show the names of the parties to the transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the certificate, and the number of shares transferred. No share of stock against which the corporation holds any unpaid claim shall be transferable on the books of the corporation. SEC. 36. (re voting trust agreement) ... The certificates of stock so transferred shall be surrendered and cancelled, and new certificates therefor issued to such person or persons, or corporation, as such trustee or trustees, in which new certificates it shall appear that they are issued pursuant to said agreement. xxx

xxx

xxx

(Emphasis supplied).

31

(In the case of nonstock corporations a membership certificate is usually issued. Lee E. Won vs. Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc., 104 Phil. 466; Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Won, L-23851, March 26, 1976, 70 SCRA 165). As prescribed in section 35, shares of stock may be transferred by delivery to the transferee of the certificate properly indorsed. "Title may be vested in the transferee by delivery of the certificate with a written assignment or indorsement thereof" (18 C.J.S. 928). There should be compliance with the mode of transfer prescribed by law (18 C.J.S. 930). The usual practice is for the stockholder to sign the form on the back of the stock certificate. The certificate may thereafter be transferred from one person to another. If the holder of the certificate desires to assume the legal rights of a shareholder to enable him to vote at corporate elections and to receive dividends, he fills up the blanks in the form by inserting his own name as transferee. Then he delivers the certificate to the secretary of the corporation so that the transfer may be entered in the corporation's books. The certificate is then surrendered and a new one issued to the transferee. (Hager vs. Bryan, 19 Phil. 138, 143-4). That procedure cannot be followed in the instant case because, as already noted, the twenty shares in question are not covered by any certificate of stock in Po's name. Moreover, the corporation has a claim on the said shares for the unpaid balance of Po's subscription. A stock subscription is a subsisting liability from the time the subscription is made. The subscriber is as much bound to pay his subscription as he would be to pay any other debt. The right of the corporation to demand payment is no less incontestable. (Velasco vs. Poizat, 37 Phil. 802; Lumanlan vs. Cura, 59 Phil. 746). A corporation cannot release an original subscriber from paying for his shares without a valuable consideration (Philippine National Bank vs. Bitulok Sawmill, Inc., L-24177-85, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1366) or without the unanimous consent of the stockholders (Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc. vs. Baltazar, 93 Phil 404). Under the facts of this case, there is no clear legal duty on the part of the officers of the corporation to register the twenty shares in Nava's name, Hence, there is no cause of action for mandamus.

Nava argues that under section 37 a certificate of stock may be issued for shares the par value of which have already been paid for although the entire subscription has not been fully paid. He contends that Peers Marketing Corporation should issue a certificate of stock for the twenty shares, notwithstanding that Po had not paid fully his subscription for the eighty shares, because section 37 requires full payment for the subscription, as a condition precedent for the issuance of the certificate of stock, only in the case of no par stock. Nava relies on Baltazar v Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc., L-16236-38, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 522, where it was held that section 37 "requires as a condition before a shareholder can vote his shares that his full subscription be paid in the case of no par value stock; and in case of stock corporation with par value, the stockholder can vote the shares fully paid by him only, irrespective of the unpaid delinquent shares". There is no parallelism between this case and the Baltazar case. It is noteworthy that in the Baltazar case the stockholder, an incorporator, was the holder of a certificate of stock for the shares the par value of which had been paid by him. The issue was whether the said shares had voting rights although the incorporator had not paid fully the total amount of his subscription. That is not the issue in this case. In the Baltazar case, it was held that where a stockholder subscribed to a certain number of shares with par value and he made a partial payment and was issued a certificate for the shares covered by his partial payment, he is entitled to vote the said shares, although he has not paid the balance of his subscription and a call or demand had been made for the payment of the par value of the delinquent shares. As already stressed, in this case no stock certificate was issued to Po. Without stock certificate, which is the evidence of ownership of corporate stock, the assignment of corporate shares is effective only between the parties to the transaction (Davis vs. Wachter, 140 So. 361). The delivery of the stock certificate, which represents the shares to be alienated , is essential for the protection of both the corporation and its stockholders (Smallwood vs. Moretti, 128 So. 2d 628). 32

In view of the foregoing considerations, the trial court's judgment dismissing the petition for mandamus is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.

SEC Case No. 04-98-5954, petitioner Calatagan Golf Club, Inc. (Calatagan) filed this Rule 45 petition against respondent Sixto Clemente, Jr. (Clemente). The key facts are undisputed.

SO ORDERED. Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur. 8. SECOND DIVISION CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB, INC. G.R. No. 165443 Petitioner, Present: QUISUMBING, J., - versus - Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.* SIXTO CLEMENTE, JR., Respondent. Promulgated:

Clemente applied to purchase one share of stock of Calatagan, indicating in his application for membership his mailing address at Phimco Industries, Inc. P.O. Box 240, MCC, complete residential address, office and residence telephone numbers, as well as the company (Phimco) with which he was connected, Calatagan issued to him Certificate of Stock No. A-01295 on 2 May 1990 after paying P120,000.00 for the share.[2] Calatagan charges monthly dues on its members to meet expenses for general operations, as well as costs for upkeep and improvement of the grounds and facilities.The provision on monthly dues is incorporated in Calatagans Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. It is also reproduced at the back of each certificate of stock.[3] As reproduced in the dorsal side of Certificate of Stock No. A-01295, the provision reads: 5. The owners of shares of stock shall be subject to the payment of monthly dues in an amount as may be prescribed in the by-laws or by the Board of Directors which shall in no case be less that [sic] P50.00 to meet the expenses for the general operations of the club, and the maintenance and improvement of its premises and facilities, in addition to such fees as may be charged for the actual use of the facilities x x x

April 16, 2009 x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION TINGA, J.: Seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated 1 June 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62331 and the reinstatement of the Decision dated 15 November 2000 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in

When Clemente became a member the monthly charge stood at P400.00. He paid P3,000.00 for his monthly dues on 21 March 1991 and another P5,400.00 on 9 December 1991. Then he ceased paying the dues. At that point, his balance amounted to P400.00.[4] Ten (10) months later, Calatagan made the initial step to collect Clementes back accounts by sending a demand letter dated 21 September 1992. It was followed by a second letter dated 22 October 1992. Both letters were sent to Clementes mailing address as indicated in his membership application but were sent back to sender with the postal note that the address had been closed.[5] 33

Calatagan declared Clemente delinquent for having failed to pay his monthly dues for more than sixty (60) days, specifically P5,600.00 as of 31 October 1992. Calatagan also included Clementes name in the list of delinquent members posted on the clubs bulletin board. On 1 December 1992, Calatagans board of directors adopted a resolution authorizing the foreclosure of shares of delinquent members, including Clementes; and the public auction of these shares. On 7 December 1992, Calatagan sent a third and final letter to Clemente, this time signed by its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Benjamin Tanedo, Jr. The letter contains a warning that unless Clemente settles his outstanding dues, his share would be included among the delinquent shares to be sold at public auction on 15 January 1993. Again, this letter was sent to Clementes mailing address that had already been closed.[6] On 5 January 1993, a notice of auction sale was posted on the Clubs bulletin board, as well as on the clubs premises. The auction sale took place as scheduled on 15 January 1993, and Clementes share sold for P64,000.[7] According to the Certificate of Sale issued by Calatagan after the sale, Clementes share was purchased by a Nestor A. Virata.[8] At the time of the sale, Clementes accrued monthly dues amounted to P5,200.00.[9] A notice of foreclosure of Clementes share was published in the 26 May 1993 issue of the Business World.[10] Clemente learned of the sale of his share only in November of 1997.[11] He filed a claim with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeking the restoration of his shareholding in Calatagan with damages. On 15 November 2000, the SEC rendered a decision dismissing Clementes complaint. Citing Section 69 of the Corporation Code which provides that the sale of shares at an auction sale can only be questioned within six (6) months from the date of sale, the SEC concluded that Clementes claim, filed four (4) years after the sale, had already prescribed. The SEC further held that Calatagan had complied with all the requirements for a valid sale of the subject share, Clemente having failed to inform Calatagan that the address he had earlier supplied was no longer his address. Clemente, the SEC ruled, had acted in bad faith in assuming as he claimed that his non-payment of monthly dues would merely render his share inactive.

Clemente filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On 1 June 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reversing the SEC. The appellate court restored Clementes one share with a directive to Calatagan to issue in his a new share, and awarded to Clemente a total of P400,000.00 in damages, less the unpaid monthly dues of P5,200.00. In rejecting the SECs finding that the action had prescribed, the Court of Appeals cited the SECs own ruling in SEC Case No. 4160, Caram v. Valley Golf Country Club, Inc., that Section 69 of the Corporation Code specifically refers to unpaid subscriptions to capital stock, and not to any other debt of stockholders. With the insinuation that Section 69 does not apply to unpaid membership dues in non-stock corporations, the appellate court employed Article 1140 of the Civil Code as the proper rule of prescription. The provision sets the prescription period of actions to recover movables at eight (8) years. The Court of Appeals also pointed out that since that Calatagans first two demand letters had been returned to it as sender with the notation about the closure of the mailing address, it very well knew that its third and final demand letter also sent to the same mailing address would not be received by Clemente. It noted the by-law requirement that within ten (10) days after the Board has ordered the sale at auction of a members share of stock for indebtedness, the Corporate Secretary shall notify the owner thereof and advise the Membership Committee of such fact. Finally, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated that a person who is in danger of the imminent loss of his property has the right to be notified and be given the chance to prevent the loss.[12] Hence, the present appeal. Calatagan maintains that the action of Clemente had prescribed pursuant to Section 69 of the Corporation Code, and that the requisite notices under both the law and the by-laws had been rendered to Clemente. Section 69 of the Code provides that an action to recover delinquent stock sold must be commenced by the filing of a complaint within six (6) months from the date of sale. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Section 69 is part of Title VIII of the Code entitled Stocks and Stockholders and refers specifically to unpaid subscriptions to capital stock, the sale of which is governed by the immediately preceding Section 68. 34

The Court of Appeals debunked both Calatagans and the SECs reliance on Section 69 by citing another SEC ruling in the case of Caram v. Valley Golf. In connection with Section 69, Calatagan raises a peripheral point made in the SECs Caram ruling. In Caram, the SEC, using as take-off Section 6 of the Corporation Code which refers to such rights, privileges or restrictions as may be stated in the articles of incorporation, pointed out that the Articles of Incorporation of Valley Golf does not impose any lien, liability or restriction on the Golf Share [of Caram], but only its (Valley Golfs) By-Laws does. Here, Calatagan stresses that its own Articles of Incorporation does provide that the monthly dues assessed on owners of shares of the corporation, along with all other obligations of the shareholders to the club, shall constitute a first lien on the shares and in the event of delinquency such shares may be ordered sold by the Board of Directors in the manner provided in the By-Laws to satisfy said dues or other obligations of the shareholders.[13] With its illative but incomprehensible logic, Calatagan concludes that the prescriptive period under Section 69 should also apply to the sale of Clementes share as the lien that Calatagan perceives to be a restriction is stated in the articles of incorporation and not only in the bylaws.

(5) years as the period of prescription for all other actions whose prescriptive periods are not fixed in the Civil Code or in any other law. Neither article is applicable but Article 1140 of the Civil Code which provides that an action to recover movables shall prescribe in eight (8) years. Calatagans action is for the recovery of a share of stock, plus damages.

Calatagans advertence to the fact that the constitution of a lien on the members share by virtue of the explicit provisions in its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws is relevant but ultimately of no help to its cause. Calatagans Articles of Incorporation states that the dues, together with all other obligations of members to the club, shall constitute a first lien on the shares, second only to any lien in favor of the national or local government, and in the event of delinquency such shares may be ordered sold by the Board of Directors in the manner provided in the By-Laws to satisfy said dues or other obligations of the stockholders.[14] In turn, there are several provisions in the By-laws that govern the payment of dues, the lapse into delinquency of the member, and the constitution and execution on the lien. We quote these provisions:

We remain unconvinced. ARTICLE XII MEMBERS ACCOUNT There are fundamental differences that defy equivalence or even analogy between the sale of delinquent stock under Section 68 and the sale that occurred in this case. At the root of the sale of delinquent stock is the non-payment of the subscription price for the share of stock itself. The stockholder or subscriber has yet to fully pay for the value of the share or shares subscribed. In this case, Clemente had already fully paid for the share in Calatagan and no longer had any outstanding obligation to deprive him of full title to his share. Perhaps the analogy could have been made if Clemente had not yet fully paid for his share and the non-stock corporation, pursuant to an article or by-law provision designed to address that situation, decided to sell such share as a consequence. But that is not the case here, and there is no purpose for us to apply Section 69 to the case at bar. Calatagan argues in the alternative that Clementes suit is barred by Article 1146 of the Civil Code which establishes four (4) years as the prescriptive period for actions based upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff on the hypothesis that the suit is purely for damages. As a second alternative still, Calatagan posits that Clementes action is governed by Article 1149 of the Civil Code which sets five

SEC. 31. (a) Billing Members, Posting of Delinquent Members The Treasurer shall bill al members monthly. As soon as possible after the end of every month, a statement showing the account of bill of a member for said month will be prepared and sent to him. If the bill of any member remains unpaid by the 20th of the month following that in which the bill was incurred, the Treasurer shall notify him that if his bill is not paid in full by the end of the succeeding month his name will be posted as delinquent the following day at the Clubhouse bulletin board. While posted, a member, the immediate members of his family, and his guests, may not avail of the facilities of the Club. (b) Members on the delinquent list for more than 60 days shall be reported to the Board and their shares or the shares of the juridical entities they represent shall thereafter be ordered sold by the Board at auction to satisfy the claims of the Club as provided 35

for in Section 32 hereon. A member may pay his overdue account at any time before the auction sale. Sec. 32. Lien on Shares; Sale of Share at Auction- The club shall have a first lien on every share of stock to secure debts of the members to the Club. This lien shall be annotated on the certificates of stock and may be enforced by the Club in the following manner: (a) Within ten (10) days after the Board has ordered the sale at auction of a members share of stock for indebtedness under Section 31(b) hereof, the Secretary shall notify the owner thereof, and shall advise the Membership Committee of such fact. (b) The Membership Committee shall then notify all applicants on the Waiting List and all registered stockholders of the availability of a share of stock for sale at auction at a specified date, time and place, and shall post a notice to that effect in the Club bulletin board for at least ten (10) days prior to the auction sale. (c) On the date and hour fixed, the Membership Committee shall proceed with the auction by viva voce bidding and award the sale of the share of stock to the highest bidder. (d) The purchase price shall be paid by the winning bidder to the Club within twenty-four (24) hours after the bidding. The winning bidder or the representative in the case of a juridical entity shall become a Regular Member upon payment of the purchase price and issuance of a new stock certificate in his name or in the name of the juridical entity he represents. The proceeds of the sale shall be paid by the Club to the selling stockholder after deducting his obligations to the Club. (e) If no bids be received or if the winning bidder fails to pay the amount of this bid within twenty-four (24) hours after the bidding, the auction procedures may be repeated from time to time at the discretion of the Membership Committee until the share of stock be sold.

(f) If the proceeds from the sale of the share of stock are not sufficient to pay in full the indebtedness of the member, the member shall continue to be obligated to the Club for the unpaid balance. If the member whose share of stock is sold fails or refuse to surrender the stock certificate for cancellation, cancellation shall be effected in the books of the Club based on a record of the proceedings. Such cancellation shall render the unsurrendered stock certificate null and void and notice to this effect shall be duly published. It is plain that Calatagan had endeavored to install a clear and comprehensive procedure to govern the payment of monthly dues, the declaration of a member as delinquent, and the constitution of a lien on the shares and its eventual public sale to answer for the members debts. Under Section 91 of the Corporation Code, membership in a non-stock corporation shall be terminated in the manner and for the causes provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. The By-law provisions are elaborate in explaining the manner and the causes for the termination of membership in Calatagan, through the execution on the lien of the share. The Court is satisfied that the By-Laws, as written, affords due protection to the member by assuring that the member should be notified by the Secretary of the looming execution sale that would terminate membership in the club. In addition, the By-Laws guarantees that after the execution sale, the proceeds of the sale would be returned to the former member after deducting the outstanding obligations. If followed to the letter, the termination of membership under this procedure outlined in the By-Laws would accord with substantial justice.

Yet, did Calatagan actually comply with the by-law provisions when it sold Clementes share? The appellate courts finding on this point warrants our approving citation, thus:

In accordance with this provision, Calatagan sent the third and final demand letter to Clemente on December 7, 1992. The letter states that if the amount of delinquency is not paid, the share will be included among the delinquent shares to be sold at public auction. This letter was signed by Atty. Benjamin Tanedo, Jr., CalataganGolfs Corporate Secretary. It was again sent to Clementes mailing address Phimco Industries Inc., P.O. 36

Box 240, MCC Makati. As expected, it was returned because the post office box had been closed. Under the By-Laws, the Corporate Secretary is tasked to give or cause to be given, all notices required by law or by these By-Laws. .. and keep a record of the addresses of all stockholders. As quoted above, Sec. 32 (a) of the By-Laws further provides that within ten (10) days after the Board has ordered the sale at auction of a members share of stock for indebtedness under Section 31 (b) hereof, the Secretary shall notify the owner thereof and shall advise the Membership Committee of such fact., The records do not disclose what report the Corporate Secretary transmitted to the Membership Committee to comply with Section 32(a). Obviously, the reason for this mandatory requirement is to give the Membership Committee the opportunity to find out, before the share is sold, if proper notice has been made to the shareholder member. We presume that the Corporate Secretary, as a lawyer is knowledgeable on the law and on the standards of good faith and fairness that the law requires. As custodian of corporate records, he should also have known that the first two letters sent to Clemente were returned because the P.O. Box had been closed. Thus, we are surprised given his knowledge of the law and of corporate records that he would send the third and final letter Clementes last chance before his share is sold and his membership lost to the same P.O. Box that had been closed. Calatagan argues that it exercised due diligence before the foreclosure sale and sent several notices to Clementes specified mailing address. We do not agree; we cannot label as due diligence Calatagans act of sending the December 7, 1992 letter to Clementes mailing address knowing fully well that the P.O. Box had been closed. Due diligence or good faith imposes upon the Corporate Secretary the chief repository of all corporate records the obligation to check Clementes other address which, under the ByLaws, have to be kept on file and are in fact on file. One obvious purpose of giving the Corporate Secretary the duty to keep the addresses of members on file is specifically for matters of this kind,

when the member cannot be reached through his or her mailing address. Significantly, the Corporate Secretary does not have to do the actual verification of other addressees on record; a mere clerk can do the very simple task of checking the files as in fact clerks actually undertake these tasks. In fact, one telephone call to Clementes phone numbers on file would have alerted him of his impending loss.

Ultimately, the petition must fail because Calatagan had failed to duly observe both the spirit and letter of its own by-laws. The by-law provisions was clearly conceived to afford due notice to the delinquent member of the impending sale, and not just to provide an intricate faade that would facilitate Calatagans sale of the share. But then, the bad faith on Calatagans part is palpable. As found by the Court of Appeals, Calatagan very well knew that Clementes postal box to which it sent its previous letters had already been closed, yet it persisted in sending that final letter to the same postal box. What for? Just for the exercise, it appears, as it had known very well that the letter would never actually reach Clemente. It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had provided his residential address along with his residence and office telephone numbers. Nothing in Section 32 of Calatagans By-Laws requires that the final notice prior to the sale be made solely through the members mailing address. Clemente cites our aphorism-like pronouncement in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals[15]that [a] simple telephone call and an ounce of good faith x x x could have prevented this present controversy. That memorable observation is quite apt in this case. Calatagans bad faith and failure to observe its own By-Laws had resulted not merely in the loss of Clementes privilege to play golf at its golf course and avail of its amenities, but also in significant pecuniary damage to him. For that loss, the only blame that could be thrown Clementes way was his failure to notify Calatagan of the closure of the P.O. Box. That lapse, if we uphold Calatagan would cost Clemente a lot. But, in the first place, does he deserve answerability for failing to notify the club of the closure of the postal box? Indeed, knowing as he did that Calatagan was in possession of his home address as well as residence and office telephone numbers, he had every reason to assume that the club would not be at a loss should it need to contact him. In addition, 37

according to Clemente, he was not even aware of the closure of the postal box, the maintenance of which was not his responsibility but his employer Phimcos.

acts, thereby entitling him to moral damages under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. Moreover, it is evidentthat Calatagans bad faith as exhibited in the

The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code,[16] under the Chapter on Human Relations. These provisions, which the Court of Appeals did apply, enunciate a general obligation under law for every person to act fairly and in good faith towards one another. A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in its treatment of its members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every person honestly and in good faith extends even to its shareholders or members, even if the latter find themselves contractually bound to perform certain obligations to the corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be a charter of dehumanization.

course of its corporate actions warrants correction for the public good, thereby justifying exemplary damages under Article 2229 of the Civil Code.

We turn to the matter of damages. The award of actual damages is of course warranted since Clemente has sustained pecuniary injury by reason of Calatagans wrongful violation of its own By-Laws. It would not be feasible to deliver Clementes original Certificate of Stock because it had already been cancelled and a new one issued in its place in the name of the purchases at the auction who was not impleaded in this case. However, the Court of Appeals instead directed that Calatagan to issue to Clemente a new certificate of stock. That sufficiently redresses the actual damages sustained by Clemente. After all, the certificate of stock is simply the evidence of the share. The Court of Appeals also awarded Clemente P200,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. We agree that the award of such damages is warranted. The Court of Appeals cited Calatagan for violation of Article 32 of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of damages from any private individual who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs the right against deprivation of property without due process of laws. The plain letter of the provision squarely entitles Clemente to damages from Calatagan. Even without Article 32 itself, Calatagan will still be bound to pay moral and exemplary damages to Clemente. The latter was able to duly prove that he had sustained mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded feelings by reason of Calatagans

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. 9. G.R. No. L-57707 November 19, 1982 PHILEX MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. DOMINGO CORONEL REYES, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Albay, 10th Judicial District, Branch IV, and RICHARD HUENEFELD, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: A special civil action for certiorari seeking to set aside the Orders of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Albay in Civil Case No. 6400, denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction on March 12, 1981, and the Motion for its reconsideration on June 25, 1981. The relevant facts follow: Private respondent, Richard Huenefeld, is a stockholder of petitioner Philex Mining Corporation (Philex, for short). He originally owned 800,000 shares of stock. On February 15, 1979, Philex declared a 10% stock dividend. Stock Certificate No. 190579 for 80,000 shares was issued by Philex in favor of Huenefeld. On April 18, 1979, Philex sent the stock certificate to Huenefeld through its transfer agent, First Asian, Stock Transfer, Inc. (First Asian, for brevity). Huenefeld claims that he never received the stock certificate.

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On February 6, 1980, First Asian wrote Huenefeld informing him that the stock certificate had been delivered to him at his address at Michelle Apartment, 2030 A. Mabini Street, Manila; and that if the certificate could not be located that Huenefeld execute an Affidavit of Loss, with the notice of loss to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in accordance with the procedure prescribed BY Republic Act No. 201 (now Section 73, Corporation Code). On March 4, 1980, Huenefeld, through counsel, replied that RA 201 is not applicable because the stock certificate was not lost in the possession of the stockholder; that assuming it was, the expenses of publication and premiums for the bond should be at Philex's expense; and demanded the issuance of a replacement stock certificate. Huenefeld also submitted an Affidavit of Loss but did not comply with the other requirements on publication. On November 3, 1980, Huenefeld commenced suit for Specific Performance with Damages against Philex, First Asian and/or the latter's General Manager, before the Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch IV, Legaspi City (Civil Case No. 6400), presided by respondent Judge, to compel the issuance of a replacement for Stock Certificate No. 190579, plus damages. On January 27, 1981, Philex filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case, the issue being one of intra-corporate relationship between a stockholder and a corporation, which under Presidential Decree No. 902-A, falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Huenefeld filed an Opposition claiming that the refusal of Philex to issue a replacement certificate resulted in actual damages to him, and thus, it is no longer a case of intra-corporate conflict, but one which is civil or tortious in nature. On March 12, 1981, respondent Court issued the first questioned Order holding in abeyance resolution of the incident as the grounds alleged did not appear to be indubitable. Philex moved for reconsideration. In the interim, Philex filed a Petition with the SEC (SEC Case No. 002053) praying that the Commission hear the controversy; that Huenefeld be held to have received Stock Certificate No. 190579 and had subsequently lost the same;

and that the provisions of RA 201, or Section 73 of the new Corporation Code, be followed for the issuance of a replacement certificate, at Huenefeld's expense. Philex informed respondent Court of the filing of the Petition with the SEC and reiterated that Civil Case No. 6500 be dismissed. On June 25, 1981, respondent Court issued the second challenged Order denying Philex's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. On August 17, 1981, Philex filed the present Petition. On August 21, 1981, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent Judge from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 6400. And on October 19, 1981, we resolved to give due course and required the parties to submit simultaneous Memoranda, with which they complied. The issue is whether respondent Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the present controversy, which Philex contends is an intra-corporate one, but which Huenefeld denies. Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A provides: Sec. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees; it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: a) ... b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar 39

as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity (Emphasis supplied) Evident from the foregoing is that an intra-corporate controversy is one which arises between a stockholder and the corporation. There is no distinction, qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever. The provision is broad and covers all kinds of controversies between stockholders and corporations. The issue of whether or not a corporation is bound to replace a stockholder's lost certificate of stock is a matter purely between a stockholder and the corporation. It is a typical intra-corporate dispute. The question of damages raised is merely incidental to that main issue. Huenefeld's attempt to limit intra-corporate controversies thus: The phrase 'controversies, arising out of intra-corporate relations' would seem to refer to controversies, cases or intramurals among or between stockholders and the corporation involving the exercise of stockholders' privileges, rights, benefits and their duties in a corporation, and the existence in law of a corporation. Like, for instance, an example of 'controversies arising out of an intra- corporate relation' are cases between stockholders in 1) contesting or vying for a seat in the Board of Directors, 2) questions on voting by proxy, 3) election and tenure of office and qualification of directors, 4) removal and resignation of Directors, 5) repeal and amendment of corporate charter and by-laws, 6) questions on corporation meetings and increase of capital stocks, etc. (pp. 70, 80, Rollo).

xxx xxx xxx After a thorough consideration of the allegations and arguments adduced in the motion to dismiss, as wen as petitioners opposition thereto, the Commission resolves to. DENY said motion. It appearing that the instant suit before us involves an intra-corporate dispute, the same is, therefore, within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission to resolve. (pp. 94-95, Ibid) xxx xxx xxx The controversy between the parties being clearly an intra-corporate one, it is the SEC, as held by it, and not respondent Court of First Instance, that has original and exclusive jurisdiction, by express mandate of the law. WHEREFORE, granting this Petition, the challenged Orders of respondent Judge, dated March 12, 1981 and June 25, 1981, are hereby annulled and set aside, and Civil Case No. 6400 of the Court of First Instance of Albay is hereby ordered dismissed. Private respondent may seek relief in SEC. Case No. 2053 now pending with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. Costs against private respondent, Richard Huenefeld. SO ORDERED.

Is not well taken. The foregoing interpretation does not square with the intent of the law, which is to segregate from the general jurisdiction of regular Courts controversies involving corporations and their stockholders and to bring them to the SEC for exclusive resolution, in much the same way that labor disputes are now brought to the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and not to the Courts. The Securities and Exchange Commission, on October 7, 1981, in resolving the Motion to Dismiss filed by Huenefeld before it, ruled: 40