Sk B9 Team Monograph Outlines Fdr- Draft Monograph Outlines 9-9-03 Incl 2 Withdrawal Notice

Unclassified with CONFIDENTIAL Attachments

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES Draft Monograph Outlines as of 9/9/03 Team 1A (Commission Sensitive) Team 2 (CONFIDENTIAL) Team 3 (CRU - Not Attached) Team 4 (LES) Team 5 (Commission Sensitive) Team 6 (Commission Sensitive) Team 7 (Commission Sensitive) Team 8 (Commission Sensitive)

Unclassified with CONFIDENTIAL Attachments

Commission Sensitive TEAM 1A MONOGRAPH OUTLINE The September 11 Conspiracy I.

Overview of Conspiracy

II.

Formation of the Conspiracy A. Context of Al-Qaeda's Plans to Use Civil Aircraft as Weapons 1. Manila Air (Bojinka) - 1994-95 2. Murad debriefing by Philippine National Police - 1995 3. Air France Hijacking by GIA Terrorists - Dec. 1994 4. Other B. Hatching of 9/11 Plot 1. Conception and Approval of Operation -1996-1998 2. Kuala Lumpur meeting - Jan. 2000 3. Detailing of Nawaf Al-Hazmi (NAH) and Khalid Al-Mihdhar (KAM) to US 4. Recruiting of Hamburg Cell in Germany, Pakistan & Afghanistan 5. Selection of Atta as Emir - 1999-2000

III.

Preliminary Phase of Operation A. Hamburg Cell Pilots' Preparation 1. Researching Flight Schools - early 2000 2. Preparing for Travel to US - spring 2000 3. Arrival of Al-Shehhi, Atta, Jarrah in US - 5/00-6/00 4. Financial Support from Operatives in UAE 5. Flight Training - 6/00-12/00 B. Arrival of NAH and KAM in US-1/15/00 1. Activities in LA [to be investigated] 2. Meet Al-Bayoumi and Move to SD - 2/00 3. Activities in SD - 2/00-12/00 a. Move into Parkwood Apartments b. Open BOA account c. Buy Car d. Move to Lemon Grove e. Departure of KAM f. NAH's Activities - 6/00-12/00 [to be investigated] C. Substitution of Hanjour for NAH as 4th Pilot - Dec. 2000 1. Hanjour's Prior Flight Training and Licensing - mid-1990s 2. Hanjour's Arrival in SD-12/00 3. Hanjour and NAH travel to Arizona

Commission Sensitive

Commission Sensitive

IV.

Deployment Phase A. Involvement of Bin Al-Shibh as Liaison between Al-Qaeda Leadership and Atta - Jan.June 2001 1. Meeting with Atta, Berlin, Jan. 2001 2. Meetings with UBL, KSM, Abu Hafs Al-Masri in Afghanistan 3. Meeting with KSM in Karachi - June 2001 B. Travels of Pilot Hijackers After Flight Training 1. Atta, Al-Shehhi & Jarrah in Georgia, Virginia & NJ - late Jan.-early April 2001 - then back in Florida 2. Jarrah's 5 Trips to Germany and Lebanon - Oct. 2000-July 2001 C. Travel of Non-Pilot Hijackers to US 1. Selection of Operatives in Afghanistan 2. Arrangements to Travel to US 3. Arrival of Operatives in US 4. Infusion of Additional Financing D. Transcontinental Test Flights by the Four Pilots - May-Aug. 2001 1. Information Pilots Obtained 2. Las Vegas Rendezvous E. Bin Al-Shibh's Coordination Role 1. Spain Meeting and in Phone Contacts with Atta - Summer 2001 2. Contact with and Money Transfer to Moussaoui - July-Aug. 2001 3. Receipt of 9/11 Date from Atta and Communication thereof to KSM F. Planning Delays and Al-Qaeda's Preparations in Afghanistan for Post-Operation Counterattack - Summer 2001 G. Hijackers' Acquisition of Tickets for 9/11 Flights -- Aug. 2001

V.

Execution Phase A. Assembly of Flight Teams 1. AA #11: Atta, Al-Suqami, Waleed & Wail Al-Shehri, Al-Umari 2. UA #175: Al-Shehhi, Banihammad, Ahmed & Hamza Al-Ghamdi, Mohand Al-Shehri 3. AA #77: Hanjour, NAS, KAM, Moqed, Salim Al-Hazmi 4. UA #93: Jarrah, Saeed Al-Ghamdi, Al-Haznawi, Al-Nami B. Return of Excess Funds to Operatives in UAE C. September 11 Hijackings and Crashes

Commission Sensitive

Commission Sensitive

VI.

Sidebars to Address Loose Ends, Alternative Theories and Popular Misconceptions

A. B. C. D. VII.

DSM "Holy Tuesday" Second Wave of Attacks Other

Glossary of Who's Who in Conspiracy

Commission Sensitive

WITH DRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Box: 00004 Series: Copies: 1

Folder: 0009 Document: 7 Stephanie Kaplan Files Pages: 4 ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: Folder Title: Team Monograph Outlines Document Date: Document Type: Miscellaneous (o^-\\e j Special Media: From: To: Subject:

Intelligence: Management, Analysis, Collection

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination.

NND: 301 Withdrawn: 06-20-2008

by:

RETRIEVAL #: 301 00004 0009 7 System DocID: 2869

|/U3tXA CVvja-'i'

WITH DRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Box: 00004 Series: Copies: 1

Folder: 0009 Document: 8 Stephanie Kaplan Files Pages: 9

ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: Folder Title: Team Monograph Outlines Document Date: Document Type: Miscellaneous Special Media: From: To: Subject:

Team 3 Outline

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination.

NND: 301

Withdrawn: 06-20-2008

by:

RETRIEVAL #: 301 00004 0009 8 System DocID: 2870

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive MONOGRAPH OUTLINE TEAM 4: TERRORIST FINANCING I.

How did Al-Qaeda as an institution (as opposed to the hijackers) raise and move funds to support itself? What were Al-Qaeda's expenditures? A. Who were the facilitators/ fundraisers? 1. How important is fundraising to Al-Qaeda a. Discuss UBL's personal wealth 2. Who were the individuals enlisted to raise money a. AQ operatives b. Donors c. Religious figures d. Representatives of other terrorist groups 3. What methods did they use a. Meetings b. Zakat c. Barter B. What were the sources of Al-Qaeda's funds? 1. Individual donors a. Where located b. Size of donations c. Commitment to AQ versus other organizations 2. State support of terrorism a. Saudi Arabia and associated entities b. Other countries c. Quasi state support - government funding of NGOs 3. Charities a. Generally b. Description of specific charities pre 9/11 suspected of raising money c. U.S. sources 4. Micro financing a. General description of the financing of terrorist groups through petty or organized criminal activity b. Description of specific investigations prior to 9/11 5. Drug trafficking a. To what extent has al-Qaeda financed itself through drug trafficking (particularly Afghanistan opium production), or taxing drug traffickers b. To what extent have terrorist cells, particularly domestic terrorist cells, financed themselves through drug trafficking C. What methods were used to move money destined for terrorist groups or terrorist acts? 1. Money movement through financial institutions Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive a. Poorly regulated and offshore financial centers b. Other financial institutions c. MSBs/ hawalas other money remitters 2. Money movement and storage through non-financial institutions and other informal methods a. Precious metals and stones b. Trade-based movements c. Bulk cash/courier movement D. What were Al-Qaeda's expenditures? 1. How much money was involved a. How much did al-Qaeda spend to sustain itself and run its various activities b. Did this budget change over time pre-9/11 2. What were specific expenditures a. Taliban b. Training camps c. Terrorist operations d. Other terrorist groups e. Other II.

Prior to 9/11, what did the U.S. do to identify and stop the raising and movement of money in support of terrorist groups? A. What did the USG do to gather and analyze intelligence on the raising and movement of money in support of terrorist groups? 1. Description and assessment of the government's ability to gather and analyze intelligence domestically on al-Qaeda related fundraisers and money transmitters a. FBI i. Description and analysis of the FBI structure involved in terrorist finance; institutionally, did the FBI see a need for a separate effort focused on the money trails ii. Description and analysis of the amount of collection and level of understanding of the means and methods of fund raising and money movement iii. Description and analysis of the methods used to coordinate the various FBI Field Offices b. Treasury i. FinCEN's efforts to analyze intelligence (a) Office for Intelligence (i) Why/how set up (ii) Description of how it operates (including chain of Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive command, information flows, funding) (iii) How did FinCEN use this information (b) Office of Strategic Analysis (i) Function and structure (ii) Studies or typologies on terrorist finance or alternative methods of moving value (c) General description and analysis of the level of coordination between FinCEN and other USG intelligence efforts (i) Domestic agencies (ii) Foreign intelligence agencies ii.

Other Treasury efforts

c. Description of the roles and efforts of other agencies (e.g., State, NSA) involved in the gathering or analysis of intelligence regarding terrorist financing d. Description of the level of cooperation and intelligence sharing among the relevant agencies. Did agencies with a need get information in a timely manner? 2. Description and assessment of the government's ability to gather and analyze intelligence on al-Qaeda related fundraisers and money transmitters overseas a. CIA i. Description and assessment of the CIA structure involved in terrorism generally and terrorist financing specifically (a) CTC efforts (i) Creation of UBL station (ii) Intelligence gathering re: a. Al-Qaeda financing, efforts, success b. Countries supporting terrorism c. Abilities of foreign entities to identify, track and disrupt TF (iii) Sources of information (iv) Level of interest in financial activities vs. other activities (b) Non-CTC efforts (i) Regional/country desks (ii) Use of foreign intelligence services ii. Institutionally, did the CIA see a need for a separate effort focused on the money trails iii. Description and assessment of the amount of collection and level of understanding about terrorist financing prior to 9/11 b. General description and assessment of the State Department's role in gathering and analyzing financial intelligence related to terrorist groups Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive i.

Structure of State for gathering and analyzing intelligence generally (a) Analysis by INR (b) Other efforts (i) Foreign trips/meetings (ii) Embassy/envoy feedback (iii) Multilateral/regional efforts (iv) Voluntary provision of information ii. Description and analysis of the level of information collection and analysis conducted by State with regard to terrorist financing Description and analysis of other foreign intelligence collection and analysis efforts i. NSA ii. Treasury iii. Defense

B. What did the USG do to disrupt the raising and movement of money in support of terrorist groups? 1. Description and assessment of law enforcement efforts to disrupt terrorist financing domestically a. Domestic criminal prosecutions i. Traditional criminal prosecutions, e.g., money laundering ii. Prosecutions under 2339A and 2339B (a) Description of the history and use of terrorist financing statutes (b) Analysis of the lack of domestic prosecutions under the statute iii. Interrelationship between domestic and foreign criminal prosecutions, if any: use of renditions, extradition or evidence sharing with regard to terrorist finance b. Other disruptive activities short of prosecution 2. A description and assessment of covert and other actions to disrupt terrorist financing overseas a. Did the CIA use the intelligence it had to disrupt terrorist financing i. Proposals for covert action ii. Barriers to US covert action b. Sharing information with foreign intelligence or law enforcement services i. General US willingness to pass information ii. Ability and willingness of foreign intelligence services to use USG information to disrupt terrorist financing groups 3. A description and assessment of efforts to freeze terrorist assets or otherwise financially isolate them through designations a. Legal authority for and scope of designations Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive i.

President's authority under War Powers Act and IEEPA, delegated to OFAC (a) History and nature of President's authority (b) Description of how designations work within OFAC (including chain of command, information flows, funding) (c) Level of follow through ii. Secretary of State's authority to designate Foreign Terrorist Organizations (a) Nature and history of Secretary's authority (b) Description of how designations occur (including chain of command, information flows, funding) (i) EB, S/CT, INL (c) Level of follow through iii. Level of interagency coordination among agencies involved in the EEPA and FTO process

b. Descriptions of the various designations made between 1996 and 2001 i. What was designated and by whom, and a description and analysis of assets frozen/blocked as a result of designations (a) Taliban (b) Bin Laden (c) Al-Qaeda ii. Designations considered but not made, particularly with respect to the five terrorist funding organizations identified in our document request (a) Description and analysis of the barriers (institutional or otherwise) present prior to 9/11 that prevented the naming of these organizations iii. Attempts made by US to gather information in support of designations, blocking and freezing (a) Bin Laden family interviews (i) Purpose and goals (ii) Level of cooperation w/family (iii) Results: Information/conclusions (b) OFAC Trips to SA, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, etc. to enlist cooperation (i) Purpose and goals of the trip (ii) Level of cooperation (iii) Results (c) FT AT center (i) Rationale and purpose of FT AT center (ii) Description and assessment of the pre-9/11 efforts to get the center staffed and operational c. Discussion and analysis of the effect of the freezing and blocking i. Any internal/external studies to show that blocking is effective Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive ii.

Any evidence of disruption to plans

4. Regulation of financial institutions to deter or disrupt terrorist financing (to the extent not covered in discussion of the 9/11 hijackers) a. General description of enforcement efforts against regulated financial institutions regarding money laundering and terrorist finance i. Relationship between money laundering and terrorist finance; do AML controls assist in stopping TF b. Regulation of money service businesses and non-bank financial institutions i. Congress required Treasury to regulate MSBs in 1994, but no regulations were issued until post 9/11 c. Regulation of non-financial institutions and non-traditional methods of moving value d. Attempts to increase regulation of financial flows i. "Know your customer" and privacy issues generally ii. Legislative attempts C. What did the USG do to generate international cooperation on identifying/ disrupting terrorist financing? 1. What were US efforts to garner international support for efforts to block and freeze assets a. Description of the general international attitude regarding counter-terrorist financing i. Support of multilateral institutions for blocking and freezing (a) UN actions against Taliban UNSCR 1267 Oct. 99 (b) Other examples of support (c) USG response to independent foreign efforts (i) Did they overlap USG efforts (ii) Were they seen as effective (iii) Interaction with private sectors ii. Foreign entities' views of the terrorism problem and the utility of blocking and freezing (a) Definitions of terrorism (b) Charities (c) "Legitimate struggles" (d) Emphasis on sources of terrorism (e) Human rights issues (f) Link between terrorism and other issues (drugs/guns/etc.) (g) Interface between UNSC CTC and Sanctions Committee (h) State terrorism b. Level of foreign cooperation i. Assets claimed frozen vs. actually frozen ii. Closing/sanctioning financial institutions (formal/informal) iii. Did multilateral organizations put pressure on members Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive iv.

Intelligence provided

2. Description and assessment of USG efforts to increase foreign political will a. What were efforts made in conjunction with countries not involved in supporting terrorism i. Meetings and conferences in which the subject of terrorist financing was on the agenda, ii. Efforts in multilateral context b. What efforts were made against (with?) countries considered to be supporters of terrorism i. Sticks: What sanctions were considered or levied ii. Carrots: What benefits were considered for those who would renounce support of terrorism iii. Multilateral efforts and sanctions 3. Description and assessment of USG efforts to increase the technical capacity of foreign entities to identify and disrupt terrorist financing a. Description of technical capacity of certain strategic countries (and related private sectors) i. Legal authorities ii. Intelligence iii. FIUs iv. Private sector sophistication b. Description and assessment of USG efforts to improve these abilities i. Assessments ii. Training iii. Funding iv. Role of various agencies (coordination, etc.) D. What did the United States Government do to coordinate the disparate agencies involved in identifying, tracking and disrupting terrorist finances? 1. Description and assessment of the structural mechanisms in place to coordinate the US Government activities and resolve disputes a. NSC/CSG description generally b. PDD-39-June21, 1995 i. Description ii. Response by relevant agencies c. Were there shortcomings in efforts to: i. Prevent the abuse of charities ii. Regulate informal money transmitters iii. Identify illegal trade-based money movements 2. Description and assessment of structural mechanisms in place to share financial information Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive 3. Description and assessment of barriers to effective interagency coordination and information sharing III.

Based on what we know about the 9/11 conspiracy, were there any key opportunities to detect them as a result of their financial transactions? What other lessons can be drawn from these financial transactions? A. What do these transactions say about how organized, planned terrorist operations operate within the US? 1. How sophisticated were the 19 hijackers in disguising their financial transactions? Do the transactions of other known terrorist cells or groups differ from what we had seen with the 9/11 hijackers? What does that difference tell us? 2. Were there patterns within the transactions that we can look to in identifying or disrupting future terrorist attacks? B. Were the anti-money laundering controls in place sufficient to detect the types of movement of money involved here? 1. General description of anti-money laundering controls prior to 9/11 [with cross-reference to detailed discussion contained elsewhere] a. Financial institution controls b. Non-financial institution controls 2. What was the role of foreign regulatory environments in facilitating funding i. UAE: The UAE is has a notoriously lax regulatory environment. What is that environment, and did it contribute to the ease of movement of terrorist money? Would it have made any difference? ii. German iii. Saudi Arabia iv. Pakistan 3. How did the financing evade detection? a. Were transactions lawful (were false SSANs used; any other illegality) b. Did transactions generate SARs (must address persistent reports SARs were generated, but never timely investigated) i. If yes, which transactions; why no follow-up; was there breakdown in system ii. If no, should any have been filed, did any transactions meet criteria c. Any other relevant reporting (CTRs etc.) d. Any other facts that should have raised red flags under then-existing regime 4. Was the existing system simply not designed to detect the type of transactions engaged in by the 9/11 terrorists, or was there some specific individual, Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive corporate, or government failure? C. Was there any concerted, contemporaneous effort to track known terrorists cells through their financial transactions? 1. Discuss and assess the government's technical ability to engage in real time monitoring and tracking a. Description and assessment of the government's ability to engage in real time monitoring b. Factors inhibiting efforts to develop capability i. Privacy/civil liberty issues (were there relevant legislative or regulatory efforts halted as a result) ii. Technological deficiencies iii. Resource issues iv. Interagency coordination/cooperation c. Compare the private sector and government capability to engage in real time transaction monitoring 2. Two 9/11 hijackers with known extensive UBL links were not located for over two weeks after the realization that they were in the U.S., despite holding U.S. bank accounts in their own names a. Why was no effort made to track them through financial transactions? b. Had efforts been made, could the two known hijackers have been timely found (i.e., were their specific bank accounts and/or other transactions discoverable) c. Address JI findings 3. Moussaoui financial transactions a. In the pre 9/11 world, would a timely analysis of Moussaoui's financial transactions been able to allow the intelligence or law enforcement communities to expose the conspiracy? IV.

What has al-Qaeda done since 9/11 to continue to support terrorist operations and move money? A. How have their methods of fundraising changed? B. What are the sources of Al-Qaeda's funds? 1. Individual donors a. Reluctant to give 2. States 3. Charities 4. Micro-financing 5. Other

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive C. How does Al-Qaeda move money? 1. Increased use of couriers versus financial institutions D. What are al-Qaeda's expenditures? 1. No longer have expenses of Taliban 2. What are training expenses now 3. Support of other terrorist groups 4. Terrorist operations E. To what extent are these changes in reaction to USG policies discussed in Section V below V.

What are we currently doing, and have these efforts eliminated the deficiencies present before 9/11? A. What is the current approach to gathering and analyzing intelligence on the raising and movement of money in support of terrorist groups? 1. Description and assessment current domestic intelligence gathering and analysis a. Structural i. FBI (a) TFOS (i) Structure and function (ii) Relationship/function with field offices (b) JTTFs and their focus on terrorist financing ii. FinCEN iii. Other agencies b. Capability i. Capability to do real-time tracking of persons through financial transactions (a) Given the same facts today, could known operatives in U.S. be located in time to avert disaster (b) Given the Moussaoui facts today, could his financial transactions be tracked to unravel the plot (c) Impact of changes (legal, technological, structural) (d) Ability to identify people through bank records (e) Other data that the USG can search to find people quickly and link them to others (f) How fast can this information be accessed in emergency (g) What obstacles hinder U.S. efforts to enhance capabilities in this area (i) Legal obstacles (ii) Technological obstacles (iii) Lack of cooperation/data sharing between and among USG (iv) Insufficient public-private partnerships (are talent, Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive initiative, and resources being optimally utilized) (h) How should privacy and civil liberties be assured ii. Other changes in capability c. Information sharing and coordination among the different agencies 2. Discuss and assess current foreign intelligence gathering and analysis a. Structural i. CIA (a) Creation of FINO (i) Rationale/ history, etc (ii) Description of duties, etc (iii) Assessment of effectiveness ii. State iii. Other agencies b. Capability i. Effect of detainee interviews ii. Other changes in capability c. Coordination and information sharing with foreign intelligence i. Has this improved ii. US willingness to share information d. Coordination and information sharing within the USG i. Among intelligence agencies ii. With law enforcement agencies B. What is the current approach to disrupting terrorist funding? 1. Description and assessment of changes in law enforcement efforts to disrupt terrorist financing a. Legal and structural changes b. Changes in focus and aggressiveness c. Changes in capability d. Specific efforts against specific methods (a) Micro-financing (b) Charities (c) Financial institutions (d) Hawala and other informal methods (e) Bulk cash (f) Other e. Coordination and evidence sharing 2. Description and assessment of the changes made, procedurally and substantively, in the US effort to name terrorist groups a. General description of namings since 9/11 i. General description of the post 9/11 process as compared to the previous process (a) Is there a significant difference as to the type/nature/number of Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive designations compared to pre 9/11 (b) Description of specific namings (c) Analysis of specific namings, with an eye to answering the following questions: (i) Is OF AC receiving information from the FBI/CIA/Foreign partners better and faster than before (ii) Could any of these entities been named prior to 9/11 if the processes had been working better (iii) How significant are these groups in the world of terrorist finance (iv) Will naming/blocking/freezing really make any difference ii. International cooperation in the naming process (a) Description of international post-9/11 efforts (i) UN efforts (ii) Bilateral efforts (b) Assessment of level of cooperation and effectiveness (i) Description of countries that have frozen assets a. Claims vs. reality b. Private sector follow-through and enforcement (ii) Consequences for failing to comply (c) Barriers to more effective cooperation (i) Jurisdictional issues (ii) Inability to share sensitive information internationally iii. Future of OF AC naming efforts (a) The "second phase" — allowing foreign partners to take the lead in future namings (i) Rationale/background (ii) Effectiveness of second phase (b) Terrorist efforts to circumvent 3. Description and assessment of covert and other actions to disrupt terrorist financing overseas a. Legal and structural b. Focus and aggressiveness c. Capability d. Ability and willingness to share information for covert operations with foreign law enforcement or intelligence C. What is the current regulatory environment? 1. Description and assessment of title HI of the USA PATRIOT Act a. General description b. Use of section 311 of USA PATRIOT i. Description/history of section 311 "special measures" for areas/institutions of money laundering concern ii. Use so far: Ukraine (threaten); Narau (actual) Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive iii.

c.

d. e. f.

Why no broader requests (a) Worry about diplomatic backlash (b) Sufficiency of evidence/use of classified materials (c) Political will/philosophical objection Broader scope of AML i. MSBs ii. Other non-bank financial institutions, including hawala and other methods of informal value transfer iii. Non-financial institutions Customer ID Correspondent bank restrictions/enhanced due diligence Patriot Act Communication System (PACS) system i. General description ii. Workable?

2. Other regulatory agencies a. Fed b. OCC 3. Regulation of charities within the US 4. Private sector efforts a. Private initiatives b. Public-Private Cooperation D. What are the current efforts to generate international cooperation? 1. Description and assessment of structural changes within the USG a. Description and roles of various agencies involved b. Methods and effectiveness of interagency coordination 2. Description and assessment of changes made to increase the capacity of foreign entities to identify and disrupt terrorist financing a. Participation in multilateral efforts i. UN ii. World Bank/IMF iii. FATF iv. Relationship between USG policy and policies/efforts of multilaterals b. Bilateral efforts 3. Description and assessment of changes made to increase the political will of foreign entities or to gain consensus on the issue of terrorist financing a. Multilateral efforts b. Bilateral efforts c. Overcoming differences Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive i. ii. iii. iv.

Diplomatic pressure Sticks Carrots Use of multilaterals

E. What are the current mechanisms to coordinate government agencies? 1. Description and assessment of structural mechanisms in place to coordinate US government policies and actions a. Policy Coordinating Committee i. General description (a) History, etc (b) Description of structure (c) Issues raised at PCC/ method by which it works b. Groups above the PCC - Principals and Deputites Committees c. Other informal senior-level coordinating mechanisms 2. Operational coordination issues a. Structure for interagency coordination and information sharing b. Specific issues 3. Assessment a. Does the fact that no single entity/person has authority over counterterrorist financing as issue impair its effectiveness 4. Does the ad-hoc nature of the PCC (why the GC of Treasury?) ultimately have an impact on the ability of the USG to focus long-term on the problem VI.

What specific, actionable policy recommendations can be made to improve the current efforts in light of the lessons of 9/11?

Commission Sensitive Law Enforcement Sensitive

COMMISSION SENSITIVE TEAM 5 MONOGRAPH OUTLINE Immigration, Nonimmigrant Visas and Border Control I.

Principles and Goals of the US Border Security System Prior to Sept. 11, 2001 A. What were the principal broad purposes of the US immigration system before the Sept. 11 attack? What border security issues were recognized over time and how did the system address them? How did immigration laws and policies address Islamic and other terrorism? B. What agencies directed our border security system, and what were their mandates and activities? How well did the agencies involved in the system work to fulfill their mission as they understood it? To what extent was counterterrorism a real element of border security policy and programs? 1. Department of State 2. Department of Justice 3. Immigration and Naturalization Service 4. FBI 5. CIA and other intelligence agencies 6. Department of Defense and military 7. Congress 8. State and local authorities 9. Coast Guard

II. The Encounter Between the Al Qaeda Plotters and the US Border Security System A. Intelligence about terrorist mobility and access to the US 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Al Qaeda's view of entry into the US as understood today Intelligence agency knowledge before Sept. 11 Law enforcement agency knowledge before Sept. 11 Intelligence and information disseminated to border security authorities Border security agencies' own intelligence capabilities and knowledge

B. Intelligence about individual terrorists: watchlisting 1. Intelligence and law enforcement agency identification of terrorists a. CIA, NSA, DIA terrorist identification information b. FBI information c. Foreign participation in terrorist identification 2. The development of terrorist watchlisting by the Dept. of State

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE a. Islamic fundamentalist terrorists watchlisted prior to Sept. 11 b. The Sept. 11 plot and watchlisting 3. Lookouts by federal inspection services (INS, APHIS, and Customs) 4. FAA and airline company listings (with Team 7) 5. Assessment and accountability C. Terrorist acquisition of international travel documents 1. Al Qaeda's view of the role of travel documents 2. Terrorist travel document practices known prior to the Sept. 11 plot 3. US policy and security practices concerning travel and supporting documents. a. International and US standards for documentation b. Enforcement policy, programs, and resources prior to Sept. 11 4. Characteristics of the Sept. 11 hijackers' international travel documents D. The visa process 1. The US visa process encountered by al Qaeda in the Sept. 11 plot a. b. c. d. e. f. g. 2.

Statutory authority Policy direction Budget, personnel, training Consular access to terrorist intelligence Applications, other forms, interviews, and technology tools Adjudication clearances and advisory opinions Internal controls and evaluations of posts

Visas issued to the Sept. 11 hijackers a. Saudi Arabia i. Visa Express and interview policy ii. the 15 Saudi hijackers iii. Saudi runner-up hijackers b. United Arab Emirates i. AlShehhi ii. Banihammad c. Germany - Berlin i. interview policy ii. Atta iii. Jarrah d. Yemen i. Binalshibh ii. Essabar

3. Visas issued to terrorists prior to the Sept. 11 plot

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

4. Visas issued to U.S. associates of the hijackers 5. Assessment and accountability E. Federal inspections upon entry 1. The federal inspection process encountered by al Qaeda a. b. c. d.

Statutory authority Policy direction Watchlist/lookout information Primary inspection i. inspections of the 19 hijackers ii. inspections of other plotters e. Secondary inspection i. inspections of certain hijackers ii. inspections of plotters and associates

2. Border crossing by previous Islamic terrorists 3. Assessment and accountability F. Detection and interior immigration enforcement of terrorists 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Statutory authority Policy direction Enforcement agencies, missions, and resources 1996 mandated student tracking system 1996 mandated exit-entry system Biometrics Identification document standards Technology Assessment and accountability

III. Terrorism, US Immigration and Border Security After Sept. 11 A. How did border security authorities respond on Sept. 11 and in the immediate aftermath? (duration of "immediate aftermath " tbd) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Consulates Airports Land borders Sea borders Foreigners in the US

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE B. How do we now assess the terrorist threat? Since Sept. 11, 2001, how have those involved in our immigration and border security system redefined its goals to address Islamic and other terrorism? 1. Borders and the terrorist threat a. Vulnerabilities exposed by al Qaeda and others b. Terrorist mobility's relationship with other transborder crimes c. Access to the US as a dimension of national policy 2. Redefined goals of the immigration and border security system a. Immigration and border security framework b. Intelligence and watchlisting c. Identity documents d. Screening prior to entry e. Screening at entry f. Border enforcement - north, south, sea g. Internal regulation, compliance, and enforcement h. International cooperation C. Key participants and their contributions to the redefined mission. How has the US immigration and border security system changed to address Islamic and other terrorism? 1. The White House a. Immediate response and its impact b. Current role c. Recommendations 2. The CIA and other intelligence agencies a. Immediate response and its impact b. Terrorist identity intelligence c. Terrorist mobility intelligence d. Watchlisting and terrorist tracking e. Recommendations 3. Department of State a. Immediate response and its impact b. Current role c. Opportunities and vulnerabilities d. Recommendations 4. Department of Justice a. Immediate response and its impact b. Current role

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE c. Opportunities and vulnerabilities d. Recommendations 5. Department of Homeland Security a. Immediate response and its impact b. Transformation at the nation's borders c. Key achievements d. Key weaknesses e. Recommendations 6. Department of Defense and other military [tbd] a. Immediate response b. Current role c. Recommendations 7. State and local authorities a. Immediate response b. Current role c. Recommendations 8. Private sector and citizens a. Immediate response b. Current role c. Recommendations IV. Conclusion

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Commission Sensitive TEAM 6 MONOGRAPH OUTLINE Law Enforcement and Domestic Intelligence I. The Domestic Intelligence/Counterterrorism Community Prior to the September 11 Attacks A. The Members of the Domestic Intelligence/Counterterrorism Community and their Respective Roles Prior to September 11 1. The legal framework governing intelligence collection and counterterrorism activity within the United States 2. The actual roles assumed by the various agencies acting within the United States B. The FBI's Approach to Combating International Terrorist Activity in the United States prior to September 11. 1. The FBI's collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence regarding foreign terrorist activity within the United States a. Collecting the "dots" b. Connecting the "dots" c. Sharing the picture with others 2. The FBI's structure, traditions, and priorities and their impact on counterterrorism strategy a. The law enforcement mentality b. The field office structure c. The oppression of tradition 3. The impact of external forces on the FBI's counterterrorism strategy a. Legal constraints - real and imagined - on the FBI's operations b. The role of other agencies or institutions on FBI operations i. The White House's influence ii. Congress and the power of the purse

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Commission Sensitive iii. The Department of Justice's directives iv. The influence of fellow community members C. The Other Participants in the Domestic Counterterrorism Efforts - Who They Were and What They Were Doing 1. The CIA's NR Division 2. The Department of Defense and Protection of the Homeland 3. The NSA and the Issue of U.S. Persons II. The Extent to Which the Structure and Operations of the Domestic Intelligence Community Was a Factor in the Failure of the Domestic Intelligence Community to Protect the Homeland on September 11 A. The lack of a search for Hazmi and Mihdhar when they entered the United States and established residence in early 2000. B. New attention on Hazmi and Mihdhar but ultimately a failed search over Summer 2001. C. Hijackers' stumbles and other possible missed opportunities. D. The Phoenix EC: missed opportunity or distraction? E. The failed pre-9/11 investigation into Moussaoui. III. The Domestic Intelligence/Counterterrorism Community Since the September 11 Attacks A. The Changing Roles Within the Community and the Altered Legal Framework B. The Reinvention of the FBI Since the September 11 Attacks 1. The FBI's new collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence regarding foreign terrorist activity within the United States a. Collecting the "dots" b. Connecting the "dots" c. Sharing the picture with others 2. The FBI's new structure, and priorities and their impact on counterterrorism

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Commission Sensitive strategy a. Prevention as the new motto b. Centralization of the counterterrorism effort c. Changing technology, incentives, and ways of thinking d. The changing operational landscape - JTTFs, TTIC, 3. The impact of external forces on the FBI's counterterrorism strategy a. The new legal landscape - its impact on effectiveness b. The changing role of other agencies or institutions on FBI operations i. The White House's influence ii. Congress and the power of the purse iii. The Department of Justice's directives iv. The impact of competition for the FBI's job 4. How Far the FBI Has Come and Whether It Has Come Far Enough a. Intentions versus reality - how far has the FBI come along its intended trajectory b. How much further the FBI must go to meet the needs of our primary domestic counterterrorism agency C. The Department of Homeland Security and its intended role in the Intelligence Community D. The Other Participants in the Domestic Counterterrorism Efforts - Who They Are Now and What They Are Doing 1. The CIA's NR Division 2. The Department of Defense and Protection of the Homeland 3. The NSA and the Continuing Issue of U.S. Persons

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Commission Sensitive IV.

Defining the Future of the Domestic Intelligence/Counterterrorism Community A. Information Sharing - Analysis of the Way Forward B. The Foreign/Domestic dichotomy and resolving artificial barriers to an effective intelligence program. C. Mapping vulnerabilities - whose job? D. The best way to close the remaining gaps between the existing domestic intelligence function and the ideal

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE TEAM 7 MONOGRAPH OUTLINE Civil Aviation and Transportation Security: 9/11/01 and Beyond PART ONE: CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY AND THE 9/11/01

HIJACKINGS

I.

Creation and Evolution of the Aviation Security System prior to Pan Am 103 a. Threats to Commercial Aviation prior to Pan Am 103 1. Domestic threats 2. International threats 3. Commercial aviation as terrorism target 4. Hijackings b. FAA's "Dual Mandate" and reactive nature c. International Conventions d. Role of federal government, airlines and airports

II.

Destruction of Pan Am 103 (1988) and Response a. Change in perceived threat b. President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (1990)

III.

Destruction of TWA 800 (1996) and Response a. Change in perceived threat b. White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (1997) c. Change and continuity

IV.

The Institutions of Civil Aviation Security on September 11, 2001: Priorities and Approaches a. Congress 1. Authorizing legislation 2. Appropriations and funding 3. Oversight (including GAO) b. Federal Aviation Administration 1. Culture 2. Authorities 3. Organization c. Air Carriers 1. FAR 108 and Air Carrier Standard Security Program 2. Screening 3. Other security responsibilities d. Airports 1. FAR 107 and Airport Security Program 2. Facility security (including workforce) 3. Access control 4. Law enforcement

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V.

Elements of the Aviation Security System on September 11, 2001: What the Hijackers Had to Defeat a. Intelligence collection, threat assessment and response b. Passenger pre-screening c. Secure area designation and enforcement d. Checkpoint screening for weapons e. Checked baggage screening for explosives f. Cargo and mail screening g. Aircraft security

VI.

The Status and Quality of the Aviation Security System on September 11, 2001

VII.

The Setting a. The hij ackers (April 2001 -September 11, 2001) b. The airports (Boston, Newark, Washington-Dulles) c. The airlines (American, United) d. The day (weather, other events)

VIII.

The Flights a. US Airways (Colgan Air 5930) Portland, ME-Boston b. AAL11 c. UAL 175 d. AAL77 e. UAL 93

IX.

Immediate Response (to September 20, 2001) a. White House b. DOT leadership c. FAAandATC d. Airlines e. Airports and law enforcement f. Congress

X.

Consequences a. Economic b. Psychological

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE PART TWO: TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 XI.

Transportation Security Today: Organization a. DHS b. TSA c. DOT d. Congress e. State and local government f. Private sector

XII.

Transportation Security Today: Key Issues a. Leadership and accountability b. Implementation ways and means c. Priority-setting and risk management d. Consequence management: economic and psychological

XIII.

Recommendations

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE TEAM 8 MONOGRAPH OUTLINE PART ONE: The Attacks: Breaching the Air Traffic Control and Continental Air Defense Systems I.

The Air Traffic Control and Continental Air Defense Systems on 9/11 A) How the FAA watched airspace pre 9/11 1. Crowded skies - graphic freeze frame 2. Safety first vs. security 3. Hijacking protocols B) NORAD's mission and capabilities 1. Rules of Engagement C) The relationship and ineraction between FAA and NORAD

II.

9/11 Part One: The New York Attacks: Indicators and Warnings (8:15 - 9:10) A) AA 11 B) United 175 (introduce confusion) C) Sounding the alarm (9:10 am) D) The struggle to gain situational awareness

III. 9/11 Part Two: The Washington Attacks: A Failure of Situational Awareness (9:10-10:15 am) A) Chasing the phantom A 11 B) Missing AA 77 C) Changing the Rules of Engagement (the shoot-down decision) D) United 93 IV.

9/11 Part Three: The Fog of War A) Scrambles 1. NORAD (push into the air) 2. DEFCON 4 and 3 B) Chasing Phantom UA 93 C) Warning the Russians D) More false alarms 1. Delta 89 / Chicago 2. Air Canada 3. KAL 85 4. US Air 36 E) Clearing the skies: SCATANA

V.

Lessons A) Indications and Warnings B) Command and Control C) Homeland Defense D) Bureaucratic Rivalry/Interaction COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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PART TWO: On-Site Response to the Attacks I.

Emergency Readiness on September 10th A) General Principles 1. Public sector entities: The relationship and interaction between FBI and ATF, NYPD and FDNY 2. Building owners of WTC 3. Tenants of WTC 4. Pentagon B) Response upon Impact 1. Tower 1 2. Tower 2 C) Critical Choices: Command and control, Communication, and Evacuation (8:46 prior to towers failing) 1. NYPD 2. FDNY 3. Private sector 4. NY OEM 5. FEMA 6. Port Authority D) Collapse 1. NIST structural assessment of why the towers fell 2. The command and control response 3. The emergency responder perspective II.

Pentagon A) What happened (damage, fire, casualties) B) Critical choices

III.

Consequence Management A) Rescue B) Security

IV.

The Remains of the Day A) NY response B) Pentagon response C) Recovery and initial lessons learned (NY and Pentagon)

PART THREE: The Response of National Leadership I..

Crisis Management for National Recovery A) Agenda at Cabinet level September 11 B) Critical Choices: 1. Continuity of Operations 2. Continuity of Government COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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C) D)

3. Reassuring the Public a. Closing and reopening the financial markets b. Resuming normal air traffic c. Air quality at Ground Zero d. Law enforcement measures e. The 9/20 Address Process for taking decisions Reflections (what worked and didn't work)

PART FOUR: Lessons Learned and Best Practices I.

Emergency response best practices A) Command and Control B) Evacuation strategies C) Continuity of business/government

II.

Creating Incentives for Emergency Preparedness A) Interagency relations: Overcoming bureaucratic rivalry 1. FAA/NORAD today 2. NYPD/FDNY today 3. FBI/ATF today B) Private Sector Incentives for Preparedness

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