Security Council Study Guide-jacomun

THE SECURITY COUNCIL STUDY GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Ethiopia-Somalialand Border Conflict Puntland-Somalia Dispute Civil War in Somalia Piracy in The Somali Waters

INTRODUCTION As we all should be aware, the Somalia Crisis is a very vast topic that includes many aspects in that trouble-rifled country. There are various problems in this single nation including, the border conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Puntland-Somalia dispute, the civil war in Somalia as well as the piracy in the Somali Waters. Before reading I must warn all the delegates that this is a collection of information from many sources including Wikipedia, crisisgroup.org, and many more. This study guide thus contains a lot of information regarding the crises themselves, but not the solutions, which is something you delegates must decide about. Happy reading…

ETHIOPIA-SOMALIALAND BORDER CONFLICT The Ethiopian-Somali conflict and tension has a background in territorial and political disputes. Animosity between Ethiopia and Somalis dates back a few centuries with wars and conflicts. In recent years, those tensions caused two wars. A broader perspective shows many incidents of Ethiopian-Somali conflict. Boundary disputes over the Ogaden region date to the 1948 settlement when the land was granted to Ethiopia. Somali disgruntlement with this decision has led to repeated attempts to invade Ethiopia with the hopes of taking control of the Ogaden to create a Greater Somalia. This plan would have reunited the Somali people of the Ethiopian-controlled Ogaden with those living in the Republic of Somalia. Shy of that, ethnic and political tensions have caused cross-border clashes over the years. 1960-1964 : Border Dispute 1977-1978 : Ogaden War 1982 : August Border Clash 1998-2000 : Cross-border warfare during the chaotic warlord-led era. Conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia are of course not limited to the 20th21st Centuries. Wars between Somalia, or its precursor Islamic states, and Ethiopia, stretch back to the 16th century. Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi was a 16th century Islamic leader of Adal popular in Somali culture for his jihad against the Ethiopians during the rise of the Adal Sultanate (a multi-ethnic former vassal kingdom of Ethiopia). Therefore, painful living history, oral and cultural traditions, long-standing ethnic divisions and sectarian differences lay between the two nations and fuel the conflict. The first incursion by Ethiopian troops after the fall of the central Somali government took place in August 1996. In March 1999, Ethiopian troops reportedly raided the Somali border town of Balanballe in pursuit of members of the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya group which has been fighting to unite Ethiopia’s eastern Ogaden region with Somalia. Later, in April 1999 two Somali leaders, Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aideed, said in an official protest to the United Nations Security Council, that heavily-armed Ethiopian troops entered the towns of Beledhawo and Doollow on Friday, April 9, 1999. They further alleged that the Ethiopian troops had taken over the local administration and detained officials in the towns. In May 1999, Ethiopian soldiers, with the help of a pro-Ethiopian Somali faction occupied the town of Luuq in southwestern Somalia, close to the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya. In late June 1999, Ethiopian soldiers, supported by armoured vehicles launched an attack from Luuq that resulted in the capture of Garba Harre in the Gedo region, which was previously controlled

by the Somali National Front lead by Hussein Aideed. The attack was apparently aimed at flushing out Ethiopian rebels based in Somalia. After the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia in August 2000, Ethiopia at first did not recognize the interim government and reportedly continued its raids against Al-Ittihad and supporting various warlord factions, which lead to very strained relations between the Ethiopian government and the interim Somali government, characterized by accusations, denials and counter-accusations on both sides. In January 2001, Somalia’s TNG Prime Minister, Ali Khalif Galaid, strongly accused Ethiopia of arming factions opposed to the government, occupying Somali districts and increasing its military presence in the country. He later claimed that Ethiopian soldiers had occupied towns in Somalia’s southwestern region, and had detained and intimidated its nationals; the Ethiopian government denied these charges. Ethiopia has supported and is alleged to have supported a number of different Somali factions at one time or another. Among these are the Somali Reconstruction and Restoration Council (SRRC), Muse Sudi Yalahow, General Mohammed Said Hirsi Morgan (allied to the Somali Patriotic Movement or SPM), Hassan Mohamed Nur Shatigudud and his Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) and Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (former President of Puntland and current Somali TNG President). A number of Somali warlord factions have also held meetings and formed loose alliances in Ethiopia. Reports in early January, 2002 indicated that around 300 Ethiopian soldiers were deployed in Garowe (capital of Puntland) with other Ethiopian troops reportedly moving into the neighbouring Bay region and around Baidoa. The Ethiopian government denied these reports and accused the interim government of spreading "malicious lies" about Ethiopia’s policy towards Somalia. Ethiopian soldiers again attacked and temporarily captured the border town of Beledhawo on Wednesday, May 15, 2002 with the help of the SRRC after the town had been captured by a rival militia. During the raid, the commander of the rival militia, Colonel Abdirizak Issak Bihi, was captured by the Ethiopian forces and taken across the border to Ethiopia. After the raid, control of the town was turned over to the SRRC. Earlier in May, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed had retaken control of Puntland by ousting his rival Jama Ali Jama with the aid of the Ethiopian army. In February 2003, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, admitted that Ethiopian troops were occasionally sent into Somalia to battle the militant Islamist group, Al-Ittihad and stated that the group was linked to Al-Qaeda. He also claimed that Ethiopia’s government had lists of Al-Ittihad members who

were, at the time, in the Transitional National Government and parliament of Somalia; a claim that TNG President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan has consistently denied. President Hassan has in turn, accused Ethiopia of destabilizing Somalia, interfering daily in Somali affairs and violating the arms embargo on Somalia by supplying weapons to warlords opposed to the Transitional Government at the time; Ethiopia denied these charges. Although an attempt was made to improve relations between Ethiopia and the TNG in June 2001, relations only really improved in 2004 when Abdullahi Yusuf became the TNG President. Then Ethiopia reversed its position and began to support the interim government, especially against various Islamist militias in Somalia, most recently the Islamic Courts Union. Ethiopian involvement in Somalia gained widespread public attention when Ethiopian troops moved into Somalian territory on July 20, 2006. Somalia's interim government was then resisting advances by the Islamic Courts Union forces north to the last unoccupied city of Baidoa. A Somali Islamist leader has ordered a "jihad" to drive out Ethiopian troops, after they entered the country to protect the weak interim government, however, Sharia courts in Ethiopia condemned the ICU's declaration of holy war. Meles Zenawi has agreed to withdraw Ethiopian forces at arrival of the African Union. Ethiopia has been a long-term ally of President Abdullahi Yusuf and in the 1990s helped him defeat an Islamist militia led by Mr Aweys. Ethiopian troops had reportedly moved into another town in south-western Somalia, two days after entering the country to protect the weak government. Eyewitnesses say about 200 Ethiopian soldiers took control of the airstrip outside Waajid early on Saturday, July 22. Later reports indicate that Ethiopian soldiers have occupied Bardaale, 60 kilometers 40 miles west of Baidoa, the day after the ICU seized control of Kismayo on September 21. An exchange of mortar shells between Union of Islamic Courts and Ethiopian forces has occurred in Galkayo on November 28, 2006 where both Islamists and Ethiopian forces are facing off. Ethiopian and Islamist forces in Galkayo, central Somalia, were less than 5 km away from one another. On November 30, 2006, an Ethiopian military convoy in Somalia was ambushed by fighters loyal to the Union of Islamic Courts. It happened on Tuesday 35km south-west of Baidoa, seat of the weak interim government, who deny it took place. Eyewitness said a truck was blown up and there was an exchange of fire. The UIC claim 20 Ethiopians died. Ethiopia's parliament voted the same day to let the government take "all necessary" steps to rebuff any invasion by Somalia's Islamists. "Parliament hereby authorizes the government to take all

necessary and legal steps to stave off a declaration of holy war and invasion by the Union of Islamic Courts against the country," the resolution said.

PUNTLAND-SOMALIA DISPUTE The Puntland–Somaliland dispute is a territorial dispute over the Somali regions of Sool, Cayn and Sanaag between the two autonomous Somaliland and Puntland macro regions of Somalia. The dispute escalated into armed clashes on October 15, 2007 when a Somaliland-aligned faction of the Dulbahante clan attacked the ruling Puntland-aligned faction of the same clan in Las Anod, the capital of the "SSC" region (Sool, Sanaag and Cayn). The Puntland-aligned administration has ruled the town since 2003, when the Somaliland-aligned faction was forced out. Sanaag is a disputed region, claimed as sovereign territory by the two autonomous Somaliland and Puntland macro regions of Somalia. The dispute between Somaliland and Puntland stems from 1998, when Puntland formed and declared the region as part of its territory. Prior to that, it had been claimed by Somaliland since the 1991 events of the Somali Civil War. Beginning in 2003, the forces of Puntland entered and occupied the region based on irredentist desires, due to the large Darod clan population in the area. Somaliland claimed the territory as part of the original bounds of British Somaliland. Fighting between the two forces led to casualties and captured prisoners, who were later exchanged. As a related contention, in 2005 Puntland tried to sell off mineral rights to foreign investors, including the disputed territories of Sool and Sanaag. The dispute with the TFG stems from the passage of the new Charter in November 2004. However, this was not a pragmatic issue until the military successes of the government in the 2006–2007 war in Somalia. Assertions of sovereignty in January 2007 by the TFG leadership sparked riots in Somaliland. In July 1, 2007, the state of Maakhir was declared on the area. It claims independence from both Puntland and Somaliland. Maakhir has since been reincorporated into Puntland. Sool is a disputed region, claimed as sovereign territory by both the Somaliland and Puntland administrations. During 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) also incorporated sharia courts in Sool region into their loose alliance, though their military forces never occupied the region. Under the government of Siad Barre, Sool was not a separate region, but part of the larger Nugaal province, with the capital city of Garowe. It was separated

from Nugaal in the 1980s. Since 2003 and until October 2007, Sool has been under control of Puntland. The area, centered on the town of Buuhoodle, is also disputed by Somaliland and Puntland. According to Somaliland, the so-called Ayn area claimed by Puntland remains part of the Togdheer region. Somaliland disputes the territorial claims of Puntland, which wrote the claim on the portion of Togdheere into their 1998 charter. In October 2007, the conflict mushroomed into a regional conflict over control of the city of Las Anod, as Somaliland regular army forces mobilized from their base in the town of Adhicadeeye, west of the city, and entered the conflict. Puntland was slow to mobilize a counter-attack, as Puntland's weak economy and overstretched military obligations in Mogadishu prevented a rapid response. After getting the city under its control, Somaliland moved Sool's regional administration into Las Anod. Between 10 and 20 people were reported to be dead. A security official who tracks Somalia said, "Somaliland troops have captured the entire town and 100 Puntland troops. Somaliland has warned that if Puntland troops try to come back, they would not mind going deep into Puntland territory," There were conflicting reports on whether Somaliland troops advanced further into Puntland toward its capital Garowe, about 90km to the east. Abdillahi Ali, Somaliland's defence minister, told that Somaliland troops had control of the checkpoint on the road to Garowe. A diplomat that tracks Somalia from Nairobi told Reuters Somaliland had advanced 25km east of Las Anod. On January 13 2008, heavy fighting erupted after troops from Somaliland attacked a base where rival clan militias were organizing, local sources said. The fighting began early in the morning when Somaliland troops raided militias organizing at Dhabansar, a village southwest of Las Anod, the provincial capital of disputed Sool region. Somaliland forces captured more than 20 prisoners of war, including Col. Deyr Abdi. Some 10 people were killed. Col. Deyr was recently appointed as military commander for the region by Gen. Adde Muse, leader of the neighboring rival sub-state of Puntland, which also claims legitimacy over Sool region. On January 15 2008, the president of Puntland Adde Muse Hersi said that its government would soon resume control of Las Anod, and recapture it from Somaliland[14], but Somaliland's forces were still in control in April 2009, when the conflict flared up once again, as Somaliland troops clashed with Puntland militia.

CIVIL WAR IN SOMALIA

The Advance of the Islamic Courts Union is the period in the Somali Civil War that began on May 2006 with the Islamic Courts Union's (ICU) conquest of Mogadishu from the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and CounterTerrorism (ARPCT) and continued with further ICU expansion in the country. Following the outbreak of the 2006 Somali War on December 21, 2006, by December 24, direct Ethiopian intervention in the conflict in support of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was no longer denied by the Ethiopian government. The Eritrean government denied any involvement despite Ethiopian claims to the contrary. The rise of the Islamic Courts in Somalia began in the mid 1990s with the alliance of a group of Muslim legal scholars and business people led by Hassan Aweys (former leader of the AIAI) and Sharif Ahmed, with two other powerful elements: Yusuf Mohammed Siad "Indha'adde" the self-declared governor of Shabeellaha Hoose, and the militant Islamist group al-Itihaad al-Islamiya led by Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, forming the Islamic Courts Union. Initially these three distinct elements maintained separate leadership, In July 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts and the AIAI merged to form the Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC). By the end of September Indha'adde's voluntary annexed his warlordship to the SICC, which created a larger unified organization. Against them are posed the Transitional Federal Government, and the breakaway region of Puntland, plus other individual warlords and tribes. Until September, the conflict was limited to the Benadir region, and pitted petty warlord and pirate fiefdoms in a one-sided battle against the Islamic Courts, often with the local populace supporting the Islamists. The ICU's capture of Kismayo brought them into an irresolvable conflict with the newly declared Jubaland and the Juba Valley Alliance forces. The JVA withdrew in the face of an overwhelming ICU army in the hopes that, when returning in full force, the JVA would be strong enough to retake Kismayo. In the ensuing battles outside of Bu'aale and Kismayo however, the JVA proved to be no match for the ICU, who defeated them easily. JVA forces began to crumble by November, as JVA militias began defecting to the ICU. By November 14, entire Marehan subclans began defecting to the ICU, setting up courts in Bardhere and Afmadow. Puntland entered the conflict on November 12, attacking ICU positions south of Galkacayo. This led to immediate setbacks for Puntland as they lost several important pieces of military hardware including two tanks and many technicals. Puntland stepped up their deployment to the border significantly.

Southwestern Somalia and their military forces, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army, sat out the conflict entirely other than deploying several hundred troops in Baidoa to defend the city until December 1st. On December 1st 350 RRA soldiers defected to the ICU, along with the entire district of Dinsoor. A division of pro-Government RRA soldiers may still be deployed in support of the government at Baidoa, but this is unclear, as the overall RRA commander has opposed the government rather openly since the end of October. The RRA has a longstanding "wait and see" policy when it comes to involvement outside Rahanweyn clan territory, so alignment towards the ICU may tip the scales dramatically in favor of the ICU. Though the ICU has been somewhat bellicose towards Somaliland, due to their alleged ill treatment of a respected Jihadist religious leader in Somaliland, and Somaliland has been quite hostile to the ICU whom they term "false prophets", Somaliland took no direct role in the conflict. Somaliland is traditionally the heartland of the AIAI, and support is quite high for the ICU in Somaliland territory, and conflict may occur in the future. Ethiopian troops invaded Somalian territory on July 20, 2006. Ethiopia maintained it was providing military assistance to the transitional government. Somalia's interim government resisted militant advances by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) forces north to the last unoccupied city of Baidoa. The fighting intensified into direct confrontations on December 8th as ICU and Ethiopian troops backed by government forces clashed in Dinsoor and near Galkayo. Both the Transitional Government (TFG) and the Islamic Courts Union had taken great pains to avoid direct confrontation between ICU and TFG forces, preferring until December 8th to attack proxy and allied forces. The ICU invasion of Hiran, Southwestern Somalia and Jubaland technically did not violate the ceasefire as those forces had not submitted territorial control to the government, despite ruling the territories in their name, and the TFG invasion of Burhakaba attacked tribal militias allied to the ICU, but was at that point not ICU territory. This mutual following of the letter of the peace agreement, while ignoring the spirit of the peace agreement, increased tension to a fever pitch, though both sides seemed unwilling to fire the first shot and be seen as the aggressor. Differing interpretations of the peace agreement led to a tense situation, as the opponents viewed their adversaries as not being committed to negotiation. US interests in Somalia date back to funding and military backing of the regime of Siad Barre in the 1970s. After the UN interventions of the 1990s, the US has mainly avoided involvement in the nation.

Officially, the present United States' interest in the Horn of Africa region comprises desires for stability and peace in Somalia, including support of the establishment of a new government under the Transitional Federal Government, passage of the UN Security Council resolution to deploy an African-led peacekeeping force known as IGASOM, delivery of humanitarian aid, as well as warnings against the spread of extremist and terrorist groups in the region, including Al-Qaeda. As part of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa was established in Djibouti. It serves to monitor and check the spread of terrorism, as well as deal with piracy. It has also undertaken humanitarian missions in the region, but it has no mandate towards the conflict in Somalia. The US denies any direct military operations in Somalia, or in neighboring Kenya, and stated that it has no intention of deploying troops to Somalia. U.S. sponsorship of a Dec. 6 U.N. Security Council resolution that authorized, over the Islamists' opposition, the deployment of an African peacekeeping force but omitted a demand for the withdrawal of the estimated 8,000 Ethiopian troops. A visit by Army Gen. John Abizaid, head of U.S. Central Command, to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, last month for talks with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. The Bush administration's failure to insist publicly on an Ethiopian withdrawal or to participate directly in efforts to negotiate a cease-fire and power-sharing agreement between the transitional government and the Islamic Courts. The McClatchy article went on to cite U.S. politicians have played a part in American policy surrounding the conflict. Former majority leader in the Republican Party-run House of Representatives, Dick Armey, has been lobbying for Ethiopia and working to block a vote on a bipartisan bill (HR 5680) entitled "Ethiopia Freedom, Democracy and Human Rights Advancement Act of 2006" to cut U.S. security aid to Ethiopia if it failed to halt political repression. The Bush administration also opposed the bill. United States opposition to the formation of an Islamic Somalia led to the CIA making secret payments to aid Somali warlords in early 2006 organized under the name Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). Disclosure of these payments to warlords helped galvanize the ICU's opposition and created public support for the Islamists amongst Somalis. This led directly to fueling the Second Battle of Mogadishu, fought between May and June 2006. The result was the driving of the ARPCT forces from Mogadishu, and the militant rise of the ICU. A number of regional and international expressions and efforts, such as by the UN and EU, have attempted to stem the tide of war. Other efforts, such as by the ICRC, seek to alleviate the humanitarian suffering and ameliorate the crisis caused by the conflict.

PIRACY IN THE SOMALI WATERS Piracy off the Somali coast has been a threat to international shipping since the beginning of Somalia's civil war in the early 1990s. Since 2005, many international organizations, including the International Maritime Organization and the World Food Program, have expressed concern over the rise in acts of piracy. Piracy has contributed to an increase in shipping costs and impeded the delivery of food aid shipments. Ninety percent of the World Food Program's shipments arrive by sea, and ships have required a military escort. According to the Kenyan foreign minister, Somali pirates have received over US$150 million during the 12 months prior to November 2008. Clashes have been reported between Somalia's Islamist fighters (who are opposed to the Transitional Federal Government) and the pirates. In August 2008, Combined Task Force 150, a multinational coalition task force, took on the role of fighting Somali piracy by establishing a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) within the Gulf of Aden. The increasing threat posed by piracy also caused significant concerns in India since most of its shipping trade routes pass through the Gulf of Aden. The Indian Navy responded to these concerns by deploying a warship in the region on October 23, 2008. In September 2008, Russia announced that it too will soon join international efforts to combat piracy. On October 7, 2008, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1838 calling on nations with vessels in the area to apply military force to repress the acts of piracy. At the 101st council of the International Maritime Organization, India called for a United Nations peacekeeping force under unified command to tackle piracy off Somalia. (There has been a general and complete arms embargo against Somalia since 1992.) In November 2008, Somali pirates began hijacking ships well outside the Gulf of Aden, perhaps targeting ships headed for the port of Mombasa, Kenya. There are discussions under way to begin an aggressive covert operation against the pirates. The CIA has been publicly warning of this potential threat for months. Per a recent article in the Harpers Magazine, a CIA official stated, "We need to deal with this problem from the beach side, in concert with the ocean side, but we don't have an embassy in Somalia and limited, ineffective intelligence operations. We need to work in Somalia and in Lebanon, where a lot of the ransom money has changed hands. But our operations in Lebanon are a joke, and we have no presence at all in Somalia." During the Siad Barre regime, Somalia received aid from Denmark, Great Britain, Iraq, Japan, Sweden, USSR, and West Germany to develop its fishing industry. Cooperatives had fixed prices for their catch, which was often exported due to the low demand for seafood in Somalia. Aid money improved the ships and supported the construction of maintenance facilities. After the

fall of the Barre regime, the income from fishing decreased due to the Somali Civil War. Also, there was no coast guard to protect against trawlers from other countries illegally fishing in Somali waters. This led to the erosion of the fish stock. Local fishermen started to band together to protect the resource. Soon they discovered that piracy was an easier way to make money. Due to the clanbased organization of Somali society, the lack of a central government, and the country's strategic location at the Horn of Africa, conditions were ripe for the growth of piracy in the early 1990s. Armed suspected pirates in the Indian Ocean near Somalia. After the picture was taken, the vessel’s crew members opened fire on U.S. Navy ships and the ship's crew members returned fire. One suspected pirate was killed and 12 were taken into custody. Precise data on the current economic situation in Somalia is scarce but with an estimated per capita GDP of $600 per year, it remains one of the world's poorest countries. Millions of Somalis depend on food aid and in 2008, according to the World Bank, as much as 73% of the population lived on a daily income below $2. These factors and the lucrative success of many hijacking operations have drawn a number of young men toward gangs of pirates, whose wealth and strength often make them part of the local social and economic elite. Abdi Farah Juha who lives in Garoowe (100 miles from the sea) told the BBC, "They have money; they have power and they are getting stronger by the day. They wed the most beautiful girls; they are building big houses; they have new cars; new guns." Some pirates are former fishermen, who argue that foreign ships are threatening their livelihood by illegally fishing in Somali waters. After seeing the profitability of piracy, since ransoms are usually paid, warlords began to facilitate pirate activities, splitting the profits with the pirates. In most of the hijackings, the bandits have not harmed their prisoners. The attackers generally treat their hostages well in anticipation of a big payday to the point of hiring caterers on the shores of Somalia to cook spaghetti, grilled fish and roasted meat that will appeal to a Western palate. They also keep a steady supply of cigarettes and drinks from the shops on shore. The Transitional Federal Government has made some efforts to combat piracy, occasionally allowing foreign naval vessels into Somali territorial waters.[citation needed] However, more often than not, foreign naval vessels chasing pirates were forced to break off when the pirates entered Somali territorial waters. The government of Puntland has made more progress in combating piracy, evident in recent interventions.

In June 2008, following the letter of the Transitional Federal Government to the President of the Council asking for assistance from the international community in its efforts to address acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships off the coast of Somalia the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a declaration authorizing nations that have the agreement of the Transitional Federal Government to enter Somali territorial waters to deal with pirates. The measure, which was sponsored by France, the United States and Panama, will last six months. France initially wanted the resolution to include other regions with pirate problems, such as West Africa, but were opposed by Vietnam, Libya and most importantly by veto-holding China, who wanted the sovereignty infringement limited to Somalia. On November 21, 2008 BBC News reported that the Indian Navy had received United Nations approval to enter Somali waters to combat piracy. On April 8, 2009, four Somali pirates seized the Maersk Alabama 240 nautical miles (440 km; 280 mi) southeast of the Somalia port city of Eyl. The ship was carrying 17,000 metric tons of cargo, of which 5,000 metric tons were relief supplies bound for Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya. On April 12, 2009, United States Navy SEALs snipers killed the three pirates that were holding Captain Richard Phillips hostage aboard a lifeboat from the Maersk Alabama after determining that Captain Phillips' life was in immediate danger. A fourth pirate, Abdul Wali Muse, surrendered and was taken into custody. On April 20, 2009 United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton commented on the capture and release of 7 Somali pirates by Dutch Naval forces who were on a NATO mission. After an attack on the Handytankers Magic, a petroleum tanker, the Dutch frigate De Zeven Provincien tracked the pirates back to a pirate "mother ship" and captured them. They confiscated the pirates weapons and freed 20 Yemeni fishermen who the pirates had kidnapped and who had been forced to sail the pirate "mother ship". Since the Dutch Naval Forces were part of NATO but were not part of the EU they lacked legal jurisdiction to keep the pirates so they released them. Clinton stated that this action "sends the wrong signal" and that additional coordination was needed among nations. On April 23, 2009 international donors pledged over $250 million for Somalia which include $134 million to increase the African Union peacekeeping mission from 4,350 troops to 8,000 troops and $34 million for Somali security forces. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told delegates at a donors' conference sponsored by the U.N. that "Piracy is a symptom of anarchy and insecurity on the ground," and that "More security on the ground will make less piracy on the seas." Somali President Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed pledged at the conference that he would fight piracy and to loud applause said that "It is our duty to pursue these criminals not only on the high seas, but also on terra firma,". The Somali government has not gone after pirates because pirate leaders currently

have more power than the government. It has been estimated by piracy experts that in 2008 the pirates gained about $80 million through ransom payments. On May 18, 2009, a federal grand jury in New York returned a ten-count indictment against Abduhl Wal-i-Musi. Most pirates are aged 20–35 years old and come from the region of Puntland, a region in northeastern Somalia. The East African Seafarers' Association estimates that there are at least five pirate gangs and a total of 1,000 armed men. According to a BBC report, the pirates can be divided into three main categories: Local Somali fishermen, considered the brains of the pirates' operations due to their skill and knowledge of the sea. Ex-militiamen who used to fight for the local clan warlords, used as the muscle. Technical experts who operate equipment such as the GPS devices. According to Globalsecurity.org, there are four main groups operating off the Somali coast. The "National Volunteer Coast Guard" (NVCG), commanded by Garaad Mohamed, is said to specialize in intercepting small boats and fishing vessels around Kismayu on the southern coast. The "Marka group", under the command of Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siad (also known as Yusuf Indha'adde), is made up of several scattered and less organized groups operating around the town of Marka. The third significant pirate group is composed of traditional Somali fishermen operating around Puntland and referred to as the "Puntland Group". The last set are the "Somali Marines" and reputed to be the most powerful and sophisticated of the pirate groups with a military structure, a fleet admiral, admiral, vice admiral and a head of financial operations. There have been both positive and negative effects of the pirates' economic success. Local residents have complained that the presence of so many armed men makes them feel insecure, and that their freespending ways cause wild fluctuations in the local exchange rate. Others fault them for excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages and khat. On the other hand, many other residents appreciate the rejuvenating effect that the pirates' on-shore spending and re-stocking has had on their impoverished towns, a presence which has oftentimes provided jobs and opportunity when there were none. Entire hamlets have in the process been transformed into veritable boomtowns, with local shop owners and other residents using their gains to purchase items such as generators -- "allowing full days of electricity, once an unimaginable luxury." The pirates get most of their weapons from Yemen, but a significant amount comes from Mogadishu, Somalia's capital. Weapons dealers in the capital receive a deposit from a hawala dealer on behalf of the pirates and the weapons are then driven to Puntland where the pirates pay the balance.

Various photographs of pirates in situ indicate that their weapons are predominantly AKM assault rifles, RPG-7 rocket launchers and semi-automatic pistols such as the TT-30. Additionally, given the particular origin of their weaponry, they are likely to have hand grenades such as the RGD-5 or F1. Pirates say ransom money is paid in large denomination US dollar bills. It is delivered to them in burlap sacks which are either dropped from helicopters or cased in waterproof suitcases loaded onto tiny skiffs. Ransom money has also been delivered to pirates via parachute, as happened in January 2009 when an orange container with $3 million cash inside it was dropped onto the deck of the supertanker MV Sirius Star to secure the release of ship and crew. To authenticate the banknotes, pirates use currency-counting machines, the same technology used at foreign exchange bureaus worldwide. According to one pirate, these machines are, in turn, purchased from business connections in Dubai, Djibouti, and other areas. Hostages seized by the pirates usually have to wait 45 days or more for the ships' owners to pay the ransom and secure their release, but the pirates' treatment of the hostages is relatively humane, and their reputation for turning over the ship, cargo and crew over upon receipt of the demanded ransom has been cited as a reason for their continued success in having their demands met. Somali pirates allegedly get help from the Somali diaspora. Somali expatriates, including reputedly some among the 200,000 Somalis living in Canada, offer funds, equipment and information. The UN envoy for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, has stated that "because there is no (effective) government, there is ... much irregular fishing from European and Asian countries," and that the UN has "reliable information" that European and Asian companies are dumping toxic and nuclear waste off the Somali coastline. However, he stresses that "no government has endorsed this act, and that private companies and individuals acting alone are responsible." In addition, Ould-Abdallah told the press that he believes the toxic waste dumping is "a disaster off the Somali coast, a disaster (for) the Somali environment, the Somali population," and that what he terms "this illegal fishing, illegal dumping of waste" helps fuel the civil war in Somalia since the illegal foreign fishermen pay off corrupt local officials or warlords for protection or to secure counterfeit licenses. However, Ould-Abdallah noted that piracy will not prevent waste dumping: "The intentions of these pirates are not concerned with protecting their environment," and "What is ultimately needed is a functioning, effective government that will get its act together and take control of its affairs." These issues have generally not been reported in international media when reporting on piracy. Following the massive tsunami of December 2004, there have emerged allegations that after the outbreak of the Somali Civil War in the late 1980s, Somalia's long, remote shoreline was used as a dump site for the disposal of

toxic waste. The huge waves which battered northern Somalia after the tsunami are believed to have stirred up tonnes of nuclear and toxic waste that was illegally dumped in Somali waters by several European firms. The European Green Party followed up these revelations by presenting before the press and the European Parliament in Strasbourg copies of contracts signed by two European companies—the Italian Swiss firm, Achair Partners, and an Italian waste broker, Progresso—and representatives of the warlords then in power, to accept 10 million tonnes of toxic waste in exchange for $80 million (then about £60 million). According to a report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) assessment mission, there are far higher than normal cases of respiratory infections, mouth ulcers and bleeding, abdominal haemorrhages and unusual skin infections among many inhabitants of the areas around the northeastern towns of Hobbio and Benadir on the Indian Ocean coast—diseases consistent with radiation sickness. UNEP continues that the current situation along the Somali coastline poses a very serious environmental hazard not only in Somalia but also in the eastern Africa sub-region. Under Article 9(1)(d) of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, it is illegal for "any transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes: that results in deliberate disposal (e.g. dumping) of hazardous wastes or other wastes in contravention of this Convention and of general principles of international law". According to Nick Nuttall of the United Nations Environmental Programme, "Somalia has been used as a dumping ground for hazardous waste starting in the early 1990s, and continuing through the civil war there," and "European companies found it to be very cheap to get rid of the waste, costing as little as $2.50 a tonne, where waste disposal costs in Europe are something like $1000 a tonne." At the same time, illegal trawlers began fishing Somalia's seas with an estimated $300 million of tuna, shrimp, and lobster being taken each year depleting stocks previously available to local fishermen. Through interception with speedboats, Somali fishermen tried to either dissuade the dumpers and trawlers or levy a "tax" on them as compensation. In an interview, Sugule Ali, one of the pirate leaders explained "We don't consider ourselves sea bandits. We consider sea bandits (to be) those who illegally fish and dump in our seas." Peter Lehr, a Somalia piracy expert at the University of St. Andrews says "It's almost like a resource swap, Somalis collect up to $100 million a year from pirate ransoms off their coasts and the Europeans and Asians poach around $300 million a year in fish from Somali waters." According to Roger Middleton of Chatham House, "The problem of overfishing and illegal fishing in Somali waters, is a very serious one, and does affect the livelihoods of people inside Somalia the dumping of toxic waste on Somalia’s

shores is a very serious issue, which will continue to affect people in Somalia long after the war has ended, and piracy is resolved." To lure fish to their traps, foreign trawlers reportedly also use fishing equipment under prohibition such as nets with very small mesh sizes and sophisticated underwater lighting systems. Under Article 56(1)(b)(iii) of the Law of the Sea Convention: "In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment". Article 57 of the Convention in turn outlines the limit of that jurisdiction: "The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured".

CLOSING REMARKS Here we are dealing with 4 crises in the same region simply for the reason that the crisis includes all these and hence a resolution solving the crisis needs to resolve all of these. However, the committee will be deemed as not failed even if only two of these extensive topics are resolved. However, you have 3 days, excellent debaters, and I expect that you can resolve 3 of these, if not all 4. Hope you enjoy Jaco-MUN, 2009. Delegates please keep in mind that you will definitely have to put in a lot of effort and do a lot more research outside the boundaries of this study guide as it JUST a basis of your topic and in no way will do justice to the entire scope of the topic. Please do come prepared with your material and be on the lookout for study guide updates that will be posted onto the site. (If there are any that is) You must also form your own bloc positions and we will be in a position to help you in every way and for every doubt you have. There are just a number of things to remind you of before you step into committee: • You do not represent your school or yourself in any way once you step into committee for you are a representative of your given country. • For that purpose you must know your countries stand thoroughly and adhere to it at all times without for a second shifting out of policy or practical sense. • A good delegate is one who does not create enemies but is diplomatic and manipulative at the same time and places himself in a position to make others do what he so wishes to in a very subtle manner. Basically I mean being cunning is what will get you ahead.