Sca Rule 62 And 63.docx

SCA RULE 62 - INTERPLEADER Makati Development Corp v. Tanjuatco Facts: Plaintiff Makati Dev’t Corp and defendant Tanjuatco entered into a contract whereby the latter bound himself to construct a reinforced concrete covered water reservoir, office and pump house and water main at Forbes Park, furnishing the materials necessary therefor. Before making the final payment of the consideration agreed upon, plaintiff inquired from the suppliers of materials, who had called its attention to unpaid bills of Tanjuatco, whether the latter had settled his accounts with them. In response to this inquiry, Concrete Aggregates, Inc. (supplier) made a claim in the sum of P5,198.75, representing the cost of transit-mixed concrete allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco. With his consent, plaintiff withheld said amount from the final payment made to him and, in view of his subsequent failure to settle the issue thereon with the Supplier, plaintiff instituted the present action against Tanjuatco and the Supplier, to compel them "to interplead their conflicting claims." Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation, the amount involved therein being less than P10,000.00. The lower court granted the same and dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal. Plaintiff contends that the CFI has jurisdiction because the subject-matter of this litigation is not the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75, but the right to compel the defendants "to litigate among themselves". Issue:Does the CFI have jurisdiction over the case? Ruling:No. Plaintiff may compel the defendants to interplead among themselves concerning the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75. The issue of who among the defendants is entitled to collect the same is the object of the action and is not within the jurisdiction of the CFI. The plaintiff in asserting the jurisdiction of the CFI relies upon Rule 63 of the present Rules of Court, prescribing the procedure in cases of interpleading, and section 19 of Rule 5, which omits the Rules on Interpleading among those made applicable to inferior courts.However, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of justiciable controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to which municipal courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy", amounts to not more than PHP10,000. Secondly, "the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts" belongs to Congress and is beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, which is limited to matters concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of Court to make its Rule 63, on interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that the same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing with cases of interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on procedure applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts. LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.G.R. No. 193494 Date: March 07, 2014 Facts: Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10-year contract of lease over a parcel of land located in Barrio Tigatto, Buhangin, Davao City. Zuellig Pharma, the lessee over the parcel of land, received a letter from the Philippine Bank of Communications. Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it. Zuellig Pharma promptly informed Lui Enterprises of the Philippine Bank of Communications’ claim. As a reply, Lui Enterprises wrote to Zuellig Pharma and insisted on its right to collect the leased property’s rent Due to conflicting claims, Zuellig Pharma filed a case for interpleader to compel Lui Enterprises and Philippine Bank of Communications to litigate their conflicting claims on who should be the one entitled to payment of monthly rents. Meanwhile, Zuellig asked the courts to tender and consign monthly rents while the case is ongoing. The Philippine Bank of Communications filed its answer to the complaint. On the other hand, Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s alleged representative did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the corporation Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss of Lui Enterprises. It argued that the motion to dismiss should be denied for having been filed late. A motion to dismiss should be filed within the required time given to file an answer to the complaint, which is 15 days from service of summons on the defendant.23 Summons was served on Lui Enterprises on July 4, 2003. It had until July 19, 2003 to file a motion to dismiss, but Lui Enterprises filed the motion only on July 23, 2003. RTC Makati found Lui Enterprises to be declared in default for failure to file the motion to dismiss within the reglementary period. Then, the court proceeded to hear the case without Lui Enterprises’ participation. CA sustained the denial of admission of the motion to dismiss. Petitioner now contends that the lower courts should have admitted the motion to dismiss since the very purpose of an interpleader is to litigate who is entitled to the monthly rent. By declaring them in default, it defeated the very purpose of the suit for interpleader Issue: W/N the a party may be declared in default in an interpleader case Held: Yes. Under Rule 62, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person may file a special civil action for interpleader if conflicting claims are made against him or her over a subject matter in which he or she has no interest. This remedy is for the lessee to protect him or her from double vexation in respect of one liability. In this case, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to extinguish its obligation to pay rent. Its purpose

in filing the interpleader case was not defeated when the Makati trial court declared Lui Enterprises in default.An adverse claimant in an interpleader case may be declared in default. Under Rule 62, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a claimant who fails to answer within the required period may, on motion, be declared in default. The consequence of the default is that the court may render judgment barring [the defaulted claimant] from any claim in respect to the subject matter.The Rules would not have allowed claimants in interpleader cases to be declared in default if it would ironically defeat the very purpose of the suit.Since Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion to dismiss within the prescribed period, Makati RTC correctly declared them in default. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK G.R. Nos. 154470-71 September 24, 2012 FACTS: First set of CB bills Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) was the registered owner of 7 Central Bank (CB) bills with a total face value of Php 70 Million, which were eventually sold to Bank of Commerce (BOC), which, in turn, sold these CB bills to Planter’s Development Bank (PDB) as evidenced by a “Detached Assignment”. A week later, PDB sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth Php 70 Million as evidenced by a Trading Order and Confirmation of Sale. Second set of CB bills RCBC sold 2 CB bills with a total face value of Php 20 Million to the PDB and delivered to PDB the corresponding Detached Assignment. PDB delivered to Bancap the 2 CB bills which in turn sold the CB bills to Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines, which also sold it to the BOC. Upon learnin g of the transfers involving the CB bills, the PDB informed the OIC of the BSP’s Government Securities Department of the PDB’s claim over these CB bills, based on the detached assignment in its possession. The requests of PDB were denied by the OIC which prompted the petitioner to file an action so as to compel the BSP to determine the party legally entitled to the proceeds of the subject CB bills. Alternatively, the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and among the claimants to the subject CB bills on the position that while it is able and willing to pay the subject CB bills’ face value,it is duty bound to ensure that payment is made to the rightful owner. ISSUE: Whether or Not an action for Interpleader is applicable to the case at bar. HELD:The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect a person against double vexation in respect of a single liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter) who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single proceeding to determine conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to pay more than once on a single liability. The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the specific provisions in Rule 62 of the Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable to ordinary civil actions. Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-in-interpleader as part of, although separate and independent from, the answer. Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court does not include a complaint-in-interpleader as a claim, a form of defense, or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer or in a motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the BSP’s "counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader" runs counter to general procedures. Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to govern the uniqueness of its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, governing ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is asserted "in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention." In an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not required to be contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of the conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule 62. Also mentioned in the ruling the importance of paying the correct amount of docket fee which cannot be overemphasized: The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are necessary to defray court expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in order to avoid tremendous losses to the judiciary, and to the government as well, the payment of docket fees cannot be made dependent on the outcome of the case, except when the claimant is a pauper-litigant. RULE 63 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG) vs. RAUL V. GATUZ G.R. No. 191176 ; October 14, 2015 FACTS: Domingo filed an administrative complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Gatuz, Barangay Captain of Barangay Tabang, Plaridel, Bulacan, for Abuse of Authority and Dishonesty. The Ombudsman found the respondent guilty of Dishonesty and imposed the penalty of three months suspension without pay. Then, it indorsed its decision to the DILG for immediate implementation. However, after it was endorsed, the respondent moved for reconsideration, which was later on denied by the Ombudsman. After its denial, the DILG issued a memorandum addressed to the DILG-RD, directing him to implement the respondent's suspension. Eventually, Gatuz filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order or a writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC. He argued that the filing of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal automatically stays the execution of the Ombudsman's decisions in administrative cases pursuant to Samaniego and Lapid v. Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the RTC issued a TRO prohibiting DILG from implementing the memorandum.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC erred in taking cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief and in restraining the execution of the Ombudsman's decision. HELD: YES. RTC erred in taking cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief and in restraining the execution of the Ombudsman's decision. Judicial or quasi-judicial orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of declaratory relief is the doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference. Courts and tribunals with the same or equal authority - even those exercising concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction are not permitted to interfere with each other's respective cases, much less their orders or judgments. Where the decisions of certain administrative bodies are appealable to the Court of Appeals, these adjudicative bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and stature; their actions are logically beyond the control of the RTC, a co-equal body. Notably, the decisions of the Ombudsman in disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. As a co-equal body, the RTC has no jurisdiction to interfere with or to restrain the execution of the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases. Court orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of declaratory relief. They are not included within the purview of the words "other written instrument." The same principle applies to orders, resolutions, or decisions of quasi-judicial bodies. The fundamental rationale for this is the principle of res judicata. Parties are not permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. Judgment rendered by a court or a quasi-judicial body is conclusive on the parties subject only to appellate authority. The losing party cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment under the guise of an action for declaratory relief. Finally, SC already reconsidered the 2008 Samaniego decision in our resolution dated October 5, 2010. SC unanimously held en banc that the decisions of the Ombudsman in disciplinary cases are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ. This legal question has already been settled with finality. Tambunting vs Baello September 16, 2005 FACTS:To secure the payment of a P7,727.95 loan, Spouses Emilio Sumabat and Esperanza Baello mortgaged their parcel of land situated in Caloocan City to Antonio Tambunting Jr. The Spouses were later informed that their indebtedness had ballooned to P 15,000 for their failure to pay the monthly amortizations. When they defaulted in their obligation, Commercial House of Finance, Inc. (CHFI), as assignee of the mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property but the same did not push through. The Spouses then filed for an action for Declaratory Relief. The CFI of Caloocan ruled in favor of the spouses however, petitioners claim that the trial court erred when it affirmed the validity of the consignation. They insist that the CFI was barred from taking cognizance of the action for declaratory relief since, petitioners being already in default in their loan amortizations, there existed a violation of the mortgage deed even before the institution of the action. ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI had jurisdiction and could have rendered a valid judgment on the present case. HELD:No. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order, regulation or ordinance before breach or violation thereof .[1] The purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach.[2] It may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers.[3] Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action.[4] In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject, i.e., the statute, deed, contract, etc., has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify short of a judgment or final order. Here, an infraction of the mortgage terms had already taken place before the filing of Civil Case No. C-7496. Thus, the CFI lacked jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case in 1979. And in the absence of jurisdiction, its decision was void and without legal effect. AQUINO vs. MUNICIPALITY OF AKLAN G.R. No. 211356 ; September 29, 2014 FACTS:Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan. While the company was already operating a resort in the area, the application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan,which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove. Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the "no build zone" demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance). In due time, petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor on February 1, 2010. On May 13, 2010, petitioner followed up his appeal through a letter but no action was ever taken by the respondent mayor. On April 5, 2011, however, a Notice of Assessment was sent to petitioner asking for

the settlement of Boracay West Cove’s unpaid taxes and other liabilities under pain of a recommendation for closure in view of its continuous commercial operation since 2009 sans the necessary zoning clearance, building permit, and business and mayor’s permit. In reply, petitioner expressed willingness to settle the company’s obligations, but the municipal treasurer refused to accept the tendered payment. Meanwhile, petitioner continued with the construction, expansion, and operation of the resort hotel. Subsequently, on March 28, 2011, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issuedthe assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel. EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances followed wherein respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove, the most recent of which was made in February 2014. Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA. He argued that judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the respondent mayor could order the demolition of the company’s establishment; that Boracay West Cove was granted a FLAgT by the DENR, which bestowed the company the right to construct permanent improvements on the area in question; thatsince the area is a forestland, it is the DENR — and not the municipality of Malay, or any other local government unit for that matter—that has primary jurisdiction over the area, and that the Regional Executive Director of DENR-Region 6 had officially issued an opinion regarding the legal issues involved in the present case; that the Ordinance admits of exceptions; and lastly, that it is the mayor who should be blamed for not issuing the necessary clearances in the company’s favor. In its assailed Decision dated August 13, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie. Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner, according to the CA, is to file a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court. ISSUE: The propriety under the premises of the filing of a petition for certiorari instead of a petition for declaratory relief; HELD: NO. Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy. An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs. In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement and implementation. The closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile any possible guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for carrying out the directives in the challenged EO 10. Indubitably, the CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy given such a situation. ALLIANCE OF GOVT. WORKERS vs. MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 124 SCRA 7 FACTS: Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered labor federation while the other petitioners are its affiliate unions with members from among the employees of the following offices, schools, or government owned or controlled corporations of government. On February 28, 1983, the Philippine Government Employees Association (PGEA) filed a motion to come in as an additional petitioner. They are questioning the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 851 which provides that: WHEREAS, it is necessary to further protect the level of real f wages from the ravage of world-wide inflation; WHEREAS, there has been no increase case in the legal minimum wage rates since 1970; WHEREAS, the Christmas season is an opportune time for society to show its concern for the plight of the working masses so they may properly celebrate Christmas and New Year. NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution do hereby decree as follows: SECTION 1. All employers are hereby required to pay all their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than Pl,000 a month, regardless of the nature of their employment, a 13th-month pay not later than December 24 of every year. SECTION 2. Employers already paying their employees a 13th-month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree. SECTION 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately. Done in the City of Manila, this 16th day of December 1975. According to the petitioners, P.D. No. 851 requires all employers to pay the 13th-month pay to their employees with one sole exception found in Section 2 which states that "(E)mployers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree. " The petitioners contend that Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 included other types of employers not exempted by the decree. They state that nowhere in the decree is the secretary, now Minister of Labor and Employment, authorized to exempt other types of employers from the requirement. Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 provides: Section 3. Employers covered - The Decree shall apply to all employers except to: a) Distressed employers, such as (1) those which are currently incurring substantial losses or 112) in the case of non-profit institutions and organizations, where their income, whether from donations, contributions, grants and other earnings from any source, has consistently declined by more than forty (40%) per cent of their normal income for the last two (2) )years, subject to the provision of Section 7 of this issuance. b) The Government and any of its political subdivisions, including

government-owned and controlled corporations, except)t those corporation, operating essentially as private, ,subsidiaries of the government; c) Employers already paying their employees 13th-month pay or more in a calendar year or its equivalent at the of this issuance; d) Employers of household helpers and persons in the personal service of another in relation to such workers: and e) Employers of those who are paid on purely commission, boundary, or task basis and those who are paid a fixed for performing a specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof, except where the workers are paid an piece- rate basis in which case the employer shall be covered by this issuance:insofar as such workers are concerned ... The petition was filed directly before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether action can be directly file before the Supreme Court HELD: No. At the outset, the petitioners are faced with a procedural barrier. The petition is one for declaratory relief, an action not embraced within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. (Remotigue v. Osmena,, Jr., 21 SCRA 837;Rural Bank of Olongapo v. Commission of Land Registration, 102 SCRA 794;De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294). There is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for the petitioners' statement that the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief suits where only questions of law are involved. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. The petitioners have not pointed to any provision of the Constitution or statute which sustains their sweeping assertion. On this ground alone, the petition could have been dismissed outright. This was not dismissed for the reason that the Court considered the important issues propounded and the fact, that constitutional principles are involved. Nonetheless, the petition was dismissed. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. IBAY G.R. No. 137538 ; September 3, 2001 FACTS: Sometime in 1998, petitioner conducted an investigation on the alleged "scam" on the Public Estates Authority-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation. The alleged anomaly was committed through the issuance of checks which were subsequently deposited in several financial institutions. Ombudsman issued an order directing Lourdes Marquez, Manager of Union Bank of the PH – Julia Vargas Branch, to produce several bank documents for inspection relative to 4 accounts reportedly maintained in the said branch. The documents referred to include bank account application forms, signature cards, transactions history, bank statements, bank ledgers, debit and credit memos, deposit and withdrawalslips, application for purchase of manager’s checks, used manager’s checks and check microfilms. Marquez failed to comply with such order, explaining that the subject accounts pertain to Interbank, which merged with Union Bank, so she has to first verify from the Interbank records in its archives the whereabouts of said accounts. Ombudsman found Marquez’ reasoning unacceptable and issued another order to produce the requested documents, with a threat of citing her in contempt should she fails to comply. Instead of complying with the order of petitioner, Marquez filed a petition for declaratory relief with an application for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction before the RTC of Makati. Marquez said that under Secs. 2 and 3 of R.A. 1405 (Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits), she had the legal obligation not to divulge any information relative to all deposits of whatever nature with banks in the Philippines. But petitioner's Order cited Sec. 15 (8) of R.A. 6770 stating that the Ombudsman had the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records. Marquez, therefore, sought a definite ruling and/or guidelines as regards her rights as well as petitioner's power to inspect bank deposits under the cited provisions of law. Petitioner moved to dismiss the aforesaid petition for declaratory relief on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. Judge Ibay denied said motion. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent acted without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the cited petition for declaratory relief. HELD:Petitioner contends that the RTC of Makati City lacks jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief. It asserts that respondent judge should have dismissed the petition outright in view of Section 14 of R.A. 6770. Section 14 of R.A. 6770 provides: Restrictions.— No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.Petitioner’s invocation of the aforequoted statutory provision is misplaced. The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.5 It is not among the actions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved.6 Similarly, the Rules of Court is explicit that such action shall be brought before the appropriate Regional Trial Court. Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Who may file petition.— Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.7 In this case, the controversy concerns the extent of the power of petitioner to examine bank accounts under Section 15 (8) of R.A. 6770 vis-a-vis the duty of banks under Republic Act 1405 not to divulge any information relative to deposits of whatever nature. The interests of

the parties are adverse considering the antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one hand, that is the power of Ombudsman to examine bank deposits, and on the other, the denial thereof apparently by private respondent who refused to allow petitioner to inspect in camera certain bank accounts. The party seeking relief, private respondent herein, asserts a legal interest in the controversy. The issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination as litigation is inevitable. Note that petitioner has threatened private respondent with “indirect contempt” and “obstruction” charges should the latter not comply with its order. Circumstances considered, we hold that public respondent has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief. Nor can it be said that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in doing so. We are thus constrained to dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit. Multi-Realty Development Corporation vs. Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation, 491 SCRA 9, G.R. No. 146726 June 16, 2006 FACTS: Makati Tuscany consisted of 160 condominium units, with 156 units from the 2nd to the 25th floors, and 4 penthouse units in the 26th floor. Two hundred seventy (270) parking slots were built therein for apportionment among its unit owners. One hundred sixty-four (164) of the parking slots were so allotted, with each unit at the 2nd to the 25th floors being allotted one (1) parking slot each, and each penthouse unit with two slots. Eight (8) other parking slots, found on the ground floor of the Makati Tuscany were designated as guest parking slots, while the remaining 98 were to be retained by Multi-Realty for sale to unit owners who would want to have additional slots. In the meantime, the fair market value of the unallocated parking slots reached P250,000.00 each, or a total of P18,000,000.00 for the 72 slots. In September 1989, Multi-Realty, through its President, Henry Sy, who was also a member of the Board of Directors of MATUSCO, requested that two Multi-Realty executives be allowed to park their cars in two of Makati Tuscanys remaining 72 unallocated parking slots. In a letter, through its counsel, MATUSCO denied the request, asserting, for the first time, that the remaining unallocated parking slots were common areas owned by it. In another letter, MATUSCO offered, by way of goodwill gesture, to allow Multi-Realty to use two unallocated parking slots, which offer was rejected by the latter. On April 26, 1990, Multi-Realty, as plaintiff, filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-1110, against MATUSCO, as defendant, for Damages and/or Reformation of Instrument with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. The case was raffled to Branch 59 of the Makati RTC. ISSUE: whether or not Multi-realty have a cause of action for the reformation of the instrument. HELD: YES. The concept and meaning of the term cause of action in proceedings for declaratory relief, vis-à-vis an ordinary civil action, is broadened. It is not, as in ordinary civil action, the wrong or delict by which the plaintiff’s rights are violated, but it is extended to a mere denial, refusal or challenge raising at least an uncertainty or insecurity which is injurious to plaintiff’s rights. For a petition for declaratory relief to prosper, the following conditions sine qua non must concur: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. Multi-Realty reiterated its contentions in the trial court, insisting that it had adduced evidence to prove all the requisites for the reformation of Section 7(d) of the Master Deed under Article 1359 of the New Civil Code. It was never its intention to designate the 98 unassigned parking slots as common areas, and, as shown by the evidence on record, this was known to MATUSCO. Under Article 1364 of the New Civil Code, an instrument may be reformed if, due to lack of skill on the part of the drafter, the deed fails to express the true agreement or intention of the parties therein. Since MATUSCO knew that it (Multi-Realty) owned the 98 parking slots when the Master Deed was executed, its registration did not make MultiRealty guilty of estoppel by deed. In fact, MATUSCO failed to object to the sale of some of the parking slots to third parties. It was also pointed out that Multi-Realty remained in possession thereof.