Safety Concept Egina.docx

OVERVIEW OF THE SAFETY CONCEPT

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1.

INTRODUCTION This safety concept outlines the general safety philosophy to be implemented for the design of the EGINA Project and includes specific safety management requirements to be implemented for the execution. The EGINA Project involves the development of the EGINA south, EGINA main and Preowei fields. The purpose of this safety concept is to describe the systems, equipment and procedures necessary to protect against the major hazards which could lead to injury of personnel, damage to facilities, loss of production or pollution of the environment, and to prescribe the safety measures which are adopted in the design. This Safety Concept assumes the occurrence of only one major incident at any one time and it also assumes that the FPSO will be operated in the manner for which it was designed. This objective includes the design of; 

Production and water injection wells at EGINA fields and their Subsea Manifolds.



Utilities/Controls from FPSO to EGINA south, EGINA main and Preowei wells.



Flowlines and their risers

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Risers from flowlines and interfaces to the FPSO

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Gas lift lines from the FPSO to production riser at sea bed

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Interfaces from risers to subsea flowlines and umbilicals

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FPSO Topsides and the Hull systems,

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FPSO spread moorings arrangement

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FPSO interfaces with risers and Oil Offloading Lines

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Gas Export from FPSO to the AKPO export line to Amenam gas gathering network

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Single Point Mooring terminal for Oil Export

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FPSO interfaces with tanker in tandem offloading mode

To meet these objectives, equipment and control systems shall be designed with safety devices (adapted for the particular site and environmental conditions) to prevent or isolate uncontrolled hydrocarbons or toxic fluids/gases releases, give automatic warning alarms and provide means to mitigate the consequences that might occur. Primary Protection – Detection, alarm and control of potential hydrocarbon process hazards shall be achieved by the process control systems. Secondary Protection – Additional protection that shall be independent of the primary protection system and may typically include protection against overpressure by PSVs. Emergency Protection Systems – Fire and Gas detection, emergency shutdown and blowdown systems are designed to bring under control hazards which the process control have failed to detect or prevent. The Safety Concept covers only the requirements and design basis for the emergency protection systems.

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2.

APPLICABLE LAWS, REGULATIONS, STANDARDS, CODES & SPECIFICATIONS EGINA development and operations shall be undertaken in accordance with the following specifications, codes and standards: 

Local Laws and Regulations

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Flag Regulations for Tow

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Classification Society Rules

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This Safety Concept

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EGINA Project Specifications

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TOTAL E&P General Specifications

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International Codes & Standards

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3.

OVERALL HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION AND PREVENTION The major hazards are listed below, Hydrocarbon Hazards 

Accidental hydrocarbon leaks on the FPSO, riser terminations and subsea equipment.



Dropped objects onto hydrocarbon containing equipment, risers or pipelines causing hydrocarbon releases.

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Collisions of vessels with the FPSO and/or the risers causing structural damage to the FPSO hull and /or the risers, resulting in a release of hydrocarbons.

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FPSO flare flame out causing potential gas hazard.

Fire hazards 

Jet fires (gas) and pool fires (liquid) due to ignited hydrocarbon releases on or near the FPSO.

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Ignited gas releases from FPSO flares.

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Fire in hull tanks.

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Fire in machinery areas.

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Fire inside the Accommodation Block.

Toxic hazards 

Accidental hydrocarbon containing H2S on the FPSO

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Exhausts from gas turbines containing SO2 and NOx

Production Operations Hazards 

Failure of closed Flare system when called upon to operate.



Failure of the Flare pelletised ignition system.

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Potential gas blow by from the FPSO topsides to the hull tanks.

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Potential for overfilling the hull cargo tanks.

Explosion hazards 

Explosions due to delayed ignition of gas releases on or near the FPSO



Explosions in hull tanks

Marine and Operational Hazards Loss of FPSO hull integrity may occur due to: 

Extreme site environmental and sea conditions may affect the integrity and strength of the FPSO mooring system and can cause excessive excursions of the FPSO and result in the possible damage to risers and flowlines.



Extreme site environmental and sea conditions may affect the integrity and strength of the Oil Offloading Buoy and its mooring system. This can cause excessive excursions of the Oil Offloading Buoy and result in the possible damage Oil Offloading Lines.

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Corrosion or pitting in the cargo tanks or ballast tanks or on the hull deck due to inadequate inspection and maintenance can result in the loss of hydrocarbon containment.

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Marine collision risks to the EGINA FPSO hull can arise from the vessels visiting the installation and the EGINA fields.

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3.1.

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Failure of FPSO crane operations, including above sea-lines and risers will require operation restriction, unless protection against maximum impact loads identified by the dropped objects study is installed.

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Accidents during Personnel transfer

Prevention measures The main hazards on the FPSO, risers and the subsea systems are accidental gas and oil releases leading to fire and explosion if ignited. The strategy to control these hazards is essentially a three-stage process: 1. Reduce the leakage probability by: 

Minimising numbers of known common leakage sources (e.g. flanges, pumps, valves),

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Using high quality components (e.g. dual-seal pumps or seal-less pumps),

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Designing to proven standards,

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Systems in hydrocarbon service to be hydrotested / leak tested prior to use,

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A stringent procedure for inspection and maintenance of the hull, UFR and SPS for prevention of corrosion and pitting that cause leaks

2. Reduce the ignition probability following a leak by: 

Providing effective ventilation and drainage systems to remove or disperse released fluids,

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Reducing the quantity released by effective early gas detection systems and venting of contained inventories to a safe location,

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Automatically isolating commonly recognised, externally located, potential ignition sources (e.g. electrical equipment) on gas detection.

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Providing equipment suitable for the hazardous zone they are located. At a minimum, all electrical equipment located in external area shall be suitable for zone 2, IIB, T3 and ATEX certified category 3 and all instruments located in external area shall be suitable for zone 1, IIB and ATEX certified category 2.

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Providing equipment, which are installed in restricted area and shall be used during emergency (e.g. F&G detection system, general alarm system, etc) or cannot be deenergized during an emergency event shall be suitable for zone 1, IIB, T3 and ATEX certified category 2.

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Installing non-classified equipment outside hazardous area and restricted area.

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Providing over-pressurization of enclosures installed in hazardous area and containing a source of ignition.

3. Reduce the consequences of ignited releases by: 

Segregation and separation of critical equipment,

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Using active or passive fire protection applied to critical structures and equipment,

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Maximising effective natural ventilation for explosion overpressure relief and designing critical structures and equipment to withstand residual consequences.

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Minimising the number of personnel working in the process area, by maximising the automation of the process systems to allow remote monitoring and control from the FPSO Central Control Room.

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4.

OVERALL ASSESSMENTS OF HAZARDS AND SAFETY STUDIES A major part of safety on the installation is achieved by a combination of safety studies and engineering safety measures incorporated into the design during the project phases. Safety studies performed includes; 

Preliminary Risk Assessment Report (refer to NG-EGN-OF-COMP-000001)

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Dropped object study (refer to NG-EGN-FA-COMP-000005)

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Fire risk analysis (refer to NG-EGN-FA-COMP-000011)

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Gas Leak Dispersion and Explosion Risk Analysis (refer to NG-EGN-FA-COMP-000010)

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Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (refer to NG-EGN-FA-COMP-000006)

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Ship Collision Study (refer to NG-EGN-FA-COMP-000008)

Safety evaluations done during APPS include; 

Technical Risk assessment of Hull Tank Venting (refer to NG-EGN-FA-COMP-000001)

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Closed Flare Study (refer to NG-EGN-FA-COMP-000002)

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Pellet Ignition Flare System (refer to NG-EGN-FA-COMP-000003)

These findings and recommendations have been incorporated in Basic Engineering. Major Hazard Identification by a HAZID The HAZID purpose is to identify hazards (and their consequences) in the current design. HAZID#1 and HAZID#2 have been carried out during the Pre-Project phases and studies identified will be carried out during the Project development phases. Additional HAZID(s) will be carried out to cover the construction, installation the commissioning activities, including SIMOPS and also in case of major changes in design. SPOTs and HAZOPs SPOT (Safety, Process, Operability Technical Review) and HAZOP (Hazards Operability) studies are formalised methods of investigating the safe design of the plant process with deviations to its normal mode of operation. The objectives are to detect latent faults or hazardous interactions and identify areas for safety and operability improvements. A FPSO HAZOP has been carried out at the close out of Basic Engineering. The Findings shall be addressed from the start of Detailed Engineering Stage. Project Technical Reviews (PTR’s) At each project milestones, PTR involves in-depth technical questioning of the project aspects (design, documentation, drawings) by a COMPANY experts team to detect errors, omissions or designs not adapted for operation etc and propose improvements considered as necessary. STANDARD DESIGN To prevent failure in the design of all parts of the facility, there is a need for a good design. All engineering departments must liaise for this purpose to be achieved. The process department is the arrow head of the project and are mainly involved in the design and specifications. The various applicable laws, regulations, standards, codes and specification must be considered in the design. Also, the environmental factors, type of fluid and operating conditions must also be considered. 6

Pre-Project TOTAL Project Scope Specifications Statutory Regs. Project Safety Concept

HAZID to identify major hazards

Primary/Secondary Protection Pre-Project

SPOT 1 Project Technical Review 1 Safety Design Documents Env. Assessment

Basic Engineering Development of Safety Safety Risk Concept Assessments Safety Design Documents SPOT 2

Env. Assessments

Project Technical Review 2 Finalise Safety Safety Dossier Concept

Detailed Engineering Figure 1 – Safety Engineering Management Process In this case, EGINA development, the Pre-Project phase comprised two stages, the Pre-Project phase and Advanced Pre-Project phase. Process Department The process department specifies all the design and operation of the production, storage and export equipments which includes; 

Production and water injection wells at EGINA fields

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Utilities/Controls from FPSO to EGINA south, EGINA main and Preowei wells.



Risers from flowlines and interfaces to the FPSO

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Gas lift lines from the FPSO to production riser at sea bed

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FPSO Topsides and the Hull systems,

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FPSO interfaces with risers and Oil Offloading Lines

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Gas Export from FPSO to the AKPO export line to Amenam gas gathering network 7

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Single Point Mooring terminal for Oil Export

They interact with other engineering disciplines. Electrical Department The electrical department is concerned with the electric power consumption of the facility. They determine the Normal, Essential and Emergency load consumption. Electrical department interfaces with the mainly process and mechanical departments to know the electrical consumptions of each equipment. A load list prepared by the process department is used as input for electrical calculations. Provision is also made in the load for the power consumption of the instrumentation and control systems. HSE department determines the hazardous area classification of the various parts of the FPSO. The electrical department must consider this classification before installation of electrical cables and equipment suitable for the zone. Mechanical Department The mechanical department handles the design and specification for all rotating and static mechanical equipment. Mechanical equipments include Pumps, Compressors, Generators, Turbines, Pressured Vessels, Drums e.t.c This department prepares a Mechanical data sheet, MDS that shows the equipment material type, thickness and confirms if such equipment can serve the purpose for which it has been designed. To prepare the MDS, process departments must have done the entire equipment sizing and specified all process and operating condition. The mechanical department requires the Process data sheet, PDS for all such information. Instrumentation Department The instrumentation department performs the integrated control and safety systems for monitoring all aspects of the facility. They are in charge of the design of the Central Control Room in terms of the work stations, F&G matrix panel, detectors, monitors, ESDV, among others. They relate with the process department to understand the general process, the control and safety systems for the facility and they require all PID drawings as input for their deliverables. They relate with electrical department for the power requirement (load) for powering the instruments. They also relate with electrical department to know the hazardous area classification before installing cables. Two types of cables include the Non intrinsic cables installed in non hazardous areas and the Intrinsic safe cables installed in hazardous areas. The instrumentation and HSE departments work hand in hand for the design and layout of the F&G systems. Piping Department The piping department specify the overall layout of the FPSO, the equipment layout for all levels, piping arrangement, pipe supports, machinery room space piping and the integration of the modules. They work closely with the process and process safety departments to know the best possible location of all equipments, pipelines considering the various hazards posed. Structural and weight control Department The department does the overall weight estimation of the FPSO. They design the jackets, the piling for all the modules and the riser systems. They determine the level of Fire proofing (fire resistance) of structural steels, stools, various equipment, piping and modules whose sudden failure would result in danger for operating personnel or escalation of an incident. They require inputs from all departments. 8

5.

SUBSEA PRODUCTION SYSTEM

5.1.

Major Hazards Hydrocarbon Hazards Accidental Hydrocarbon Leaks Leakage can be as a result of Design failure, damage during subsea installation, dropped object during workover and maintenance, corrosion/erosion, fatigue, well blow-out scenarios. Fire Hazards Fire is defined here as a fire due to an ignited hydrocarbon release from any of the subsea hydrocarbon production systems causing a fire on the sea surface Dropped objects onto pipelines or subsea hydrocarbon containing equipment

5.2.

5.3.

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Dropped objects and other impacts during offshore construction, drilling and general marine activities including dropped anchors

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Dropped objects from the FPSO during crane operations

Protection measures for the subsea facilities 

Providing the subsea wellheads with adequate protection and barriers.

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Providing flowlines and injection lines with adequate isolation and safety devices.

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Provisions to prevent leaks from the wells.

Emergency Shutdown of the Subsea Facilities An Integrated Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system for the FPSO topsides and the subsea facilities shall be provided. The subsea ESD levels are initiated as a result of the following FPSO conditions: 

ESD 0 on FPSO initiate shutdown of all subsea production systems (Subsea ESD) and close the surface-controlled sub-surface valve in the production well (SCSSV). The preservation system if it is in operation shall also be shutdown.

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ESD 1 and ESD 2 on FPSO (initiating the closure of inboard ESDV of concerned risers) will initiate the closure of wells feeding the risers, thus the shutdown of all subsea production systems (subsea ESDV). The preservation system if it is in operation shall also be shutdown.



ESD 2 or SD 2 (initiating the closure of inboard ESDV of concerned risers) will initiate the closure of wells feeding the concerned risers.

Abnormal subsea process conditions initiate shutdown of individual production well (W.SD). Refer to Emergency Shutdown Logic Diagram NG-EGN-FA-CENG-113652 for details of actions performed.

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6.

UMBILICAL FLOWLINES AND RISERS

6.1.

Major Hazards

6.1.1. Hydrocarbon Hazards Accidental Hydrocarbon Leaks Leakage can be as a result of Design failure, damage during subsea installation, dropped object during workover and maintenance, corrosion/erosion and fatigue. The impact of well blowout on the FPSO riser shall be considered. Dropped objects onto risers or pipeline terminations Accidental loadings on the UFR that could occur as a result of the hazards identified will be taken into consideration in the design of the protection requirements for the risers and pipeline end terminations and in line tees. 6.1.2. Fire Hazards Fire could be from a subsea hydrocarbon pipeline causing a fire on the sea surface, or from a hydrocarbon riser causing a fire on or above sea surface, including escalation from a riser to other risers. 6.1.3. Assessment of Risk Reduction Measures for the Gas Export Pipeline Assessment Scope and Basis The major hazards identified during the HAZID Study, highlighted the potential for very long duration hydrocarbon release from the gas export line. Without a means of subsea isolation of the gas export line from the FPSO an above sea riser release or subsea riser release could last for a number of days until the gas export pipeline has been isolated from the network. Evacuation of the personnel from the FPSO in such a scenario would normally occur well within an hour. However, it is possible that long duration fires may block escape routes and prevent personnel escaping to the muster points. Hence, the need and requirements for rapidly isolating EGINA FPSO gas export riser from the pipeline with Subsea Isolation Valves (SIV’s) in case of a gas release from the gas export riser has been evaluated. Refer to DGEP/SCR/ED/APP N°.doc ICS / PD / 08 / 153 - Subsea Isolation Valve Study - DGEP/SCR/ED/ICS Recommendation. This is in order to minimize the duration of any potential gas release (and the duration of a jet fire if the release is ignited) in the vicinity of the FPSO. The non-personnel risk implications of not providing an isolation facility for the gas export line in the event of a riser release are: 

Environment: Large quantities of gas or combustion products entering atmosphere. Oil pollution if other risers are breached.

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Asset: Serious damage or catastrophic loss of the FPSO and / topside assets.

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Production: Long term interruption of production and hydrocarbon export and loss of revenue.

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Company Image/Media: Dramatic nature of this type of event has strong potential for media interest and will affect the COMPANY share prices

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6.1.4.

Explosion Hazards Explosion can be caused by late ignition (by sparks, unprotected flames & heat sources) of a flammable vapour cloud release from hydrocarbon containing equipment or pipework. It can also be an explosion near the FPSO.

6.1.5. Marine and Operational Hazards Collision and Impacts Potential collision and impact risks to the EGINA FPSO risers hang offs can arise from the following vessels visiting the installation and the EGINA fields: 

Bunkering Tankers (Methanol, Fuel, Water)

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Oil export tankers to the EGINA oil export buoy or visiting other installations in the field



Supply vessels

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Tandem offloading tankers

Failure of Risers FPSO mooring lines failure and/or extremely adverse weather could cause the excursion of the FPSO from the station and affect the trim and heel of the FPSO. These events could cause excessive tension in the risers with potential risers failure resulting in the hydrocarbon release. Failure and collapse of the risers can occur due to loss of Buoyancy of the FPSO. Failure and collapse of risers can also occur due to bottom connection (rotolatch) failure. 6.2.

6.3.

Prevention of hazardous occurrence 

Hydrocarbon inventory shall be limited in pipelines and risers, using automatic and manually closing valves, including at the FPSO interfaces.



Risers and their structural supports shall be provided with passive fire protection against collapse of the structure or any other failure: it gives higher availability and lower maintenance requirements than for other protection means (including I tube used to route the risers).



Possible segregation of risers sequence or mechanical protection to prevent escalation.

Emergency Shutdown of the facilities Automatic closure of the two ESD valves or the combination of an ESD valve and SDV on each of the hydrocarbon risers shall be initiated when an Emergency Shutdown Level 1 is generated on the FPSO. In addition the following emergency shutdown arrangements shall be provided: 

The inboard ESD valve on an incoming hydrocarbon riser shall be closed by a low low (PSLL) signal initiated by the pressure monitoring system of the particular hydrocarbon riser. In this case, the pressure monitoring point (s) shall be downstream the ESD Valve.



The inboard ESD valve on the export riser and on a gas lift riser shall be closed by a low low (PSLL) signal initiated by the pressure monitoring system of the particular hydrocarbon riser. In this case, the pressure monitoring point (s) shall be upstream the ESD Valve.

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7.

FLOATING PRODUCTION STORAGE AND OFFLOADING (FPSO) UNIT

7.1.

Major hazards identified Hydrocarbon Hazards

7.1.1. Accidental Release Accidental Gas Leaks and Vents Accidental gas leaks shall be considered from FPSO process facilities, the riser terminations on the FPSO and the pipelines to and from the FPSO. Dispersion calculations for the releases from cargo tank vents shall be carried out based on the maximum exhaust flow rates and will be used to set their location. This is to ensure that the harmful concentration of gas releases does not reach locations where site personnel or crane operations or helicopter paths can be affected. Dropped objects during lifting operations Failure of FPSO crane operations, including above sea-lines and risers will require operation restriction, unless protection against maximum impact loads identified by the dropped objects study is installed. The routine operational swing zones of permanently installed cranes on the FPSO shall not pass over equipment containing hydrocarbon unless said equipment has been designed for resistance to impact from loads dropped by the crane. Crane movement above such equipment, such as in the laydown areas vicinity, shall be limited to heavy maintenance activities after equipment has been isolated, depressurised and drained. 7.1.2. Fire Hazards Hydrocarbon fire 

Subsea hydrocarbon equipment and pipelines (fires on the sea surface)



Production and other hydrocarbon risers to/from the FPSO (fires on or above sea surface), including escalation of the fire events from a riser to other risers



Oil and gas process facilities on the FPSO

Non hydrocarbon fire 

Hull and topsides utilities including diesel powered engines and electrical equipment

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Electrical fires or fires caused by waste material in the accommodation block

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A fire in the Galley

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A fire in the Laundry

Detectors, ESD, emergency blowdown, fixed/mobile fire fighting and protection equipment together with emergency procedures shall be used to minimise the consequences to personnel and equipment. 7.1.3. Explosion Hazards For any hydrocarbon equipment installed in buildings, the probability of explosion cannot be discarded. However, it is proposed that there will be no hydrocarbon equipment installed in buildings on the FPSO decks or other open areas. If this is the case, only explosion scenarios in process and riser areas need to be considered.

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An explosion on the FPSO would cause fatalities or injury to any exposed personnel and equipment damage with possible loss of production. It may cause impairment of the accommodation building, the safety critical functions and damage to other units in the vicinity. The effects of a blast overpressure generated by an explosion are reduced to acceptable levels on adjacent zone, by providing the necessary separation distance or by installing blast protection arrangements as necessary. In the event of a potential explosion, the gas detection, the ESD and blowdown systems shall operate to limit the loss of containment of hydrocarbons and any possible domino effect. 7.1.4. Marine and Operational Hazards Methanol and Diesel Handling Methanol is stored on FPSO and used for hydrate prevention. Special safety and emergency management procedures will be implemented during tandem loading of methanol from carrier tankers at the bow of the FPSO, taking into account of potential Zone 1 and Zone 2 areas created by these products. Diesel fuel is stored on FPSO. Special safety and emergency management procedures will be implemented during side by side loading of diesel from supply boats to the FPSO, taking into account of potential hazards that can be created by diesel fuel. Collision and Impacts Potential collision and impact risks to the EGINA FPSO hull, mooring system and the oil export buoy can arise from the vessels visiting the installation and the EGINA fields, including the Bunkering Tankers (Methanol, Diesel, and Water), oil export tankers for tandem and buoy offloading, export buoy, supply vessels. Loss of Mooring and/or Station Keeping Failure of the mooring lines under extreme site environmental conditions can cause excessive excursions of the FPSO from the station. This would cause excessive tension in the risers with the potential for failure of the risers, resulting in hydrocarbon release. Other hazard includes loss of hull integrity, failure of cargo offloading operations, hazards during personnel transfer. 7.1.5. Security measures for the installation The installation shall be provided with a security plan taking into account current and possible future developments in the Niger Delta region. Automatic Identification System (AIS) “Friend or Foe” An Automatic Identification System shall be provided on EGINA FPSO. COMPANY will ensure that all supply boats will be equipped with a suitable AIS transponder. Electronic access control systems/Electronic POB An electronic POB monitoring and control system shall be provided on the FPSO. Personnel will carry their identification swipe card, complete with photo. The Offshore Logistics Secretary will be equipped with a badge system and will provide visitors with an electronic badge/pass. It will be easier to recognise permanent staff and visitors.

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The same badges shall be used to restrict access to sensitive areas such as the Control Room, E&I Rooms or telecom rooms. Radar surveillance systems A normal surface radar system will be provided to ensure detection of all shipping vessels in the vicinity and to prevent collision of such vessels with the FPSO. Operations will ensure appropriate training of Radio operations personnel. CCTV Closed Circuit TV shall be required at all FPSO access points i.e. boat landing, helideck, riser areas with a thermal imaging (thermic) camera provided at the buoy, with display in the Control Room. Lighting Systems Communications systems dedicated to security Gates Suitable lockable gates/hatches shall be provided at all boat landings. The security arrangements provided at any platforms in the vicinity of the riser areas and any other area vulnerable to access from the sea needs to be reviewed and upgraded accordingly. Spy Glasses Spy glasses will be required for the doors for the Radio Room, Telecommunications Room and Control Room. Lockable Safe Lockable safes will be required for the person responsible for Safety and Environment on Site (RSES) and the Port Facility Security Officer of the FPSO. Paper Shredder Provision of a paper shredder for sensitive documents shall be considered. Room Locks Room locks shall be provided for the Radio Room, Telecommunication Room and Control Room (these shall be operable by swipe cards). To allow co-ordination of these systems the FPSO is provided with a dedicated security room. 7.1.6. Emergency Control Centre An Emergency Control Centre (ECC) shall be provided in the Accommodation Block as crisis room for key personnel while they implement the FPSO Emergency Response Plan. The facilities and other requirements for this ECC are specified in GS EP SAF 371 “Emergency Control Facilities”.

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7.2.

FPSO Fire zones The FPSO has been partitioned into fire zones as illustrated and described below, in order to separate areas with different types of risks and limit the probability of escalation.

Fire zone partition Zone A E&I buildings (zone C) Zone A

Zone D

Zone C

Zone E

Zone E Zone F

Zone B

Figure 2 – General separation of FPSO fire zones Fire zone A – Accommodation block, helideck areas and aft areas Fire zone B – Aft hull machinery space area Fire zone C – Utilities areas and adjoining areas Fire Zone D – Hydrocarbon processing areas above process deck level Fire Zone E – Areas between the process deck and hull deck areas Fire Zone F – Areas and tanks below the hull deck. 7.2.1. Requirements of Fire zones Fire zones are areas within the installation where equipment are grouped by nature and/or by homogeneous level of risk attached to them. The partition into fire zones is such that the consequences of a fire, a flammable gas leak or an explosion corresponding to the credible event likely to occur in the concerned fire zone shall not impact other fire zones to an extent where their integrity could be put at risk. A Fire zone is defined physically by its limits and hydrocarbon inventory inside the zone. It shall be possible to isolate completely the hydrocarbon inventory within a single fire zone by Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs) and depressurise it by Emergency Depressurisation valves (BDVs). A fire will initially be contained within the affected zone due to the fire detection, ESD, emergency blowdown and fixed fire fighting systems consequences to any other fire zone will be reduced or prevented. 7.2.2. Separation of Fire zones It is not possible to physically separate the Fire Zones, thus an approach based on appropriate partitioning and fire prevention/control shall be adopted. For this purpose the following protection measures shall be implemented: 15

7.3.



Jet fire and blast overpressure protection of the Accommodation and E/I Buildings for credible scenarios



Jet fire rated barriers between Utilities and Process areas (plated decks and vertical partitions for example) shall be designed to retain their integrity after an explosion.



Foam coverage of the whole top of the hull deck



Passive fire protection for the hydrocarbon risers and their ESDVs



Other passive and active fire protection measures identified by the detailed Fire Risk Analysis.

Specific protection measures for crude handling

7.3.1. Cargo monitoring The cargo handling monitoring equipment shall be located in the CCR and centralised with the FPSO monitoring system. It shall include all necessary control and command systems to safely operate the FPSO in normal and emergency cases. 7.3.2. Prevention of gas blow-by in process Tanks Liquids from the 2nd Stage Separator are routed to 2 x 50% Wash Tanks in the Hull. The cargo tank vent system shall be designed to handle gas blow-by from the 2nd Stage Separator, although this is an undesirable event which has to be prevented. This design requires the total liquid height in the Wash Tank (combined oil and water leg) to be maintained at a level sufficient to prevent such an occurrence. The height of this liquid level shall be monitored and alarm facilities shall be provided in the Central Control Room to alert the Operators of any drop in this liquid level below the pre- determined required safety level. 7.3.3. Gas Blanketing of Tanks Cargo, wash, settling, reject oil, methanol and slop tanks shall be provided with the hydrocarbon gas blanketing for normal operations, with provision for one 100% back-up supply of inert gas system to provide full redundancy requirement for two independent systems). Two separate hydrocarbon gas and inert gas headers shall be provided. Cargo offloading and transfer operations must be shut when both systems are lost. Detailed Engineering design shall ensure that both systems cannot be damaged by a single accident. The hydrocarbon blanket gas system provides the following main functions: 

Provision of HC (hydrocarbon) blanket gas during offloading to prevent a sub-atmospheric pressure being formed in the cargo tanks,



A blanket gas recovery system, routed back to the topsides process via the Flare and HC Blanket Gas system, to avoid venting the gas to atmosphere



A ‘closed’ flare tips design so that, under normal conditions, the need for hydrocarbon purge gas and a pilot flame are avoided.

Ballast tanks and void spaces adjacent to cargo areas are not required to be inerted continuously, but provision shall be made for them to be inerted using hoses connected to the inert gas system. Protection shall normally be ensured by periodic analysis of the ambient atmosphere in the tanks, and provision shall be made to facilitate this analysis, either by manual or automatic arrangements.

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7.4.

Specific protection measures for FPSO Mooring System At least two monitoring systems shall be provided to identify any abnormal excursion of the FPSO from the station. For this purpose tension of the mooring lines and record of the GPS position shall be monitored to detect any abnormal offset of the FPSO and/or failure of one or more of the mooring line. In case of a single mooring line failure the production will be shutdown by manual initiation. Mooring chains shall be protected against a fire on the sea surface by locating chain stoppers below sea level. The protection of the mooring chain shall be considered in relation to the risk of collision with tandem export tankers and supply boats.

7.5.

Hazardous Area Classification, Ventilation and Pressure Protection

7.5.1. Hazardous Areas The area classification purpose is to avoid ignition that can occur when handling flammable liquids and gas in normal operation. The approach is to reduce to an acceptable level the probability of coincidence of a flammable atmosphere and an electrical or other source of ignition. The classification of hazardous areas is defined as follows: Zone 0 Explosive atmosphere is or is likely to be permanently present

Zone 1 Explosive atmosphere is likely to be present in normal condition of operation

Zone 2 Explosive atmosphere is likely to be present in abnormal condition or during a short duration in normal condition.

The main reasons for classifying the installation into hazardous areas are: 

To ensure that sources of ignition are segregated from sources of flammable gas or vapour to prevent ignition of flammable atmospheres,



To assist in the appropriate location of ventilation air inlets and outlets,



To assist in the appropriate location of ventilation and combustion air inlets and exhausts for combustion equipment,



To define the extent of hazardous areas from vents,



To determine the location of flammable gas detectors,



To determine the maximum allowable surface temperature for particular equipment and areas of the FPSO decks.

The overall design philosophy shall make the site as safe as possible by minimising the potential sources of release of flammable gas and ensuring efficient ventilation. 7.5.2. Selection of Electrical Equipment All equipment shall be rated for the hazardous area in which it is located and suitable for gas group IIB Temperature Class T3 (200ºC max. surface temperature). All electrical equipment required to operate in an emergency shutdown situation, shall be suitable for Zone 1. It includes the following items when these items are located outside the Accommodation or a pressurised building: 

F&G detection items



Process control and emergency shutdown (ESD) equipment 17



Communications and general alarms equipment



Emergency and escape luminaries

The logic solvers for the above items shall be located in non-hazardous areas. Electrical equipment that cannot be de-energised or shall voluntarily be used while the atmosphere within the enclosure is hazardous (e.g. emergency ventilation), shall be suitable for operation in Zone 1. The electrical equipment within a turbine enclosure shall always be suitable for Zone 2. Electrical equipment which cannot be isolated in case of gas detection, or is essential for equipment such as post lube oil pumps for the gas turbines, shall be suitable for Zone 1 group II B T3. All Zone 1 and Zone 2 certified equipment shall comply with the requirements of ATEX European Directive 94/9/EC (23/03/94). 7.5.3. Hot Surfaces The maximum temperature shall not exceed 250 °C for: 

any non-electrical equipment located in a hazardous area under normal operating,



any non-electrical equipment in the ‘Restricted Area’ under abnormal conditions.

Spilled liquid hydrocarbon shall never be in contact with a surface whose temperature exceeds their flash point. 200°C shall be taken as default value, it must be highlighted that condensate and lube oil may have significantly lower flash points. Turbo-generator and diesel engines external exhausts shall be heat insulated even if not located in a hazardous area as they are in a restricted area. 7.6.

Fire and Gas detection system The prime objective in the F&G detection system design is the rapid detection of a gas release or a fire at the incipient stage to prevent any potential fire or explosion hazards. The detection system shall, upon the appropriate F&G conditions, automatically initiate the active fire protection systems (i.e. foam and/or firewater deluge or fixed total flooding extinguishing systems). It shall be interfaced with the ESD system to perform emergency shutdown and blowdown actions and PA/GA system to activate the general alarm. F&G detection and resulting executive actions have been developed in the F&G detection philosophy. Refer to NG-EGN-FA-CENG-113004 for details. The F&G detection system is totally independent from the process control systems and shall continuously monitor all areas of the FPSO including the process modules, risers, utilities, the hull and internal areas of the accommodation for potential events. Functions The Fire and Gas control and monitoring panel shall be installed in the Central Control Room (CCR). When a hazardous situation is detected, the control and monitoring system shall provide the operator with the complete detection/protection systems status and shall automatically annunciate alarm and fault conditions at the CCR. The F&G system will use the General Alarm system to initiate audible and visual alarms. Fire detection systems for LQ and machinery spaces shall be able to activate local audible and visual alarm in case of fire detection. This system is independent from PA/GA. Alarms dedicated to extinguishing systems will be actuated via the control panel of each system. 18

7.6.1. System Features The F&G detectors shall, as far as possible, be protected against environmental effects, which influence their operation. F&G detection devices suppliers shall identify accessories to ensure the satisfactory operation of equipment under prevailing environmental conditions. The gas detectors shall be calibrated to the gas mixture most likely to be present on the production installation where the detector is located. All detection sensors including those inside the E/I Buildings and the Accommodation shall be suitable for installation in Zone 1 Gas Group IIB Temp. Class T3. Detection equipment in the battery rooms will be suitable for installation in Zone 1 Gas Group IIC Temp. Class T3. Equipment packages such as power generators will have their own F&G systems supplied as part of the package. Detectors include, flammable gas detectors, flame detectors, VESDA (very early smoke detection alarm). For information on F&G detection, refer to Fire and Gas detection philosophy- NG- EGNFA-CENG-113004. 7.6.2. VESDA Systems Very Early Smoke Detection Alarm (VESDA) is a system of aspirating smoke detection that provides the earliest possible response to incipient fires. VESDA shall be used in combination with traditional fire detection, in the following areas: 

Topsides Electrical Equipment Room



Topsides Instrument Technical Room



Hull Technical Rooms



Accommodation Technical Rooms

Early smoke detection shall activate a local alarm in the fire risk area and in CCR. 7.6.3. Manual alarm call points Manual Alarm Call points (MACs) shall be provided and strategically distributed throughout the installation for personnel to raise an alarm. They shall also be provided near buildings doors. In the LQ, manual alarm call points shall be strategically located in all corridors, stairways, escape routes and at each exit. MACs comprise call points located near Telephones directly connected to specific emergency telephone in the CCR. The type and location of the MACs shall be determined based on the current practice on the other FPSO’s of the Nigeria Offshore Fields. 7.7.

Emergency Shutdown and Depressurisation Systems The FPSO topsides, the hull, risers and the subsea facilities shall have an integrated automatic emergency shutdown (ESD) and emergency depressurisation (EDP) systems.

7.7.1. Emergency Shutdown (ESD) ESD system is designed to reliably detect and initiate automatic executive actions in case of any abnormal operational or hazardous conditions. In the event of an emergency situation, the FPSO ESD system shall bring the complete or selected sections of the FPSO production facilities, utility systems and the subsea systems into a safe predetermined emergency shutdown condition.

19

7.7.2. Emergency Depressurisation (EDP) EDP of the FPSO process systems is required to mitigate consequences in case of a gas leak or fire. The depressurisation criteria are to reduce the system pressure for all the process systems in the Process Fire Zone down to the lower of 7 barg or one half of the maximum operating pressure (design pressure for individual equipment) whichever is the most stringent, in less than 15 minutes starting from the maximum operating pressure which will normally corresponds to PSHH. Depressurisation staggering in order to meet these criteria is not permitted. 7.8.

Active Fire Protection

7.8.1. Fire Water System Philosophy Water deluge systems shall be installed to protect the following typical areas: 

Equipment, vessels & piping handling or storing significant quantities of flammable fluids,



Cargo tanks deck (foam / water deluge),

The FPSO fire water ring main system shall be permanently pressurised pipe work system supplying firewater by feeders to the deluge systems, foam systems, monitors, hydrants and hose reels. To calculate the maximum firewater, we consider the following: 

Deluge and foam protection for the affected sub deluge zones



Deluge and foam protection for the adjacent sub deluge zones



Deluge for the adjacent central pipe rack sub-deluge zones



120 m3/h for one fire monitor.



60 m3/h for fire hydrants.

Remotely controlled firewater monitors shall be located to cover the FPSO topside areas including the diesel loading areas, the methanol storage tanks, the methanol loading and the crude oil offloading areas. Hose reels shall be provided in the LQ, workshops, and more generally where hydrocarbon inventory and electricity are not the primary hazards. 7.8.2. Fire Water Pumps Each fire water pump will be rated at 35% of fire water demand. The pumps shall be located inside caissons, widely separated throughout the FPSO to avoid common-cause failures and protected against wave action and mechanical damage. Pumps shall have a two stage arrangement of hydraulic submersible lift pump and a deck mounted booster pump energised by a dedicated diesel generator. Diesel drivers shall be located in pressurized enclosures and equipped with F&G detectors at the combustion/ ventilation air inlet since the pump enclosures will be located in restricted area. Fire water pumps shall be started automatically by: 

Low ring main pressure (via PTs installed on the firewater ring main),



Confirmed fire detection via the F&G system,

7.8.3. Fire Water Mains and Distribution Network The fire water main shall be arranged in the form of a loop around utilities and process fire zones feeding each sub deluge zone. With this arrangement each ring and any area within the Process 20

fire zone can be supplied with water coming from two opposite directions. Each Process fire zone sub deluge system shall be served by two water supplies fed from separate isolatable headers from the ring main and each of these feed shall be provided with an individual deluge control valve which are located at a safe distance from the protected area. All fire water system pipe work (including normally wet and normally dry pipe work) shall be fabricated in Copper-Nickel or glass reinforced epoxy (GRE) material. The use of GRE is conditional on the provision of minimum 60 minutes hydrocarbon fire Passive Fire Protection (PFP) to all piping joints, piping supports and to all sections of the fire water ring main in the vicinity of the hydrocarbon risers. 7.8.4. Fixed water / foam deluge systems Foam storage and injection facilities shall be provided to inject it into the following systems: 

Deluge systems, hydrants and any monitors serving process areas.



Deluge systems serving the hull deck (i.e. top of the tanks). In this case the deluge system will be divided to enable selective deluging of the top of the tanks.



Foam monitors and hydrants serving the hull deck



Helideck fire monitors.



Fire Monitors in diesel loading areas.

Injection of foam concentrate shall be achieved by foam proportioners, fitted local to each relevant deluge valve skid, hydrant and monitor, and regulated to automatically produce the required foam solution. For topsides deluge systems, the foam concentrate valves located on the deluge skids shall be opened manually by operators from CCR or locally. For cargo deck deluge systems, the valves shall open automatically in case of confirmed fire detection or manually from CCR or locally. The foam concentrate shall be stored in an atmospheric storage tank located in a safe area, ideally within the hull. The stored quantity shall correspond to 20 minutes operation at maximum demand for cargo tanks deck protection, in accordance with SOLAS requirements, or 30 minutes operation at maximum demand for methanol tanks deck protection, in accordance with IBC code, whichever is greater plus an operational contingency factor of similar duration to allow for losses due to spurious system initiation. The foam concentrate shall be able to extinguish both hydrocarbon and polar solvent (methanol) fire. 2x100% duty/standby electrically driven foam pumps connected to the foam tank shall feed the relevant deluge systems and hydrants via a pressurised foam-concentrate ring main with isolation valves. The foam pumps shall be started automatically via the F&G system on confirmed fire detection. Moreover pushbuttons shall be provided to start the foam pumps manually from the CCR and from a local control panel. 7.8.5. Total flooding extinguishing systems Fixed gaseous total flooding or water mist systems shall be installed for the following areas: 

Power generator & compressor gas turbine hoods



Emergency diesel generator (EDG) room



Essential diesel generator room



Fire pump enclosures 21



Storage rooms for paints or other flammable substances



Hydraulic Power Unit room



Any other machinery spaces upon requirements from Fire Risk Analysis and Classification Society

Total flooding inert gas (INERGEN agent) shall be provided for the following rooms: 

E/I building Electrical Equipment Rooms



E/I building Instrument Equipment Room



E/I building Telecom Room



Accommodation Emergency Electrical Equipment Room



Accommodation Electrical Room



Accommodation Instrumentation Technical Room



Machinery spaces Electrical Equipment Room



Machinery spaces Instrument Technical Room

7.8.6. Portable and mobile fire fighting equipment Portable extinguishers shall be located in strategic places throughout the FPSO as for example, close to the access doors of rooms, on access stairways, near escape ways and adjacent to the helideck. The extinguishers to be located outdoors shall be housed in suitable protection boxes. Extinguishers of two main types shall be used: -

7.9.



Extinguishers on wheels, 30/ 50 kg capacity;



Portable extinguishers, 5 or 9 kg capacity.

Passive Fire Protection The protection ratings for the items listed below have been determined based on the results of the FRA carried out for EGINA FPSO during the Basic Engineering phase. Refer to NG-EGN-FACENG-113921 – Preliminary Fire Protection Report for details. 

Hydrocarbon risers and their ESDVs



Actuators of the riser ESDVs if not failsafe



Critical structural members supporting the accommodation



Accommodation exterior faces



Fire/blast partitions between the process and utility areas



Faces of the E/ I Buildings facing the process areas.



Critical structural members supporting the process and utility modules



Critical Pipe racks and structures



Flare tower base up to about 20 meters height



Muster stations at the forward areas



All firewater distribution piping (GRE) joints, and piping in the vicinity of the risers

PFP in the form of structural barriers with insulation or fire protection coatings shall be applied to walls, decks and structural members of the FPSO where credible fire hazards are capable of causing failure, taking into account the fire size, duration, location and intensity.

22

7.10.

Flaring and Venting Closed HP and LP flare systems shall be provided on the EGINA FPSO in line with the No Flaring policy. In the case of ESD1, the closed flare systems collect hazardous gas from the emergency depressurisation systems and dispose of it safely by burning. Flaring systems will also be used during start-up, maintenance operations and when a compressor is out of action. Flare knockout drums shall be installed to minimise the possibility of liquid carry-over.

7.11.

Communications Systems Systems shall be provided to fulfil all external and internal offshore voice and data communications requirements on-board and around the FPSO (supply boats, shipping, helicopters) and for long distance voice and data communications with other installations and onshore base. In addition security surveillance data communications requirements on-board and around the FPSO will be provided. A PA/GA system shall carry routine and emergency speech and alarm tones throughout the FPSO, although the operator shall inhibit routine PA messages in sleeping areas. In areas where the ambient noise level can be higher than 85 dB (A), a visual alarm should be provided in addition to the audible alarm to alert persons that an emergency message is being transmitted and to enable them to take appropriate action. One network of CCTV cameras and television monitors shall be provided for surveillance of FPSO critical areas, including offloading operations with tankers and for security monitoring purposes. The cameras for this system shall be supplied with certified flame/explosion proof housing.

7.12.

Essential and Emergency Power

7.12.1. Essential generation In addition to the main power generation system, essential service generators and their associated primary distribution equipment shall be sized to cover operating requirements for the subsea preservation systems and other systems designated as essential for FPSO operations. The Essential Power system shall be supplied by at least two diesel driven generators located inside the hull machinery spaces. 7.12.2. Emergency generation When main power supply is lost, an emergency generator shall provide within 45 seconds and for 18 hours minimum supply to the following loads required during emergency conditions: 

Control and safety systems UPS



Life support



Ventilation fans serving the muster areas, radio room, UPS equipment room, Central Control Room, hospital and emergency switchgear rooms



Navaids UPS



Communications UPS



Fire-fighting foam injection pumps



Remote controlled fire monitors



Jockey pumps



Emergency Lighting. In order to assure sufficient light in case of a loss of main power during night time, approximately 30% of the lighting shall remain in service.

23

The Emergency Generator shall be located in a non- hazardous area above the hull deck level. 7.12.3. Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) AC and DC Uninterruptible Power Systems (UPS’s) shall be installed to provide a no-break power supply to operation and safety related equipment in the event of main power failure or total shutdown. The emergency lighting, provided to illuminate specific areas such as sick bay, shall be fed by the emergency power distribution network and have integral battery back-up, ATEX certified as category 2 (suitable for zone 1) in order to ensure 90 minutes illumination The escape lighting fixtures of the hull and living quarters shall be fed by the emergency power distribution network and have integral battery back-up, ATEX certified as category 2 (suitable for zone 1) in order to ensure 180 mins illumination. The escape and emergency lighting fixtures of the topsides shall be fed by the emergency power distribution network and have integral battery back-up, ATEX certified as category 2 (suitable for zone 1) in order to ensure 90 mins illumination. The sea surface floodlights and embarkation stations lighting shall be fed by the emergency power distribution network and have integral battery back-up, ATEX certified as category 2 (suitable for zone 1) in order to ensure 90 mins illumination. 7.13.

Drains Systems We have the closed and open drain system. The closed drains shall be used for draining equipment and lines for maintenance purposes. Their use for routine operational purposes shall be avoided. Hazardous open drains shall be provided for water collected underneath process equipment and leaks from process drip pans. Hazardous open drains and water from cargo tanks stripping shall be connected to the Slop Tank. Firewater and rainwater will be directed overboard. Non-hazardous open drains shall be provided for water collected from utility areas and other nonhazardous locations. There shall be no permanent connection between the open and closed drains, and systems must be designed to prevent hydrocarbons going from a classified to a non-classified area.

7.14.

Escape Evacuation and Escape

7.14.1. General Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) facilities shall be designed for the complete FPSO lifetime, including periods of: 

Construction, hook-up, pre-commissioning and start-up;



Drilling, simultaneous operations on wells and production;



Scheduled maintenance.

These periods will require additional persons on board: all manning scenarios must be addressed in the EER facilities design, including the maximum POB of 240 persons. 24

An escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment study has been performed during basic engineering as part of the safety studies. Refer to Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Philosophy NG-EGN-FA-CENG-113005 for details. 7.14.2. Escape Escape routes shall be provided to facilitate personnel evacuation in critical situations. They shall enable personnel to rapidly escape from any part of the installation to the prime and secondary muster stations, and thereafter to the TEMPSC embarkation areas. There shall be four main routes running the length of the FPSO: two main routes shall be located on each side of the FPSO, at the hull and process deck levels. In addition secondary routes shall run port to starboard. All deck levels shall be connected by multiple stairways. All spaces in the hull, such as tanks, cofferdams, double hull and other void spaces, shall be provided with at least two exits located with due consideration of the topsides risks. Escape routes on the hull deck shall be at least 3 m from sources of release (vents, PV breakers, etc.) and with a non-slip surface: where spillage might occur, self-draining grating or similar shall be provided. Escape route signs and floor markings shall be provided along the escape routes to direct personnel to the primary and secondary muster stations. The primary escape route shall be 1.2m minimum width and the secondary escape route shall be 1m minimum width. The minimum height clearance shall be 2.3m. 7.14.3. Primary and Secondary Muster Areas Primary muster area shall be a designated room in the LQ. It may normally be used for other purposes, but the cumulative floor area must accommodate the maximum POB on the basis of 0.5 m² / person, taking into account the room furnishings space. It shall be equipped with reliable means of two-way communication with the control and radio rooms. Lifejackets for 120% of maximum POB shall be located in or adjacent to the muster room. Evacuation routes from muster room to the lifeboats shall, as far as possible be located inside the LQ and sized for the rapid transfer of large numbers of personnel. Alternative muster facilities shall also be provided, in the form of an external muster area adjacent to the accommodation, for incidents internal to the LQ. Secondary Muster Station A secondary muster station shall be provided at the FPSO bow for people unable to reach the primary muster area. It shall be located in a shelter. This muster station shall be enclosed, mechanically ventilated and suitably protected against explosion, smoke, fire, noise and thermal radiation from the flare for at least 60 minutes. It shall be designed for 60 persons on the basis of 0.35 m² / person and equipped with reliable means of two-way communication with the control and radio rooms. Lifejackets, smoke hoods and/or escape BA sets for 120% of its design manning capacity shall be located in the shelter. Escape routes leading from/to this shelter to the free fall lifeboat at the bow (reference section 7.14.4) shall be protected. 7.14.4. Evacuation of Personnel The primary evacuation means shall be the permanently stationed stand-by vessel, with embarkation either directly from the FPSO or via surfer boats.

25

The secondary evacuation means shall be freefall Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Crafts (TEMPSC). In the case of EGINA FPSO with the maximum POB of 240 and lifeboats of capacity 60 persons each, the requirement is five freefall lifeboats at the stern and one freefall lifeboat at the bow that can be shielded from heat radiation, fire and blast if necessary. The tertiary evacuation means shall comprise life rafts for at least 100% of the maximum POB on each side of the FPSO. Davit-launched and throw-over life rafts (capacity: 20 persons each). Access to throw-over life rafts and to the sea shall be by means of scramble nets. A Fast Rescue Craft (FRC) shall be provided on the FPSO near the laydown area Portside. Following safety precautions are recommended for launching and recovery: from the Process Deck, the FRC shall be launched unmanned and a platform shall be provided near to the sea level from which the crew shall board the boat. 7.15.

Miscellaneous Safety Equipment Lifejackets Lifejackets shall be provided throughout the installation as follows: Primary muster point

120% maximum POB

Bow secondary muster shelter

120% maximum of shelter design capacity

For each freefall TEMPSC

- 20% TEMPSC capacity at the embarkation - 10% TEMPSC capacity stored onboard

For each davit-launched TEMPSC / forward life raft embarkation area

- 20% maximum secondary muster shelter capacity - 10% of each TEMPSC capacity stored onboard

Intermediate life raft embarkation areas on each side of the FPSO

10% maximum POB

Every life jacket shall be available for immediate use and where necessary protected against damage. Lifebuoys Lifebuoys shall be provided at all locations on the FPSO where it is possible that personnel may fall into the sea. As a general principle, sufficient lifebuoys shall be provided such that the maximum distance to a lifebuoy on each deck shall be no greater than 30m. The number and locations of lifebuoys on the FPSO shall be confirmed during detailed design. Smoke Hoods Smoke hoods shall be provided in each cabin (at least one per bed), for 120% maximum POB at the primary muster point and for 120 % of the bow shelter capacity at the bow secondary muster point; additional ones shall be distributed around the process pancakes. They shall provide protection for a minimum of 10 minutes. Emergency Escape Breathing Devices A quantity of 2 off emergency escape breathing devices shall be located within the CCR and a minimum of 2 off devices shall be located at each level of the hull machinery spaces. Stretchers 26

Location and number of stretchers shall be confirmed during detailed design but shall be included in the sick bay, in each muster areas and in the hull aft machinery space. Their locations shall be properly marked, illuminated and protected against damage. Combined safety showers and eye-washes Combined safety showers and eye-washes shall be readily accessible and immediately available in case of emergency in all areas where direct contact with chemicals is possible and harmful to personnel. They shall be equipped with eye wash fountains and only use potable water. They shall be positioned not more than 15 m away from the potential hazard. They shall not be obstructed or obscured from view in all directions. Where visual obstructions cannot be avoided, means shall be provided to indicate their locations. Eye-washes In addition the combined safety showers eye-washes, eye-wash stations shall be installed on modules where chemical products are present near staircases and along escape ways. Potable water characteristics (temperature, flowrate) and eye-wash design shall be the same as for combined safety shower eye-washes. Firemen’s Equipment Dedicated fire crew changing room(s) shall be located within the LQ. A series of bench seats and lockers shall be located within the room, of suitable size and quantity, to allow the fast and easy donning of fireman’s equipment. The overall quantity of equipment shall reflect the number of persons required for a fire response by operational procedures. Helicopter Crash Rescue Kit 2 Helicopter Crash Rescue Kits shall be provided within dedicated cabinets at helideck access points. They shall include an adjustable wrench, rescue axe (large), bolt cutters, crowbar (large), hook (grab or salving), hacksaw (heavy duty), fire blanket, ladder, life line/rescue harness, pliers, set of assorted screwdrivers, harness knife, gloves, self contained breathing apparatus, power cutting tool and a portable safety lamp. Kits are available for each trained heli-deck crew member, to assist in the personnel rescue. First Aid Kits First aid kits location and number shall be confirmed during detailed design and shall include all levels of the hull machinery spaces, the accommodation, the sick bay, plus the laboratory on the utility area of the process deck. Their locations shall be properly marked, illuminated and protected against damage. Other miscellaneous safety equipment includes, escape to sea devices, safety kit for battery room among others. 7.16.

Man overboard arrangements The stand-by vessel shall be equipped with a fast rescue craft complying with SOLAS regulations. This craft shall be deployed for man overboard recovery. A fast rescue craft is also located on the FPSO, near the Lay-down Area Portside.

7.17.

Thermal insulation and protection Personnel protection (thermal insulation or, preferably, a physical barrier with warning signs) shall be provided where there is risk of contact with surfaces having a skin temperature above 70°C.

27

If thermal insulation coating is required, corrosion under insulation must be avoided. 7.18.

Safety signs Safety signs and colour coding of piping, slings and shackles are important features of personnel safety. In particular, signs shall be installed to indicate access areas to suitably trained personnel only (i.e. forward of the LQ). Safety signs and operating instructions for safety equipment shall be in English Language.

7.19.

Navigation Aids NAVID refers to the FPSO markings and marine navigation aids. Navaids shall be located such that they can be maintained without scaffolding. For warning a helicopter pilot in case of the presence of flammable gas (leakage or flare flameout), the FPSO shall be equipped with a flashing beacon linked to the gas detection system and to flow sensors in the flare system. The offloading buoy shall be marked at night by one or more flashing lights visible from all directions. An audible fog warning system shall also be provided.

7.20.

Noise and Vibration

7.20.1. Noise levels Noise levels throughout the FPSO shall be minimised in order to achieve the following objectives: 

To minimize any health hazards and the risk of hearing damage to personnel,



To provide acceptable working conditions in terms of communications and concentration,



To provide acceptable living conditions in the recreation and sleeping areas of the LQ.

Where noise levels above 85 dB(A) are predicted, all personnel working in such areas shall be obliged to wear hearing protection. These high noise areas shall be clearly defined and marked by sign. Moreover, flashing beacons shall be provided to supplement PA announcements. 7.20.2. Vibration Levels of vibration on the FPSO shall be controlled to ensure acceptable conditions for equipment and personnel in working and accommodation areas.

28

8.

EXPORT SYSTEMS AND PIPELINES

8.1.

Crude oil export system Oil is normally discharged from the FPSO tanks through Oil Offloading Lines (OOLs) to an Oil Offloading Terminal (OOT) which is a Single Point Mooring (SPM) buoy from where it is discharged to the export tanker via floating offloading hose(s). When not connected to a tanker the hose will remain floating idle on the sea surface. Offloading operation system shall be controlled from the FPSO CCR. Emergency pushbuttons shall be provided in the CCR and at the offloading station for emergency stop of the crude offloading pumps and closure of the offloading FPSO ESDV, located upstream of the OOT’s. Emergency stop buttons for terminating the offloading shall be provided onboard the offtake tankers. Pressure sensors on the SPM buoy shall be installed to detect the sudden pressure raise caused by a surge in the offloading system. Pressure data signals shall be sent to the FPSO for the Operator to decide closing the SPM Buoy SDV and shutting off the offloading pumps. The OOT and SPM piping (including the swivel), shall be designed to withstand the full surge pressure. Ship collisions deem to be a potential source of SPM buoy unavailability.

8.2.

Tandem Offloading Tandem offloading to a tanker is provided as a back up for the SPM buoy in the FPSO design. A dedicated safety review shall be performed as part of the FPSO Collision Risk Analysis to evaluate the potential risk of collision between the export tanker and FPSO, including its mooring chains. This safety review shall evaluate the following:

8.3.



Impact of the Flare radiation and dispersion,



Requirements for the emergency shutdown of offloading facilities.

Gas Export Gas from the EGINA FPSO is exported to the AKPO gas export pipeline to Amenam and then to Bonny gas export network. A Subsea Isolation Valve is installed on this Gas Export Line from the EGINA FPSO.

8.4.

ESD and Alarm Interfaces Interface action is between the FPSO, the Oil Offloading Terminal (OOT) and other installations. It is done by telecommunications between these installations to prevent over pressurisation in oil & gas systems: 

An ESD on the AKPO FPSO, including confirmed fire or gas detection, shall initiate an alarm in the EGINA Central Control Room.



An ESD including confirmed fire or gas detection on the OOT shall initiate an alarm in the EGINA Central Control Room and initiate the shutdown of the oil export ESDV on FPSO following a time delay.

29

9.

SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS (SIMOPS) Project activities and FPSO operations may run simultaneously during the field life. These simultaneous activities could be: 

Production and Drilling



Production, Drilling and Construction



Production and Construction

Construction activities during development may be required to run simultaneously with Drilling activities. Drilling activities will also run simultaneously with production. Hazards associated with these combined operations shall be identified and assessed. The appropriate SIMOPS Procedures including protection measures, constraints and procedures shall then be adopted to minimise the associated risks. These SIMOPS Procedures shall apply to construction and other non routine activities carried out within the FPSO Restricted area, which is defined as all areas of the FPSO and inside the 500 meters exclusion zone around the FPSO. The minimum vertical distance between an anchor cable and a fixed structure, subsea installation and pipeline should be 20m. Location for FPSO shall be subject to ensuring that the minimum safety distance between the FPSO and a drilling rig in the vicinity, as identified by a safety study to be performed during detailed engineering is respected. This safety distance is to ensure that the consequences of credible hazardous events on the FPSO shall not impact the drilling rig) to the extent where their integrity could be put at risk. This would mean evaluating the impact of the drilling rig onto the FPSO (i.e. gas dispersion towards FPSO while performing a well clean up, or gas dispersion in a blowout scenario). Conversely the impact of a gas leak/explosion/fire on the FPSO onto the drilling rig unit must be evaluated to determine the minimum safety distance.

30

10.

HANDLING OF EMERGENCIES ON SITE

10.1.

Principles The Emergency Response Plan for NIGERIA offshore installations shall be updated to cover the emergency response requirements and procedures for the EGINA FPSO

10.2.

Crisis Control Centre The facilities in the Crisis Control Centre for NIGERIA offshore installations shall be updated to cover the crisis control requirements and procedures for the EGINA FPSO

10.3.

Mutual Help The provisions and arrangements for mutual help between EGINA FPSO and other FPSO installations in the vicinity, during an emergency affecting one or more of the installations will be developed in the next Engineering phase.

10.4.

EGINA FPSO Emergency Response Plan

10.4.1. Principles The Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is the set of actions in compliance with GS EP SAF 371 to be taken by personnel on or off the FPSO installation to control and/or mitigate any hazardous event. It is COMPANY practice to have an ERP in all cases. It constitutes the basis for the definition of the emergency operating procedures which shall be defined by the Operations Department prior to the start-up, and shall address such issues as the members, the responsibilities and the role of the emergency response team. Note: The ERP may involve other installations and/or safety and rescue means. 10.4.2. Emergency Control Centre An Emergency Control Centre as crisis room shall be provided inside the Accommodation Block and is the place where the key emergency response personnel in charge of communications with personnel and to take decisions go to undertake their emergency duties. The design and characteristics of emergency control centre facilities (control room equipment and ergonomics, communications, alarm systems, emergency station etc) shall comply with GS EP SAF 371 and be such that the implementation of the ERP is rendered possible. As described in Section 4.3 of GS EP SAF 371, other members of the emergency response team either stay in the Control Room and the Radio Room or intervene locally for checking, repairing, undertaking prevention or mitigation measures and rescuing. Non-essential personnel escape and stay at their muster areas until further spoken message. The Emergency Control Centre is not a survival/temporary refuge for other personnel than the key emergency response personnel. It is not either a duplicate or a back-up of the control room. The Emergency Control Centre should be in a safe area. If this requirement proves not practicably feasible, the emergency station shall be adequately designed and fitted with necessary lift support systems to provide protection to personnel for two hours. In this case the impact of hazards such as blast/fire impingement, toxic or flammable gas ingress, and smoke ingress shall be addressed.

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ANNEX 1 – METHODOLOGY FOR DEFINING SELECTIVE DELUGING OF THE SUB DELUGE ZONES ON A FPSO TO RATIONALISE THE MAXIMUM FIREWATER DEMAND.

1)

The following definitions of the Process Fire Zone, Sub Deluge Zones and Sub Deluge Areas are used:

Fire Zone

Utilities FZ

ESDV

Fire Zone ESDV

Process FZ

Sub-Deluge Zone Sub-Deluge Area Fire Zone Figure 1 – Definitions 

Module or sub-deluge zone – An individual sub structure / plant unit. Each module shall be supplied with its own deluge via a dedicated FW deluge valve.



Sub Deluge Area – A group of Sub-Deluge Zones (selected according to the location of the fire scenario) that shall be deluged simultaneously in the event of a specified fire scenario.



Fire Zone – All modules / sub deluge zones forming the boundary of the Fire Zone. Within a Fire Zone an event (refer to GS-EP-SAF-253) in any module shall not escalate beyond the Fire Zone boundary by virtue of the separation / segregation provided.

2)

In order to limit the maximum firewater demand, the FPSO Process Fire Zone above the process deck may be split into a number of sub deluge zones. This arrangement is represented in figure 2 below, and the sub deluge zone is represented by all green shaded modules Fire Zone

Utilities FZ

ESDV

Fire Zone ESDV

Figure 2 – Sub-Deluge Area Concept In this case, depending on the location of the fire, the minimum number of modules requiring deluge, within the sub deluge area, shall be as follows:

3)



The module on fire



Modules bordering the module on fire according to the results of the Fire Risk Analysis

It shall be demonstrated by Fire Risk Analysis that the consequences of any single module design basis fire - (GS-EP-SAF-253) - does not extend beyond the limit of the applied deluge. This demonstration is required to be performed on a module by module basis, see figure 3. Fire Zone

Utilities ESDV FZ Fire Zone ESDV

Figure 3 – Consequences of fire in Module 4)

Where a process line has potential to feed the module on fire – originating from outside of the Sub-Deluge Area – then ESDV isolation shall be fitted at the module boundary of such lines in addition to the existing equipment SDV. Note this only applies to liquid HC lines as it is assumed that gas process lines will be automatically depressurised via the EDP system. Process lines crossing modules within the sub deluge area shall require SDV isolation only, in this case SDVs shall have the same valve body as ESDVs and specified as being spring return, fail closed, firesafe valves, thus with actuator specification as for ESDVs.

This arrangement is represented in figure 4 below: Fire Zone ESDV

Utilities FZ

SDV

SDV

ESDV

SDV

Fire Zone ESDV

SDV

SDV

Figure 4 – Isolation of Sub Fire / Deluge Zones with ESDV / SDV 5)

A Fire Risk Assessment shall be carried out for each module, within the Fire Zone, to demonstrate that the risk of escalation beyond the adjacent module boundary is acceptable. Note that for the case where additional ESDV is identified as a requirement, based on 4) above, but the Fire Risk Assessment demonstrates that the liquid HC line is of sufficiently low hazard to not significantly impact escalation - then it may be justifiable to provide SDV isolation (only).