Russian Foreign Politics By Cristina Carpinelli

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation by Cristina Carpinelli1 Main lines of Russia’s new foreign politics 1) Russia is integrating the development of relations with traditional partners with the expansion of contacts with new ones. In determining its guidelines and the nature of its activity, Russia proceeds from the principles of its new vision of foreign policy. This involves, in particular, the primacy of collective action and a priority focus on so-called “network diplomacy”, meaning the formation of ad hoc groups created for the solution of specific political tasks. These groups are not closed blocs or alliances (like NATO) and often cut across and supplement each other. They include the G8 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, US, and UK), the Quartet (EU, Russia, US, and UN), the “Six” (South Korea, North Korea, China, Japan, US, and Russia) who had scored a spectacular success with the North Korean problem, and so forth. This thesis is supported by the analysis of the foreign policy review prepared by the Foreign Ministry Sergej Lavrov, on Vladimir Putin’s instructions, when the latter was still President of Russia. The review confirms that Russia made the right thing in 2000, when it chose pragmatism and multi-vector diplomacy. Of course, this adherence to collective action, be it in the form of the United Nations or network diplomacy, nonetheless does not rule out action by Moscow in keeping with its national interests, though without violating its international commitments or obligations to its main global partners. Russia’s foreign policy independence (autonomy/equidistance) is the current imperative. Vitalij Naumkin, President of the International Center for Strategic and Political Studies, have asserted: “Russia is open to constructive dialogue and equitable cooperation with all states without exception. With many countries, including our CIS neighbors, China, India, Egypt, Brazil, and the G8 group of industrialized countries, we have already established or are developing a strategic partnership. The forces interested in a powerful, independent Russia are gaining strength. Needless to say, the notion of a state’s might and greatness has a new definition of ‘soft power’, which implies an ability to be part of a team, readiness to promote a positive agenda on the entire range of international problems, and a capacity to preserve one’s own cultural and civilizational identity with due respect for the world’s versatile cultures and traditions” (from: Moskovskie Novosti - January 19, 2007). Personally I don’t think that the current russian paradigm of international relations (choice of pragmatism, a multi-vectored policy) is based on the wish to please everyone or on common good, now that “under new global circumstances the awareness of the community of all states in the face of the challenges and threats of the 21st century is being transformed into a trend towards asserting collective and legal principles in world politics” (Vitalij Naumkin. Moskovskie Novosti - January 19, 2007). This is an idea that has little to do with the factual world. Russia simply proceeds from its own clear pragmatic interests; it works using “real politique”. After the 11 September, the russian President Putin has changed his political line towards the appeasement with America: his country entered the “western living-room” of the international geopolitics. Was this choice aimed at constructively cooperating with the America in combating global terrorism and drug trafficking? Or was this choice aimed at combating a “dirty” war in Chechnya, without expecting a threat from all international community, that therefore missed an opportunity to make the demand for the protection of rights inside Russia a priority? The way in which the russian forces conducted their anti-terror campaign in Chechnya was profoundly counterproductive; this was not a clean campaign but one freighted 1

CESPI - International Problems Study Center of Sesto San Giovanni (Milan - Italy).

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with serious abuses that have alienated the local population and made them more susceptible to the appeal of extremism. Recently Russia has delivered defensive arms to such states as Iran and Syria and established several contacts with Hamas. Maybe Russia doesn’t claim special rights in international relations now. But there are not reasons to believe that it’s a neutral player in world politics. Russia is protecting its national interests in full, using all of its competitive advantages and tools (in primis: gas and oil) in foreign affairs. 2) In today’s conditions of globalization (contrary to common idea), the system of international relations is unstable and becoming increasingly imbalanced. The world has not become a safer place to live in. The main reason is in the cost people pay for globalization - the growing gap in development engenders social, economic, ethnic, and religious conflicts. Recurrent unilateral use of force is also creating a feeling of insecurity. Disarmament stagnation is increasing the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Under these circumstances, many countries are beginning to revise their interests. Development of new global centers of influence and growth, a more even distribution of development resources and control over natural wealth are laying the foundation for a multi-polar world arrangement. The existing global politics is designed to preserve a certain status quo - that is, the privileged position of some individual countries in the developing international system. It seems that Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC), in the future South Korea, Malaysia and others will set themselves objectives of a more political colouring symbolising national pride in their programmes. The absolute pre-eminence of the USA and Europe is starting to fade. For some emerging countries the natural resources or other potential such as human, technological, space resources are becoming an integral component of their strategic position or an asymmetrical capability aimed at weakening the credibility of advantages held by old potential rivals. This could not encourage the global cooperation or the “right competition”. On the contrary, the current international order, that doesn’t promote a balanced and fair economic, social and political growth, leads towards the “confrontation”, that is to say towards, for istance, the unilateral use military force or the collision of civilizations, and so forth. Nevertheless, the competitive spirit (in its negative meaning) is not the only possible way. Permanent infrastructures (ex: space infrastuctures, infrastuctures to promote the rational and efficient use of water, clean-energy and clean-technologies and so non) could also be organised globally, as ‘global public goods’, to contribute to answering questions related to major issues facing all humanity: pollution, economic and financial crisis, social polarization and inequalities. 3) The current russian government is trying to reestablish influence in former Soviet republics - particularly the more Western-leaning ones like Georgia and Ukraine, but also with other CIS (Commonwealth of Indipendent States) countries - the near abroad. This approaching is, above all, based on its “energy muscle” (suffice it to remember the recent “gas wars” with Ukraine, although these wars are over and the agreements are signed). Of course, the matter is more complex: it doesn’t merely consists of using its energy power “to discipline and put down a former satellite”. Russia is unique, because of its size and its energy and naturalresource potential. It is trying to establish a new identity by redefining relations with its former holdings (also in terms of cooperation and of good neighbourhood). In the meantime, it is creating new alliances outside the former soviet bloc (with other world countries) “to consolidate its power observing the ‘democratic course’, the ‘concert ed effort’ and accepting the global ‘liberal’ model of development”. Shortly, Russia feels it must secure its place within the cross-currents of globalization. The building of a new russian pole (not necessarily marked like “phisical space”) will allow it to better face the rising giants like China, India and Brasil, and to be considered as an equal partner on the world arena. In the anti-globalization language, this pole (like the others one) is better defined as imperialistic, as soon as it has as main goal the control and the participation on the splitting up of the world resources (natural resources, capitals, markets, labour, and so on) using own charismatic super power and if necessary also, but like extreme ratio, the own military force. From this point of view, it’s possible understand the reason for which Putin had strengthened the internal power system with the “vertical of power” and the patriotic, nationalist spirit, even if Putin himself had always maintained that these measures were not “a desire to revive old dogmas and to remilitarize international relations”. 4) Russia has regained its role as a major power on the international stage, after the serious crisis in the prestige of Yeltsin’era. This was achieved with a policy of re-nationalization of the gas and oil companies (although not completely), first of all of Gazprom. The national wealth of Russia and its power in relation to other major world powers are dependent from oil and gas exports. There are, however, some problems that

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Russia must solve as soon as possible, if it doesn’t want to fall into oblivion again: its economic strategy can not be guided only of hydrocarbons export, that is about extraction of raw materials without investing in infrastructure (e.g. to participate more heavily together with foreign companies in the construction of gas/oil pipelines, oil and gas distribution and their storage). It is also too vulnerable to changes in international prices. The Asian crisis of 1997/1998 should teach something to Russia. That said, we can say that Russia is an important piece of multipolar world (U.S., China, European Union, etc.). It participates in all respects to the international imperialistic competition. I do not believe, however, that Russia could in time overcome the other major world powers. The “blackmail” of Russian gas will not last long: a) for structural reasons I mentioned above, b) because the EU is trying to diversify more and more sources from which oil and gas come (ex: Algeria and Norway), c) because Russia can not solve the strong defense of its historical influence areas through continuous wars for gas/oil (Chechnya). This has a very negative impact not only abroad but even within Russia itself. The political of the economy of war is a loser. This naturally applies to all countries, including America. The economy of war produces in the world terrorism and instability. Russia also has to deal from one part with America and its allies (we must not forget that the European Union, especially after the entry of Central and Eastern European countries, is closer to America than Russia. The idea of a Europe with its own political identity is still very far away! And then there is the issue of Ukraine and Georgia, which are pushing not only to enter NATO but also to join the European Union, although I believe that if this happens it will take many years yet), and from the other part, Russia also has to deal with the giant China, historically an enemy and rival of Russia. Of course, I do not want to underestimate the success of Russia and its desire to count something in the world. But the stakes at the international level is very high, for all the competing countries, including Russia. And yet it is unclear which countries will be the strongest and which countries will be the weakest in the near future. Some economists speak of a new winning block BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) versus Europe and America, and of a new losing block - PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) towards the Europe, America and BRIC. But I believe that the international dynamics are far more complex and even with a dose of unpredictability. Russia is undergoing a serious economic crisis because all its gold reserves are in american dollars. China is also experiencing a serious crisis because its great credit (in dollars) with America is not more recoverable. Each country (or imperialistic pole) wants to be stronger, but all countries are in fact very economically dependent upon one another, and if one of these countries falls into disgrace (the crisis started in America) all the other countries also suffer the same consequences. This is the reason for which the crisis has assumed an international dimension. 5) Russia is moving in the new international order as a great power. Recent events such as the election of a new president in Russia, the russian-georgian war, the election of Obama as President of the US, the russianucrainian gas conflict have changed the world framework of relationships and dynamics between the countries. Not only. The outcome of some facts even more recent such as 1) the call of the russian president Medvedev for creation of a new security pact to include the European Union and NATO countries as well as former Soviet Republics; 2) the disappointment expressed by the United States after Russia effectively vetoed a plan to keep peace monitors in Georgia after the next June (U.S. officials say Russia insisted on a plan that would implicitly recognize the self-declared independence of the breakaway region of South Ossetia); 3) the moving of Russia to reassert its role in the Middle East - and in particular in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov chaired recently a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council that endorsed the idea of holding a Middle East peace conference in Moscow this year. In a presidential statement, the Security Council called on all parties to honor past international accords - a clear nudge to a wavering Israeli government to embrace the concept of a two-state solution, in which a new Palestine would exist next to Israel); 4) the travel of Mr. Obama that will visit Moscow from July 6 to 8 for meeting with russian President Dmitri Medvedev (the two leaders are expected to talk about ways to reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons, cooperate on non proliferation and resolve differences over a U.S. planned missile defense system in central Europe), all that will be crucial in understanding what will be, in particular, the future relations between Russia and the European Union, between Russia and the Usa and among Russia and the other world powers. May 14, 2009

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