Ritter - Iraq Confidential (2005) - Synopsis

UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper: September 11, 2006, 7:00 p.m. Scott Ritter, Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein (New York: Nation Books, 2005). Foreword by Seymour Hersh. Ritter is “a purist, an uncompromising believer in empiricism who has never been afraid to tell the truth to superiors. . . . He is a Thomas à Becket in a world full of Bush administration yes-men” (viii). Preface. This book is a partial account: it describes a dozen inspections, but UNSCOM conducted “nearly 300 discrete inspection missions, and thousands of monitoring inspections” (xii). Glossary. 5 pp., 81 terms and acronyms. Maps. Central Baghdad; Greater Baghdad area; Middle East. Prologue: In the Eye of the Storm. On Mar. 8, 1998, Ritter led a dramatic attempt to inspect the Iraqi Ministry of Defense in Baghdad (1-4). U.N. Security Resolution 687, which was seen by the U.S. from the beginning (1991) as a means to regime change, not disarmament (4-6).

19, 1992: Iraq admits concealment of 89 SCUDs and 8 mobile launchers, but claims it destroyed them in July 1991 (38). Inspection of the destruction site (41). UNSCOM 40 “hit the jackpot” thanks to British intelligence, but the U.S. was discomfited. Growing harassment of inspectors. Ch. 4: Counterattack: AugustOctober 1992. As U.N. contemplates getting more “aggressive,” a member of the team who is really special forces informs Ritter that there contingency plans to avoid hostage-taking (55). UNSCOM 42. Political pressure; Iraqis open MIC headquarters. Amer Rashid says everything has been destroyed under Res. 687 (60-62). Ch. 5: Assassinating the Truth: October 1992-January 1993. UNSCOM 45. Iraq responds truthfully to SCUD inquiries, but U.S. government refuses to accept the conclusion, insisting that UNSCOM has been deceived. “There were political reasons for maintaining the myth of a secret SCUD force” (75).

PART ONE: BAPTISM Ch. 1: A Delicate Balancing Act: September-December 1991. Ritter observed the struggle between the U.N. and the U.S. (through the CIA) to control inspections from the beginning, recognizing “State Dept.” experts as U.S. special forces personnel. Ch. 2: The Bumpy Road to Independence: December 1991February 1992. UNSCOM 28; Rolf Ekéus lobbies U.N. Security Council.

Ch. 6: Shifting the Goalposts: February 1993-March 1994. UNSCOM (and Ritter) squeezed by different CIA factions over “Roller Blade” targets for UNSCOM 63. On Nov. 8, 1993, Ritter briefs NSC’s Indyk that Iraq has credibly destroyed all SCUDs, but CIA rejects the conclusion, Charles Duelfer saying: “I just don’t think that was the message they wanted to hear” (86). Disillusioned, Ritter returns to active duty in the Marines in February 1994. PART TWO: CRUSADE

Ch. 3: Showdown in Baghdad: March-July 1992. UNSCOM 31. Mar.

Ch. 7: New Friends: MarchNovember 1994. In Sept. 1994, Ritter returns to UNSCOM. Israel’s help causes problems. Ritter goes to Israel in Oct. to ask for Israeli help with signals intelligence (SIGINT), an ultra-sensitive intelligence area (96-98). Israelis agree to help interpret photos. Though Iraq has been effectively disarmed, WMD programs are becoming an issue. Ch. 8: A Fresh Start: December 1994-July 1995. Ritter leaves the Marine Corps for good, returns to UNSCOM. The relation to Israel is to be kept secret. Ch. 9: Adventures in Amman: JulyNovember 1995. Iraq admits biological weapons program in July, and Hussein Kamal defect to Jordan in August 1995. Qusay’s countermoves. Kamal says all biological chemical, missile weapons, and nuclear materials, were destroyed. ‘Gharbieh’ material becomes available in Jordan. Ch. 10: A Breach of Trust: November 1995-January 1996. In planning for UNSCOM 120, the CIA fails to provide needed eavesdropping equipment. ‘Gharbieh’ material shows Iraq violated sanctions, but in a rogue operation. Ch. 11: The Listening Post: JanuaryMarch 1996. UNSCOM 143 finds nothing, but establishes a listening post inside Iraq, due to CIA maneuvering. Ch. 12: The Managers: March-May 1996. Turning over tapes recorded in Iraq to Israel, Ritter feels the risks are justified. U.S. gives nothing, while CIA tries to use what Ritter produces for an anti-Saddam coup plan. Both CIA and Iraq’s Mukhabarat devise plans to manipulate Ritter at this time. Ch. 13: Blowback: June 1996. A CIA coup plotted with Iyad Alawi was planned

to be integrated with UNSCOM 150, but the Iraqis unravel it. Ch. 14: The Poison Pill: July-August 1996. US intelligence effectively blows cover on communications intercepts in Iraq. Ch. 15: The Con Game: AugustDecember 1996. Dramatic airport standoff (189-93). After the Nov. election, Albright becomes U.S. secretary of state and Clinton ups the political support of UNSCOM. Ch. 16: White House Blues: JanuaryMarch 1997. US fails to support UNSCOM mission, changing U-2 flights; Ritter denounces this in a White House Situation Room meeting. PART THREE: BETRAYAL Ch. 17: The Truth Emerges: MarchMay 1997. Ritter concludes the CIA is using UNSCOM to spy; Duelfer warns him not to say anything. Ch. 18: Unraveling Concealment: June 1997. At Ritter’s behest, UNSCOM inspections aim at finding not weapons but concealment mechanisms. Ekéus replaced by Richard Butler. Ch. 19: New Directions: July-October 1997. Republican Guard admits involvement in concealment. UNSCOM 207 demands entry to presidential palace, but backs off. Ch. 20: False Starts: OctoberDecember 1997. Chalabi; Duelfer’s role as background source for Judith Miller. U.S. weakens support for UNSCOM. Ch. 21: The Death of Inspections: January-August 1998. Butler backs off the concealment investigations, dooming UNSCOM to failure: “He had decided to play the USA’s game” (287). After two

weeks, Ritter resigns from UNSCOM (Aug. 26, 1998). Epilogue: All Those Lies. Not disarmament, but regime change, was the US’s principal policy objective in Iraq from 1991 on. “The real reason that the inspections regime which began in 1991 failed to certify Iraq’s weapons status was that the United States of America never intended it to succeed” (290). The U.S. did not support UNSCOM: support was “at best, tailored to the political imperatives at any given time,” with “a total willingness to compromise the integrity of UNSCOM (and with it the whole notion of multilateral disarmament) for short-term tactical advantages in the battle between the

U.S. and Iraqi regimes” (290). Iraq was not a case of intelligence failure but “a great intelligence victory, insofar as the CIA, through the manipulation of the work of the U.N. weapons inspectors and the distortion of fact about Iraq’s WMD programs, maintained the public perception of an armed and defiant Iraq in the face of plausible and plentiful evidence to the contrary” (291). “When intelligence is skewed to fit policy, then the entire system of trust that is fundamental to a free and democratic society is put at risk” (291). Notes. 10 pp. Index. 10 pp.