Right To Believe

Fernandez 1 Mark Fernandez PHI 215 – Philosophical Issues Philosophy of Religion: Topic 5 The Right to Believe All of humanity’s diverse faculties serve a purpose. Hunger spurs eating, satiety prevents over-consuming, and memory catalogues safe foods. Emotion and reason guide and protect humanity, each serving a vital function. But William Clifford in “The Ethics of Belief” imposes excess restrictions on the emotion of belief with the justifications that are always given when rights are restricted: It is for your own protection and the benefit of society. Belief will “weaken our powers of self-control, of doubting, [and] of judicially and fairly weighing evidence” (Clifford 4) unless severely limited. The natural forces that keep belief in check – reason, fear of being fooled, and loss of credibility – are insufficient. We must indefinitely suspend all belief until sufficient evidence arrives. Until then, doubt will replace belief in all instances. This is Clifford's ideal world. But this is not reality. Every human is born with emotion as well as reason; both are innate components of humanity. Therefore the faculty of belief is a natural right, for it is intrinsically and uniquely human. To suppress this faculty is to oppress human rights. In counter to Clifford, I interpret “The Will to Believe” as an epistemic argument derived from the natural order of humanity, contrasting these facts of nature against the principles espoused by Clifford. It is worth noting that Clifford was a mathematician and James a psychologist. Clifford’s formulaic argument to virtually guarantee a “dispassionate investigator” (Jaggar 226) collides with James’ acknowledgement and embracement of the vital roles emotion must play in order to guide human life to its fulfillment.

Fernandez 2 Dichotomies pervade our universe, with many of them either false or so intellectually abstract that over-analysis can do more harm than good. Take the dichotomy of reason and emotion. From day one the philosophy student is asked to discern which camp to reside in. The fact that this philosophical proto-inquiry is still intellectually open points to a deeper truth: We have falsely divorced reason and emotion. An empiricist might exclaim “I feel, therefore I am” as proof of his existence. As to why we have the faculty of belief, psychologist James says “we hardly know how or why” (James 124), but certainly the same force that gave us reason imbued us with emotion. Just as the fact that animals create and use tools – an overt display of reason – has not negated Descartes' rationalism, the fact that animals experience emotions does not damage James’ pragmatism. There is a visible gulf between homo sapiens and other species; animals neither entertain abstract concepts nor cry. It is the abundance of the faculties of reason and emotion that make us fully human. The lack of intellect incurs labels such as mentally challenged; more severe deficiencies provide justification for termination of life. Likewise, those with a lack of emotional abilities are “robots”, and extreme cases prove dangerous. One who cannot feel empathy is a sociopath. To be fully human one must manifest both reason and emotions. Despite this axiom, we not only divorce reason and emotion; we subject one under the other. An analogy can be made using the sexes. Male and female have biological differences. Each is equally and fully human, yet humanity is not complete without both. To denigrate one is to falsely elevate the other. Male and female cannot exist in perpetual separation. For human life to exist, both aspects of humanity must embrace each other. The same is true for reason and emotion.

Fernandez 3 Questions in turn are either rational or emotional in nature, with degrees in between. Pure mathematics involves solely rational inquiry, while love may be the paradigm of emotion. Consequentially, each question necessitates a proportionally rational or emotional response. One cannot correctly answer 2+2 with emotion, and who to love cannot be divined from a calculator. This is what makes politics vexing. Social problems are both rational and emotional in nature; the successful politician acknowledging both components. The adage “fight fire with fire” proves apropos. Likewise, religion is a fusion of science and morality (James 127). Like science, religion declares what exists (heaven, God, etc.) and what is (morally) good. It is this holistic philosophy that guides James' criticism against Clifford's rule that “it is wrong in all cases to believe on insufficient evidence” (Clifford 13). Instead of a line-item critique, James applies a logistical coup de grace, charging Clifford with using the emotion of fear to influence action. “[Clifford] is actively playing his stake as much as the believer is” (James 128). Clifford's reasoning is unknowingly tainted by “fear” (of error), while the believer's reasoning is consciously guided by “hope” (James 128). This dichotomy of belief existed at the genesis of philosophy. While conversing with Meno, Socrates states “we shall be better, braver, and more active men if we believe it right to look for what we don’t know than if we believe there is no point in looking because what we don’t know we can never discover” (Jordan 2). James does not widen the gulf between evidentialists and pragmatists. In both cases emotion is part of the process; James intrinsically links the two. The excess of “robustious pathos” (James 124) in “The Ethics of Belief” is not specifically rejoined by James, but Clifford's apparent inconsistencies deserve analysis.

Fernandez 4 Nowhere does Clifford quantifiably define sufficient. Reason proves ill-equipped to selfimpose limits, as “it [will] find a few arguments ... to recite in case our credulity is criticized” (James 124). Taken to extremes, Clifford’s rule is unattainable. A rule that condemns all with no access to appeal is an abomination of truth. In the end, the desire to appease the emotion of fear through application of Clifford’s rule cannot be accomplished. Entertaining an emotional desire that is impossible to fulfill can be mentally and physically harmful (Kasser 9). In his story of a negligent ship owner, Clifford states the guilt of the merchant remains consistent whether the crew on the non-seaworthy ship survives or not. A judge, however, sees things different, as the charge of murder is only applicable to the latter. According to Clifford, the true, verifiable fact that hundreds of men died has no bearing on a man's guilt. Clifford next posits that “no man holding a strong belief ... can investigate it with fairness” (Clifford 2). Here Clifford conflates judge and scientist (James 126). Ultimately, life will fully verifies all hypotheses. Yes, a judge must be indifferent to people or ideas. Yet for the initial truth-seeker, emotions are beneficial. Determination, patience, zeal, and stubbornness sustain the scientist through the potentially grueling verification process. These emotions stem from belief. Belief precipitates action. I believe the highway is quicker, so I enter the on-ramp. I believe I want to be a doctor, so I apply to medical school. Clifford, however, declares the opposite, as we are to “act upon probabilities ... to justify future belief” (Clifford 5), and through “verification [i.e. action] ... turn conjecture into belief” (6). Is this just a semantic misunderstanding? Is James too flippant with the word belief? Is Clifford too

Fernandez 5 restrictive? The fact that both employ belief in their titles denotes the level of scrutiny each applies to the word. However, I do believe their respective connotations differ. For James, belief is as wholesome as truth. The fact that he uses it more broadly may be due to his more extensive study of the emotion as a psychologist. Clifford, however, strips belief of much of its dictionary meaning, reserving it for situations where evidence has already decided. After warning of the inherent risks of belief, he creates a rule to expunge said risk, making belief perfunctory. It is interesting that American English says “I think the party starts at 8:00”, while many romance languages use the phrase “I believe ...” Perhaps this is linguistic evidence of a nationwide aversion to risk? While Clifford provides one correct path, James offers (at least) two: “Believe truth [or] shun error!” (James 125), summarizing James’ and Clifford’s arguments, respectively. It is important to realize that James still keeps Clifford’s argument as a viable option for those who gain most pleasure with the avoidance of mistakes (Kasser 6). However, Clifford’s path is neither beneficial nor practical for everyone. A counter to James’ argument is the “multiple gods” problem (Jordan 5), though it is more damaging to Pascal’s wager. While Pascal shows that belief in religion in general is rational, the odds of picking the right God are low and choice is based on irrational criteria, like the religion of one’s parents. An evidentialist might concede that humanity has a right to believe, but concerning religion it truly is blind faith, which should be avoided whenever possible. The “multiple gods” problem, however, does not weaken the epistemic foundations of James’ argument; it only jeopardizes religious belief. James’ “dependent truths” (Jordan 7) do not directly answer the “multiple gods” problem, for it is absurd to

Fernandez 6 assume gods will be formed ex nihilo, through faith alone. What is the minimum faith quorum to generate a god? Instead, James says a religious person “gain[s], even now … a certain vital good” (James 127) (emphasis added). These vital goods may follow from liturgical precepts (do not smoke, drink, gamble, etc.), or they may be the aforementioned dependent truths, including less stress, more self-confidence, and supernatural comfort. “[W]e are better off even now if we believe” (James 127). Clifford’s and James’ disagreements over religion stem from a difference in prudential actions, which originate in conflicting epistemic world-views. Clifford’s rational evidentialism is the antithesis of James’ empirical pragmatism. Their epistemology in turn shapes what constitutes humanity’s innate rights. In the end, James’ comprehensive argument against Clifford’s narrow claim provides rational justification for the innate faculty of belief that helps define humanity.

Fernandez 7 Works Cited Clifford, William K. “The Ethics of Belief.” Lectures and Essays. 1879. 19 Nov 2008 . James, William. “The Will to Believe.” The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. 1896. Philosophical Questions: Classical and Contemporary Readings. 1st ed. Ed. William Lawhead. NY: McGraw-Hill, 2003. 121-129. Jaggar, Alison M. “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology” Inquiry 32.2. Philosophical Questions: Classical and Contemporary Readings. 1st ed. Ed. William Lawhead. NY: McGraw-Hill, 2003. 220-234. Jordan, Jeff. "Pragmatic Arguments for Belief in God." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2008 ed. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. 19 Nov 2008 . Kasser, Jeff, and Nishi Shah. “The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of ‘The Will to Believe’.” Social Epistemology. 20.1 (2006): 1-17. 19 Nov 2008 .