Right To Bail.docx

RIGHT TO BAIL i. Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002 PANGANIBAN, J. Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of Due Process and Fundamental Fairness in Extradition Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty FACTS: Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion”. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court. ISSUES: i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069 ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

YES.

By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused. The prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended. Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. The Proper Procedure to “Best Serve The Ends Of Justice” In Extradition Cases Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether a) they are sufficient in form and substance b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law c) the person sought is extraditable At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. ii.

Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained

for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” finds application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.” That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court. Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing 1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and 2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for

Extradition. iii.

NO.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition. It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away. Other Doctrines: Five Postulates of Extradition 1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country. 2)

The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein. 3)

The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis: a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof “beyond reasonable doubt” for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited “upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case” d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final

discretion to extradite him. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable. 4)

Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper 5)

‗Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail‘ private complainant (respondent herein) filed this petition before the CA. CA granted the petition. Hence this case. Petitioner averred that CA erred when it reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which granted the petitioner his constitutional right to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence or proof of his guilt, and more especially when the public prosecutors, who have direct control of the proceedings and after assessment of the evidence, have themselves recommended the grant of bail.

There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent: a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable Extradition is Essentially Executive Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation. RIGHT TO BAIL JOSELITO V. NARCISO V. FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ, G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000 PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: An information for parricide was filed against Joselito Narciso for the death of his wife Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso. After his review asked and motion for reconsideration was both denied, he asked for reinvestigation of his warrant of arrest. Prosecutor found no reason to disturb and the case was remand for arraignment and trial. Thereafter, he filed an ‗Urgent Ex-Parte‘ to allow him to Post Bail‘. The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted on the same day. It was opposed by respondents herein, then they moved for the postponement of the hearings because no witness was available, Not obtaining any resolution on her

Issue: Whether the bail granted was valid and CA should not have reversed RTC.

Ruling: No. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no hearing had been conducted on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We agree with the CA. Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo that the judge had the duty to determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong, the Court held: x x x x x x x x x "Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor."

Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several case that emphasized the mandatory character of a hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following duties of the trial judge in such petition: "(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended; "(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra); "(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra); "(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied." The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof."

provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayandeferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that

Issue: Whether

her

or

Not

right

the

to

petitioner’s

travel

right

to

is

travel

impaired.

is

impaired.

Held: The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement, that she he every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Additionally, the court‘s grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail. Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of discretion and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him RIGHT TO BAIL DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ [217 SCRA 633; G.R. NOS. 99289-90; 27 JAN 1993] Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignmentwas set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed

Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE G.R. No. 132926

July 20, 2001

ELVIRA AGULLO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS: On September 30,1988 Elvira was Charge of malversation germinated from an audit conducted on 14 July 1986 by Ignacio Gerez, Auditing Examiner III, as a result of which a P26,404.26 cash shortage was discovered on petitioner’s accountability. In the course of the pre-trial, petitioner Agullo conceded the fact of audit and admitted the findings in the Report of Cash Examination and the facts set forth in the Letter of Demand. In effect, she admitted the fact of shortage in the amount stated in the Information. Notwithstanding, petitioner Agullo, at all stages of the criminal indictment, persistently professed her innocence of the charge and categorically denied having malversed or converted the public funds in question for her own personal use or benefit. With petitioner’s admission of the fact of cash shortage, the prosecution then rested its case For its part, the defense, in its bid to overturn the presumption of malversation and shatter the prima facie evidenceof conversion, offered the testimony of the following witnesses: petitioner Elvira Agullo; Rene Briones Austero, Cashier III of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Region VIII; and Engracia Camposano-Camaoy, Barangay Captain of Hinabuyan, Dagame, Leyte. Striking down the defense as “incredible and without basis,” the Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed decision, convicting petitioner Agullo of the crime of malversation of public funds, ratiocinating principally that “no evidence has been presented linking the loss of the government funds with the alleged sudden heart attack of the accused (herein petitioner).” ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan disregarded or overlooked certain evidence of substance for the crime of malversation.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked certain evidence of substance which, to a large extent, bear considerable weight in the adjudication of petitioner’s guilt or the affirmation of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Upon thorough scrutiny of the evidence adduced by both prosecution and defense, we hold that petitioner Agullo has satisfactorily overcome and rebutted by competent proof, the prima facie evidence of conversion so as to exonerate her from the charge of malversation. To this end, petitioner presented evidence that satisfactorily prove that not a single centavo of the missing funds was used for her own personal benefit or gain. Notably, the Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner, obviously relied more on the flaws and deficiencies in the evidence presented by the defense, not on the strength and merit of the prosecution’s evidence This course of action is impermissible for the evidence of the prosecution clearly cannot sustain a conviction “in an unprejudiced mind. “The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude meant only to embellish the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven

contest between the lone individual pitted against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of doubt.” PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANSELMO BERONDO JR. G.R. No. 177827, March 30, 2009 Criminal Case Digest / Digested Case Murder to Homicide Facts: At around 11:30 p.m. of February 13, 1999, after joining the Miss Gay competition at New Danao, Sinaysayan, Kitaotao, Bukidnon, Herbert Nietes, Jr. walked home to Puntian, Quezon, Bukidnon. While on the way, he suddenly heard a gunshot from nearby. Feeling afraid, he ran towards the grassy area by the roadside to hide. After about five minutes, he saw BERONDO, Julie Tubigon, and Jesus Sudario, each holding a knife, walk towards the road and take turns in stabbing a person who was already slumped on the ground. He recognized the three as they are his townmates. Thereafter, he ran away from the area and went to Bato-Bato, Sinaysayan, Kitaotao, Bukidnon, where he spent the night. The next day, he learned that the person stabbed was GENARO LAGUNA. He later testified that he did not reveal what he had witnessed to anyone because he was afraid of getting involved. Two years after the incident, Nietes and Tero (another witness) admitted to Dolores, Laguna’s widow, that they had witnessed the crime. Trial proceeded only against accused-appellant BERONDO for murder, because the two other accused remained at-large, where he was convicted. The CA affirmed conviction, but ruled that BERONDO was liable only for homicide. ISSUES: 1.

Does the belated reporting of Nietes of what he witnessed defeat his credibility as a witness?

2.

Was the CA correct in holding that BERONDO was liable only for homicide?

HELD: 1. No. Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, especially where sufficient explanation is given.No standard form of behavior can be expected from people who had witnessed a strange or frightful experience. Jurisprudence recognizes that witnesses are naturally reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case or are unwilling to be involved in criminal investigations because of varied reasons. Some fear for their lives and that of their family; while others shy away when those involved in the crime are their relatives or townmates. And where there is delay, it is more important to consider the reason for the delay, which must be sufficient or well-grounded, and not the length of delay. Despite the delay in reporting the identities of the malefactors, Nietes testified in a categorical, straightforward, and spontaneous manner, and remained consistent even under grueling cross-examination. Such bears the marks of a credible witness.

2. Yes. The Court finds error in the Trial Court’s finding that the killing of the deceased was committed with abuse of superior strength, because no evidence was presented to prove that the accused purposely took advantage of their numerical superiority. Absent clear and convincing evidence of any qualifying circumstance, conviction should only be for homicide.

consequences attached thereto as well as the meaning and significance of his plea of guilty; and that the prudent and proper thing to do in capital cases is to take testimony, toassure the court that the accused has not misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of guilty. Mere pro-forma appointment of de

RIGHT TO BE HEARD

officiocounsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the court

PEOPLE VS. MAGSI [124 SCRA 64; G.R. NO.L-32888; 12 AUG 1983] Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance. RIGHT TO BE HEARD

Facts: Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, hisarraignment was scheduled before the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set and rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that date, despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of accused desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next

People v. Rivera G.R. Nos. 38215 & 38216. December 22, 1933 Facts: Rivera signed and swore to a complaint accusing Vito and Moreno the crime of theft. According to the information, the items stolen were a white American suit with one eyeglasses amounting to P30, one buntal hat which costs P3, and to two buttons which cost P3 each, with the total amount of P39. The justice of the peace dismissed the case. After which, Vito and Moreno filed complaints against Rivera, charging him with incriminating innocent people, which falls under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code. Rivera objected and claimed that the facts alleged did not fall under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code, and that, Article 363 of the Codigo Penal does not appear in the Revised Penal Code. Hence, there is no offense embracing acusacion o denuncia falsa. Issue: Whether or not Rivera can be charged guilty of incriminating innocent people under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code

day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third

Held: No. Not guilty and inapplicable.

hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officiocounsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed

Ratio: The crime Rivera was accused of is not explicitly stated in the Revised Penal Code, although the crime of indictment of the innocent is included in the Old Penal Code. Article 363 of the Old Penal Code talks about punishment for false prosecutions. In the Revised Penal Code, Article 363 pertains to punishment for any act which may tend directly to cause a false prosecution. This provision is limited to acts of planting evidence which do not constitute false prosecution but tend directly to cause false prosecutions.

that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear of his coaccused Eloy Magsi and the other coaccused. Appellant was found guilty of murder and made to suffer the death

Issue: Whether

penalty.

or

not

there

was

a

violation

of

the

rights

of

the

StatCon maxim: The title may indicate the legislative intent to extend or restrict the scope of the law and a statute couched in a language of doubtful import will be construed to conform to the legislative intent as disclosed in its title.

accused. RIGHT TO BE HEARD

Held: YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the basic rights of the accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55 SCRA 243-244): the trial courts should exercisesolicitous care before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital offenses by first insuring that the accused fully understands thegravity of the offense, the severity of the

People of the Philippines vs. Oscar Alcanzado, G.R. No. 138335, May 20, 2004Facts: Oscar Alcanzado was accused of Murder.On the early morning of June 17, 1998, the Barangay Tanods of Bel-Air, while on duty,heard two (2) shots; when they investigated they found a dead body of the victim with two (2)gunshot wounds inside the storeroom of TGIF American Bar being guarded by the accused. Theaccused, who was the security guard of the TGIF, surrendered his service firearm to policemanBagon which was found to have spent two (2) spent shells. The ballistic report states that the two(2) spent shells

were fired from the gun surrendered by the accused to policeman Bagon. During arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. There was no eye-witness to the shooting incident. The RTC relied principally on the admission of accused to the police officer that he shot the unknown victim when he surrendered his service firearm. The prosecution rested its case on October 13, 1998. Upon motion of appellant, the RTC issued an Order dated November 10, 1998 allowing appellant to file a demurrer to evidence. On November19, 1998, appellant filed his Demurrer to Evidence which was opposed by the prosecution. The accused opted to file demurrer to evidence which was denied by the Court, instead of testifying and could have explained what really happened and why he surrendered his service firearm. On April 22, 1999, the RTC promulgated herein assailed decision convicting appellant. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused without any admission on his part or despite a broken chain of incriminating circumstances which constitutes a violation of the accused’s constitutional right to be heard. Ruling: The RTC committed a very serious error in promulgating a decision after denying the demurrer to evidence filed by appellant upon prior leave of court, without first giving appellant the opportunity to present his evidence. If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused filed such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. Contrary to the RTC’s assertion in its decision that the demurrer to evidence was denied, the records of the case do not reveal that there was any prior order denying appellant’s demurrer to evidence before the rendition of the assailed judgment. Evidently, the trial court violated the provisions of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Appellant had filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted by the RTC and therefore upon denial of his demurrer, if indeed it was denied, the trial court should have given appellant the opportunity to present his evidence. Equally astonishing is the fact that appellant’s counsel did not raise said irregularity as an issue in the RTC or in this Court. In effect, appellant has not been accorded due process. Due to the procedural unfairness and complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings in the RTC, a remand of the case for reception of defense evidence is warranted. The constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense has been violated. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED People vs. Bayya on 10:03 PM in Case Digests, Criminal Law, Remedial Law G.R. No. 127845, March 10, 2000 FACTS: Some time in 1994, when victim was still 12 years old, her father, the accused, forced her at the point of a knife to have sexual intercourse with him. He repeated the bestial act in their house about twice a week afterwards, and then later used her four (4) times a month, the last she remembered being on July 5, 1995. During the trial, appellant unhesitatingly admitted having carnal knowledge of his daughter twice but theorized that he was "out of his mind" when he committed the incestous rape. In view of the facts established, the trial court rendered judgment of conviction, sentencing appellant to suffer the ultimate

penalty of death. Upon appeal, appellant questioned thepenalty imposed under R.A. 7659, considering that the Information filed against him was silent about the applicability of the same. He alleged denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a transgression of appellant's right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him HELD: A careful perusal of the Information indicting the appellant reveals a crucial omission in its averments of the minority of the victim. The objectives of the defendant's right to be informed are: (1) to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make the defense; (2) to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further prosecution for the same cause; and (3) to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether the are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. The Information does not allege the minority of the victim although the same was proven during trial as borne by the records. It matters not how conclusive and convincing evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense not charged in the Complaint or Information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. The Information charges nothing more than simple rape as absent are the special qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority which had the capacity of increasing the penalty by degrees. "WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction under review is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appelant LODRIGO BAYYA is adjudged guilty of simple rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua...." RIGHT TO BE INFORMED People vs. Malansing, G.R. Nos. 131736-37, March 11, 2002 QUISUMBING, J. FACTS: This is an automatic review for the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting appellants of two counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death for each count. Appellants are brothers. Joey Manlansing denied participation in the killing, but he admitted boxing Jorja in the face to prevent her from shouting, while Mario was assaulting her husband. Mario Mallansing claimed he alone was responsible for the deaths. In open court, Mario affirmed his confession and insisted that his brother had nothing to do with the deaths He claimed that Joey woke up only after he killed Magin

and that Joey tried to unsuccessfully stop him from attacking Jorja. He said he killed the couple out of anger after Jorja told him that he was going to be ejected as a tenant. Mario said Joey knew nothing of his motive. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of night-time. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that none of the aggravating circumstances were alleged in the informations nor in the amended informations with specificity as a qualifying circumstance elevating either killing to murder. Thus, conformably with Gario Alba, the offenses committed by appellants only constitute two counts of homicide and not murder. Since the penalty for homicide under 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal, it is incorrect to sentence both appellants to death. In evaluating the circumstances that qualified the crimes to murder, the trial court considered, aside from evident premeditation, treachery, nighttime, and use of a deadly weapon, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and dwelling The Supreme Court note that abuse of superior strength and dwelling were not alleged in the informations. In accordance then with Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, abuse of superior strength and dwelling may not be appreciated to convict the brothers. Further, should there be a finding of treachery, then abuse of superior strength is absorbed by the former. We are thus left to review only the allegation that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, and nocturnity were present in the commission of the crimes. At the outset, we shall discount nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance, since in this case, the darkness of the night was not purposely sought by the offenders to facilitate the commission of the crime nor to ensure its execution with impunity. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED

right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was transgressed because they were never apprised at any stage of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan that they were being charged with, and arraigned and tried for, violation of the LGC of 1991. The variance doctrine invoked by the respondent is but a rule of procedural law that should not prevail over their constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan violated the petitioners'constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. RULING: The Supreme Court held that petitioners can be convicted of second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest considering that it was not charged in the information. In Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which both read: Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those constituting the offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense charged, as alleged in the information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to this case, thereby warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.

Teves vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154182, December 17, 2004 DAVIDE, JR., C.J. FACTS: Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting them of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in Valencia. Upon their arraignment on 12 May 1997, the petitioners pleaded “not guilty.” On 23 February 1998, the petitioners filed their Comment/Objections to the evidence offered by the prosecution and moved for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. On 29 July 1998, the Sandiganbayan admitted Exhibits “A” to “S” of the prosecution’s evidence but rejected Exhibits “T,” “U,” and “V.” It also denied petitioners’ demurrer to evidence, as well as their motion for reconsideration On 16 July 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision. The petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan committed serious and palpable errors in convicting them. In the first place, the charge was for alleged unlawful intervention of Mayor Teves in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the AntiGraft Law. But they were convicted of having a direct financial or pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which is essentially different from the offense with which they were charged. Thus, the petitioners insist that their constitutional

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 AM Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001 [Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy] FACTS: It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada

were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office. ISSUE(S): 1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy. 2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.

affected the office of the President. extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review

presented a political question;

intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. 2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace. Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.

3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.

SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:

4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.

1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;

5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);

RULING: 1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity); 4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country;

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II: EDSA I

EDSA II

exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.

exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assemblyto petition the government for redress of grievances which only

5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria MacapagalArroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability. The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution. RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre Trial, AM No.10-11-5SC, June 14, 2011 Facts: Almost a year after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters , the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities, and members of the academe filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. Petitioners assert the exercise of the

freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court. Hence, this petition docketed as AM No. 10-11-5-SC. Issue: Can there be live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings? Ruling: Yes. The court ruled that there can be live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceeding but subject to some guidelines which addressed also the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada. Furthermore, the court held “that t he impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whetherprivate complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.”

Republic Act No. 8493

February 12, 1998

AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998." Section 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. - In all cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following: (a) Plea bargaining; (b) Stipulation of Facts; (c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties; (d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and (e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. Section 3. Pre-Trial Agreement. - All agreements or admissions made or entered into during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used in evidence against the accused. The agreements in relation to matters referred to in Section 2 hereof is subject to the approval of the court: Provided, That the agreement on the plea of the accused to a lesser offense may only be revised, modified, or annulled by the court when the same is contrary to law, public morals, or public policy. Section 4. Nonappearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - Where counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his/her lack of cooperation, the pre-trial justice or judge may impose proper sanctions or penalties.

accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court. Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the court. If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence. Section 8. Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial. - If the accused is to be tried again following an order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final, except that the court retrying the case may extend such period but in any case shall not exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final if unavailability of witnesses or other factors resulting from passage of time shall make trial within thirty (30) days impractical. Section 9. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Act, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by Section 7 of this Act shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial shall be eighty (80) days. Section 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence: (a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following:

Section 5. Pre-Trial Order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.

(1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused, and hearing on his/her mental competency, or physical incapacity;

Section 6. Time Limit for Trial. - In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the

(3) delay resulting from interlocutory appeals;

(2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges against the accused;

(4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions: Provided, That the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days,

(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;

(b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and so complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established by this Act.

(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial question; and (7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement. (b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the accused or an essential witness. For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or an essential witness shall be considered absent when his/her whereabouts are unknown and, in addition, he/she is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his/her whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. An accused or an essential witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his/her whereabouts are known but his/her presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or he/she resists appearing at or being returned for trial.

No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 shall be granted because of general congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the public prosecutor. Section 12. Public Attorney's Duties Where Accused is Imprisoned. - If the public attorney knows that a person charged of a crime is preventively detained, either because he/she is charged of a bailable crime and has no means to post bail, or is charged of a non-bailable crime, or is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution, the public attorney shall promptly: (a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner mandating such person to so advise the prisoner of his/her right to demand trial.

(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.

(b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of his/her right to demand trial. If at any time thereafter the prisoner informs the person having custody that he/she demands trial, such person shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney.

(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, or any offense required to be joined with that offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.

(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.

(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted. (f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice or judge motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or judge granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this subparagraph shall be excludable under this section unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the accused in a speedy trial. Section 11. Factors for Granting Continuance. - The factors, among others, which a justice or judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 of this Act are as follows: (a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.

(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a properly supported request for temporary custody of the prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall be made available to that public attorney. Section 13. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the Time Limit. - If an accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 7 of this Act as extended by Section 9, the information shall be dismissed on motion of the accused. The accused shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with the exclusion of time under Section 10 of this Act. In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal, and the impact of a reprosecution on the implementation of this Act and on the administration of justice. Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section. Section 14. Sanctions. - In any case in which counsel for the accused, the public prosecution or public attorney: (a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;

(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she knows is totally frivolous and without merit;

Section 19. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain in effect.

(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he/she knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or

Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation: Provided, That Section 7 of this Act shall become effective after the expiration of the aforementioned third-calendar-month period provided in Section 9 of this Act.

(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions of this Act, the court may, without prejudice to any appropriate criminal and/or administrative charges to be instituted by the proper party against the erring counsel if and when warranted, punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows: (1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an accused, by imposing a fine not exceeding; fifty percent (50%) of the compensation to which he/she is entitled in connection with his/her defense of the accused; (2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or public prosecutor a fine not exceeding Ten thousand pesos (10,000.00); and (3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right to practice before the court considering the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be in addition to any other authority or power available to the court. The court shall follow the procedures established in the Rules of Court in punishing any counsel or public prosecutor pursuant to this section. Section 15. Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars which shall seek to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases. The rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars formulated shall provide sanctions against justices and judges who willfully fail to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions of this Act. Section 16. Funding. - For the effective implementation of the rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars promulgated under this Act, the amount of Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) annually shall be appropriated from the allocation of the Supreme Court under the General Appropriations Act. Thereafter, such additional amounts as may be necessary for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. Section 17. Act Not a Bar to Speedy Trial Claim Under the Constitution. - No provision of this Act shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 18. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Approved: February 12, 1998

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre Trial, AM No.10-11-5SC, June 14, 2011 Facts: Almost a year after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some newsreporters , the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN BroadcastingCorporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from variousmedia entities, and members of the academe filed a petition before this Court praying that livetelevision and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices bepermitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines beformulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. Petitioners assert theexercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right toassembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts,and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court. Hence, this petitiondocketed as AM No. 10-11-5-SC. Issue: Can there be live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings? Ruling: Yes. The court ruled that there can be live broadcast by television and radio of the trial courtproceeding but subject to some guidelines which addressed also the concerns mentionedin Aquino and Estrada . Furthermore, the court held “that t he impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whetherprivate complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commandsthat a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takesplace inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherentlimitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.”

RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE Cariaga v. LTB Co. Facts: At about 3:00 pm on June 18, 1952, a collision occurred between LTB bus and a train, which resulted to the death of the bus driver, and severe injury to its passengers, including plaintiff Edgardo Cariaga. Edgardo was a 4th year medical student at the University of SantoTomas. LTB paid the sum of P16,964.45 for his hospital bills, and daily allowance of P10 up to January 15, 1953, which totalled P775.30. On April 24, 1953, the present action was filed to recover for Edgardo the sum of P312,000 as actual, moral and compensatory damages from LTB and MRR Co. LTB disclaimed liability and filed a cross-claim against MRR for the medical assistance extended to Edgardo. The trial court awarded P10, 490 to Edgardo against LTB, and dismissed he cross-claim against MRR. The Cariagas and LTB both appealed. The Cariagas claim that the trial court erred in merely awarding P10,490 as compensatory damages, while LTB contends that the collision was due to the fault of the train engineer. Issues: (1) Whether it was the railroad company, and not LTB, who should be held liable (2) Whether actual and moral damages should be awarded to Edgardo (3) Whether Edgardo’s parents are entitled to damages Held: (1) The findings of the lower court are predicated mainly upon the testimony of Gregorio Ilusondo, a witness for the Manila Railroad Company. Notwithstanding the efforts exerted by the LTB to assail his credibility, we do not find in the record any fact or circumstance sufficient to discredit his testimony. We have, therefore, no other alternative but to accept the findings of the trial court to the effect, firstly, that the whistle of locomotive was sounded four times two long and two short "as the train was approximately 300 meters from the crossing"; secondly, that another LTB bus which arrived at the crossing ahead of the one where Edgardo Cariaga was a passenger, paid heed to the warning and stopped before the "crossing", while as the LTB itself now admits, the driver of the bus in question totally disregarded the warning. (2) Appellant LTB admits that under Art. 2201 of the Civil Code the damages for which the obligor, guilty of a breach of contract but who acted in good faith, is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach and which the parties had forseen or could have reasonably forseen at the time the obligation was constituted, provided such damages, according to Art. 2199 of the same Code, have been duly proved. Upon this premise it claims that only the actual damages suffered by Edgardo Cariaga consisting of medical, hospital and other expenses in the total sum of P17,719.75 are within this category. We are of the opinion, however, that the income which Edgardo Cariaga could earn if he should finish the medical course and pass the corresponding board examinations must be deemed to be within the same category because they could have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he boarded the bus No. 133 owned and operated by the LTB. At that time he was already a fourth-year student in medicine in a reputable university. While his scholastic may not be first rate, it is, nevertheless, sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have passed the board test in due time. As regards the income that he could possibly earn as a medical practitioner, it appears that, according to Dr. Amado Doria, a witness for the LTB, the amount of P300.00 could easily be expected as the minimum monthly income of Edgardo had he finished his studies. Upon consideration of all the facts mentioned heretofore this Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the compensatory damages awarded to Edgardo Cariaga should be increased to P25,000.00. Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. In the case of Cangco, vs. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768, We established the distinction between obligation derived from negligence and obligation as a result of a breach of contract. Thus, we said: It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say,its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially in the legal viewpoint from the presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by Article 1903 of the Civil Code (Art. 2180 of the new), which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection of supervision. Article 1903 is not applicable to obligations arising EX CONTRACTU, but only to extra-contractual obligation or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to CULPA AQUILIANA' and not to CULPA CONTRACTUAL. (3) The claim made by said spouses for actual and compensatory damages is likewise without merits. As held by the trial court, in so far as the LTB is concerned, the present action is based upon a breach of contract of carriage to which said spouses were not a party, and neither can they premise their claim upon the negligence or quasi-delict of the LTB for the simple reason that they were not themselves injured as a result of the collision between the LTB bus and train owned by the Manila Railroad Company.

RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE G.R. no. 97347 Jaime Ong vs. Court of Appeals and Robles couple July 6, 1999 Facts: Petitioner Jaime Ong and respondents, Robles couple executed an “Agreement of Purchase and Sale” with regard to 2 parcels of land, on which a rice mill and a piggery were found and thus included. The terms and conditions of the contract included an initial payment, payment for the loan of the sellers including interest, and the balance to be satisfied in 4 equal quarterly installments. As agreed, petitioner took possession of the subject property and everything else thereon upon satisfaction of the initial payment. However, petitioner failed to comply with the payment for the loan. Plus, the checks that the petitioner issued to the couple as payment for the balance were dishonored due to insufficient funds. To avoid foreclosure, the respondent couple sold the ricemill with the knowledge and conformity of petitioner.

Respondents sought for the rescission of the properties due to the latter’s failure to comply with the terms and conditions on the contract. RTC ruled in favor of the Robles couple and ordered the restitution of the properties. The couple were also ordered to return an amount, as determined by the court, to Ong. CA affirmed the decision in contemplation of Article 1191 of The New Civil Code Issue: (1) whether the contract entered into by the parties may be validly rescinded under Article 1191 of the New Civil Code as distinguished to Article 1383 of the same. (2) whether the parties had novated their original contract as to the time and manner of payment. HELD: The Contract entered into by the parties was a “Contract to Sell” which means that the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. Respondents bound themselves to deliver a deed of absolute sale and clean title covering the two parcels of land upon full payment by the buyer of the purchase price of P2,000,000.00 subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive condition of full payment of the purchase price by the petitioner. Petitioner, however, failed to complete payment of the purchase price. The non-fulfillment of the condition of full payment rendered the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect.

As to the issue on novation, in order for novation to take place, the concurrence of the following requisites is indispensable: (1) there must be a previous valid obligation; (2) there must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract; (3) there must be the extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) there must be the validity of the new contract. 25 The aforesaid requisites are not found in the case at bench.

with his business associate and long-time friend Michael Thomas Dunn (Michael), a Canadian citizen, Steven resided at a two-storey apartment unit at No. 5958 Firmina Street, Barangay Poblacion, Makati City.4 Steven married appellant Evelyn Bohol in Hong Kong sometime in March 1997, when the latter was only 17 years old. Together with their two minor children, Steven and the appellant shared a house at No. 1823 Fifth Street, Villasol Subdivision in Angeles City, Pampanga. Steven spent his weekdays in the Makati apartment, and stayed with his family in Angeles City during weekends. 5 On July 17, 2002, Steven and Michael worked until around ten o'clock in the evening at the principal office of JC Software in Makati. At about 10:45 p.m., they headed to their rented apartment. Steven proceeded to his room, did some computer work, then went to sleep. At about 11:30 p.m., Michael went to the airport to fetch his girlfriend Jennifer Castillo (Jennifer), who was then arriving from Hong Kong. Michael and Jennifer returned to the apartment at one o'clock in the morning of July 18, 2002. They went to bed a short moment thereafter.6 At around two o'clock in the morning, Jennifer told Michael that a person seemed to be moving and flashing a light outside their room. Suspecting that the person outside the room was Steven, and that the latter was just trying to play a practical joke on them, Michael inquired "What are you doing tonight?" Instead of Steven answering back, three men with drawn handguns suddenly entered their room. These three individuals were later positively identified during the trial to be Arnold Adoray (Arnold), Alexander Dagami (Alexander), and accused-turned-state-witness Robin Butas (Robin). Arnold, whose gun was aimed at Michael, asked, "Ito ba? Ito ba?" Alexander thereafter grabbed Jennifer by the hand and locked her inside Michael's bathroom. After taking Michael's keys, wallet, and cellular phone, the three men proceeded to Steven's room.7 Upon seeing the then sleeping Steven, Arnold fired four consecutive shots upon the former, hitting the latter at the back. The three men then hurriedly left the house. 8 After he was sure that Arnold, Alexander and Robin were no longer inside the apartment, Michael immediately went to Steven's room. There, Michael saw the lifeless body of Steven. After checking Steven's pulse, Michael administered cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on the former's chest but he no longer made any response.9 Thereafter, Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel arrived at the scene of the crime; then an ambulance took Steven's body to the Makati Medical Center where he was pronounced dead on arrival. 10

RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE [G.R. NO. 178198 : December 10, 2008] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. EVELYN BOHOL y TALAOGAN a.k.a. EVELYN BOHOL, a.k.a. EVELYN BOHOL DAVIS, a.k.a. DIANITA BOHOL DAVIS, Appellant This is an appeal interposed by appellant Evelyn Bohol seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated December 28, 2006 which in turn affirmed with modification the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Decision3 dated November 25, 2004. The facts of the case follow: The victim, Steven Alston Davis (Steven), a 31-year old British national, was the Chief Technology Officer of JC Software, a local subsidiary of Hong Kong based corporation JADECOOL Entertainment. Together

Michael made numerous attempts to reach the appellant by phone immediately after the incident, but his efforts were all in vain. Finally, he was able to contact her through her mobile phone at around six o'clock in the morning; the former immediately informed the latter of the killing of her husband. When Michael met Evelyn at ten o'clock in the morning, he readily observed that appellant showed no signs of sadness or mourning despite the violent death of her husband.11 After the autopsy of the cadaver in the afternoon of July 18, 2002, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Medico-Legal officer found that Steven sustained four gunshot wounds at the upper left portion of his back, including four bullet holes at the back of his upper left arm, just below the shoulder. 12 Arnold and Alexander were thus charged with murder on August 16, 2002.13 Trial thereafter ensued. The information was later amended14charging the appellant, together with Robin, with the crime of murder, in conspiracy with Arnold and Alexander. The accusatory portion of the information reads:

That on or about the 18th day of July, 2002, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an automatic pistol and revolver, conspiring and confederating together, and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shot one STEVEN ALSTON DAVIS, on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal gunshot wound which directly caused his death. CONTRARY TO LAW.15 Considering that at the time the appellant was arrested, the trial of the case, in which Arnold and Alexander were eventually convicted,16 was almost complete, a separate trial for the appellant was held. Upon arraignment, the appellant pleaded "Not guilty." 17 To ensure impartiality, the presiding judge inhibited himself, and the case of the appellant was re-raffled to Branch 141. It appears that Robin was discharged as a state witness.18 Robin contended that the appellant was responsible for inducing/persuading him, Arnold, and Alexander to perpetrate the killing of Steven. He further stated that the appellant and Arnold (as in fact admitted to him by the appellant) were having a love affair, as he would oftentimes see them caress and kiss each other in the living room of their house in Angeles City. Robin also testified that, at about eleven o'clock in the evening of July 17, 2002, appellant roused him from sleep and required him to join them. 19 Robin then rode a white car together with Arnold, Alexander and the appellant, who acted as the guide in proceeding towards Steven's apartment. Upon reaching Steven's place, appellant gave Arnold the keys of the house, and forthwith ordered the group to alight from the car. Upon gaining entry, the three performed all the acts of execution. Riding the same car, Arnold, Alexander, Robin and Evelyn returned to Angeles City. Even as they were traveling, Evelyn warned them never to tell anybody about the incident. Robin, however, divulged the violent incident to his wife Gina Bohol Butas (Gina), Evelyn's sister. In essence, the material points of Robin's testimony were wholly corroborated by Gina. According to Gina, the appellant admitted that she was in love with Arnold. She added that the appellant confided to her the plan to kill Steven in order for the appellant and Arnold to freely stay together.20 By way of defense, appellant theorized that it was physically impossible for her to have a direct and material participation in the killing of Steven as she was absent from the scene of the crime, and she lacked the ill motive to orchestrate the murder of her husband. She also contended that she was at home with her children at the time of the commission of the felony.21 On November 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision22 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The court also made her liable to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. The court found sufficient evidence to establish conspiracy to kill Steven. It likewise held that treachery was adequately proven, thus, establishing the crime of murder. It, however, refused to recognize the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation because of insufficiency of evidence. It is undisputed that the appellant was married to Steven; however, the trial court concluded that she could not be held liable for parricide in view of the nullity of their marriage, for having been contracted at the time when appellant was only 17 years old.23

This decision was affirmed by the CA in its Decision dated December 28, 2006, with an added award of P50,000.00 representing moral damages due the heirs of Steven. 24 In her final attempt to seek the reversal of her conviction, appellant comes before this Court, raising the following as lone error: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT HER GUILT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.25 Appellant bewails the fact that the trial and the appellate courts accorded great weight to the testimony of Robin. She posits that having turned state witness, Robin was motivated to testify solely by his desire to be exculpated from liability.26 Appellant adds that her motive to kill Steven was not established at all. 27 She further avers that her conviction should not have been based on Robin's testimony, or on the weakness of the evidence for the defense.28 Lastly, appellant insists that in no way could she be convicted of murder for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the qualifying circumstance of treachery. 29 After a careful review of the records and evidence presented, we find no cogent reason to reverse the decision of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. Nevertheless, we deem it proper to discuss the issues raised by the appellant. First, whether Robin's testimony is credible. As this Court has consistently said, where the culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of the credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the CA affirming those of the trial court, duly supported by sufficient and convincing evidence, must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, by this Court, and are not to be disturbed on appeal. 30 The only exception is when certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.31 Moreover, as enunciated in People v. Bocalan,32 the simple fact that Robin was originally charged with the appellant as a co-conspirator but was later discharged as a state witness and was no longer prosecuted for the crime charged does not render his testimony incredible or lessen its probative weight. Otherwise stated, the barefaced fact that Robin was charged as a co-conspirator in the commission of the crime before he was discharged as a state witness does not disqualify him as a witness or discredit his testimony. 33 While his testimony should be taken with caution, there is no reason why it cannot be given credence, it appearing that the same was corroborated by the testimony of his wife who happens to be appellant's sister. Besides, appellant offered no evidence to show that Robin was actuated by an ill or devious motive to testify against her. Appellant's claim that Robin testified against her only because he was motivated by his desire to be exculpated from his liability as a co-conspirator is likewise bereft of merit. Considering his close relationship with the appellant, the latter being his sister-in-law, there was no other reason for Robin to have testified against the appellant except his desire to tell the truth. This was bolstered by the fact that appellant's own sister corroborated Robin's testimony. More importantly, Robin's testimony was corroborated by physical evidence, namely, the autopsy report that Steven sustained four gunshot wounds at the upper left portion of his back, including four bullet holes at the back of his upper left arm, just below

the shoulder,34 which was thus consistent with his testimony that upon seeing Steven who was then asleep, Arnold fired four consecutive shots upon the former, hitting him at the back. 35 Second, whether appellant was correctly convicted of murder. Murder is committed by any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 36 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), kills another, if the killing is committed with treachery.37 There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 38 Hence, for treachery to be appreciated, two conditions must be met, to wit: (1) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender's safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2) the offender's deliberate or conscious choice of means, method or manner of execution.39 The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to himself.40 The circumstances obtaining in the instant case show that treachery attended the killing of the victim. It is undisputed that the killing occurred at around two o'clock in the morning, an hour when generally people are asleep. The witnesses are also one in saying that upon entering Steven's room, the assailants immediately shot the former and caused the latter's death. Both the testimonial and the physical sets of evidence also show that Steven was shot from behind. Evidently, the victim was caught unaware, totally defenseless against the armed invaders.41 While it is true that appellant did not directly participate in shooting Steven, nevertheless, evidence clearly shows that she was part of the conspiracy to commit the crime. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 42 It must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. However, direct proof is not required, as conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence. It may be established through the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of a felony that all the accused aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other performing another for the attainment of the same objective; and that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.43 In the present case, the CA correctly outlined the circumstances showing the appellant's participation, viz.: First, Evelyn [appellant herein] provided for the effective and compelling inducement for Arnold to carry into effect the killing of Steven. Second, Evelyn personally summoned and "recruited" Robin to come along with them for possible backup or perhaps as "additional ammunition" in case of resistance or retaliation on the part of their target. Third, it is apparent that the three men were not aware of Steven's location, and thus Evelyn acted as the guide who directed the group towards the residence of Steven at Makati. And fourth, Evelyn provided the group with the keys in order for them to enter the apartment with ease and unnoticed.44 Indubitably, conspiracy was established. Appellant seeks refuge in the defense of alibi which we have consistently regarded as the much abused sanctuary of felons and which is considered as an argument with a bad reputation. It is, to say the least, the weakest defense which must be taken with caution being easily

fabricated.45 Such defense cannot prevail over the positive identification of appellant as one of the conspirators in killing Steven. Though she did not participate in the actual shooting of Steven, it was sufficiently established that she traveled from Angeles City to Makati City, together with the assailants; she waited for the assailants inside the car; and she traveled back to Angeles City, again with her coconspirators, after the commission of the felony. Furthermore, appellant failed to establish that it was physically impossible for her to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Angeles City is only a few kilometers away from Makati and only a few hours of travel by land. This is coupled by the fact that when Michael was trying to reach her through her mobile and residence phones, she was not available until six o'clock in the morning, which was only about four hours after the incident. Clearly, it was possible for her to be at the place where the felony was committed. Besides, as earlier discussed, considering the appellant's participation as a co-conspirator, her absence from the place of commission does not negate her culpability. We would like to clarify at this point that although admittedly, appellant was the wife of the victim, she could not be convicted of parricide as provided in Article 246 of the RPC. Records show that appellant's relationship with the victim was not alleged in the information. 46 Hence, she can be convicted only of murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua. The prison term imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the CA is, therefore, correct. Lastly, whether the damages awarded to the heirs of Steven are proper. We affirm the award of civil indemnity and moral damages but we deem it proper to order the payment of an additional amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim even without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. The amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial and appellate courts is in line with prevailing jurisprudence.47 As to moral damages, the same is mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.48 The amount of P50,000.00 was, therefore, correctly awarded. In addition, exemplary damages should be awarded to the heirs of the victim, since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proven by the prosecution. 49 When a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. This kind of damage is intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.50 WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the December 28, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 00551 finding appellant Evelyn Bohol y Talaogan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, with the MODIFICATION that the victim's heirs are also entitled to the award of exemplary damages of P25,000.00. SO ORDERED.

RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MELISSA CHUA G.R. No. 187052 ; 13 September 2012 PONENTE: Villarama, Jr. SUBJECT: (4) Estafa, Illegal Recruitment in large scale FACTS: Within the period of 29 July 2002 up to 20 August 2002, accused personally met the complainants individually and on separate dates where she represented herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport the complainants as Filipino Overseas Workers, particularly Taiwan. She personally received various amounts as placement fees in consideration for their overseas employment and personally issued receipts to the complainants. Accused represented herself that she is an employee of Gate International (Golden Gate) Office located in Paragon Tower, Ermita, Manila. She also assured them that the earlier complainants would be able to pay their placement fees then the earlierthat they could leave. After the complainants completed payment of their placement fees, they were made to sign a contract containing stipulations as to salary and conditions of work. On several occasions thereafter, they returned to appellant’s office to follow-up on their application. After several visits, however, they noticed that all the properties of Golden Gate in its Paragon Tower Office were already gone. Thus, the complainants filed a complaint for Illegal Recruitment and Estafa against the accused. During trial, accused denied that she was the one who recruited the complainants and that she is merely a cashier of Golden Gate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the crime of Illegal Recruitment and Four (4) Estafa

HELD: Yes, the accused cannot escape liability by conveniently limiting her participation as a cashier of Golden Gate. Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 are unequivocal that illegal recruitment may or may not be for profit. It is immaterial, therefore, whether appellant remitted the placement fees to the agency’s treasurer or appropriated them. The same provision likewise provides that the persons criminally liable for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories. Just the same, therefore, appellant can be held liable as a principal by direct participation since she personally undertook the recruitment of private complainants without a license or authority to do so.

It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud. However, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of the third and fourth elements of estafa as to the case of private complainant Ursulum. While Ursulum claims that he delivered to the accused some amounts, he failed to produce receipts to substantiate the same. Instead, Ursulum relies only on ten text messages allegedly sent by the accused as evidence of their transaction. Said text messages alone does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was able to obtain an amount from Ursulum as a result of her false pretenses. Unlike in illegal recruitment where profit is immaterial, a conviction for estafa requires a clear showing that the offended party parted with his money or property upon the offender’s false pretenses, and suffered damage thereby. In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the accused.32 It is imperative, therefore, that damage as an element of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) be proved as conclusively as the offense itself. The failure of the prosecution to discharge this burden concerning the estafa allegedly committed against Ursulum warrants the acquittal of appellant on the said charge.

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

conviction." This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial. (Chavez vs. CA, G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968)

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. (Art. III, Sec. 17, 1987 Philippine Constitution) The right of the defendant in a criminal case “to be exempt from being a witness against himself” signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the What is the right against self-incrimination? Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. (Rosete vs. Lim) A person’s right against self-incrimination is enshrined in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads: “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” The same principle shall apply to the respondent in an administrative proceeding where the respondent may be subjected to sanctions of a penal character, such as the cancellation of his license to practice medicine or The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntary or the forfeiture of property. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law) under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. It secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to It is clear, therefore, that only an accused in a criminal case can refuse to take the witness stand. The right refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to to refuse to take the stand does not generally apply to parties in administrative cases or proceedings. The incriminate him for some crime. (Rosete vs. Lim, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006) parties thereto can only refuse to answer if incriminating questions are propounded. This Court applied the exception – a party who is not an accused in a criminal case is allowed not to take the witness stand – in administrative cases/proceedings that partook of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous When is this right available? to a criminal proceeding. It is likewise the opinion of the Court that said exception applies to parties in civil actions which are criminal in nature. As long as the suit is criminal in nature, the party thereto The right is available not only in criminal prosecutions but also in all other government proceedings, can altogether decline to take the witness stand. It is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of including civil actions and administrative or legislative investigations. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in the proceedings that controls. (Rosete vs. Lim) Political Law)

Who

may

claim

the

right

against

self-incrimination?

It may be claimed not only by the accused but also by any witness to whom a question calling for an incriminating answer is addressed. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law)

When

can

the the

right

against

self-incrimination

be

invoked?

1. Ordinary witness - The right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to which may incriminate himself for some offense that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty. (Rosete vs. Lim)

2. Accused in a criminal case - An accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his

What

is

the

scope

of

the

right

against

self-incrimination?

● The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but testimonial compulsion only (Alih vs. Castro, 151 SCRA 279). The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of his guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. (People vs. Malimit, People v. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167) Thus, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received in evidence. Hair samples taken from the accused may be admitted in evidence against him [People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, December 9,1999] Evidence involving deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is likewise admissible, and in People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, May 9, 2002, and in People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004, was utilized to affirm the death sentence on the accused found guilty of child-rape with homicide. A person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing and paraffin testing, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. In People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, February 27, 2000, where immediately after the incident, the policemen took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, it was held that there was no violation. In fact, the accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused. In U.S. v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil 145, a person charged with rape was ordered examined for gonorrhea, which might have been transmitted to the victim; in Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil 62, a woman accused of adultery was subjected to medical examination to determine if she was pregnant. In People v. Tranca, 35 SCRA 455, the accused was made to undergo ultra-violet ray examination to determine the presence of fluorescent powder dusted

on the money used in a buy-bust operation. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law)

RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

● The prohibition extends to the compulsion for the production of documents, papers and chattels that may be used as evidence against the witness, except where the State has a right to inspect the same such as the books of accounts of corporations, under the police or taxing power. Thus, in Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 122, the Supreme Court said that the demand of the PCGG that the petitioners — lawyers and co-accused — would be excluded from the case if they revealed the identity of their clients and submit the documents related to the suspected transactions, violated the right of the petitioners against selfincrimination. They did not have to wait until they were called to testify; they could raise the objection because they were not merely witnesses; they were parties in the case for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. However, in Almonte v. Vasquez, supra., it was held that where the subpoena duces tecum is directed to government officials required to produce official documents/public records which are in their possession or custody, then there is no violation of the right against self incrimination. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law)

G.R. No. 109775 November 14, 1996 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE ENCARNACION MALIMIT alias "MANOLO", accused-appellant.

● The privilege also protects the accused against any attempt to compel him to furnish a specimen of his handwriting in connection with a prosecution for falsification

In this appeal, appellant asks for his acquittal alleging that the trial court committed the following errors, to wit:

Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier.

I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ON THEIR ALLEGED IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME DESPITE THE FACT (SIC) THEY REVEALED THEIR ALLEGED "KNOWLEDGE" OF TH6E CRIME MORE THAN FIVE MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE WALLET AND ITS CONTENTS ALTHOUGH THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LEAD TO ITS PRODUCTION WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED. III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 5

For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. [Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil 570].

May

the right

against

self-incrimination

be

FRANCISCO, J.: Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with 1 and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, 2 was meted by the trial court 3 the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Onofre Malaki the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost. 4

waived?

Yes. The right against self-incrimination may be waived, either directly or by a failure to invoke it, provided the waiver is certain and unequivocal and intelligently made. Thus, the accused who takes the witness stand voluntarily and offers testimony in his behalf may be cross-examined and asked incriminating questions on any matter he testified to on direct examination. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law)

The following is the recital of facts as summarized by the appellee in its Brief, and duly supported by the evidence on record: On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, [Onofre] Malaki was attending to his store. Malaki's houseboy Edilberto Batin, on the other hand, was busy cooking chicken for supper at the kitchen located at the back of the store (TSN, June 19, 199 (sic), p. 14). Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. Rondon was to purchase chemical for his rice farm (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 19). Rondon came from his house, approximately one hundred and fifty (150) meters distant from Malaki's store (Ibid., p. 24). Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking and from the kitchen, he proceeded directly to the store to ask his employer (Malaki) if supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped

inside the store, he was taken aback when he saw appellant coming out of the store with a bolo (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 14), while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor "struggling for his life" (hovering between life and death) (Ibid.). Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, also saw appellant Jose Malimit (or "Manolo") rushing out through the front door of Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 29). Aided by the illumination coming from a pressure lamp ("petromax") inside the store, Rondon clearly recognized Malimit (Ibid., p. 22). Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside the store, he met Rondon (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 15). After a brief conversation, both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki. Batin, along with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body of Malaki in a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the store's drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket (Ibid., pp. 16-17). 6 In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility of prosecution witnesses Florencio Rondon and Edilberto Batin by pointing out their alleged delay in revealing what they knew about the incident. He posits that while the crime took place on April 15, 1991, it was only on September 17, 1991 when these witnesses tagged him as the culprit. We find these contentions bereft of merit. Appellant haphazardly concluded that Rondon and Batin implicated the appellant to this gruesome crime only on September 17, 1991. The aforementioned date however, was merely the date 7 when Rondon and Batin executed their respective affidavits, 8 narrating that they saw the appellant on the night of April 15, 1991 carrying a bolo stained with blood and rushing out of Malaki's store. As to appellant's claim of delay, suffice it to state that extant from the records are ample testimonial evidence negating appellant's protestation, to wit: (1) after having discovered the commission of the crime, Rondon and Batin immediately looked for Eutiquio Beloy, Malaki's brother-in-law, and informed him that appellant was the only person they saw running away from the crime scene; 9 (2) Beloy and Batin reported the crime with the CAFGU detachment in their barangay where Batin declared that it was appellant who robbed Malaki on that fateful night; 10 and (3) Batin again made a similar statement later at the Silago Police Station.11 Next, appellant derided the non-presentation by the prosecution of the police blotter which could prove if appellant was indeed implicated right away by Batin to the crime. 12 We do not believe, however, that it was necessary for the prosecution to present as evidence a copy of the aforementioned police blotter. Neither was its non-presentation in court fatal to the prosecution's case. Entries in the police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the uncontroverted testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as evidence is not indispensable. 13 Besides, if appellant believed that he was not identified therein, then he should have secured a copy thereof from the Silago Police Station and utilized the same as controverting evidence to impeach Batin's credibility as witness. 14 Having failed to do so, appellant cannot now pass the blame on the prosecution for something which appellant himself should have done.

Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the appellant only on September 15, 1991, or after the lapse of five months from commission of the crime, this fact alone does not render their testimony less credible. The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. 15 In fact the natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors, as in this case, 16 is of judicial notice. 17 At any rate, the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are given weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court. 18 This is the established rule of evidence, as the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial court which can weigh said testimony in the light of the witness" demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial. 19 And although the rule admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence, 20 we found none in this case. In his second assignment of error, appellant asseverates that the admission as evidence of Malaki's wallet 21together with its contents, viz., (1) Malaki's residence certificate; 22 (2) his identification card;23 and (3) bunch of keys, 24 violates his right against self-incrimination. 25 Likewise, appellant sought for their exclusion because during the custodial investigation, wherein he pointed to the investigating policemen the place where he hid Malaki's wallet, he was not informed of his constitutional rights. We are not persuaded. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, 26 ". . . is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ." It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. 27 It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said: If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles — a clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion 28 Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned pieces of evidence pursuant to the provision of the Constitution under Article III, Section 12, viz: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof, shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (Emphasis ours.) xxx xxx xxx These are the so-called "Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded by our men in uniform. However, infractions thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, 29 is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have his own counsel by the investigating policemen during the custodial investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the admissibility of Malaki's wallet, identification card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will not detract from appellant's culpability considering the existence of other evidence and circumstances establishing appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime charged. We, now come to appellant's third assignment of error where he demurs on the prosecution's evidence, contending that they are insufficient to sustain his conviction.

allegedly in the house of a certain Maui Petalcorin. Surprisingly, however, the defense did not bother to call appellant's wife to the witness stand to corroborate appellant's alibi. Neither did it present as witness Maui Petalcorin, or any other person who may have seen the appellant in the said place, if only to provide a semblance of truth to this assertion. As the defense of alibi is weak in view of the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses, 39 it becomes weaker because of the unexplained failure of the defense to present any corroboration. 40 Furthermore, proof that appellant was in his house when the crime was committed is not enough. Appellant must likewise demonstrate that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its vicinity, at the time of its commission. 41 In this case, appellant himself admitted that his house was just about eighty (80) meters away from the house of Malaki. 42 It was, therefore, not impossible for him to have been physically present at the place of the commission of the crime, as in fact, no evidence to negate this possibility was ever adduced by him at the trial. Appellant's insistence that he merely found Malaki's wallet by chance while gathering shells along the seashore, and that he feared being implicated in the crime for which reason he hid the wallet underneath a stone, hardly inspires belief. We are at a loss, just as the trial court was, as to why appellant should fear being implicated in the crime if indeed he merely found Malaki's wallet by chance. No inference can be drawn from appellant's purported apprehension other than the logical conclusion that appellant had knowledge of the crime. Besides, proof that appellant is in possession of a stolen property gives rise to a valid presumption that he stole the same. 43 In fine, as the killing of Malaki took place on the occasion of robbery, appellant was correctly convicted by the trial court of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Our close scrutiny of the record reveals otherwise. Time and again, we ruled that there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator of the crime. 30In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz., (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 31 In this case, there were at least five (5) circumstances constituting an unbroken chain of events which by their "concordant combination and cumulative effect", satisfy the requirements for the conviction of the appellant, 32specifically: (1) appellant was seen by Rondon and Batin, whose credibilities were untarnished, holding a bolo in his right hand and rushing out of Malaki's store seconds prior to their discovery of the crime; 33 (2) Malaki sustained multiple stab wounds 34 and he died of "cardiac arrest, secondary to severe external hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds", 35 (3) witness Elmer Ladica saw the appellant on August 6, 1991, accompanied by some policemen, retrieve Malaki's wallet underneath a stone at the seashore in Barangay Hingatungan; 36 (4) appellant himself admitted in his testimony that on August 6, 1991, he accompanied several policemen to the seashore where he hid Malaki's wallet; 37 and (5) appellant's flight and his subsequent disappearance from Hingatungan immediately after the incident. 38 On the other hand, appellant's version of the story does not inspire belief. He maintains that on that fateful night he was in his house together with his wife. He claims that they had just arrived from a gambling spree

SO ORDERED.

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION PEOPLE vs. RONDEROFACTS Facts On the evening of March 25, 1994, the 9yo daughter of MAXIMO Doria named MYLENE went missing MAXIMO sought the help of their neighbors to search for her. He also asked the Barangay Captain for assistance in the search. The search team looked everywhere but the it yielded nothing for hours. Tired and distraught, MAXIMO started his way back home when, at about 5 meters away from his house, he saw herein accused-appellant Delfin RONDERO pumping the artesian well. He had an ice-pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands After searching, the team proceeded with the search and after some time, they found MYLENE’s lifeless body near the canteen. Her right hand was raised above her head, which was severely bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked from the waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair strands30mins later, policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. Thereafter, MAXIMO led the policemen to the artesian well where he had seen RONDERO earlier washing his hands. The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered with blood After investigation, the policemen, acting on the lead as guided by MAXIMO, arrested RONDERO. Thereafter, appellant was formally charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide and he pleaded “not guilty” at his arraignment. Meanwhile, the hair strands which were found on the victim’s hand, together with hair specimens taken from the victim and RONDERO, were sent to the NBI for laboratory examination. The NBI chemist, however, found it difficult to conduct the tests because the sample provided to her were not viable for comparison with the strands found clutched in MYLENE’s hand so the hair from both MYLENE and RONDERO must be pulled, not cut. Thereupon, appellant RONDERO, who executed a “waiver of detention” including a waiver of his custodial rights (under Sec 12, Article III, Const.), was allegedly convinced by a police superior to give sample hair strands. Another police officer went to the Doria’s residence to get hair samples from MYLENE, who had not yet been interred With viable samples now at hand, the NBI conducted the necessary tests and it found that the hair strands found on the right hand of the victim had similar characteristics to those of RONDERO’s. The accused-appellant avers the acquisition of his hair strands without his express written consent and without the presence of his counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his Constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution ISSUE : WON the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellant’s hair strands can be admitted as evidence against him? HELD: Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police officers. Accused-appellant’s wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, accused- appellant’s garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence. Nevertheless, even without the admission of the bloodied garments of the accused as corroborative evidence, the circumstances obtaining against accused-appellant are sufficient to establish his guilt. RIGHT AGAINSTV SELF-INCRIMINATION Marcelo v Sandiganbayan Gr no. 109242, jan 26, 1999 361 Phil. 772 MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Lito Marcelo from a decision of the Sandiganbayan (First Division)[1] convicting him and two others of qualified theft. The information against them alleges That on or about February 17, 1989, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, ARNOLD PASICOLAN, a public officer, being then an Emergency Laborer assigned as bag opener at the printed matters section of Makati Central Post Office, and taking advantage of his official position by having access to the mail matters in conspiracy with accused RONNIE S. ROMERO and LITO MARCELO, both private individuals, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with grave abuse of confidence, and with intent of gain and without the consent of the owners thereof, take, steal and carry away from the Central Post office of Makati one bag containing assorted mail matters some of them containing U.S. Dollar Bills in the aggregate amount of $500, or its peso equivalent in the amount of P11,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the different addressee (sic) or the government in the aforesaid mentioned (sic) amount. CONTRARY TO LAW. The facts established during the trial show the following: On February 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post office.[2] Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. Merete likewise described the modus operandi of the group. For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office. On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi Village following a

report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a private car. They arrived at Legaspi Village at about 1:00 p.m. They stayed at the corner of Adelantado and Gamboa Streets, while two other teams of NBI agents waited at Amorsolo Street, near the Esguerra Building.[3]

before the Sandiganbayan.

At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street.[4]Esguerra Building is located between Adelantado and Amorsolo Streets. Adelantado and Amorsolo Streets are parallel to each other. The passengers of the postal delivery jeep were Arnold Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete, and the driver, Henry Orindai. [5] Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Merete stayed inside the jeep. Pasicolan then passed through an alley between Esguerra and Montepino Buildings going towards Amorsolo St. [6] Montepino Building is adjacent to Esguerra Building. The two are separated by the alley. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the mail bag (i.e., assorted mail matter) to a travelling bag. The two then secured the bag to the back of their motorcycle.[7]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the three accused, Arnold Pasicolan y Mabazza, Ronnie Romero y Santos, and Lito Mercado [should be Marcelo] y Cruz, guilty, as principals, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft defined in Article 310, in conjunction with Articles 308 and 309, of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering the aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of public position, the Court imposes upon Arnold Pasicolan y Mabazza the penalty ranging from EIGHT (8) years, EIGHT (8) months, and ONE (1) day of Prision mayor, as minimum, to THIRTEEN (13) YEARS, ONE (1) month, and ELEVEN (11) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Applying again the Indeterminate Sentence Law and there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the Court imposes upon Ronnie Romero y Santos and Lito Marcelo y Cruz, the penalty ranging from SEVEN (7) YEARS, four (4) months, and ONE (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, SIX (6) months, and TWENTY-ONE (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari based on the following assignment of errors:

Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car and started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero.[8] At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested the two accused. Unaware of the arrest of Romero and Marcelo, Pasicolan went back to the postal delivery jeep and proceeded toward Pasay Road. The NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan.[9] The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters. They also brought along with them the motorcycle of Romero and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail found in their possession.[10] On their way to the NBI headquarters, they passed by the Makati Central Post Office, intending to arrest another suspect, Redentor Aguinaldo. However, they were not able to find him there. [11] The unsorted mail seized from Marcelo and Romero consisted of 622 letters. [12] The names of the addressees were listed. They were subsequently notified by the Bureau of Posts to claim their letters. Many of them, after proper identification, were able to claim their letters. Some letters contained money. Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same letters confiscated from them. [13] NBI Director Ranin allegedly saw US dollar bills in various denominations of 20, 50, and 100 dollars.[14] Vela and the other NBI agents stated in their affidavits that there were dollar bills in the letters which, if converted to Philippine pesos, at the then exchange rate of P22 to US $1, were worth P11,000.00.[15] The addressees agreed to leave the envelopes of the letters with the NBI. Those letters which were not claimed were opened in court in the presence of the counsel for the defense. The letters were found to contain three (3) one dollar bills, one (1) five dollar bill, one (1) twenty dollar bill, a check for twenty-five dollars, and fifty (50) Saudi Arabian riyals.[16] Arnold Pasicolan, Ronnie Romero, and herein petitioner Lito Marcelo were charged with infidelity in the custody of documents. The case was later withdrawn and another information for qualified theft was filed

On March 8, 1993, the Sandiganbayan found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of qualified theft. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

(1) (2)

Respondent Honorable Court had wrongly made the crucial finding against petitioner that he has committed the act charged in conspiracy with each other. Respondent Honorable Court erred in admitting as evidence of petitioner's guilt the letters signed by the accused during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, in utter disregard of his constitutional right.

First. Petitioner says that since the subject of the alleged pilferage was mail matter, only a government employee may be held guilty of qualified theft unless a private individual was shown to have been in conspiracy with him. He contends that since he is not a government employee, then he cannot be charged or held guilty of the crime as there is no proof that he conspired with a postal employee. The petitioner argues that there is no evidence to prove that he was at any time in conspiracy with the members of the syndicate inside the post office. In fact, petitioner points out, Jacinto Merete, Projecto Tumagan, and his co-accused Arnold Pasicolan were one in saying that it was their first time to see him and Romero on February 17, 1989. Likewise, in the meeting allegedly conducted by the members of the syndicate, he and Romero were not around nor were their names mentioned. Petitioner says that although he and Romero knew each other, it was only on February 17, 1989 that they saw each other again in order to see a movie. We cannot understand petitioner's theory that, as the subject of the pilferage was mail matter, only a government employee, presumably of the postal service, can be held liable of qualified theft. What makes the theft of mail matter qualified is the fact that the subject thereof is mail matter, regardless of whether the offender is a postal employee or a private individual. This much is clear from Art. 310 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

Thus, as long as the thing stolen is one of those enumerated in Art. 310, the crime is qualified theft. In this case, it is mail matter. Hence, it is not necessary that petitioner be shown to have been in conspiracy with a government employee in order to hold him liable for qualified theft. Be that as it may, conspiracy was proven in this case. NBI agent Arles Vela testified that petitioner was instrumental in transferring the contents of the mail bag which Pasicolan handed to them to their travelling bag and that afterward petitioner and his co-accused Romero tied the bag to their motorcycle. Vela's testimony was corroborated by Projecto Tumagan, who likewise testified that Romero and Marcelo transferred the contents of the mail bag to their bags. Although Tumagan said petitioner and Romero had two bags, thus contradicting Vela's testimony that petitioner and his co-accused had only one bag, the inconsistency in the testimonies of these two prosecution witnesses is not really of much importance. What is important is that Tumagan corroborated Vela's testimony that petitioner helped in putting the letters in their bag. The discrepancy could be due to the fact that these two witnesses were inside a car and were at some distance from the persons they were observing. At any rate, during the cross-examination, Tumagan said that the contents of the mail bag were transferred to one "other bag" implying that there was really just one bag involved.[17] Moreover, the defense should have confronted Tumagan with this inconsistency and asked him to explain. For its failure to do so, the defense cannot for the first time raise the point in this appeal. Petitioner Marcelo showed no sign of surprise or hesitation when Pasicolan handed the mail bag to him and Romero. It was apparent he was acting pursuant to a prior agreement because when the mail bag was given to him, he got the bag and he and Romero then transferred its contents to their travelling bag. Petitioner acted in concert with Pasicolan and Romero, thus indicating he was in conspiracy with them. As the Sandiganbayan said: The accused appear to have committed the acts charged in conspiracy with each other pursuant to a preconceived plan known to all of them to attain a common goal. Thus, when the postal delivery jeep stopped near Esguerra Building along Adelantado Street, Pasicolan alighted bringing with him a mail bag, passed through an alley beside Esquerra Building, and upon reaching Amorsolo Street handed over the mail bag to Romero and Marcelo who were waiting for him. Upon receiving the mail bag they quickly opened it and transferred its contents to a bag which Aguinaldo provided for the purpose. No words were exchanged between Pasicolan, on the other hand, and Romero and Marcelo, on the other, in effecting the delivery. Pasicolan did not ask if Romero and/or Marcelo were the person or persons sent to receive the mail bag. These facts indicate that the three accused already knew each other and were fully aware of what each had to do. And when Romero and Marcelo were arrested for receiving the mail bag, they said nothing to the NBI. Not even a whimper of protest was heard from them. They appear resigned to their fate after having been caught red-handed. Petitioner Marcelo claimed that he and Romero met on February 17, 1989 in order to see a movie; that when Pasicolan handed four envelopes to Romero, he was across the street buying cigarettes; and that when he joined Romero, a person identifying himself as an NBI agent arrested them. Marcelo testified:[18] ATTY. CRUZ Q So you were asked by Ronnie Romero if you will be reporting for work at that time? A Yes, sir. JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA Q What time was this when you were asked by Ronnie Romero? A 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

ATTY. CRUZ Q What was the reason why you were asked by Ronnie Romero? A He wanted me to go with him to see a movie. Q Did he tell you at what place you will see a movie? A No, sir. Q What was your reply? I told him "yes, I will go with you, anyway I have to go to my work at 10:00 o'clock in the A evening." .... Q What happened next Mr. Marcelo? Then I rode at the back of his motorcycle and we went straight to Makati. Suddenly we stopped A near a building and I asked him what we will do there and he told me he was going to wait for somebody there. .... ATTY. CRUZ Q What was told to you when you reached there? WITNESS He told me he had to wait for somebody there and I told him to hurry up, "I thought you said we A are going to see a movie", and he said, "this will not take long". While at Taguig, were you informed by Ronnie Romero that you will be waiting for somebody Q when you reached Makati? A No, sir. .... Q And what happened next? While we were there I told Ronnie Romero I had to buy cigarette from across the street and after A a while, about half an hour, Ronnie called me I saw somebody handing him about four pieces of envelopes. Q How would you describe that envelope? A It was like the Manila envelope that we see being used by the elementary grades. Q Was there any distinguishing mark in this envelope? A No, sir. Q Were you able to see what was the contents of these envelopes? A No, sir. Q That person who handed the envelope to Ronnie, do you know him? A I do not know him. Q While that envelope was being handed to Ronnie, you mean to say you were across the street? A Yes, sir. Q And so you crossed the street to reach Ronnie? A Yes, sir. Q When you crossed the street was the envelope still being handed or already handed to Ronnie? A It was already handed to him. Q What happened next? After I crossed the street somebody shouted at us identifying himself as NBI, "WE are from the A NBI, do not move". The foregoing testimony is contrary to the testimony of Ronnie Romero. Romero said that Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter, had asked him to meet a person in Makati who would give him an envelope to be delivered to an unidentified person at the BF Homes Subdivision in Parañaque. Romero's version is as

follows:[19] ATTY. I. CRUZ: Q And do you know a certain person by the name of Redentor Aguinaldo? JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA: The accusation against you is that you conspired with your co-accused Arnold Pasicolan and Q Lito Marcelo in stealing the articles and things stated in the Information. Why do you say that you are not part of the conspiracy, what do you mean by that statement? A Because, sir, I do not know what was the contents of the envelope. You can proceed now. ATTY. I. CRUZ: You mentioned of an envelope which you claim not to have known the contents of the same. Q Who gave you the envelope? A Arnold Pasicolan. Q Do you know Arnold Pasicolan prior to and/or before February 17, 1989? .... A No, sir. ATTY. I. CRUZ: Q When for the first time did you come to know Arnold Pasicolan? A On February 17, sir. Q When, where specifically did you come to know him? A At the NBI office, sir. Q Now... JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA: Q February 17, 1989? A Yes, Your Honor. Proceed. .... ATTY. I. CRUZ: Q Do you know a certain Redentor Aguinaldo? A Yes, sir. JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA: Q Tell us the circumstances under which you received this envelope? A I received that envelope given to me by Arnold Pasicolan. Q If you answer in monosyllable we will not understand. Alright, you tell your story? Redentor Aguinaldo on February 17 told me that he is going to give me a job. What I will do is A get the envelope and bring it to a certain subdivision in Las Piñas and somebody will pick it up and pay me P100.00 for it. Proceed. ATTY. I. CRUZ: Q Now, do you know the person to whom you are to deliver the envelope? A No, sir. Q Now, if you do now know the person to whom you will deliver the envelope. JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA: You may not cross-examine, tell him to tell us facts. ATTY. I. CRUZ: Q Where specifically in the subdivision in Parañaque where you will deliver the envelope? A BF Homes.

JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA: Q To what particular person will you supposed to deliver it? A I was just asked to go to that place and somebody will approach me. To make your story more believable, BF Homes in Parañaque is a very big subdivision. You enter that subdivision and there will be several persons whom you can see there. How will the Q person know that you are carrying an envelope for him. Where were you supposed to deliver it. If you cannot explain that, we will not believe you? A In that subdivision, there is a vacant place where there are no houses. It is where I often go. BF Homes subdivision in Parañaque has several vacant lots, how will you know what vacant lot Q to proceed to? A It was pointed to me by Aguinaldo. Q So, Aguinaldo went with you in the morning of that same day and pointed to you the place? A In the morning of that same day and he pointed to me the place. Second. The petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in admitting in evidence the letters signed by him because he was asked to sign them during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel. The following provisions of the Constitution are invoked by petitioner: Article III, §12(1). - Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. .... (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. §17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Petitioner's counsel says that the signing of petitioner's and his co-accused's names was not a mere mechanical act but one which required the use of intelligence and therefore constitutes selfincrimination. Petitioner's counsel presumably has in mind the ruling in Beltran v. Samson[20] to the effect that the prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness against himself extends to any attempt to compel the accused to furnish a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparing it with the handwriting in a document in a prosecution for falsification. "Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act because it requires the application of intelligence and attention,"[21] so it was held. To be sure, the use of specimen handwriting in Beltran is different from the use of petitioner's signature in this case. In that case, the purpose was to show that the specimen handwriting matched the handwriting in the document alleged to have been falsified and thereby show that the accused was the author of the crime (falsification) while in this case the purpose for securing the signature of petitioner on the envelopes was merely to authenticate the envelopes as the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero. However, this purpose and petitioner's signatures on the envelope, when coupled with the testimony of prosecution witnesses that the envelopes seized from petitioner were those given to him and Romero, undoubtedly help establish the guilt of petitioner. Since these signatures are actually evidence of admission obtained from petitioner and his co-accused under circumstances contemplated in Art. III, §§12(1) and 17 of the Constitution, they should be excluded. For indeed, petitioner and his co-accused signed following their

arrest. Hence, they were at the time under custodial investigation, defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way.[22] Under the Constitution, among the rights of a person under custodial investigation is the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and if the person cannot afford the services of counsel, that he must be provided with one. However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The letters were validly seized from petitioner and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that petitioner's admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and his companion on February 17, 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of a crime validly seized during a lawful arrest. That these letters were the ones found in the possession of petitioner and his companion and seized from them was shown by the testimonies of Vela and Tumagan. Indeed, petitioner and his co-accused were not convicted solely on the basis of the signatures found on the letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents and other prosecution witnesses. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.

3. WON the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a purely private transaction which is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into. 4. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process. HELD: 1. YES. As the court held in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the departments of the government, and it is the judiciary that was vested of the powers to determine the scope, nature and extent of such powers. 2. NO. The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent SBRC was to find out WON the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36/39 corporations of Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears, therefore, no intended legislation involved. The inquiry also is not conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 2123 (SR 2123), as the committee alleges. The inquiry under SR 2123 is to look into the charges against PCGG filed by stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26 Article XVIII of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCIMINATION Bengzon v. Blue Ribbon FACTS: On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG), filed a complaint with Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case. PCGG allege, among others, that: defendants (petitioners therein) Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and Juliette. Gomez Romualdez, alleged cronies of former President Marcos and First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos, engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. Among these stratagems are (1) obtained control of some big business enterprises such as MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (2) manipulated the formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable and borrow more capital, reaching a total of more that P2 billion, (3) collaborated with lawyers (petitioners therein) of the Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and properties, in maneuvering the purported sale of interests in certain corporations, in misusing the Meralco Pension Fund worth P25 million, and in cleverly hiding behind the veil of corporate entity. On 13 September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over of SolOil Incorporated by Ricardo Lopa (who died during the pendency of this case) and called upon the senate to look into possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019. The Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC) started its investigation through a hearing on 23 May 1989, but Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitioner Bengzon s plea and voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner claims that the SBRC, in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Hence this petition. ISSUES: 1. WON the court has jurisdiction over this case. 2. WON the SBRC s inquiry has a valid legislative purpose.

3. YES. Mr. Lopa and the petitioners are not connected with the government and did their acts as private citizens, hence such a case of alleged graft and corruption is within the jurisdiction, not of the SBRC, but of the courts. Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of this issue before the SBRC did. The inquiry of the respondent committee into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment of into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction. 4. NO. The Constitution provides the right of an accused of a crime to remain silent; this extends also to respondents in administrative investigation but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. This is not so in this case. BUT since the court already held that the inquiry is not in aid of legislation, the petitioners therein cannot be compelled to testify.

Fourteenth Congress Third Regular Session Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of July, two thousand nine. REPUBLIC ACT N0. 9745 AN ACT PENALIZING TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: Section 1. Short Title. - This Ad shall be known as the "Anti-Torture Act of 2009". Section 2. Statement of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State: (a) To value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full respect for human rights; (b) To ensure that the human rights of all persons, including suspects, detainees and prisoners are respected at all times; and that no person placed under investigation or held in custody of any person in authority or, agent of a person authority shall be subjected to physical, psychological or mental harm, force, violence, threat or intimidation or any act that impairs his/her free wi11 or in any manner demeans or degrades human dignity; (c) To ensure that secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention, where torture may be carried out with impunity, are prohibited; and (d) To fully adhere to the principles and standards on the absolute condemnation and prohibition of torture as provided for in the 1987 Philippine Constitution; various international instruments to which the Philippines is a State party such as, but not limited to, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and all other relevant international human rights instruments to which the Philippines is a signatory. Section 3. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(a) "Torture" refers to an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third person information or a confession; punishing him/her for an act he/she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or intimidating or coercing him/her or a third person; or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a person in authority or agent of a person in authority. It does not include pain or Buffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. (b) "Other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment" refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority against a person under his/her custody, which attains a level of severity causing suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter. (c) "Victim" refers to the person subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as defined above and any individual who has suffered harm as a result of any act(s) of torture, or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. (d) "Order of Battle" refers to any document or determination made by the military, police or any law enforcement agency of the government, listing the names of persons and organizations that it perceives to be enemies of the State and that it considers as legitimate targets as combatants that it could deal with, through the use of means allowed by domestic and international law. Section 4. Acts of Torture. - For purposes of this Act, torture shall include, but not be limited to, the following: (a) Physical torture is a form of treatment or punishment inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority upon another in his/her custody that causes severe pain, exhaustion, disability or dysfunction of one or more parts of the body, such as: (1) Systematic beating, headbanging, punching, kicking, striking with truncheon or rifle butt or other similar objects, and jumping on the stomach; (2) Food deprivation or forcible feeding with spoiled food, animal or human excreta and other stuff or substances not normally eaten; (3) Electric shock;

(4) Cigarette burning; burning by electrically heated rods, hot oil, acid; by the rubbing of pepper or other chemical substances on mucous membranes, or acids or spices directly on the wound(s);

(2) Threatening a person(s) or his/fher relative(s) with bodily harm, execution or other wrongful acts; (3) Confinement in solitary cells or secret detention places;

(5) The submersion of the head in water or water polluted with excrement, urine, vomit and/or blood until the brink of suffocation; (6) Being tied or forced to assume fixed and stressful bodily position; (7) Rape and sexual abuse, including the insertion of foreign objects into the sex organ or rectum, or electrical torture of the genitals; (8) Mutilation or amputation of the essential parts of the body such as the genitalia, ear, tongue, etc.; (9) Dental torture or the forced extraction of the teeth;

(4) Prolonged interrogation; (5) Preparing a prisoner for a "show trial", public display or public humiliation of a detainee or prisoner; (6) Causing unscheduled transfer of a person deprived of liberty from one place to another, creating the belief that he/she shall be summarily executed; (7) Maltreating a member/s of a person's family; (8) Causing the torture sessions to be witnessed by the person's family, relatives or any third party;

(10) Pulling out of fingernails; (9) Denial of sleep/rest; (11) Harmful exposure to the elements such as sunlight and extreme cold; (12) The use of plastic bag and other materials placed over the head to the point of asphyxiation;

(10) Shame infliction such as stripping the person naked, parading him/her in public places, shaving the victim's head or putting marks on his/her body against his/her will;

(13) The use of psychoactive drugs to change the perception, memory. alertness or will of a person, such as:

(11) Deliberately prohibiting the victim to communicate with any member of his/her family; and

(i) The administration or drugs to induce confession and/or reduce mental competency; or

(12) Other analogous acts of mental/psychological torture.

(ii) The use of drugs to induce extreme pain or certain symptoms of a disease; and (14) Other analogous acts of physical torture; and (b) "Mental/Psychological Torture" refers to acts committed by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority which are calculated to affect or confuse the mind and/or undermine a person's dignity and morale, such as: (1) Blindfolding;

Section 5. Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. - Other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority against another person in custody, which attains a level of severity sufficient to cause suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter. The assessment of the level of severity shall depend on all the circumstances of the case, including the duration of the treatment or punishment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, religion, age and state of health of the victim. Section 6. Freedom from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, An Absolute Bight. - Torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as criminal acts shall apply to all circumstances. A state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency, or a document or any determination

comprising an "order of battle" shall not and can never be invoked as a justification for torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. Section 7. Prohibited Detention. - Secret detention places, solitary confinement, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention, where torture may be carried out with impunity. Are hereby prohibited. In which case, the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and other law enforcement. agencies concerned shall make an updated list of all detention centers and facilities under their respective jurisdictions with the corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees incarcerated or detained therein such as, among others, names, date of arrest and incarceration, and the crime or offense committed. This list shall be made available to the public at all times, with a copy of the complete list available at the respective national headquarters of the PNP and AFP. A copy of the complete list shall likewise be submitted by the PNP, AFP and all other law enforcement agencies to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), such list to be periodically updated, by the same agencies, within the first five (5) days of every month at the minimum. Every regional office of the PNP, AFP and other law enforcement agencies shall also maintain a similar list far all detainees and detention facilities within their respective areas, and shall make the same available to the public at all times at their respective regional headquarters, and submit a copy. updated in the same manner provided above, to the respective regional offices of the CHR. Section 8. Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule; Exception. - Any confession, admission or statement obtained as a result of torture shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceedings, except if the same is used as evidence against a person or persons accused of committing torture. Section 9. Institutional Protection of Torture Victims and Other Persons Involved. - A victim of torture shall have the following rights in the institution of a criminal complaint for torture: (a) To have a prompt and an impartial investigation by the CHR and by agencies of government concerned such as the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the PNP, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the AFP. A prompt investigation shall mean a maximum period of sixty (60) working days from the time a complaint for torture is filed within which an investigation report and/or resolution shall be completed and made available. An appeal whenever available shall be resolved within the same period prescribed herein,

(c) To be accorded sufficient protection in the manner by which he/she testifies and presents evidence in any fora in order to avoid further trauma. Section 10. Disposition of Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo and Habeas Data Proceedings and Compliance with a Judicial 07'der. - A writ of habeas corpus or writ of amparo or writ of habeas data proceeding, if any, filed on behalf of the victim of torture or other cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment or punishment shall be disposed of expeditiously and any order of release by virtue thereof, or other appropriate order of a court relative thereto, shall be executed or complied with immediately. Section 11. Assistance in Filing a Complaint. - The CHR and the PAO shall render legal assistance in the investigation and monitoring and/or filing of the complaint for a person who suffers torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, or for any interested party thereto. The victim or interested party may also seek legal assistance from the Barangay Human Rights Action Center (BRRAC) nearest him/her as well as from human rights nongovernment organizations (NGOs). Section 12. Right to' Physical, Medical and Psychological Examination. - Before and after interrogation, every person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall have the right to he informed of his/her right to demand physical examination by an independent and competent doctor of his/her own choice. If such person cannot afford the services of his/her own doctor, he/she shall he provided by the State with a competent and independent doctor to conduct physical examination. The State shall endeavor to provide the victim with psychological evaluation if available under the circumstances. If the person arrested is a female, she shall be attended to preferably by a female doctor. Furthermore, any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, including his/her immediate family, shall have the right to immediate access to proper and adequate medical treatment. The physical examination and/or psychological evaluation of the victim shall be contained in a medical report, duly signed by the attending physician, which shall include in detail his/her medical history and findings, and which shall he attached to the custodial investigation report. Such report shall be considered a public document. Following applicable protocol agreed upon by agencies tasked to conduct physical, psychological and mental examinations, the medical reports shall, among others, include: (a) The name, age and address of the patient or victim;

(b) To have sufficient government protection against all forms of harassment; threat and/or intimidation as a consequence of the filing of said complaint or the presentation of evidence therefor. In which case, the State through its appropriate agencies shall afford security in order to ensure his/her safety and all other persons involved in the investigation and prosecution such as, but not limited to, his/her lawyer, witnesses and relatives; and

(b) The name and address of the nearest kin of the patient or victim; (c) The name and address of the person who brought the patient or victim for physical, psychological and mental examination, and/or medical treatment;

(d) The nature and probable cause of the patient or victim's injury, pain and disease and/or trauma;

without having participated therein, either as principal or accomplice, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner:

(e) The approximate time and date when the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were sustained;

(a) By themselves profiting from or assisting the offender to profit from the effects of the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment;

(f) The place where the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were sustained;

(b) By concealing the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and/or destroying the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; or(c) By harboring, concealing or assisting m the escape of the principal/s in the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment: Provided, That the accessory acts are done with the abuse of the official's public functions.

(g) The time, date and nature of treatment necessary; and (h) The diagnosis, the prognosis and/or disposition of the patient. Any person who does not wish to avail of the rights under this pr<;lvision may knowingly and voluntarily waive such rights in writing, executed in the presence and assistance of his/her counsel. Section 13. Who are Criminally Liable. - Any person who actually participated Or induced another in the commission of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment or who cooperated in the execution of the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment by previous or simultaneous acts shall be liable as principal

Section 14. Penalties. - (a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the perpetrators of the following acts: (1) Torture resulting in the death of any person; (2) Torture resulting in mutilation; (3) Torture with rape;

Any superior military, police or law enforcement officer or senior government official who issued an order to any lower ranking personnel to commit torture for whatever purpose shall be held equally liable as principals. The immediate commanding officer of the unit concerned of the AFP or the immediate senior public official of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies shall be held liable as a principal to the crime of torture or other cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment for any act or omission, or negligence committed by him/her that shall have led, assisted, abetted or allowed, whether directly or indirectly, the commission thereof by his/her subordinates. If he/she has knowledge of or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment shall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his/her subordinates or by others within his/her area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during or immediately after its commission, when he/she has the authority to prevent or investigate allegations of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment but failed to prevent or investigate allegations of such act, whether deliberately or due to negligence shall also be liable as principals. Any public officer or employee shall be liable as an accessory if he/she has knowledge that torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is being committed and

(4) Torture with other forms of sexual abuse and, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have become insane, imbecile, impotent, blind or maimed for life; and (5) Torture committed against children. (b) The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed on those who commit any act of mental/psychological torture resulting in insanity, complete or partial amnesia, fear of becoming insane or suicidal tendencies of the victim due to guilt, worthlessness or shame. (c) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed on those who commit any act of torture resulting in psychological, mental and emotional harm other than those described 1n paragraph (b) of this section. ' (d) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have lost the power of speech or the power to hear or to smell; or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg; or shall have lost the use of any such member; Or shall have become permanently incapacitated for labor.

(e) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have become deformed or shall have lost any part of his/her body other than those aforecited, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for a period of more than ninety (90) days. (f) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for mare than thirty (30) days but not more than ninety (90) days. (g) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for thirty (30) days or less. (h) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed for acts constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as defined in Section 5 of this Act. (i) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon those who establish, operate and maintain secret detention places and/or effect or cause to effect solitary confinement, incommunicado or other similar forms of prohibited detention as provided in Section 7 of this Act where torture may be carried out with impunity. (j) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon the responsible officers or personnel of the AFP, the PNP and other law enforcement agencies for failure to perform his/her duty to maintain, submit or make available to the public an updated list of detention centers and facilities with the corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees incarcerated or detained therein, pursuant to Section 7 of this Act.

coordination with the Chairperson of the CHR, shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable and not limited to, the existence in the requesting State of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. Section 18. Compensation to Victims of Torture. - Any person who has suffered torture shall have the right to claim for compensation as provided for under Republic Act No. 7309: Provided, That in no case shall compensation be any lower than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00). Victims of torture shall also have the right to claim for compensation from such other financial relief programs that may be made available to him/her under existing law and rules and regulations. Section 19. Formulation of a Rehabilitation Program. - Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the DOJ and the Department of Health (DOH) and such other concerned government agencies, and human rights organizations shall formulate a comprehensive rehabilitation program for victims of torture and their families. The DSWD, the DOJ and thc DOH shall also call on human rights nongovernment organizations duly recognized by the government to actively participate in the formulation of such program that shall provide for the physical, mental, social, psychological healing and development of victims of torture and their families. Toward the attainment of restorative justice, a parallel rehabilitation program for persons who have committed torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment shall likewise be formulated by the same agencies. Section 20. Monitoring of Compliance with this Act. - An Oversight Committee is hereby created to periodically oversee the implementation of this Act. The Committee shall be headed by a Commissioner of the CRR, with the following as members: the Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, the respective Chairpersons of the House of Representatives' Committees on Justice and Human Rights, and the Minority Leaders of both houses or their respective representatives in the minority.

Section 16. Exclusion from the Coverage of Special Amnesty Law. - In order not to depreciate the crime of torture, persons who have committed any act of torture shall not benefit from any special amnesty law or similar measures that will have the effect of exempting them from any criminal proceedings and sanctions.

Section 21. Education and Information Campaign. - The CHR, the DOJ, the Department of National Defense (DND), the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and such other concerned parties in both the public and private sectors shall ensure that education and information regarding prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment shall be fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment. The Department of Education (DepED) and the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) shall also ensure the integration of human rights education courses in all primary, secondary and tertiary level academic institutions nationwide.

Section 17. Applicability of Refouler. - No person shall be expelled, returned or extradited to another State where there are substantial grounds to believe that such person shall be in danger of being subjected to torture. For the purposes of determining whether such grounds exist, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Secretary of the DOJ, in

Section 22. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions of the Revised Penal Code insofar as they are applicable shall be suppletory to this Act. Moreover, if the commission of any crime punishable under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) and Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of the Revised Penal Code is attended by any of the acts

Section 15. Torture as a Separate and Independent Crime. - Torture as a crime shall not absorb or shall not be absorbed by any other crime or felony committed as a consequence, or as a means in the conduct or commission thereof. In which case, torture shall be treated as a separate and independent criminal act whose penalties shall be imposable without prejudice to any other criminal liability provided for by domestic and international laws.

constituting torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as defined herein, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum period. Section 23. Appropriations. - The amount of Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated to the CHR for the initial implementation of tills Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The DOJ and the CHR, with the active participation of human rights nongovernmental organizations, shall promulgate the rules and regulations for the effective implementation of tills Act. They shall also ensure the full dissemination of such rules and regulations to all officers and members of various law enforcement agencies. Section 25. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect. Section 26. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 27. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.