People V Echegaray Digested.docx

People v Echegaray G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997 Per Curiam Facts: The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his tenyear old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death. The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. This was dismissed. On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant. In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659. Issue: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty. Ratio: One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws. The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments. Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions," Munoz- A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough

Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty. The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to reimpose the death penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was not completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time. We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their cause. Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion

perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be2. Whether or not the trial court’s haste in deciding the case resulted to imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in grave and serious errors to the prejudice of the defendants. court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; RULING: and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be1. No the death penalty is not unconstitutional. As settled in People singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous vs. Echagaray, death penalty is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or crimes." unusual punishment." It is an exercise of the state's power to It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of "secure society against the threatened and actual evil". Procedural heinousness must be squarely applied. and substantial safeguards to insure its correct application are We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with established. each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human standards2. No, the contention of the defendants that the speed the trial court of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and decided their case resulted in grave and serious errors to their consequences so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or prejudice. A review of the trial court's decision shows that its aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic findings were based on the records of this case and the transcripts agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated, of stenographic notes taken during the trial. The speed with which curtailed and altogether eradicated. the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to the Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision supposed to study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime judge studies a case long before the deadline set for the should first be perceived and statistically proven following the promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day period suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision between the filing of accused-appellants' memorandum and the require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when promulgation of the decision was sufficient time to consider their all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. arguments and to incorporate these in the decision. As long as the It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the same was in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he cannot be never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the taken to task for rendering his decision with due dispatch. The trial existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. court in this case committed no reversible errors and, Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in consequently, except for some modification, its decision should be the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to affirmed. rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said Double jeopardy crimes."

Against cruelty People vs. Mercado G.R. No. 116239 November 29, 2000 Bill of Rights People vs. Mercado G.R. No. 116239November 29, 2000

FACTS: The defendants were convicted by the trial court with the crime of kidnapping with murder and sentencing them the punishment of death. The defendants raised the constitutionality of death penalty and the alleged haste of the trial court in deciding the case resulting in grave and serious errors committed in convicting the accused. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional and "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment."

CUISON vs. CA and Valiant G.R. No. 88539 October 26, 1993 FACTS: Kue Cuison is a sole proprietorship engaged in the purchase and sale of newsprint, bond paper and scrap. Valiant Investment Associates delivered various kinds of paper products to a certain Tan. The deliveries were made by Valiant pursuant to orders allegedly placed by Tiac who was then employed in the Binondo office of petitioner. Upon delivery, Tan paid for the merchandise by issuing several checks payable to cash at the specific request of Tiac. In turn, Tiac issued nine (9) postdated checks to Valiant as payment for the paper products. Unfortunately, sad checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank.

Thereafter, Valiant made several demands upon petitioner to pay for the merchandise in question, claiming that Tiac was duly authorized by petitioner as the manager of his Binondo office, to enter into the questioned transactions with Valiant and Tan. Petitioner denied any involvement in the transaction entered into by Tiac and refused to pay Valiant.

Left with no recourse, private respondent filed an action against petitioner for the collection of sum of money representing the price of the merchandise. After due hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint against petitioner for lack of merit. On appeal, however, the decision of the trial court was modified, but was in effect reversed by the CA. CA ordered petitioner to pay Valiant with the sum plus interest, AF and costs.

ISSUE: WON Tiac possessed the required authority from petitioner sufficient to hold the latter liable for the disputed transaction HELD: YES As to the merits of the case, it is a well-established rule that one who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent and holds him out to the public as such cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such person in good faith and in the honest belief that he is what he appears to be

It matters not whether the representations are intentional or merely negligent so long as innocent, third persons relied upon such representations in good faith and for value. Article 1911 of the Civil Code provides: “Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers.”

The above-quoted article is new. It is intended to protect the rights of innocent persons. In such a situation, both the principal and the agent may be considered as joint tortfeasors whose liability is joint and solidary.

It is evident from the records that by his own acts and admission, petitioner held out Tiac to the public as the manager of his store in Binondo. More particularly, petitioner explicitly introduced to Villanueva, Valiant’s manager, as his (petitioner’s) branch manager as testified to by Villanueva. Secondly, Tan, who has been doing business with petitioner for quite a while, also testified that she knew Tiac to be the manager of the Binondo branch. Even petitioner admitted his close relationship with Tiu Huy Tiac when he said that they are “like brothers” There was thus no reason for anybody especially those transacting business with petitioner to even doubt the authority of Tiac as his manager in the Binondo branch. Tiac, therefore, by petitioner’s own representations and manifestations, became an agent of petitioner by estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon (Article 1431, Civil Code of the Philippines). A party cannot be allowed to go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who, in good faith, relied upon them. Taken in this light,. petitioner is liable for

the transaction entered into by Tiac on his behalf. Thus, even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to fact as though he had full powers (Article 1911 Civil Code), as in the case at bar. Finally, although it may appear that Tiac defrauded his principal (petitioner) in not turning over the proceeds of the transaction to the latter, such fact cannot in any way relieve nor exonerate petitioner of his liability to private respondent. For it is an equitable maxim that as between two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss

Self –incrimination

G.R. 125687, December 9, 1999 EXCLUSIONARY RULE ART III SECTION 3. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. FACTS: The accused was seen by the victim’s father with an ice pick and washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9 year old victim was later found dead and half naked with lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. He was convicted of homicide only. For his conviction, several circumstantial pieces of evidence were submitted including strands of his hair for comparison with the strands of hair found in the victim’s right hand at the scene of the crime as well as blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from his house. The accused-appellant avers the acquisition of his hair strands without his express written consent and without the presence of his counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his Constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to wit: Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. ISSUE: WON the evidence gathered, particularly accusedappellant’s hair strands can be admitted as evidence against him? HELD: Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police officers. Accused-appellant’s wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, accused-appellant’s garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence. 263 Phil. 1060

CRUZ, J.: The petitioner was indicted for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in an information reading as follows: That on or about March 6, 1982, in the Municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Primitivo Marcelo, a public officer being then a Deputy Sheriff in the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan and Atty. Alberto Domingo, a private law practitioner, conspiring, confederating and confabulating with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause undue injury to Reynaldo Sanchez and give Osaka Merchandising Co., Inc. unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge by accused Primitivo Marcelo of his official and administrative functions in connection with the enforcement of the Writ of Execution issued by the CFI of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 6336-M, entitled "Osaka Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Sanz Steel Corp." through manifest partiality and evident bad faith, by unlawfully taking, carrying and seizing one (1) Ford Fiera with Plate No. DCK 863, owned by and registered in the name of Reynaldo Sanchez, and as such not belonging to Sanz Steel Corp., which vehicle was not included in the notice of levy or execution of leased properties and without issuing any receipt therefor nor mentioning the same in the partial sheriff's returns on execution thereby making it appear that said vehicle was not seized, levied or taken away by accused Primitivo Marcelo and Alberto Domingo and, consequently deprived Reynaldo Sanchez of the use and possession of said vehicle. After trial, he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment from three to six years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and to pay the costs. His co-accused was acquitted on reasonable doubt that he had conspired with the petitioner.[1] The petitioner now comes to us seeking reversal of the judgment on the ground that it is tainted with error and grave abuse of discretion. The respondent court found that the petitioner abused his functions as a deputy sheriff in the implementation of a writ of execution. Specifically, he was held liable under Section 3(e) of the above-mentioned law, to wit: (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,

advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. It was established at the trial that on March 5, 1982, the petitioner went to the premises of the Sanz Steel Corporation to enforce a writ of execution against it in favor of the Osaka Merchandising Company. Instead of limiting himself to the properties he had earlier listed in the notice of levy,[2] he also took a Ford Fiera with license plate No. DCK 863 over the objection of Reynaldo Sanchez, who said the vehicle belonged to him. The petitioner did not issue a receipt for the vehicle.[3] He also did not list it in the partial sheriff's return on execution as among the properties seized by him in satisfaction of the judgment. [4] Testifying on his behalf, the petitioner declared that the Ford Fiera had originally been included in the notice of levy but he had to erase the entry on orders of Sanchez, who had threatened him.[5] Curiously, though, the vehicle was seized nonetheless. The petitioner gave no explanation for the non-inclusion of the Ford Fiera in the sheriff's return except to say that Atty. Domingo told him he would deny any involvement in the seizure.[6] The averment that the petitioner had been threatened is not acceptable in the light of the evidence that he was accompanied at the time by two armed constables.[7] The petitioner said that Sanchez closed the gates of the compound and turned off all the lights. Nevertheless, the petitioner does not deny that he was able to take out the Ford Fiera, along with all the articles listed in the partial return. We agree with the respondent court that the petitioner did not act toward the judgment creditor with manifest partiality, which it described as "a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other." [8] The record does not disclose such motivation. As the respondent court observed, "the evidence falls short of that quantum necessary to establish the fact that he had been manifestly or patently partial to the plaintiff's corporation." But while absolving the petitioner of such fault, the respondent court ascribes to him evident bad faith in acting as he did, resulting in injury to the complaining witness and incidental benefit to the judgment creditor. Citing authorities, the decision stresses that Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895, 1007). It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166167). Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage. Applying these very same definitions, we feel that the petitioner cannot in fairness be held liable under the indictment. We are persuaded from a study of the evidence that he was not actuated by

a dishonest purpose or ill will partaking of a fraud or some furtive design or ulterior purpose to do wrong and cause damage. In fact, what we see here is a rather confused person, prodded on the one hand by the judgment creditor's counsel and resisted on the other by the president of the judgment debtor. Both apparently exerted some kind of influence upon him that befuddled his mind and warped his judgment. In the end, he was left holding the bag, so to speak, and hardly able to explain himself. But despite his general confusion, this much he could say convincingly about the Ford Fiera. It was not unreasonable for him to mistake it as property of the judgment debtor because the name of Sanz Steel Corporation was clearly painted on its sides. Anyone would have assumed that it belonged to the corporation. Sanchez claimed having exhibited his registration certificate, but the petitioner denies this; and the respondent court noted that this document was produced only much later.[9] Significantly, after the vehicle had been towed away, Sanchez merely reported to the police that it had been "carnapped" and then simply left it at that.[10] As the respondent court observed: x x x Sanchez could have filed a third-party claim with the court issuing the writ of execution or he could have officially notified the Sheriff that he was adversely claiming the same. The fact remains that he submitted the certificate of registration long after the seizure. Our reading of this sorry mess is that because of the conflicting pressures exerted on him by Domingo and Sanchez, the petitioner excluded the Ford Fiera in the notice of levy he had earlier prepared and then, to be consistent, omitted it also in the list of the seized articles in his partial sheriff's return on execution. The petitioner says it was only after his arrest that he realized he had not included the vehicle in the return. This may or may not be true. But what we may ourselves say is that this omission was as much the fault of the petitioner as of the complaining witness, who should have demanded its inclusion for his own protection. We go further and add this. We believe that the petitioner is not liable even for "gross inexcusable negligence," as there is no showing that he had acted in a wantonly careless manner to the prejudice of the complaining witness. The breach of duty was not flagrant and palpable.[11] The petitioner had not acted recklessly or in utter disregard of consequences so as to suggest some degree of intent to cause injury.[12] Notably, the petitioner did not appropriate the vehicle for himself but left it in the compound of the judgment creditor.[13] As previously observed, there was plausible reason to suppose that the Ford Fiera belonged to the Sanz Steel Corporation which, significantly, was a family corporation with Sanchez as its president.[14] If the petitioner mistook the vehicle for property of the corporation, such mistake certainly cannot be considered so gross or inexcusable as to come under the sanctions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In any event, we are not prepared to affirm that the petitioner's acts and omissions border on the criminal and justify the penalty imposed on him. It seems to us that a more appropriate relief against the petitioner would be a civil action for damages or an administrative complaint

for the faulty implementation of the writ of execution. This observation should, of course, not be taken as a prejudgment of such cases if they are filed. We do feel, though, that the criminal action lodged against the petitioner was ill-advised and that his conviction, on the basis of the meager evidence submitted, was less than warranted. While this Court has always been implacable in the face of guilt that must be punished, it has also never hesitated to protect the innocent against an accusation that is palpably unjust, as in the case at bar. In earlier decisions, we have cautioned the prosecution against hasty indictments, lest the accused be needlessly molested and irreparably stigmatized. We now address a similar admonition, and in the same spirit, to the lower courts. That the innocent may not suffer from an undeserved sentence, we urge the judges to be more careful in theirevaluation of the evidence, always remembering that what is presumed in the free society is not the guilt of the accused but his innocence. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged decision is REVERSED. The petitioner is ACQUITTED, with no pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.