Right To Bail Due Process.docx

SEC 6- LIBERTY OF ABODE

Genuino, et al. vs. De Lima, as Secretary of DOJ G.R. No. 197930 FACTS: These consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders (TRO) and/or Writs of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assail the constitutionality of Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 41, series of 2010, otherwise known as the Consolidated Rules and Regulations Governing Issuance and Implementation of Hold Departure Orders, Watchlist Orders and Allow Departure Orders, on the ground that it infringes on the constitutional right to travel. On May 25, 2010, then Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the assailed DOJ Circular No. 41, consolidating DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, which govern the issuance and implementation of HDOs, WLOs, and ADOs. After the expiration of GMA’s term as President of the Republic of the Philippines as her subsequent election as Pampanga representative, criminal complaints were filed against her before the DOJ particularly plunder, malversation and/or illegal use of OWWA funds, illegal use of public funds, graft and corruption, violation of the OEC, violation of the Code of Conduct on Ethical Standards for Public Officials and qualified theft. In view of the foregoing criminal complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-422 against GMA pursuant to her authority under DOJ Circular No. 41. She also ordered for the inclusion of GMA’s name in the Bureau of Immigration (BI) watchlist. On October 20, 2011, two criminal complaints for Electoral Sabotage and Violation of the OEC were filed against GMA and her husband, Jose Miguel Arroyo. Following the filing of criminal complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-573 against GMA and Miguel Arroyo with a validity period of 60 days, unless sooner terminated or otherwise extended. Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 197930, HDO No. 2011-64 was issued against Genuinos, among others, after criminal complaints for Malversation and Violation of Sections 3(e), (g), (h) an (i) of R.A. No. 3019. The petitioners therein seek to annul and set aside the following orders issued by the former Secretary Leila De Lima, pursuant to the said circular. ISSUES: 1) Whether the DOJ has the authority to issue Circular No. 41; and 2) whether there is ground to hold the former DOJ Secretary guilty of contempt of Court.

HELD: 1) The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal basis. Under Sec 6, Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides three considerations that may permit a restriction on the right to travel: national security, public safety or public health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit provision of statutory law or the Rules of Court providing for the impairment.i To begin with, there is no law particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of the right to travel. To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment which underwent the scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President for approval. It is a mere administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law which the former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. It is, however, important to stress that before there can even be a valid administrative issuance, there must first be a showing that the delegation of legislative power is itself valid. It is valid only if there is a law that (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A painstaking examination of the provisions being relied upon by the former DOJ Secretary will disclose that they do not particularly vest the DOJ the authority to issue DOJ Circular No. 41 which effectively restricts the right to travel through the issuance of the WLOs and HDOs. Sections 1 and 3, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292 did not authorize the DOJ to issue WLOs and HDOs to restrict the constitutional right to travel. There is even no mention of the exigencies stated in the Constitution that will justify the impairment. The provision simply grants the DOJ the power to investigate the commission of crimes and prosecute offenders, which are basically the functions of the agency. However, it does not carry with it the power to indiscriminately devise all means it dee ms proper in performing its functions without regard to constitutionally-protected rights. The curtailment of fundamental right, which is what DOJ Circular No. 41 does, cannot be read into mentioned provision of the law. As such, it is compulsory requirement that there be an existing law, complete and sufficient in itself, conferring the expressed authority to the concerned agency to promulgate rules. On its own, the DOJ cannot make rules, its authority being confined to

execution of laws. The DOJ is confined to filling in the gaps and the necessary details in carrying into effect the law as enacted. Without a clear mandate of an existing law, an administrative issuance is ultra vires. To sum, DOJ Circular No. 41 does not have an enabling law where it could have derived its authority to interfere with the exercise of the right to travel. Thus, the said circular is unconstitutional. 2) In view of the complexity of the facts and corresponding full discussion that it rightfully deserves, the Court finds it more fitting to address the same in a separate proceeding. It is in the interest of fairness that there be a complete and e xhaustive discussion on the matter since it entails the imposition of penalty that bears upon the fitness of the respondent as a member of the legal profession. The Court, therefore, finds it proper to deliberate and resolve the charge of contempt against De Lima in a separate proceeding. SEC 7- Right to Info

RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET ORCURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY. A. M. No. 09-86- SC, June 13, 2012.

Facts: Rowena Paraan, Research Director of the PCIJ, sought copies of the SALN of the Justices of the Supreme Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their database of information on government officials.

Issue #1: Can the SALN of justices be accessed via the right to information? Ruling: Yes. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service Issue #2: What are the limitations on the constitutional right to information?

Ruling: The right to information is not absolute. It is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Jurisprudence has provided the following limitations to that right:(1) national security matters and intelligence information;(2) trade secrets and banking transactions;(3) criminal matters; and(4) other confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially known to public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.

AKBAYAN vs. Aquino G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 Facts: Petitioners, non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers requested, via the petition for mandamus and prohibition, to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. The Congress, through the House Committee called for an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive refused to give them the said copies until the negotiation was completed. JPEPA was the bilateral free trade agreement entered between the Philippine government with Japan, concerned with trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and final provisions.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to request for the full text of JPEPA. Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its power of inquiry and power to concur in treaties, from the negotiation process.

Discussion:

Standing In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which is a public right by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. As the present petition is anchored on the right to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives who additionally are suing in their capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence. From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure. “Showing of Need” Test In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a “sufficient showing of need” only means, in substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages in a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional adjudication involving fundamental rights. However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked the privilege, and it has been established that the subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party overcome the same by merely asserting that the information being demanded is a matter of public concern, without any further showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be whether an information is a matter of public concern. Treaty-making power of the President Petitioners argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations since whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international trade agreements is derived only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential Decree No. 1464.

The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties and international agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes. As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII – the article on the Executive Department. While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is exercised by the President only be delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations. This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still enure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution. It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a while that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate. Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members of the House of Representatives fail to present a “sufficient showing of need” that the information sought is critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty-negotiation.

Held: The petition was dismissed. Petitioner’s demand to be furnished with a copy of the full text of the JPEPA has become moot and academic, it having been made accessible to the public since September 11, 2006. As for their demand for copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the JPEPA negotiations, the same must be denied, respondents claim of executive privilege being valid.

Diplomatic negotiations have, since the Court promulgated its Resolution in PMPF v. Manglapus on September 13, 1988, been recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction and the reasons proffered by petitioners against the application of the ruling therein to the present case have not persuaded the Court. Moreover, petitioners both private citizens and members of the House of Representatives have failed to present a sufficient showing of need to overcome the claim of privilege in this case. That the privilege was asserted for the first time in respondents Comment to the present petition, and not during the hearings of the House Special Committee on Globalization, is of no moment, since it cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the privilege on the part of the Executive branch. For reasons already explained, this Decision shall not be interpreted as departing from the ruling in Senate v. Ermita that executive privilege should be invoked by the President or through the Executive Secretary by order of the President.

IDEALS VS PSALM (2012) Background of the case. A petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to permanently enjoin the sale of the Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-Water) which won the public bidding conducted by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM). FACTS: Respondent PSALM is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of RA 9136, also known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA). The EPIRA provided a framework for the restructuring of the electric power industry, including the privatization of the assets of the NAPOCOR, the transition to the desired competitive structure, and the definition of the responsibilities of the various government agencies and private entities. PSALM is mandated to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs in an optimal manner, which liquidation is to be completed within PSALM’s 25-year term of existence. On 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt hydro electric power plant located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, which will form part of the Angat Complex which includes the Angat Dam, Angat Reservoir and the outlying watershed area.

On 2009, PSALM’s Board of Directors approved the Bidding Procedures for the privatization of the Hydro Electric Power Plant. An Invitation to Bid was published in three major national newspapers where six competing firms enjoined, namely: K-Water US$ 440,880,000.00 Energy

First Gen Northern 365,000,678.00

San Corporation Aboitiz Inc. Trans-Asia Com

Miguel 312,500,000.00 Power-Pangasinan, 256,000,000.00 Oil & 237,000,000.00

DMCI Corporation

Energy Dev. Power 188,890,000.00

After a post-bid evaluation, PSALM approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, K-Water. Contention of the petitioner: That the participation in the bidding of and award of contract to K-Water which is a foreign corporation, PSALM clearly violated the constitutional provisions on the appropriation and utilization of water as a natural resource, as implemented by the Water Code of the Philippines limiting water rights to Filipino citizens and corporations which are at least 60% Filipino-owned. Further considering the importance of the Angat Dam which is the source of 97% of Metro Manila’s water supply, as well as irrigation for farmlands in 20 municipalities and towns in Pampanga and Bulacan, petitioners assert that PSALM should prioritize such domestic and community use of water over that of power generation. ISSUE: Whether PSALM violated Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution and the Water Code provisions on the grant of water rights. RULING: It is clear that the law limits the grant of water rights only to Filipino citizens and juridical entities duly qualified by law to exploit and develop water resources, including private corporations with sixty percent of their capital owned by Filipinos. Under the Water Code concept of appropriation, a foreign company may not be said to be “appropriating” our natural resources if it utilizes the waters collected in the dam and converts the same into electricity through artificial devices. Since the NPC remains in

control of the operation of the dam by virtue of water rights granted to it, as determined under DOJ Opinion No. 122, s. 1998, there is no legal impediment to foreign-owned companies undertaking the generation of electric power using waters already appropriated by NPC, the holder of water permit. Such was the situation of hydropower projects under the BOT contractual arrangements whereby foreign investors are allowed to finance or undertake construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure projects and/or own and operate the facility constructed. However, in case the facility requires a public utility franchise, the facility operator must be a Filipino corporation or at least 60% owned by Filipino.

and conditions of the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very issues affecting the contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its efficiency and dispensed with a primary condition.

Foreign ownership of a hydropower facility is not prohibited under existing laws. The construction, rehabilitation and development of hydropower plants are among those infrastructure projects which even wholly-owned foreign corporations are allowed to undertake under the Amended Build-Operate-Transfer (Amended BOT) Law (R.A. No. 7718).

AM No. 09-6-9-SC RE: Query of Mr. Prioreschi Re Exemption from Legal and Filing Fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.

Ganzon vs Inserto

FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon executed a deed of absolute sale of a parcel of land in favor of private respondents. Several months later, a deed of real estate mortgage was executed between the same parties to secure the payment by the private respondents of a promissory not in favor of petitioner. Private respondents filed a civil action against petitioners after Ganzon initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings in accordance with the terms and conditions of the said mortgage. Respondent judge ordered the substitution of the mortgage lien with a surety bond. ISSUE(S): Whether or not the order of respondent judge violates the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. HELD: YES. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond to ensure the payment of a loan would in effect change the terms

SEC 11- Free access tp the courts

Facts:
 Roger Prioreschi is the administrator of Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. He wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice seeking to be exempt from compliance with OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 (payment of legal fees). In addition, this law deals mainly with “individual indigent” and it does not include Foundations or Associationsthat work with and for the most Indigent persons. As seen in our Article of Incorporation, since 1985 the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. reached-out to the poorest among the poor, to the newly born and abandoned babies, to children who never saw the smile of their mother, to old people who cannot afford a few pesos to pay for “common prescriptions”, to broken families who returned to a normal life. In other words, we have been working hard for the very Filipino people, that the Government and the society cannot reach to, or have rejected or abandoned them. Can the Courts grant to our Foundation who works for indigent and underprivileged people, the same option granted to indigent people? Issue: Whether the court may grant to foundations like Good Shepherd Foundation Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees which it grants to indigent people Held: NO. Ratio Decidendi: The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus: Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the

provision on free access from the Constitution on the ground that it was already covered by the equal protection clause was defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature to such specific protection of the poor.

Sec. 21. Indigent party. — A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. Xxx Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.– Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from payment of legal fees. Xxx To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant’s affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant’s affidavit. The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of theRules of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants. That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a person’s poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer. There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for exemption in favor of a juridical person. For one, extending the exemption to a juridical person

on the ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too timeconsuming and wasteful for the courts.

Sec 12- custodial investigation Jesalva vs People Facts: In September 2007, Arnel Ortigosa, Renato Flores and Manny Boy Ditche were drinking in Dupax Street, Old Balara, Quezon City when they decided to go to a store to buy cigarettes. On their way to the store, Flores noticed defendant Roberto Jesalva standing in a corner near the store and staring at them. Jesalva then walked away but he came back with companions Ryan Menieva and Junie Ilaw. Menieva proceeded to stab Ortigosa twice with an ice pick. As Menieva stabbed Ortigosa, Ilaw pointed a sumpak at Ortigosa while the defendant pointed at Ortigosa's group. After th e stabbing, Ortigosa’s companions rushed him to EastAvenue Medical Center where he died.A warrant of arrest was issued against Menieva, Ilaw and the defendant. However, only the defendant was arrested. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder and denied any participation in the victim’s stabbing. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision holding that the defendant conspired with Menieva and Ilaw to kill Ortigosa. The RTC held that Flores positively identified the defendant in open court as the person who stabbed the victim. On November 18, 1997,

the RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence, not of the crime of Murder, but of Homicide. The RTC ratiocinated that, in the absence of any direct evidence or testimonies of eyewitnesses, treachery was not established, and that evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were not duly proven. When the case reached the Court of Appeals (CA), it decreased the defendant’s participation, stating that Menieva was the one who stabbed the victim while Jesalva only accompanied the perpetrators while pointing at the group of Ortigosa

Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA, however, denied in its Resolution dated April 7, 2009 for lack of merit. Hence, this Petition based on the following ground: B) THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE TRIAL COURT, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT STATEMENTS MADE BY PETITIONER IN THE POLICE STATION WERE ADMISSIBLE AS HE WAS THEN NOT UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DESPITE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY THE POLICE HAD HIS FISCAL-COMPANION NOT [TAKEN] HIM UNDER HIS CUSTODY. Petitioner argues that no evidence was ever introduced as to how, when, and where Leticia sustained her injuries. No witness ever testified as to who was responsible for her injuries. He refutes the prosecution’s contention that, even if he took the 6th Street, the same could still lead to the 7th Street, where Leticia’s house is located. Petitioner stresses that Olbes should have been considered as a suspect in this case, considering that he was the last person seen with Leticia when she was still alive. He avers that the statements he made at the police station are not admissible in evidence, considering that he was, technically, under custodial investigation, and that there was no waiver of his right to remain silent.36 Moreover, petitioner alleges that the fatal injuries sustained by Leticia, per the testimony of Dr. Abrantes, are consistent with a fall, thereby suggesting petitioner’s innocence. Petitioner claims that the evidence shows that there was more blood in Hazelwood than in the place where Olbes spotted Leticia, thereby suggesting that something worse than her jumping out of the vehicle might have happened. Held: Custodial investigation refers to "any

questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." This

presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him.39 The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements.40 The assailed statements herein were spontaneously made by petitioner and were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established that petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police station and voluntarily made the statement that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around 12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992.41The RTC and the CA did not, therefore, err in holding that the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable in the instant case. Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner could still be convicted of the crime of Homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in the crime through circumstantial evidence, which were credible and sufficient, and which led to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner committed the said crime. Indeed, when considered in their totality, the circumstances point to petitioner as the culprit.

PEOPLE VS. BOLANOS [211 SCRA 262; G.R. NO. 101808; 3 JUL 1992]

Facts: Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan. According to Pat. Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao, deceased was with two companions on the previous night, one of whom the accused who had a drinking spree with the deceased. When they apprehended the accused they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated. They boarded accused along with Magtibay, other accused on the police vehicle and brought them to the police station. While in the vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the deceased. RTC convicted him hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.

Held: Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, more particularly par. 1 and par. 3.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs PABLITO ANDAN

FACTS:

Marianne Guevarra, a second-year nursing student at Fatima was on her way to her school dormitory in Valenzuelal, Metro Manila when Pablito Andan asked her to check the blood pressure of the grandmother of Andan’s wife but there was nobody inside the house. She was punched in the abdomen by Andan and was brought to the kitchen where he raped her. She was left in the toilet until it was dark and was dragged to the backyard. It was when Andan lifted her over the fence to the adjacent vacant lot where she started to move. Andan hit her head with a concrete block to silence her and dragged her body to a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it.

The death of Marianne drew public attention which prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form a team of police officers to solve the case. Apart from the vacant lot, they also searched Andan’s nearby house and found evidences linked to the crime. The occupants of the house were interviewed and learned that accused-appellant was in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. A police team lead by Mayor Trinidad located Andan and took him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated where he said that Dizon killed the girl. The three were then brought to Andan’s house where he showed the police where the bags of Marianne were hidden. They were then brought back to the police station while waiting for the result of the investigation.

The gruesome crime attracted the media and as they were gathered at the police headquarters for the result of the investigation, Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approved him and whispered a request that they talk privately to which the mayor agreed. They went to another room and there, the Andan agreed to tell the truth and admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and the media representatives witness the confession. Mayor Trinidad first asked for a lawyer to assist the appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and recorded in video. In the presence of the media and his relatives, Andan admitted to the crime and disclosed how he killed Marianne and that he falsely implicated Larin and Dizon because of illfeelings against them.

However, appellant entered a plea of “not guilty” during his arraignment. He provided an alibi why he was at his father’s house at another barangay and testified that policemen tortured and coerced him to admit the crime but the trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of Andan to the mayor without the assistance of counsel is in violation of the constitution and cannot be admitted as evidence in court.

RULING: Under these circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the appellant’s confession before the mayor is inadmissible. A municipal mayor has “operational supervision and control” over the local police and may be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, Andan’s confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all and no police authority ordered the appellant to talk to the mayor. It was the appellant who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor acted as a confidant and not as a law enforcer and therefore did not violate his constitutional rights.

Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an

ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confession. Hence, we hold that appellant’s confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.

Andan was found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.

NAVALLO VS SANDIGANBAYAN

docketed in Sandiganbayan. A new order of arrest for the petitioner was issued by the Sandiganbayan.

Navallo filed a motion to quash contending that since he had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not double jeopardy sets it when petitioner was arraigned by the RTC.

HELD: Double jeopardy: requisites FACTS: Petitioner herein is the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia Naitonal Vocational School in del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. He was entrusted, as a Collecting and Disbursement Officer to hold in trust moneys and/ properties of the government of the Republic of the Philippines. That while being in the said position, he intentionally, feloniously and without lawful authority appropriate and misappropriate to his own private benefit, public funds he was holding in trust for the Government of the Philippines in the total amount to PHP16, 483.62. He as unable to account for the said amount during the audit.

Warrant of arrest was issued to arrest the petitioner but he was nowhere to be found.

On December 10, 1978, Sandiganbayan was created pursuant to PD No 1606, conferring to it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of the RPC

November 1984, when the petitioner herein was finally arrested. He was released on provisional liberty upon the approval of the bail bond. When arraigned by the RTC, he pleaded not guilty. Upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Quiñones-Marcos however opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. That matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was however

NO. In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.

Petition is dismissed.

People v. Mojello, 425 SCRA 11 (2004)

Facts

The victim was last seen with the appellant Bebot Mojello. On December 16,200 the body of Lenlen Rayco was found lifeless, naked and bruised on the seashore. The medico-legal report positively indicated that the victim was raped.

When apprehended by the police officers and was subjected to an investigation on 17 December 1996, the appellant admitted to the crime.

Six days after, on 23 December 1996, during custodial investigation, the appellant, assisted by his counsel, executed an extrajudicial confession to the crime.

The appellant was charged of the crime of Rape with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.The accused was arraigned and entered a not guilty plea. The lower court found him guilty. Hence, an automatic review of the case was submitted to the Supreme Court.

Issues

WON the extrajudicial confession of the appellant was admissible WON the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged

With regards to the second query, appellant alleges that the lower court erred in convicting him of the crime of rape with homicide sentencing him of the death penalty despite of the insufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove his guilt. The Court sustained the appellant’s conviction on the crime of rape based on his admission to the said crime, the medico-legal report and the witness’ testimony proving the corpus delicti but held that there was no sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant killed the victim or that the rape committed caused the death of the victim. Therefore, he cannot be convicted of the said special complex crime as that would raise a reasonable doubt to his guilt. The Court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime only that of statutory rape, the victim being 11 years old, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Ruling

The decision of the lower court was affirmed and was modified. The accused was found guilty of the crime of statutory rape.

Ho Wai Pang vs People of the Philippines

Ratio Decidendi SEC 13- Right to bail The appellant avers that his extrajudicial confession, and admissions therein, should be considered a fruit of a poisonous tree and being such, should be inadmissible as evidence against him. The Court disagrees. The Court finds the extrajudicial confession in compliance with the strict constitutional requirements of the right to counsel as enshrined in Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2. The Court observed that the confession itself expressly states that the investigating officers informed him of such rights Further, the appellant claimed that his confession was induced by a threat against his life. The Court took cognizance, however, of his failure to present evidence to prove such threat and neither did he file any case against the person who threatened him nor did he report such incident to his counsel. He also claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse. The Court also noted that even if improper interrogation methods were used at the start, it does not bar the possibility of having a valid confession by properly interrogating the subject.

PEOPLE VS. FORTES [223 SCRA 619; G.R. NO. 90643; 25 JUN 1993]

Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the accused. Following this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for accused’s provisional release. The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond was denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to bail.

Issue: Whether or Not the accused’s right to bail violated.

Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court.

Govt. of the United States v. Purganan

FACTS:

In accordance to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale an extradition request of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.

Jimenez then sought and was granted a TRO to prohibit the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition which was later on assailed by the SOJ. The Court initially dismissed the petition, but later on reverse its decision when it filed its Motion for Reconsideration and held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

On May 18, 2001, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC, the appropriate Petition for Extradition. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

Respondent Jimenez then filed an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, praying for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set a date for hearing. When the arrest warrant was issued, he was granted bail for his temporary liberty in the amount of one million pesos in cash.

ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Whether or not the respondent entitled to bail. Whether or not there is a violation of due process of law.

HELD:

Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments, to wit: SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof. (2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case.

1. No. On the basis of the Extradition Law, the word immediate was used to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from

them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments.

When it requires a speedy action on the petition, the trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.

GOV’T OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VS HON. OLALIA

Bail, Section 1, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure - is the surety for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. Extradition:

On the basis also of the Constitution, Section 2 Article III does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The Constitution only requires examination under oath or affirmation of complaints and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest. The judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused.

2. No, he's not entitled to post bail. Extradition case is different from ordinary criminal proceedings. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Jimenez should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

3. There is no violation of his right to due process. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

To sum all up, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.

FACTS: Respondent Muñoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of “accepting an advantage as agent”, and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the common law of Hongkong. The Hongkong Depoartment of Justice requested DOJ for the provisional arrest of respondent Muñoz; the DOJ forward the request to the NBI then to RTC. On the same day, NBI agents arrested him.

Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the order of arrest.

The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition by the Hongkong Department of Justice thru DOJ.

DOJ filed a petition for certiorari in this Court and sustained the validity of the arrest.

Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the RTC petition for extradition and arrest of respondent. Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the petitioner, initially the RTC denied the petition holding that there is no Philippine Law granting bail in extradition cases and that private responded is a “flight risk”.

Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent, which was granted. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition cases.

HELD: In Purganan case, the right to bail was not included in the extradition cases, since it is available only in criminal proceedings.

However the Supreme Court, recognised the following trends in International Law. [if !supportLists]1. [endif]The growing importance of the individual person in publican international law who, in the 20th century attained global recognition. [if !supportLists]2. [endif]The higher value now being given in human rights in international sphere [if !supportLists]3. [endif]The corresponding duty of countries to observe these human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations [if !supportLists]4. [endif]The of duty of this court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition on the other.

The modern trend in the public international law is the primacy placed on the sanctity of human rights.

Enshrined the Constitution “The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceeding before the a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified.

Examination of this Court in the doctrines provided for in the US Vs Purganan provide the following. [if !supportLists]1. [endif]The exercise of the State’s police power to deprive a person of his liberty is not limited to criminal proceedings. [if !supportLists]2. [endif]To limit the right to bail in the criminal proceeding would be to close our eyes to

jurisprudential history. Philippines has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been involved in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the tendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognisance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.

EXTRADITION, is defined as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with criminal investigation directed against him or execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal and criminal law of the requesting state or government. Thus characterized as the right of the a foreign power, created by treaty to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crimes within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative obligation of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.

The extradited may be subject to detention as may be necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time in the detention should be reasonable.

In the case at bar, the record show that the respondent, Muñoz has been detained for 2 years without being convicted in Hongkong.

The Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the individual his right to liberty and due process and should not therefor deprive the extraditee of his right to bail PROVIDED that certain standards for the grant is satisfactorily met. In other words there should be “CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE”.

However in the case at bar, the respondent was not able to show and clear and convincing evidence that he be entitled to bail. Thus the case is remanded in the court for the determination and otherwise, should order the cancellation of his bond and his immediate detention.

ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: DIGEST AND COMMENTSG.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015 Ponente: Bersamin

Doctrines: Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”

FACTS: On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.

Senator Enrile

a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.

b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.

HELD: 1. YES.

Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence. Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

(Source: wikifilipinas.org) Bail as a matter of discretion Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong.

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:

Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the court.

Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:

Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.

Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: “[S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

2. YES.

Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,

ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].