Research Paper To To Dept Phil, Hist And Rel, And Hak

TITLE: THE KENYAN FOREIGN POLICY 1963-2007: THE CHANGING NATURE AND ITS DIPLOMATIC IMPLICATIONS

Submitted to: Department of Philosophy, History and Religion Egerton University P.O. Box 536 – 20115 Egerton E-Mail: [email protected] Cell: +254 720 836179 Attn: Dr. Felistus K. Kinyanjui

Submitted by: Patrick Leo Kamau Magero, MA.1 Department of History and Archaeology University of Nairobi P.O. Box 30197 Nairobi E-Mail: [email protected] [email protected] Cell Phone: (+254) 724 517 238

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Patrick Leo Kamau Magero a PhD Candidate at the Department of History and Archaeology, University of Nairobi for Doctoral Studies and Senior Programme Officer Research at the Africa Peace Forum, Nairobi.

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THE KENYAN FOREIGN POLICY 1963-2007: THE CHANGING NATURE AND ITS DIPLOMATIC IMPLICATIONS INTRODUCTION Foreign policy is the strategy undertaken by a state or used by the government to guide its actions in the international arena. Foreign policy spells out the objectives state leaders have chosen to pursue in a given relationship or situation and the general means by which state leaders intend to pursue those objectives. It is the whole set of decisions and actions of a state in the external domain with an aim to secure national interest. Daily decisions made by various arms of the government that are involved in international relations are guided by the goal of implementing foreign policy. Kenya received her independence in 1963 taking rights, privileges and obligation in the international political system under international law. The inherited system of governance from the colonial authorities exhibited some gaps in the response to the national interest of an independent Kenya in the international arena. The change of regime from Kenyatta to Moi and now to Kibaki has had significant gap effect on the international relations and diplomacy. Therefore, the three regimes demonstrate their different approach to the Kenyan foreign policy with implications to international relations and diplomacy. Kenyan foreign policy lacked consistent direction in the absence of a recognizable and written foreign policy document. It is until the Kibaki regime that Kenya has made an attempt to have a foreign policy document. This challenges the attempt made by Kenya to respond to its national interest in the international arena. This

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paper presents the historicity of Kenyan foreign policy and its implication in the realization of its national interest in the globalized and yet globalizing world.

FOREIGN POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE The role of a state as a significant actor in both the national and the international arena is enormous. This role continues to be complicated with time by the ever changing environment, both at local and international level. The increasing complexity in the role of the state especially in international relations requires the adoption of a rational and functional foreign policy. States establish various organizational structures and functional relationships to create and carry out foreign policies. While the government through its agents seeks to achieve certain foreign policy objectives, there are other constrains that emanate from the internal and international arena.2 The constraining factor on the government’s pursuit of its foreign policy objectives calls for the development of a functional and rational foreign policy, which takes account of the internal and external challenges. There are three major debates or models on the foreign policy decisions. 3 First, the rational model of decision making holds that, officials choose actions whose consequences best help to meet the state’s established goals and objectives. Secondly, the organizational process model holds that, foreign policy decisions emanate from routine administrative procedures the state. Thirdly, the governments bargaining or bureaucratic politics model holds that foreign policy decisions are as a result of the negotiation among

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C. Mclelland, Theory and the International System, (New York: Macmillan, 1966). J. S. Goldstein, International Relations, 4th Ed., (New York: Longman, 2001), p. 194. See also, D. K. Orwa, “Continuity and Change: Kenya’s Foreign Policy from Kenyatta to Moi” in W. O. Oyugi, ed., Politics and Administration in East Africa, (Nairobi: Konrad Adeneur Foundation, 1992) p. 298. 3

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government agencies with different interests in the outcome. While the three propositions or models are identifiable in foreign policy decision making, it is hard to find a government that uses a single model. Most of the governments make use of two or three models at the same time. Foreign policy decisions are influenced by actions of the individual decision making leaders who are in turn influenced by other factors like their personalities, values, and beliefs ad interests.4 The Psychology of groups also plays a role in foreign policy decisions. The struggle between professional bureaucrats and politicians are evident in determining the direction of foreign policy.5 Public opinion especially in democratic states influences government’s foreign policy decisions. Since many factors influence the government’s decisions on foreign policy, a government should adopt a foreign policy that is functional and rational. Functional and rational foreign policy will be able to take into account all the relevant actors’ interests and at the same time, reduce chances of the government’s foreign policy creating friction in the international relations and the domestic arena. Foreign policy is essentially a reflection of a state’s quest for national identity and cohesion.6 Foreign policy emanates and presents national interest. This implies that foreign policy is the projection of a state’s domestic policy beyond its territorial boundaries. Therefore, foreign policy defines goals, sets precedents, and puts down course of action, and actions taken to implement those actions.7 This can be long range or 4

Research Proposal on Understanding Obstacles to Peace in the Great Lakes Region: Actors, Interests and Strategies, submitted by The Concern for Development Initiatives in Africa (forDIA) Submitted to Peace Conflict and Development initiative International Development Research Centre Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office. p. 8. 5 M. Mwagiru, “The Elusive Quest: Conflict, Diplomacy, and Foreign Policy in Kenya” in P. G. Okoth and B. A. Ogot (Eds), Conflict in Contemporary Africa, (Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2000), p. 181. 6 J. W. Spanier, World Politics in an Age of Revolution, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), p. 249. 7 K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prantice-Hall, 1972).

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short range depending on the state’s particular interest.8 All states seek to succeed in the conduct of its foreign policy.

KENYAN FOREIGN POLICY Kenya received her independence in 1963 taking rights, privileges and obligation in the international political system under international law. Kenya inherited its system of governance from the colonial authorities. The inherited system of governance exhibited some gaps in the response to the national interest of an independent Kenya which were reflected in Kenyan foreign policy. During the first period (Kentatta’s regime), the country’s foreign policy was guided with the unfolding events particularly facing territorial integrity and Cold War polarization9. Kenyatta’s regime demonstrates anti-communist sentiment during Kenyatta’s regime. During this period defense took a centre stage and was base on a (non) policy of wait and see. During this time, Kenya was faced with secessionist movements and other countries’ expansionist policies. The 1961 claim for the Northern Frontier District (NFD) now North Eastern Province by the Somalis on the basis of historical, cultural and racial reasons persisted to post-independence. The claim by Uganda on part of the Rift Valley based on historical linkages was boiling underneath but in 1976 President Idi Amin made an explicit claim of that territory. Tanzania could have claimed the Maasai territory in Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia had border disputes with Kenya. On Cold War polarization, Kenya accepted all foreign aid from Western countries and never severed its diplomatic relations with Western countries during Kenyatta’s regime. However, during that time 8

J. N. Rosenau, “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy” in R. B. Farrell (ed), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, (Evanston IL: Northwestern University press, 1966), pp. 32-49. 9 Orwa, “Continuity and Change: Kenya’s Foreign Policy from Kenyatta to Moi” in W. O. Oyugi, ed., Politics and Administration in East Africa, op. cit., p. 307.

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Kenya had strained relationship with the Eastern bloc. Kenya rejected foreign aid from the Soviet Union in 1966, it also developed strained diplomatic relations the People’s Republic of China in 1966 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Economic adventure together with the pursuance of open market economy influenced Kenya’s foreign policy during Kenyatta’s regime. Although there were some industries that produced goods for export most of the exports ended up in Eastern Africa with minimal returns to make Kenya economically prosperous. Kenya mostly relied on export of primary products especially coffee and tea whose returns were diminishing with time. Kenya ended up in economic dependency whereby, it sought to attract foreign investment and financial assistance without commitment. While during Kenyatta’s regime the country was struggling to set up its road map in governance and international relations. Kenya did not construct a clear direction of its foreign policy. This does not mean that Kenya did not have a foreign policy. However, its foreign policy was scattered in the independence declarations, KANU manifesto of 1961 and 1963, statement of the president and seasonal papers. Kenya did not craft a rational and recognizable foreign policy statements or document. Therefore, during Kenyatta’s regime the country’s foreign policy was in ambiguous motion. The management of foreign policy and diplomatic service did not stand on a clearly defined principle statement but was reactionary to unfolding events. Without a clearly written and recognizable foreign policy, management of the foreign policy is incapacitated making Kenyan foreign policy to be casually handled. For example, during the President Kenyatta’s regime, the Kenyan foreign policy was reactionary in nature to the events in the international system. During this time, Kenya as

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a new state was struggling with principles of international law and locked in the Cold War divide did not embark on an aggressive foreign policy.10 In this situation Kenya adopted both realism within Eastern Africa and idealism with the rest of the world in its foreign policy approach.11 The unfolding events in the world and within Kenya shaped the country’s foreign policy. Kenya under Kenyatta reacted to events that were unfolding. In this approach Kenya did not have a shaped foreign policy with a direction. Instead the (non)foreign policy that existed is that of “wait and see”. Foreign policy under this regime was personalized and centered on the president. The change of regime from Kenyatta to Moi and now to Kibaki has had significant effect on international relations and diplomacy. The three regimes demonstrate their different approach to foreign policy and implicitly had different national interests. This is because all along Kenyan foreign policy was personalized lacking a consistent direction in the absence of a recognizable and written foreign policy document. Orwa notes that “It is normal to expect that a regime change in a developing country such as Kenya should mean a significant shift in policy, especially foreign Policy.”12 President Moi’s regime was characterized by the foreign policy of conflict management. This was a significant step to shape the direction of Kenyan foreign policy. However, this policy of conflict management was not consistent at certain points particularly in the 1990s it declined. The reason given for the declining Kenyan foreign policy of conflict management is the transcendence of similar diplomacies particularly

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S. O. Kwasa, “Training of Kenyan Diplomats Since 1962” in D. Kappeler (ed), Training Third World Diplomats, (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1990), pp. 117-124. 11 D. K. Orwa, “Continuity and Change: Kenya’s Foreign Policy from Kenyatta to Moi” in W. O. Oyugi, ed., Politics and Administration in East Africa, op cit., p. 300. 12 D. K. Orwa, “Continuity and Change: Kenya’s Foreign Policy from Kenyatta to Moi” in W. O. Oyugi, ed., Politics and Administration in East Africa, op cit., p. 297.

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that of South Africa.13 Kenya lacked an aggressive approach within a proper framework of conflict management. During Moi’s regime attempted to exert itself as a heavyweight in diplomacy in the African region and particularly in the Horn of Africa and the East Africa sub-region by attempting to resolve internationalized conflicts in the region.14 This was demonstrated by its attempt to manage the Uganda conflict that was between Tito Okello’s government and Yoweli Museveni’s rebel group in 1985.15 The same can be seen in the Kenya’s management of the Mozambique conflict that was between Frelimo government and Renamo rebel group in 1989.16 Other recent attempts can be seen in the Sudan and Somalia IGAD peace processes in which Kenya took a leading role.17 Kenya was deeply involved in the IGAD’s peace process on Somalia without having formulated a consistent foreign policy for Somalia.18 Although this helped in the management of the Somalia conflict by making Kenya an acceptable mediator, Kenya found itself forced by situations at one point or another to side either with Ethiopia or Djibouti which already had a clear foreign policy on Somalia. The change of government in 2002 raised a significant challenge to Kenyan foreign policy. The exit of Moi from office negatively affected Kenyan foreign policy. 13

M. Mwagiru, “Issues, Problem, and Prospects in Managing the Diplomatic Services in Small States” in Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 30: 1, winter 2006. pp. 197-198. 14 M. Mwagiru, The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation, 1985, (Phd Dessertation, Rutherford College, University Of Kent at Canterbury, 1994), pp. 280-282. 15 M. Mwagiru, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management, (Nairobi: Watermark, 2000), p. 159. 16 B. Posthumus, “Mozambique: An End to An Imported War” In M. Mekenkamp, P. Van De Veen (Eds), Searching for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities, (Utrecht: European Platform For Conflict Prevention And Transformation, 1999), p. 416. 17 See O. Kamudhayi, “The Somali Peace Process” in M. Mwagiru (Ed.) African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization, (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004), pp. 107-123. , See also O. I Gamal, The Challenges of Sub-Regional Organization in Managing Conflict: IGAD Mediation on the Sudan Conflict (1993-2004), (Diploma Dissertation Submitted to the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi, 2006). 18 O. Kamudhayi, “The Somali Peace Process” in M. Mwagiru (Ed.) African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization, op. cit., p. 118.

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Having set a foot in conflict management, Moi knew how to go about the mediation process. His departure and the entry of NARC government into office with different vision for Kenya did not take a lot of attention to conflict management. Therefore, during the initial periods of Kibaki’s regime the IGAD peace process on Somalia went on recess.19 The Moi regime was more interested in creating Pax Nairobiana and president Moi’s attempt to assert himself as a regional peace broker20 by hosting peace processes in the region. The Kibaki regime is more interested in economic recovery with less attention to conflict management. The weakening of the Kenyan foreign policy can also be demonstrated in the management of the Zaire (now Congo DRC) conflict. While Kenya took the first and leading role to call the heads of states to discus the Zaire crisis in Nairobi, Kenya did not sustain that initiative.21 The whole process was hijacked by South Africa. Another critical issue in the Zaire conflict is that Kenya under Moi changed its long policy of recognition of states to recognition of the government of Mobutu. The Kenyan government curved out a mediating role in the initial stages of the peace initiative that led to the signing of the General Peace Agreement on the conflict in Mozambique. Although Kenya did this with considerable success, where the first direct talks between Frelimo and Renamo were held in Nairobi in August 1989, Kenyan influence in that peace initiative soon declined.22 Kenya has also been accused of having inconsistence in its foreign policy in apartheid

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Ibid., pp. 107-123. See M. Mwagiru, The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation, 1985, op. cit., pp. 280-282. 21 M. Mwagiru, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management, op. cit., p. 159. 22 B. Posthumus, “Mozambique: An End to an Imported War” in M. Mekenkamp, P. Van De Veen (Eds), Searching for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities, op. cit., p. 416. 20

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South Africa.23 These illustrations demonstrate weakening and declining foreign policy in Kenya. While Kenya has developed and pursued its foreign policy since independence, it did not have a recognizable and written foreign policy. Lack of a foreign policy document in Kenya evoked a debate on whether to have a written foreign policy document or have a ‘wait and see’ approach to foreign policy.24 While the approach of ‘wait and see’ has been employed in the past, it can not be projected to continue in the near future as international relations and diplomacy continue to grow and become complex. In East Africa, Tanzania pioneered an attempt to draft a foreign policy document. 25 Later, Kenya followed suit in drafting a foreign policy document. From independence to the late 1970s, Kenya did not have a long term strategic vision on its conduct of foreign policy. It embraced ‘wait and see’ approach in its conduct of foreign policy. This was an ad hoc way in which the Kenyan foreign policy was conducted. Therefore, the foreign policy was conducted in a reactionary way to bilateral and multilateral international relations without shaping a consistent and coherent operational setting.26 Such an approach is a short sighted one and cannot be projected to continue in the future. In the 1980s, Kenyan foreign policy under Moi’s regime took a different direction. Kenyan foreign policy centered on conflict management instead of being reactionary to the unfolding circumstances and events of the international system as was 23

C. M. Katumanga, The Politics of Foreign Policy Executive: Consistencies and Inconsistencies in Kenya’s Foreign Policy Towards South Africa 1978-1992, (MA Thesis Submitted to the Department of Government, University of Nairobi, 1995). 24 M. Mwagiru, “Issues, Problem, and Prospects in Managing the Diplomatic Services in Small States” in Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, op. cit., pp. 196-198. 25 United Republic of Tanzania, New Foreign Policy, (Dar-es Salaam: Government Printer, 2001). 26 K. Orwa, “Continuity and Change: Kenya’s Foreign Policy from Kenyatta to Moi” in W. O. Oyugi, (Ed), Politics and Administration in East Africa, (Nairobi: Knorad Adneur Foundation, 1992), pp. 359-394.

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the case in Kenyatta’s regime. Realizing that Kenyan national interest in the region seemed remote in the presence of many protracted and dysfunctional conflicts in the Great Lakes, Horn of Africa and the East Africa conflict systems in which Kenya is part,27 Kenya sought to address its interest by managing conflicts in these conflict systems. The conflict management attempts by Kenya in the 1980s also went down to the South African conflict system as observed in the 1989 management initiative on the conflict in Mozambique.28 Kenya’s engagement in the management of conflicts in Africa was based on an attempt to secure outcomes that would serve Kenya’s contemporary and future interests better.29 In making Kenya appear in the diplomatic map, the period of 1980s served in bringing Kenya into picture and this period can be referred to as, the golden period of Kenya’s diplomacy of conflict management.30 While this foreign policy and diplomacy of conflict management took centre stage although not consistently sustained in the 1980s, it declined during the 1990s. The declining trend in the 1990s was occasioned by the emerging regional actor with similar diplomacies like Ethiopia and Djibouti and South Africa after the end of the Cold War. This can be demonstrated in the management of the Mozambique in 1989 where Kenya led to initiate the process but soon found its influence declining in the whole process which led to the signing of the General Peace agreement in 1992. Another declining trend can be found in the case of the then Zaire (now Congo DRC) conflict in which the 27

M. Mwagiru, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management, op. Cit., pp. 76-85. B. Posthumus, “Mozambique: An End to An Imported War” in M. Mekenkamp, P. Van De Veen (Eds), Searching for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities, Op. Cit., Pp. 413-421. 29 M. Mwagiru, “Issues, Problems and Prospects in Managing the Diplomatic Service in Small States” in The Fletcher Forum Of World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter, 2006), P. 197. 30 M. Mwagiru, “Issues, Problems and Prospects in Managing the Diplomatic Service in Small States” in The Fletcher Forum Of World Affairs, op. cit., pp. 197-198. see also, M. Mwagiru, “The Elusive Quest: Conflict, Diplomacy, and Foreign Policy in Kenya” in P. G. Okoth and B. A. Ogot (Eds), Conflict in Contemporary Africa, op. cit., pp177-189. 28

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Kenyan government summoned the heads of states to discuss the ways and methodologies of resolving the Zaire conflict. The declining role is demonstrated in the fact that Kenya took the first and leading role to manage the Zaire conflict, but the whole process was soon hijacked by South Africa. Although it has been argued that the management of Zaire crisis by Kenya did not take place in an institutional framework, it reflects the declining role of Kenya’s foreign policy and diplomacy of conflict management. In the years of 1990s Kenya seemed to suffer from the end of the ‘golden period’ of the foreign policy and diplomacy of conflict management. With the declining role of Kenyan foreign policy and diplomacy of conflict management in the 1990s, Kenya started to revitalize its foreign policy of conflict management. This can be seen in the management of the Sudan conflict from about 1995 and Somalia conflict from 2000. Although Kenya took a leading role in the management of these conflicts, it did so under an institutional framework contrary to that of Uganda in 1985, Mozambique in 1989 and the then Zaire in 1996. Even though the management of the Sudan and Somalia conflicts was not strictly a Kenyan affair, Kenya played a significant role by hosting and providing the chief mediators. With the conclusion of the IGAD mediation on the Sudan and Somalia conflicts and subsequent signing of peace accords, Kenya received significant credit in its diplomacy of conflict management although the same credit also went to IGAD and friends of IGAD, and IGAD and neighboring states for the Sudan and Somalia peace processes respectively. The involvement of Kenya in the management of the Sudan and Somalia conflicts were based on ad hoc arrangement on which personalities played a significant role than a clear direction on the Kenyan foreign policy. This lack of consistent direction of foreign

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policy was for example demonstrated in the pressure Kenya received to replace Mboya and Mwangale as the chairs of the peace processes in the Sudan and Somalia conflicts respectively to which Kenya yielded.31 Particularly the replacement of Mwangale with Kiplagat did not arguer well to the Somali leaders during the peace process. The Somali leaders needed a mediator who had easy access to the corridors of power and Kenyan state house.32 On the other hand, the replacement process which was not systematic complicated the Somalia peace process during the start of Kiplagat’s tenure. In the 1980’s onward centered on conflict management, its foreign policy was in a state of ambiguous motion since independence. This incapacitates the management and direction of the Kenyan foreign policy. Foreign interference also took a center stage during Mois regime. While Kenyatta’s regime had close tie with western countries in terms of economic and diplomatic relations, Moi’s regime especially since 1988 had strained relationship with Western countries for what Moi saw as foreign meddling of internal affairs.33 During Moi’s regime diplomatic relationship with Eastern bloc improved including the 1980 visit of President Moi to China and subsequent signing of economic and cultural agreements. This marks a significant turn in foreign policy and diplomacy. During Kenyatta’s regime, it was unimaginable severing diplomatic relations with the Western countries. During the Kenyatta’s and Moi’s regimes there was personalization of foreign policy and diplomacy.

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See S. M. Kwaje, “The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha” and O. Kamudhayi, “The Somali Peace Process” In M. Mwagiru (Ed.) African Regional Security in the Age Of Globalization, op. cit., pp. 95-123 32 O. Kamudhayi, “The Somali Peace Process” In M. Mwagiru (Ed.) African Regional Security in the Age Of Globalization, op. cit., p. 111. 33 K. Orwa, “Continuity and Change: Kenya’s Foreign Policy from Kenyatta to Moi” in W. O. Oyugi, (Ed), Politics and Administration in East Africa, op. cit., p.321.

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However, the personality of the president in foreign policy and diplomacy increased during president Moi’s regime. The Kibaki regime desperately seeking resources to implement its election campaign pledges embraced a foreign policy of economic development. In this regard, it became more concerned with the attraction of foreign investment to increase employment opportunities. It also moved around the world shopping for development partners to help in the reconstruction of the economy. Regional integration, particularly the COMESA and East African Cooperation have taken center stage. Kenya under Kibaki took a leading role in fast tracking the East African integration. The hope in this integration process is that the products from the Kenyan industries would get an expanded market and the surplus trained personnel could get jobs in the neighboring countries. President Kibaki himself has taken a leading role in the search for development partners through his continuous appeal to investors and visits to many countries to promote his development agenda and seek development partners. The foreign tour of president Kibaki has taken him to all those countries that showed interest in becoming development partners including Saudi Arabia. The president has also taken substantial time receiving international trade delegations and explaining his investment interest. Kibaki’s regime has also embrace an aggressive reform in the public sector to enable service delivery. This in turn has improved the image of the country in the face of prospective investors. Privatization of public enterprises and liberalization of the economy has taken center stage. Under Kibaki there has been rationalization of the ministry of foreign affairs to enable the country to manage its foreign policy. The drafting of the foreign policy

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document has been going on to give the Kenyan foreign policy a direction to avoid ad hoc and personalization of foreign policy and diplomatic service. However, it is not clear whether that document will be subjected to the scrutiny of the general public to remove biased that may lead to personalization and marginalization in serving the national interest. Currently the civil society and particularly the NGO groups are agitating that the document be made public.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS The first phase of Kenyan foreign policy was that of wait and see. The management of foreign policy and diplomatic service was reactionary to particular situations. The foreign policy and diplomatic service was that of “wait and see” reacting to the unfolding events in the international system. This approach was challenged by lack of proper training in the management of foreign policy and diplomatic service. The management of foreign policy and diplomatic service was fragmented without properly conceived systematic approach. This kind of implementation of foreign policy is weak to advance the interest of a state in the international plane. This can be demonstrated by the Cold War divide that locked tangled President Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga who were key to the founding and governance of the country. The second phase of Kenyan foreign policy was characterized by attempt to engage in regional conflict management. Conflict management and particularly cases of those that are protracted is a complex undertaking. Kenyan attempt to manage conflicts in the region did not deliver much as observed in the case of Uganda, Mozambique and former Zaire (now Congo DRC). Kenyan foreign policy of conflict management declined

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during President Moi’s tenure. President Moi did not effectively engage competently trained personnel to manage the foreign policy of conflict management. Instead, Moi personalized the whole process of managing foreign policy and diplomatic service. 34 Conflict management mostly utilized politicians until later in the 1990s that Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat as a career diplomat entered into scene as a principal negotiator. Without well trained personnel in conflict management and a rational foreign policy, Kenya ended up declining in its foreign policy of conflict management. The management of foreign policy and diplomatic service was declining during Moi’s tenure due to lack of or under utilization of professional career diplomats, lack of rational and recognizable foreign policy document. Instead, Moi personalized the foreign policy of conflict management resulting to poor performance in the face of emerging regional powers that were more aggressive. It was easy for the president to change foreign policy from its traditional orientation. President Moi easily made a shift from recognition of states to recognition of the government as was the case with Mobutu’s regime in Zaire. The third phase of the Kenyan foreign policy entered with the entry of the NARC government in power. The wining of NARC in the 2002 general election characterized the declining role of personalized government affairs. The demand for performance in delivering to the electorates became compelling. This demand by the citizens requires the relevant ministries to engage competent personnel who can perform instead of having a large work force that is poorly prepared to handle the responsibilities assigned to them. The ministry of foreign affairs in this situation has no choice but to address its performance in delivering the fruits of diplomacy.35 The cutting of the costs and regional 34

M. Mwagiru, “The Elusive Quest: Conflict, Diplomacy, and Foreign Policy in Kenya” in P. G. Okoth and B. A. Ogot (Eds), Conflict in Contemporary Africa, op. cit. 177-189. 35 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Strategic Plan 2005-2010. pp. xi – xii, (art. 5); p. 23 (art. 68).

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representation requires an effective utilization of personnel engaged in the management of foreign policy and diplomatic service. Kibaki’s regime also benefited from the lack of a rational and recognizable foreign policy statement. Kibaki’s regime opted to make a significant shift from the foreign policy of conflict management that was dominant during Moi’s regime to the foreign policy of economic development. During president Kibaki’s time economic restructuring to attract foreign investment took a centre stage. Regional integration and diplomatic relationships that seemed to facilitate economic development for Kenya are of keen interest. President Kibaki has been visiting different countries to market the country a destination of foreign investment and opening markets for Kenyan products. The regime has also sought to increase its development partners. The compartmentalization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and giving prominence to the economic department fragments the country’s foreign policy that should instead balance all departments. During Kibaki’s regime many Ambassadors and High Commissioners have been appointed to replace those who served during Moi’s regime. However, there has been rationalization of the ministry of foreign affairs operation with the drafting of the strategic plan.36 However, the strategic plan was not centered on a rational and recognizable foreign policy statements or document but on the basis of the current government’s inclination and preferences. The challenge with this approach is that, any regime that comes to power can adjust the operations of the Ministry to its interests and inclinations. There is a needed reform to have functional, rational and recognizable foreign policy and even representation in diplomatic relations would deliver the fruits of 36

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Strategic Plan 2005-2010. pp. xi – xii, (art. 5); p. 23 (art. 68).

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international relations and diplomatic engagement. In this way, the country will be in the right track in responding to its current call to be result oriented. This will untie foreign policy and diplomacy from the hands of few people who are self-seeking and selfserving. While Kenyan foreign policy has made strides in history it has continued to be ambiguous in nature. The change of regimes implies a significant approach to foreign policy including the changing of the foreign policy itself. The changes of foreign policy in the independent Kenya have also made a significant impact on diplomatic relations. This has resulted to strain and even severing of diplomatic relations especially during the Kenyatta’s and Moi’s regimes. The changing nature of Kenyan foreign policy leading to the subsequent rearrangement in diplomatic relations demonstrates the lack of a serious long-term strategic vision on the Kenyan foreign policy. Lack of consistent and coherent foreign policy since independence has only acted to the interest of the few (political elites) as opposed to the large population of Kenyan citizens. There has not a serious effort to define national interest that is all inclusive. One of the tests for defining an all inclusive national interest is the development of a foreign policy document that receives its legitimacy from the citizenry as opposed to few political elites.

CONCLUSION The state’s involvement in diplomacy is to influence international relations and politics for its own maximum advantage, but also, with an international responsibility that such state’s policies are in the interest of world harmony.37 Foreign policy serves the interest of the state, while diplomacy implements a countries foreign policy. Foreign 37

R. G. Feltham, Diplomatic Handbook, 5th Ed. (New York: Longman, 1988), p. 1.

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policy and diplomatic service are concomitant realities. Foreign policy guides the type of diplomacy a state adopts in international relations. Through diplomacy, foreign policy finds its expression and implementation. This means that, there is need for a coordinated approach in their management, without which foreign policy and diplomatic services can perform far much below the expectation in terms of delivering the benefits of international engagement in the globalized and yet globalizing world. While the debate over the importance of retaining permanent missions in the contemporary international relations is relevant, it is important to note that for the effective management of foreign policy and diplomacy, permanent missions are important even though they are very expensive especially to poor economies like Kenya. Economic constraints facing Kenya and other poor states necessitate the need to have fewer diplomatic missions that are representational and cost effective. In this way, multiple accreditations remain an option for Kenya in the management of foreign policy and diplomatic service. While multiple accreditations may pose its challenges in the management of foreign policy and diplomatic service to Kenya, it is important for the managers of foreign policy and diplomatic service to device ways in which they can sell the idea of multiple accreditations to other states such that it does not look like downgrading diplomatic relations. This can be done effectively by incorporating this strategy of representation in the strategic plan for the ministry of foreign affairs. When the representational policy is incorporated in the strategic plan of the ministry of foreign affairs, it may be relatively easier to convince the other states that multiple representation is not in any way downgrading diplomatic relations but a matter of policy.

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In the world that is already globalized and continuing to globalize, diplomacy should be able to deliver its fruits. The direction that Kenya as a poor state needs to take is that of evaluating the performance of diplomatic missions. This calls for a continuous review of the diplomatic mission and their location. This can be done periodically especially during the drafting of every strategic plan for the ministry of foreign affairs. This should be done in such a way that there is a consideration on the performance of diplomatic mission in terms of delivering its fruits in the face of the changing foreign policy. Therefore, in the management of foreign policy and diplomatic service, it is important that the utilization of the staff involved in the Foreign Service is optimal. Diplomatic missions should also be optimally located, that is, it can be in one state or one mission can be utilized for representation of Kenya in several countries within a particular region. The reason for doing all this is to manage foreign policy and Foreign Service in such a way that there will be optimal performance in terms of delivering their fruits at a minimum cost. While there is an entire need for effective diplomatic relation in the age of globalization, the rationale for the management of foreign policy and diplomatic service is to take into account the limited resources facing small or poor economies like Kenya without compromising the quality of international relations and diplomacy. Therefore, Kenya needs to change significantly from the approach that involves the quantity of diplomatic representation to that of the quality of diplomatic representation. This will salvage Kenya from resource deficit in its diplomatic conduct against the delivery of the diplomatic fruits.

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There is a needed reform to have functional, rational and recognizable foreign policy and even representation in diplomatic relations would deliver the fruits of international relations and diplomatic engagement. This is the best direction for the future of Kenyan foreign policy and diplomatic service, which is quality and result oriented as opposed to quantity in the delivery of diplomatic fruits. Therefore, in so doing, Kenya is likely to develop and sustain not only a rational but also a functional, coherent and consistent foreign policy and diplomatic service.

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Kwasa, S. O. “Training of Kenyan Diplomats Since 1962” in D. Kappeler (ed), Training Third World Diplomats. Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1990. Lerche, C. O. and A.A. Said. Concepts Of International Politics: In Global Perspective. 3rd Ed. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1979. M. Mwagiru, “Issues, Problem, and Prospects in Managing the Diplomatic Services in Small States” in Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. Vol. 30: 1, winter 2006. Mclelland, C. Theory and the International System. New York: Macmillan, 1966. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Strategic Plan 2005-2010. Mwagiru, M. “Issues, Problems and Prospects in Managing the Diplomatic Service in Small States” in The Fletcher Forum Of World Affairs. Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter, 2006 Mwagiru, M. “The Elusive Quest: Conflict, Diplomacy, and Foreign Policy in Kenya” in P. G. Okoth and B. A. Ogot (Eds), Conflict in Contemporary Africa. Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2000. Mwagiru, M. Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management. Nairobi: Watermark, 2000.. Mwagiru, M. The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation, 1985. Phd Dessertation, Rutherford College, University Of Kent at Canterbury, 1994. Orwa, D. K. “Continuity and Change: Kenya’s Foreign Policy from Kenyatta to Moi” in W. O. Oyugi, ed., Politics and Administration in East Africa. Nairobi: Konrad Adeneur Foundation, 1992. Posthumus, B. “Mozambique: An End to an Imported War” In M. Mekenkamp, P. Van De Veen (Eds), Searching for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities. Utrecht: European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1999. Research Proposal on Understanding Obstacles to Peace in the Great Lakes Region: Actors, Interests and Strategies, submitted by The Concern for Development Initiatives in Africa (forDIA) Submitted to Peace Conflict and Development initiative International Development Research Centre Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office. Rosenau, J. N. “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy” in R. B. Farrell (ed), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics. Evanston IL: Northwestern University press, 1966. Spanier, J. W. World Politics in an Age of Revolution. London: Pall Mall Press, 1967

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