Remedies To Recover.docx

REPUBLIC vs PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS as Judge ESGUERRA, J.: Petition to review the order of the CFI dismissing the complaint instituted by the plaintiff to declare null and void Free Patent No. V-466102 and Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 issued to defendant Isagani Du Timbol; to order defendant to surrender the owner's duplicate of O.C.T. No. P2508 and the defendant Register of Deeds to cancel the same; to decree the reversion of the land to the mass of public domain. The land covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied for by Precila Soria. In 1966, transferred it to defendant Isagani Du Timbol who filed his application on Feb 3, 1969, On Dec 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the President and on July 20, 1970, after transmittal of the patent to the ROD (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 was issued Timbol. On August 5, 1971, Republic (Bureau of Forestry) filed a complaint in CFI to declare free OCT null and void ab initio and to order the reversion of the land to the mass of public domain on the ground that the land is a forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public Land Act; that in a reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity, the said land was plotted on Bureau of Forestry map L.C. 700 to be inside the area which was reverted to the category of public forest, whereas the application for free patent by Isagani Du Timbol was filed on June 3, 1969, or more than eleven years thereafter; that the said patent and title were obtained fraudulently as Isagani Du Timbol never occupied and cultivated the land applied for. Invoking the case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-28591, 30 SCRA 207-301), holding that a certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and void ab initio, unless the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land covered by the application is part of the public domain when it is not, the respondent court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Certificate of Title based on the patent had became indefeasible in view of the lapse of the one-year period prescribed under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act for review of a decree of title on the ground of fraud. From this order of June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines has appealed to this Court for review. After careful deliberation, this Court grants the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title is not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and, hence the patent and title thereto are null and void.

The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the state in an action for reversion of the land when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest reservation. As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973. Although the Director of Lands has jurisdiction over public lands classified as agricultural under the constitution, or alienable or disposable under the Public Land Act, and is charged with the administration of all laws relative thereto, mineral and timber lands are beyond his jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code). That the area in question is a forest or timber land is clearly established by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958. When the defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his application for free patent over the land in question on June 3, 1969, the area in question was not a disposable or alienable public land but a public forest. Titles issued to private parties by the Bureau of Lands when the land covered thereby is not disposable public land but forest land are void ab initio. In Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-17619, Oct. 31, 1962, 6 SCRA p. 508, 512, this Court said: And if it be true that the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue a patent because the land involved was still inalienable forest land when granted, then it may be plausibly contended that the patent title would be ab initio void, subject to attack at any time by any party adversely affected. (Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-17619, Oct. 31, 1962, supra, citing Civil Code Arts. 1409 and 1421; Vaño vs. Insular Gov't., 41 Phil. 161; Aderable vs. Director of Forestry, L-13663, March 25, 1960). A patent is void at law if the officer who issued the patent had no authority to do so (Knight vs. Land Ass., 142 U.S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct., 258, 35L ED. 974; emphasis supplied). If a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have

jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included. (See Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769) The case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L28591, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 297, relied upon by respondent Court in dismissing this case, is not controlling. In that case no forest land was involved but agricultural public land which was first covered by a patent issued to one party and later registered under the Torrens System by the other party. The litigation was between private parties where the party who registered it under Act No. 496 sought the nullity of the title of the patentee under the Public Land Act. In the case at bar the party seeking the nullity of the title and reversion of the land is the state itself which is specifically authorized under Section 101 of the Public Land Act to initiate such proceedings as an attribute of sovereignty, a remedy not available to a private individual. The complaint alleges in its paragraph 8 that applicant Isagani Du Timbol was never in possession of the property prior to his filing the application, contrary to the provisions of law that the applicant must have been in possession or cultivation thereof for at least 30 years; that the applicant, after diligent search by the Acting Chief of the Survey-Party, Francisco R. Alcones, in South Cotabato, could not be contacted because he is a resident of Davao City; that there are no existing signs of improvements found in the area in question as it is not under cultivation but covered with grasses, bushes and small trees; that it is being used as ranch for grazing cows by the heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot; that no monuments were placed on the area surveyed which goes to show that there was no actual survey thereof; that the property in question is inside the ranch of the heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1244 and, therefore, inside the forest zone; and that said ranch has a fence around it to show that other persons could not enter and cultivate the same, and that the signature of then Acting District Land Officer Elias de Castro of South Cotabato has been forged to facilitate the issuance of patent in favor of Isagani Du Timbol. The above alleged circumstances are indicative of fraud in the filing of the application and obtaining title to the land, and if proven would override respondent Judge's order dismissing the case without hearing. The misrepresentations of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land and residing thereon are sufficient grounds to nullify the grant of the patent and title under Section 91 of the Public Land Law which provides as follows:

That statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions or parts of any concession, title or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement thereon or omission of facts, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statement, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted. ... A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name although the property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17696, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA, 71, 79-80; emphasis supplied). The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title. (J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindog, L-15398, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938, page 38). Considering that it is the state is seeking the cancellation of the title, said title has not become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against the state. A title founded on fraud may be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof, through a petition filed in court by the Solicitor General, (Sumail vs. Court of First Instance of Cotabato, 51 O.G. p. 2414 Phil. L-8278. 96 Phil. 946: Eugenio, et al., vs. Perdido, et al., G. R. No. L-7083, May 19, 1955; De los Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap G.R. No. L-6088, Feb. 24, 1954, 94 Phil. 405). Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands vs. Jugado et al., G.R. No. L-14707, May 23, 1961). Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the state (Article 1108, paragraph 4 of the New Civil Code). The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred prescription (Republic of the Philippines vs. Ramona Ruiz, et

al., G.R. No. L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348. People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. L-15484, Jan. 31, 1963, 47 SCRA 12; Government of the Philippines vs. Monte de Piedad 35 Phil. 728; 751-753). Even granting that the title of private respondent Isagani Du Timbol can no longer be reopened under the Land Registration Act, the land covered thereby may be reconveyed to the state in an action for reconveyance under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act), for the remedy of reconveyance is adequately covered by the prayer of the complaint for the grant of such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises. FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent court, dated June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint, and that of September 29, 1973, denying the motion for its reconsideration, both issued in Civil Case No. 1253 of the respondent court, are hereby annulled and set aside. The respondent court shall proceed to hear said Civil Case and render judgment thereon accordingly. Costs against respondent Isagani Du Timbol. Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE MARIANO M. UMALI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 23, Trece Martires City, REMEDIOS MICLAT, JUAN C. PULIDO, ROSALINA NAVAL, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAVITE, respondents. CRUZ, J.: The petitioner seeks reversion of a parcel of land on the ground that the original sale thereof from the government was tainted with fraud because based on a forgery and therefore void ab initio. The present holders of the property claiming to be innocent purchasers for value and not privy to the alleged forgery, contend that the action cannot lie against them. The land in question is situated in Tanza, Cavite, and consists of 78,865 square meters. 1 Land was originally purchased on installment from the government on July 1, 1910 by Florentina Bobadilla, who allegedly transferred her rights thereto in favor of Martina, Tomasa, Gregorio and Julio, all surnamed Cenizal, in 1922. 2 Tomasa and Julio assigned their

shares to Martina, Maria and Gregorio. 3 In 1971 these three assignees purportedly signed a joint affidavit which was filed with the Bureau of Lands to support their claim that they were entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title over the said land on which they said they had already made full payment. 4 On the basis of this affidavit, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources executed Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) on September 10, 1971, in favor of the said affiants. 5 Subsequently, on October 13, 1971, TCT No. 55044 (replacing Bobadilla's OCT No. 180) was issued by the register of deeds of Cavite in favor of Maria Cenizal, Gregorio Cenizal, and (in lieu of Martina Cenizal) Rosalina Naval, Luz Naval, and Enrique Naval. 6 When the complaint for reversion was filed on October 10, 1985, the registered owners of the land, following several transfers, were Remedios Miclat under TCT No. 80392, Juan C. Pulido under TCT No. 80393, and Rosalina, Luz and Enrique Naval under TCT No. 80394. 7 They were named as defendants and asked to return the property to the State on the aforestated grounds of forgery and fraud. The plaintiff claimed that Gregorio Cenizal having died on February 25, 1943, and Maria Cenizal on January 8, 1959, they could not have signed the joint affidavit dated August 9, 1971, on which Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) was based. 8 In their answer, Pulido and the Navals denied any participation in the joint affidavit and said they had all acquired the property in good faith and for value. By way of affirmative defenses, they invoked estoppel, laches, prescription and res judicata. 9 For her part, Miclat moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the government had no cause of action against her because there was no allegation that she had violated the plaintiff's right, that the government was not the real party-in-interest because the subject land was already covered by the Torrens system, and that in any event the action was barred by prescription or laches. 10 The respondent court, in its order dated October 2, 1987, granted the motion. 11 The petitioner, contesting this order, now insists that it has a valid cause of action and that it is not barred by either prescription or res judicata. The Court will observe at the outset that the joint affidavit is indeed a forgery. Apart from the fact that two of the supposed affiants were already dead at the time they were supposed to have signed the sworn statement, even the most cursory examination of the document will show that the three signatures affixed thereto were written by one and the same hand. 12 There is no doubt about it. It is indeed difficult to understand how such an obvious forgery could have deceived the people in the Bureau

of Lands who processed the papers of this case and made possible the fraudulent transfer of the land. But given such deception, would the sale itself be considered null and void from the start, as the petitioner insists, so as to make all titles derived therefrom also ineffectual ab initio? We agree with the contention that there is no allegation in the complaint 13 filed by the petitioner that any one of the defendants was privy to the forged joint affidavit or that they had acquired the subject land in bad faith. Their status as innocent transferees for value was never questioned in that pleading. Not having been disproved, that status now accords to them the protection of the Torrens System and renders the titles obtained by them thereunder indefeasible and conclusive. The rule will not change despite the flaw in TCT No. 55044. Section 39 of the Land Registration Act clearly provided: Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrance except those noted on said certificate. The rulings on this provision are indeed as numerous as they are consistent: Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 (then Sec. 39 of the Land Reg. Act), every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of the encumbrances which may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except those mentioned by law as existing against the land prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the whole world, including the government. 14 xxx xxx xxx A holder in bad faith is not entitled to the protection of Sec. 39 of the Land Registration Act. 15

xxx xxx xxx The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the owner might rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. 16 The decision in Piñero v. Director of Lands 17 is not applicable to the present proceeding because the lands involved in that case had not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. They were still held by the Pineros. The action for reversion was filed by the government against them as the original transferees of the properties in question. They were the direct grantees of the free patents issued by the government pursuant to which the corresponding certificates of title were issued under the Torrens system. The fraud alleged by the government as a ground for the reversion sought was imputable directly to the Pineros, who could not plead the status of innocent purchasers for value. The difference between them and the private respondents is that the latter acquired the land in question not by direct grant but in fact after several transfers following the original sale thereof to Bobadilla in 1910. The presumption is that they are innocent transferees for value in the absence of evidence to the contrary. The petitioner contends that it was Pedro Miclat who caused the falsification of the joint affidavit, but that is a bare and hardly persuasive allegation, and indeed, even if true, would still not prove any collusion between him and the private respondents. The mere fact that Remedios Miclat was the daughter and heiress of Miclat, without more, would not necessarily visit upon her the alleged sins of her father. The Solicitor General also argues that Remedios is an extension of the juridical personality of her father and so cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value because she is charged with knowledge of her father's deceit. Such conclusion has no basis in fact or law. Moreover, there is evidence that Remedios did not merely inherit the land but actually purchased it for valuable consideration and without knowledge of its original defect. The agreement to subdivide, 18 which she presented to show that she had acquired the land for valuable confederation, is more

acceptable than the conjectures of the petitioner. It is also consonant with the presumption of good faith. The land being now registered under the Torrens system in the names of the private respondents, the government has no more control or jurisdiction over it. It is no longer part of the public domain or, as the Solicitor General contends — as if it made any difference — of the Friar Lands. The subject property ceased to be public land when OCT No. 180 was issued to Florentina Bobadilla in 1910 or at the latest from the date it was sold to the Cenizals in 1971 upon full payment of the purchase price. As private registered land, it is governed by the provisions of the Land Registration Act, now denominated the Property Registration Decree, which applies even to the government. The pertinent provision of the Land Registration Act was Section 122, which read as follows: Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. 19 This should be related to Section 12 of the Friar Lands Act, providing thus: Sec. 12. . . . upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest, the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two (Sec. 122) of the Land Registration Act. The petitioner claims that it is not barred by the statute of limitations because the original transfer of the land was null and void ab initio and did not give rise to any legal right. The land therefore continued to be part of the public domain and the action for this reversion could be filed at any time. The answer to that is the statement made by the Court in Heirs of Tanak Pangawaran Patiwayan v. Martinez 20 that "even if respondent Tagwalan eventually is proven to have procured the patent and the original certificate of title by means of fraud, the land would not revert back to the State," precisely because it has become private land. Moreover, the petitioner errs in arguing that the original transfer was null and void ab initio, for the fact is that it is not so. It was only voidable. The land remained private as long

as the title thereto had not been voided, but it is too late to do that now. As the Court has held in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals. 21 A certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and void ab initio, unless the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain, although it is not. In such case the nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Inasmuch as the land involved in the present case does not belong to such category, OCT No. 282-A would be merely voidable or reviewable (Vda. de Cuaycong vs. Vda. de Sengbengco, 110 Phil. 113): (1) upon proof of actual fraud; (2) although valid and effective, until annulled or reviewed in a direct proceeding therefor (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590), not collaterally (Sorongon vs. Makalintal, 80 Phil. 259, 262; Director of Lands vs. Gan Tan, 89 Phil. 184; Henderson vs. Garrido, 90 Phil. 624,630; Samonte vs. Sambilon, 107 Phil. 198,200); (3) within the statutory period therefor (Sec. 38, Act 496; Velasco vs. Gochuico 33 Phil. 363; Delos Reyes vs. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420; Snyder vs. Provincial Fiscal, 42 Phil. 761, 764; Reyes vs. Borbon, 50 Phil. 791; Clemente vs. Lukban, 53 Phil. 931; Sugayan vs. Solis, 56 Phil. 276, 279; Heirs of Lichauco vs. Director of Lands, 70 Phil. 69); (4) after which, the title would be conclusive against the whole world, including the Government (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 596; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883; J. M. Tuason vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615). And as we declared in Municipality of Hagonoy vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources: 22 . . . Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of public domain and becomes private property over which the director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. A public land patent, when registered in the corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens Title, and becomes as indefeasible as Torrens Title upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance

thereof. Said title is, like one issued pursuant to a judicial decree, subject to review within one (1) year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Beyond said period, the action for the annulment of the certificate of title issued upon the land grant can no longer be entertained. (Emphasis supplied). It is worth observing here that in two earlier cases, the private respondents were challenged by the heirs of Matilde Cenizal Arguson but both were dismissed and the titles of the registered owners were confirmed by the trial court. 23 This decision was later sustained by this Court. 24While this is not to say that the present petition is barred by res judicata, as the government was not a party in these cases, it does suggest that the issue it wants to rake up now has long been settled. It should not be the subject of further judicial inquiry, especially at this late hour. Litigation must stop at some point instead of dragging on interminably. The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive if not even violent. The government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. As in this case. We find that the private respondents are transferees in good faith and for value of the subject property and that the original acquisition thereof, although fraudulent, did not affect their own titles. These are valid against the whole world, including the government. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

ANTONIO PIÑERO, JR., EMMA BERNAD (assisted by her husband Norberto Bernad) and FORTUNATO PIÑERO, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, SEGUNDO M. REYES, in his capacity as the Provincial Land Officer of Zamboanga del Norte, MARIANO D. PALERMO, in his capacity as Deputy Public Lands Inspector, NICANOR ALASAAS, EUSEBIO CAMANSI and TOMAS SUMALPONG, respondents. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, SEGUNDO M. REYES, in his capacity as the Provincial Land Officer of Zamboanga del Norte and MARIANO D. PALERMO, in his capacity as Deputy Public Lands Inspector, respondents-appellants. Porferio E. Mah for petitioners-appellees. Officer of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Francisco J. Bautista for respondents-appellants. BARREDO, J.:p Appeal by the Solicitor General from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in its Civil Case No. 1128, granting the writ of prohibition prayed for by appellees against the appellant Director of Lands, the Provincial Land Officer of the same province and other subordinate officials who, by order of said director, had initiated an investigation of alleged fraud claimed to have led to the issuance of the Free Patents and corresponding Certificates of Title to the said appellees. This appeal was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on February 20, 1973, the decision of the trial court being based exclusively on a stipulation of facts as follows: 1. That Antonio Piñero, Jr., and Emma Piñero Bernad are residents of Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte; while Fortunate Piñero is presently a resident of Negros Oriental; 2. That the identities of Lots Nos. 5790, 5792 and 2532, all of Pls- 100, situated at Napuyan, Dapitan, Zamboanga del Norte, are submitted (sic); . 3. That Lot No. 5790, Pls - 100 is covered by Free Patent No. V-63411 issued January 30, 1957 in favor of Antonio Piñero, Jr., and Lot No. 5792 Pls - 100 is covered by Free Patent No. V-

63420 issued on January 30, 1957 in favor of Emma Piñero Bernad, and that Lot 2532 is applied for by Fortunato Piñero under Homestead Application No. V-66441 approved as of January 2, 1953, but up to the present no Patent has as yet been issued; . 4. That Lot 2532 was formerly part of PSU 111118, a private survey executed by Surveyor Calixto Sudiacal in 1939 for Fortunato Piñero and that by subsequent survey executed by the ECA, Psu-111118 was subdivided into smaller lots, one of which is now Lot 2532; . 5. That pursuant to Free Patent No. V-63411, Original Certificate of Title No. D-5349 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte in favor of Antonio Piñero, Jr., on October 17, 1957; . 6. That pursuant to Free Patent No. V-63420, Original Certificate of Title No. P-5312 was issued by Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte, in favor of Emma Piñero on October 17, 1957; . 7. That on August 8, 1958, the Director of Lands issued an order directing the investigation of the protest of Eusebio Camansi, against the patented application of Antonio Piñero Jr., a copy of said order being found on page 14 of the expediente; and that on March 24, 1959 the Director of Lands thru the Chief Legal Division directed the Provincial Land Officer at Dipolog, to investigate the protest of Nicanor Alasaas against the patented application of Emma Piñero Bernad, a copy of said order is also being on page 15 of the expediente; 8. That as regards Lot 5790 Pls - 100 the protest of Eusebio Camansi has been given due course against the claim of Antonio Piñero Jr., which protest has been investigated and terminated, Antonio Piñero Jr., being represented by his counsel Atty. Jesus Sarmiento; 9. That Nicanor Alasaas filed his protest dated February 27, 1958 and subscribed on March 11, 1958, before Notary Public, G.R. Dalmacio, Jr., a copy is hereto attached as Exhibit A; and that the protest of Nicanor Alasaas has been investigated by Atty. Mariano D. Palermo,

investigator of the Bureau of Lands, Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte on August 30, 1959; 10. That with respect to Lot 5792 the same has already been investigated and regarding Lot 5790 the investigation has already been terminated but no decision has as yet been issued; 11. That with respect to the claim of Tomas Sumalpong against the application of Fortunato Piñero an investigation was conducted on August 21, 1959 but neither Fortunato Piñero nor counsel appeared; that when the said case was rescheduled for October 30, 1959, Atty. Jaime T. Hamoy counsel for Fortunato Piñero filed a motion for postponement on the ground that said counsel had a Criminal Case to attend to in the Justice of the Peace Court of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, after which the hearing was rescheduled for December 28, 1959; that in said hearing counsel for Fortunato Piñero for the first time attacked the authority of the investigation on the alleged ground that under the Revised Administrative Code only the Director of Lands and Chief of Section of said Office can order investigation of land conflicts; that up to the present no resolution of that issue has as yet been made; and that no written motion bearing on the same ground interposed before the investigator was ever raised before the Director of Lands; 12. That pursuant to a letter of Atty. Candido Pa. Sumalpong as counsel for Tomas Sumalpong under date of July 28, 1959, protesting against the above-mentioned homestead application of Fortunato Piñero which letter was addressed to the Director of Lands thru the Provincial Land Officer at Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte, the said Provincial Land Officer in the first indorsement dated July 22, 1959 addressed to Deputy Public Lands Inspector, Mariano D. Palermo, directed the investigation of the case until the said case is terminated for disposition under the provision of Land Administrative Order No. 13-3 that the said first indorsement was the sole authority for the investigation of the claim of said Tomas Sumalpong against the homestead

application of Fortunato Piñero that as above stated the investigation of the claim of Tomas Sumalpong was not terminated because counsel for Fortunato Piñero attacked the authority for the said investigation; 13. That in connection with the separate petition of the respondents, Nicanor Alasaas, Eusebio Camansi and Tomas Sumalpong against the application of the petitioners the same respondents were required by the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Lands in a letter dated September 4, 1959 to file a sworn protest and pay the protest fee within a period of thirty days from the receipt of the said letter, otherwise the respondents claim will be dismissed and disregarded without further notice; that a copy of said letter is hereto attached as an integral part of this stipulation of facts as Exhibit "B"; that there is no showing that respondents complied with the said letter nor is there any showing that the claim of the respondents are already dismissed (that is as of this date); that on December 18, 1959 the petitioners, thru counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the alleged protest but up to the present no resolution on has ever been made; that as shown by this letter of September 4, 1959 which was addressed to Antonio Mabulay, Annex "B" respondents Tomas Sumalpong, Nicanor Alasaas and Eusebio Camansi were not given copy of this letter, and that the motion of counsel for the "Dismiss the Protest" (sic) does not show that respondents Tomas Sumalpong, Eusebio Camansi and Nicanor Alasaas were ever furnished a copy of said motion; 14. That the Director of Lands was actually served with summons on January 20, 1960 as shown by the return of the City Sheriff of Manila, which return appears on page 25 of the record of this case; 15. That for all matters not covered by this stipulation of facts parties agree to ask for a date for the reception of evidence. We hold the appeal to be meritorious. In the light of the facts disclosed in the foregoing stipulation, We reiterate Cebedo vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-12777, May 22, 1961, 2 SCRA 25,

wherein We held that it is not only the right but the duty of the Director of Lands to conduct the investigation of any alleged fraud in securing a free patent and the corresponding title to a public land and to file the corresponding court action for the reversion of the same to the State, if the facts disclosed in the course of such investigation should so warrant. Consequently, prohibition cannot be issued to enjoin such an investigation despite the existence of a Torrens title. Indeed, it is to be clarified that Section 91 of the Public Land Act leaves no other alternative to the Director of Lands. The provision reads thus: SEC. 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein or omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are true, or whether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the purpose of such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts. In every investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoenas or subpoenas duces tecum lawfully issued by the Director of Lands or his authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and specific answers to pertinent questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation may issue without further proceedings.

Underlying this section and providing its justification is the Regalian doctrine embodied in Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution of 1935, in force during the material dates of the events herein involved, declaring that "all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain . . and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State...." And underKrivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461, "the scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation." Accordingly, the right to acquire disposable lands from the State through any of the means provided for in the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act 141, must necessarily be subject to the reservation expressly made in above quoted Section 91 to the effect that "the statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any ... title ... issued on the basis of such application" and that "any false statement therein or omission of facts altering, changing or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto 1 produce the cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted." It is true that under Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, a Torrens title issued on the basis of a free patent or a homestead patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured. And in repeated previous decisions of this Court that indefeasibility has been emphasized by Our holding that not even the Government can file an action for annulment, but at the same time, it has been made clear that an action for reversion may be instituted by the Solicitor General, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. 2 It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an ever existing authority, thru its duly authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for the reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing

such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government. Nothing said above, however, should be understood as holding that the Court has found that the titles of appellees have been in fact fraudulently secured. That matter may be resolved only after the Director of Lands shall have finished his investigation. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is reversed and the writ of prohibition sought by appellees is denied. Costs against appellees.

HEIRS OF AMBROCIO KIONISALA, namely, ANA, ISABEL, GRACE, JOVEN and CARMELO, all surnamed KIONISALA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF HONORIO DACUT, namely: VISAMINDA D. OREVILLO, VIOLETA DACUT, JOSEPHINE DACUT and ELIZABETH DACUT, respondents. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: ONCE MORE we are faced with the erroneous application of what are perceived to be elementary rules of pleading. The misapprehension of the basic concepts underlying these rules can be befuddling, but what is worse, the lost man-hours spent in untangling the ensuing allegations of pleading errors causing unnecessary delay in the adjudication of cases. Instead of immediately resolving the original dispute and adjudicating the merits of conflicting claims, which in the instant petition involves the ownership of two (2) parcels of land with the sizable area of 187,718 square meters, the judicial process is unfortunately wasted in the maze of unfounded claims of deficiencies in the parties pleadings. On 19 December 1995 private respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles, reconveyance and damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-312 Of the Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. This complaint involved two (2) parcels of land known as Lot No. 1017 and Lot No. 1015 with areas of 117,744 square meters and 69,974 square meters respectively, located in Pongol, Libona, Bukidnon. On 7 September 1990 Lot No. 1017 was granted a free patent to petitioners Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala under Free Patent No. 603393, and on 13 November 1991 Lot 1015 was bestowed upon Isabel Kionisala, one of the impleaded heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala under Free Patent No. 101311-91904. Thereafter, on 19 November 1990Lot 1017 was registered

under the Torrens system and was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-19819 in petitioners name, while on 5 December 1991 Lot No. 1015 was registered in the name of Isabel Kionisala under Original Certificate of Title No. P-20229. In support of their causes of action for declaration of nullity of titles and reconveyance, private respondents claimed absolute ownership of Lot 1015 and 1017 even prior to the issuance of the corresponding free patents and certificates of title. They further alleged in their complaint x x x x 2. That plaintiffs are absolute and exclusive owners and in actual possession and cultivation of two parcels of agricultural lands herein particularly described as follows [technical description of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017] x x x x 3. That plaintiffs became absolute and exclusive owners of the abovesaid parcels of land by virtue of inheritance from their late father, Honorio Dacut, who in turn acquired the same from a certain Blasito Yacapin and from then on was in possession thereof exclusively, adversely and in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years. In fact Honorio Dacut has had this parcels of land rented by the Philippine Packing Corporation for more than twenty years (20) up to the present time; 4. That recently, plaintiff discovered that defendants, without the knowledge and consent of the former, fraudulently applied for patent the said parcels of land and as a result thereof certificates of titles had been issued to them as evidenced by certificate of title No. P-19819 in the name of the Hrs. of Ambrocio Kionisala and No. P-20229 in the name of Isabel Kionisala, xerox copies of the titles hereto attached and marked as annexes A and B and made part hereof; 5. That the patents issued to defendants are null and void, the same having been issued fraudulently, defendants not having been and/or in actual possession of the litigated properties and the statement they may have made in their application are false and without basis in fact, and, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources not having any jurisdiction on the properties the same not being anymore public but already private property; 6. That in the remote possibility that said certificates of title cannot be declared as null and void, plaintiffs, being the absolute and exclusive owners of the parcels of land titled by the defendants, are entitled to reconveyance x x x x WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that judgment issue: 1. declaring certificates of title No. P-19819 and P-20229, null and void, and in the event that this remedy is not possible, ordering defendants to reconvey to plaintiffs the land subject matter of this litigation x x x x

The complaint was accompanied by a verification and certificate of non-forum shopping which affirmed under oath thus I, VISAMINDA DACUT OREVILLO, after being duly sworn, states: That I am one of the plaintiffs in the above-entitled case; that we have caused the preparation and filing of the same and that all allegations contained therein are true and correct to the best of my own knowledge; That we have not filed any case in any court or bodies affecting the same subject matter. On 7 February 1996 petitioners filed their answer to the complaint and asserted the following affirmative defenses 8. That the complaint states no cause of action; 9. That the cause of action, if any, is barred by statute of limitations, prescription of action or by equitable principle of laches; 10. That x x x it is only the Director of Lands (now DENR) through the Office of the Solicitor General that has the authority to file annulment of Free Patent or Homestead Patent issued by the Director of Lands or DENR; That the complaint is not supported by certification of non-forum shopping as required by Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of the Supreme Court x x x x Petitioners set for hearing their affirmative defenses. After the hearing, or on 3 December 1996 the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the cause of action of private respondents was truly for reversion so that only the Director of Lands could have filed the complaint, and that the certificate of non-forum shopping accompanying the complaint did not comply with the standard form for such undertaking. [1] On 23 December 1996private respondents moved for reconsideration of the order of dismissal but on 3 June 1997 the motion was denied by the trial court. On 7 June 1997 private respondents appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals. On 15 February 2000 the appellate court promulgated its assailed Decision reversing the order of dismissal.[2] The Court of Appeals ruled that while the allegations in the complaint were insufficient for purposes of an ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of a certificate of title since the actual date when private respondents became owners of Lots 1015 and 1017 prior to the issuance of the corresponding free patents and certificates of title was not specifically indicated in the complaint, nonetheless the allegations therein were comprehensive enough to constitute a cause of action for reconveyance.[3] The appellate court concluded: On this score, it was reversible error for the lower court to have dismissed the complaint x x x because in an action for reconveyance, what is sought is the transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name, to its rightful

and legal owner or to one with a better right x x x. [4] The appellate court likewise found substantial compliance in the certificate of non-forum shopping[5] by citing Cabardo v. Court of Appeals[6] and Kavinta v. Court of Appeals.[7] On 7 March 2000 petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision. On 22 January 2001 the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit, hence this petition for review. At the core of the instant petition is the issue of sufficiency of the complaint filed by private respondents. Verily, does the complaint allege an action for reversion which private respondents would have no right to file or institute? Or does the complaint state a cause of action for declaration of nullity of the free patents and certificates of title for Lot 1015 and Lot 1017, or alternatively a cause of action for reconveyance of these two lots? Has the cause of action, if any, prescribed? And does the certificate of non-forum shopping substantially comply with the standard requirement? First. The test of the sufficiency of the facts to constitute a cause of action is whether admitting the facts alleged the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.[8] In answering this query, only the facts asserted in the complaint must be taken into account without modification although with reasonable inferences therefrom.[9] Applying the test to the case at bar, we rule that the complaint does not allege an action for reversion which private respondents would obviously have no right to initiate, but that it sufficiently states either a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title over Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 or alternatively a cause of action for reconveyance of these two pieces of realty, wherein in either case private respondents are the real parties in interest. An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action for reversion.[10] The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land. Hence in Gabila v. Barriga1[11] where the plaintiff in his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of the defendants title because even if the title were canceled or amended the ownership of the land embraced therein or of the portion affected by the amendment would revert to the public domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director of Lands.

On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendants fraud or mistake; as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio.[12] The real party in interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant. In Heirs of Marciano Nagano v. Court of Appeals[13] we ruled x x x x from the allegations in the complaint x x x private respondents claim ownership of the 2,250 square meter portion for having possessed it in the concept of an owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely since 1920. This claim is an assertion that the lot is private land x x x x Consequently, merely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, the lot in question is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of the Bureau of Lands and could not be the subject of a Free Patent. Hence, the dismissal of private respondents complaint was premature and trial on the merits should have been conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters. It would have been entirely different if the action were clearly for reversion, in which case, it would have to be instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 101 of C.A. No. 141 x x x x It is obvious that private respondents allege in their complaint all the facts necessary to seek the nullification of the free patents as well as the certificates of title covering Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. Clearly, they are the real parties in interest in light of their allegations that they have always been the owners and possessors of the two (2) parcels of land even prior to the issuance of the documents of title in petitioners favor, hence the latter could only have committed fraud in securing them x x x x That plaintiffs are absolute and exclusive owners and in actual possession and cultivation of two parcels of agricultural lands herein particularly described as follows [technical description of Lot 1017 and Lot 1015] x x x x 3. That plaintiffs became absolute and exclusive owners of the abovesaid parcels of land by virtue of inheritance from their late father, Honorio Dacut, who in turn acquired the same from a certain Blasito Yacapin and from then on was in possession thereof exclusively, adversely and in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30)

years x x x x 4. That recently, plaintiff discovered that defendants, without the knowledge and consent of the former, fraudulently applied for patent the said parcels of land and as a result thereof certificates of titles had been issued to them as evidenced by certificate of title No. P-19819 in the name of the Hrs. of Ambrocio Kionisala, and No. P-20229 in the name of Isabel Kionisala x x x x 5. That the patents issued to defendants are null and void, the same having been issued fraudulently, defendants not having been and/or in actual possession of the litigated properties and the statement they may have made in their application are false and without basis in fact, and, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources not having any jurisdiction on the properties the same not being anymore public but already private property x x x x It is not essential for private respondents to specifically state in the complaint the actual date when they became owners and possessors of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. The allegations to the effect that they were so preceding the issuance of the free patents and the certificates of title, i.e., the Department of Environment and Natural Resources not having any jurisdiction on the properties the same not being anymore public but already private property, are unquestionably adequate as a matter of pleading to oust the State of jurisdiction to grant the lots in question to petitioners. If at all, the oversight in not alleging the actual date when private respondents ownership thereof accrued reflects a mere deficiency in details which does not amount to a failure to state a cause of action. The remedy for such deficiency would not be a motion to dismiss but a motion for bill of particulars so as to enable the filing of appropriate responsive pleadings.[14] With respect to the purported cause of action for reconveyance, it is settled that in this kind of action the free patent and the certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible.[15] What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendants name. [16] All that must be alleged in the complaint are two (2) facts which admitting them to be true would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land and, (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the same.[17] We rule that private respondents have sufficiently pleaded (in addition to the cause of action for declaration of free patents and certificates of title) an action for reconveyance, more specifically, one which is based on implied trust. An implied trust arises where the defendant (or in this case petitioners) allegedly

acquires the disputed property through mistake or fraud so that he (or they) would be bound to hold and reconvey the property for the benefit of the person who is truly entitled to it. [18] In the complaint, private respondents clearly assert that they have long been the absolute and exclusive owners and in actual possession and cultivation of Lot 1015 and Lot1017 and that they were fraudulently deprived of ownership thereof when petitioners obtained free patents and certificates of title in their names. These allegations certainly measure up to the requisite statement of facts to constitute an action for reconveyance. Petitioners would nonetheless insist that private respondents should have also alleged, in addition to possession in the concept of owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely for thirty (30) years at the least, the statement that Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 have not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. Petitioners also proffer the trifling argument that (apparently in order to render sufficient for pleading purposes the allegations of ownership) private respondents should have attached to their complaint the documents which would prove the sources of their title to the disputed parcels of land. It is easy to see why the allegations demanded by petitioners are unnecessary, even improper, in a complaint. Whether petitioners are innocent purchasers for value of the contested lots is a matter of defense that private respondents need not anticipate in their complaint; indubitably it lies upon petitioners discretion to allege this fact in their answer perhaps to bar recovery of the two pieces of realty. [19] Moreover, private respondents do not have to asseverate in the complaint the documents proving their alleged sources of title. These matters are evidentiary details which undoubtedly find no place in a complaint. Being matters of evidence proving the ultimate fact of ownership averred by private respondents, the disclosure of such evidence must await either the proceedings for discovery or pretrial or even the trial proper. It should also be stressed that in pleading the ownership of a parcel of land in an action for recovery of ownership/possession thereof, all that plaintiff is required to state in the complaint are x x x a disseisin and its continuance by the defendant x x x x Plaintiff was not required and did not allege the source and kind of title under which it claimed, and under the complaint, it was at liberty to introduce proof of any legal title which it possessed. Conversely, the defendants were at liberty to introduce all legally admissible evidence tending to show that title was not in the plaintiff. Hence, they had the right to show that the legal title was in themselves. For, if legal title to the property were shown to be

in the defendants, the evidence of the plaintiff that title belonged to it would certainly be met x x x x It must be furthermore remembered that x x x plaintiff is allowed to make up his complaint in an action to recover possession of land without disclosing the title which he intends to rely upon.[20] Second. We rule that neither the action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title of Lot1015 and Lot 1017 nor the action for reconveyance based on an implied trust of the same lots has prescribed. We have ruled that a free patent issued over private land is null and void, and produces no legal effects whatsoever.Quos nullum est, nullum producit effectum.[21] Moreover, private respondents claim of open, public, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the two (2) parcels of land and its illegal inclusion in the free patents of petitioners and in their original certificates of title, also amounts to an action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible. [22]

The action for reconveyance based on implied trust, on the other hand, prescribes only after ten (10) years from 1990 and 1991 when the free patents and the certificates of title over Lot 1017 and Lot 1015, respectively, were registered. Obviously the action had not prescribed when private respondents filed their complaint against petitioners on 19 December 1995. At any rate, the action for reconveyance in the case at bar is also significantly deemed to be an action to quiet title for purposes of determining the prescriptive period on account of private respondents allegations of actual possession of the disputed lots.[23] In such a case, the cause of action is truly imprescriptible.[24] Third. We agree with the Court of Appeals that private respondents did not altogether dispense with the certificate of non-forum shopping. What is involved here is a certification several sentences short of the standard form as it only states: That we have not filed any case in any court or bodies affecting the same subject matter. While this manner of formulating the certification is indeed deplorable, its presence in the complaint nonetheless shows the intention of private respondents to comply with the standard form. Verily, we can only presume innocent reasons - as there is no reason for pursuing a contrary belief - for the omissions of the other standard statements therein. In Cabardo v. Court of Appeals[25] where the certificate of non-forum shopping was found deficient in details we ruled x x x petitioners failure to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping that he undertakes to inform the Court of any petition which might be filed, as required under Revised Circular No. 2891, may be overlooked since it does not appear that any petition

related to this case has ever been filed in any other court. On the other hand, to dismiss the petition on this ground would be to uphold technicality over substantial justice. For the same reason that no case related to the complaint filed by private respondents has been filed by them in any other court, we rule pro hac vice that the contested certificate of nonforum shopping is substantial compliance with the rules. Indeed to hold otherwise would only further delay the disposition of the original dispute between petitioners and private respondents concerning the ownership of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. We note that their conflicting claims could have been resolved by now if not for the erroneous application of the elementary rules of pleading which resulted in the premature dismissal of the complaint filed by private respondents. This Court need not repeat the fastidious and unfounded adherence to technicality which already stalled for an unfortunate seven (7) years more or less the proceedings in the trial court. In sum, the grounds relied upon in petitioners desire to dismiss the complaint of private respondents in Civil Case No. 95-312 cannot be impressed with merit. By this decision, however, we are not foreclosing the presentation of evidence during trial on the merits that Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 are not private property and that private respondents are not truly the owners thereof. This and other issues on the merits must follow where the preponderant evidence lies. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 15 February 2000 reversing the Order dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 95-312 entitled Heirs ofHonorio Dacut, namely, Visaminda Orevillo, Violeta Dacut, Josephine Dacut and Elizabeth Dacut v. Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala, namely, Ana, Isabel, Grace, Ophelia, Joven and Camilo, all surnamed Kionisala, and Isabel Kionisala is AFFIRMED with the understanding that private respondents Heirs of Honorio Dacut as plaintiffs therein may proceed on the basis of their causes of action of declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of titles and/or reconveyance based on an implied trust, with claim for damages. The proceedings in the trial court shall commence forthwith within thirty (30) days from notice of the finality of this Decision without unnecessary delay. SO ORDERED.

NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, PASCUAL G. QUINTO, LUIS B. BUENA, EUSEBIA V. TABLADA, CANUTO G. TISBE,

DAVID R. CARULLO, SOFONIAS E. COLEGADO, FELIX B. BUENA, TORIBIO C. EVANGELISTA, LEBRADA A. NICOLAS, ALECIA J. RAMOS, MILA G. DE LOS REYES, SALVADOR I. DE LA TORRE, MOISES CRUZ, RUFINO INFANTE, ALICIA ASTROLOGO, TRINIDAD LUMIQUED, LUZMINIDA QUINIQUINI, & TEODORA C. TEMERAS, petitioners, vs.CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO, respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: In this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners pray for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64957,[1] affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. 1220, [2] dismissing petitioners Complaint for declaration of nullity of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 670 and all other titles emanating therefrom. In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that they occupied and possessed parcels of land, located in Sitio Panayawan, Barangay San Rafael, Montalban (now Rodriquez), Province of Rizal (Subject Property), by virtue of several Deeds of Assignment, dated 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994, executed by a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez.[3] According to the Deeds of Assignment, the Subject Property was part of a vast tract of land called Hacienda Quibiga, which extended to Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, Cavite, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal; awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain and evidenced by a Spanish title. Ismael Favila claimed to be one of the heirs and successors-in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Acting as Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by hismga kapatid on 25 February 1965, Ismael Favila signed the aforementioned Deeds of Assignment, assigning portions of the Subject Property to the petitioners, each portion measuring around 500 to 1,000 square meters, in exchange for the labor and work done on the Subject Property by the petitioners and their predecessors.[4] Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning to evict them from the Subject Property. Two of the petitioners had actually received notices to vacate. Their investigations revealed that the Subject Property was included in Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) No. 53028, No. 281660, No. N-39258 and No. 205270, all originating from OCT No. 670, and now in the name of respondent.[5]

OCT No. 670 was issued in the name of respondents mother, Isabel Manahan y Francisco, and three other individuals, pursuant to Decree No. 10248, dated 13 February 1913, in Case No. 8502 of the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands. The whole property covered by OCT No. 670 was subsequently adjudicated in favor of Isabel Manahan Santiago (formerly Isabel Manahan y Francisco). Consequently, OCT No. 670 was cancelled and TCT No. T-53028 was issued exclusively in the name of Isabel Manahan Santiago. On 28 December 1968, Isabel Manahan Santiago executed a Deed of Donation transferring the property to her son, respondent herein, who subsequently secured TCTs No. 281660, No. N-39258 and No. 205270 in his own name.[6] Petitioners filed with the trial court, on 29 April 1996, an action for declaration of nullity of respondents certificates of title on the basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious. Among the defects of OCT No. 670 pointed out by petitioners were that: (1) OCT No. 670 was not signed by a duly authorized officer; (2) Material data therein were merely handwritten and in different penmanships; (3) OCT No. 670 was not printed on the Official Form used in 1913, the year it was issued; (4) It failed to indicate the Survey Plan which was the basis of the Technical Description of the property covered by the title; (5) Decree No. 10248 referred to in OCT No. 670 was issued only on 11 April 1913, while OCT No. 670 was issued earlier, on 13 February 1913; and (6) Decree No. 10248 was issued over a property other than the one described in OCT No. 670, although also located in the Province of Rizal.[7] Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses on 03 July 1996. According to respondent, [t]he allegations in the Complaint would readily and patently show that the same are flimsy, fabricated, malicious, without basis in law and in fact[8] As an affirmative defense, respondent claimed that the petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint stated no cause of action. Since OCT No. 670 was genuine and authentic on its face, then OCT No. 670 and all of respondents land titles derived therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive against the petitioners and the whole world.[9] Citing the consolidated cases of Director of Forestry, et al. v. Hon. Emmanuel M. Muoz, et al. and Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation v. Hon. Macario Peralta, Jr., et al., [10] respondent argued that the Spanish title, on which petitioners based their claim, was neither indefeasible nor imprescriptible. Moreover, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892, which took effect

on 16 February 1976, required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration of their lands under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, [11] within six months from effectivity of the decree. After the given period, Spanish titles could no longer be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens System. [12] Respondent also raised the affirmative defense of prescription. He pointed out that any action against his certificates of title already prescribed, especially with regard to OCT No. 670, which was issued in 1913 or more than 83 years prior to the filing of the Complaint by the petitioners. At the very least, respondent contended, it must be presumed that the questioned land titles were issued by the public officials concerned in the performance of their regular duties and functions pursuant to the law.[13] Even assuming arguendo that the petitioners entered and occupied the Subject Property, they did so as mere intruders, squatters and illegal occupants, bereft of any right or interest, since the Subject Property was already covered by Torrens certificates of title in the name of respondent and his predecessors-in-interest.[14] Lastly, respondent denied knowing the petitioners, much less, threatening to evict them. In fact, petitioners were not included as defendants in Civil Case No. 783 entitled, Carmelino M. Santiago v. Remigio San Pascual, et al., which respondent instituted before the same trial court against squatters occupying the Subject Property. In its decision, dated 01 July 1992, the trial court held that there is no doubt that the plaintiff (respondent herein) is the owner of the land involved in this case on which the defendants have built their houses and shanties Although the decision in Civil Case No. 783 was appealed to the Court of Appeals, it had become final and executory for failure of the defendants-appellants therein to file their appellants brief. [15] In the instant case, the trial court held a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses as prayed for by the respondent. During said hearing, petitioners presented their lone witness, Engineer Placido Naval, a supposed expert on land registration laws. In response to questions from Honorable Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez of the trial court, Engineer Naval answered that a parcel of land titled illegally would revert to the State if the Torrens title was cancelled, and that it was the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, that should file for the annulment or cancellation of the title. Respondent, on the other hand, did not present any evidence but relied on all the pleadings and documents he had so far submitted to the trial court. [16]

After the preliminary hearing, the trial court issued the questioned Order, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners Complaint. Pertinent portions of the Order of the trial court read: After considering the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, this Court is inclined not to grant plaintiffs (sic) prayer. Finding credence and giving weight to plaintiffs (sic) lone but expert witness, it is crystal clear that, to quote: 1. a parcel of land titled illegally will revert to the State 2. it is the State who must file the corresponding case of annulment of title through the Office of the Solicitor General, and 3. a land illegally titled in the name of private individual, the State through the Office of the Solicitor General should file the corresponding case for cancellation of title. (TSN August 26, 1997). The above quoted testimony is straight from horse (sic) mouth so to speak as this was the testimony of the plaintiffs (sic) expert witness. And judging from the said testimony alone aforecited, plaintiffs (sic) cause [of action] is bound to fail. Plaintiffs (sic) own testimony wrote finis to their case. From the record, this case was initiated and filed by private individuals, Nemencio Evangelista, et. al., contradicting their witness (sic) testimony. To reiterate, this Court finds credence to the testimony of the plaintiffs (sic) witness, i.e., is (sic) the State through the Office of the Solicitor General who must initiate and file a case of this nature when title to a land is being claimed to be obtained through fraud and allegedly spurious. The opinion of this Court anent the testimony of the witness is not without basis. Explicit is the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the recent case of Heirs of Marciano Nagano v. Court of Appeals, to wit: An action for reversion has to be instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 101, Commonwealth Act No. 141. (282 SCRA 43). As to the documentary evidence, having gone through with the Deed of Assignment/s purportedly executed by and between a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez and the plaintiffs, which is the principal if not the only basis of plaintiffs claim ownership and possession of the subject parcel of land, the same does not hold water in a manner of speaking, for being self-serving. Assignor Ismael Favila y Rodriguez claimed in said Deed that he is the Attorney-in-Fact by virtue of an alleged Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by his mga kapatid on February

23, 1965, but said Special Power of Attorney was not presented before this Court, thus there arises a doubt as to its existence and execution not to mention doubt on the existence of his mga kapatid who as alleged executed said Special Power Attorney (sic) in his favor. Even if this Court granting arguendo would admit the authenticity of said Deeds of Assignment/s, that will not alter the outcome of the pending incident/s before this Court. Why? Because the said Deed of Assignment/s which were based on Spanish title have lost their evidentiary value pursuant to the Presidential Decree No. 892 i.e. DISCONTINUANCE OF THE SPANISH MORTGAGE SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION AND OF THE USE OF SPANISH TITLES AS EVIDENCE IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. There is no need to elaborate on the above-cited provisions of PD 892 as they are self-explanatory. Suffice it to say that there is no showing, that plaintiffs complied with the said law i.e. to apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree (February 16, 1976). Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens System. This being the case and likewise being clear that plaintiffs were not the lawful owners of the land subject of this case, for they did not comply with PD 892, the said plaintiffs do not have the legal standing to bring before this Court the instant complaint Moreover, the principal issue in this case is for the declaration of nullity of defendants title, which has nothing to do with plaintiffs (sic) claim of ownership and possession even if we set aside, albeit momentarily, the truth that plaintiffs (sic) claim were based on barred Spanish Title/s, and thus plaintiffs were never the owners of the parcel of land subject of this case. Further, defendants (sic) title especially so with the mother title OCT 670 was entered and issued in 1913 or more than Eighty Three (83) years ago, the same not having been questioned by any party. Only now that it is being questioned, but sad to say, plaintiffs who are on the offensive and relying on their lone expert witness, instead of bolstering their case, unwittingly sealed their fate [17] After the trial court denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Order, dated 20 July 1999, [18] petitioners appealed both Orders of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 July 2002, [19] affirmed the Order of the trial court, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners Complaint. The Court of Appeals denied

petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution, dated 14 February 2003.[20] Thus, petitioners filed this Petition for Review [21] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following issues and praying for the reversal of the aforementioned Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Order of dismissal of the trial court: I. Whether the lower courts dismissal of the petitioners complaint should be proscribed by the rules of evidence it being based inter alia on Engr. Navals testimony, which was indisputably not based on facts but conclusion of law. II. Whether the lower courts dismissal of petitioners complaint should be proscribed by the rules of evidence it being done sans ample evidence except bare allegations of respondent. III. Whether the provision of P.D. 892, i.e., Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system, holds of an exception. IV. Whether an action for quieting of title, specifically where petitioners are in possession of subject land, can be subject of prescription. In his Comment,[22] the respondent, for the most part, reiterated the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The Court believes that the trial court rightfully dismissed petitioners Complaint, but for reasons different from those relied upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. According to the respondent, petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint filed before the trial court stated no cause of action. Before anything else, it should be clarified that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue [23] and the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action [24] are two different grounds for a motion to dismiss or are two different affirmative defenses. Failure to distinguish between the lack of legal capacity to sue from the lack of personality to sue is a fairly common mistake. The difference between the two is explained by this Court inColumbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[25] Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action. Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence

grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiffs general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action. In the present case, this Court may assume that the respondent is raising the affirmative defense that the Complaint filed by the petitioners before the trial court stated no cause of action because the petitioners lacked the personality to sue, not being the real party-in-interest. It is the respondents contention that only the State can file an action for annulment of his certificates of title, since such an action will result in the reversion of the ownership of the Subject Property to the State. The affirmative defense that the Complaint stated no cause of action, similar to a motion to dismiss based on the same ground, requires a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Complaint. In the case of Garcon v. Redemptorist Fathers, [26] this Court laid down the rules as far as this ground for dismissal of an action or affirmative defense is concerned: It is already well-settled by now that, in a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations of fact made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action, and not on whether these allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint; that the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated otherwise, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear in the face of the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground, for in the determination of whether or not a complaint states a cause of action, only the facts alleged therein and no other matter may be considered, and the court may not inquire into the truth of the allegations, and find them to be false before a hearing is had on the merits of the case; and it is improper to inject in the allegations of the complaint facts not alleged or proved, and use these as basis for said motion.

In resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present case stated a cause of action, the trial court should have limited itself to examining the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint. It was proscribed from inquiring into the truth of the allegations in the Complaint or the authenticity of any of the documents referred or attached to the Complaint, since these are deemed hypothetically admitted by the respondent. The trial court evidently erred in making findings as to the authenticity of the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in favor of petitioners on 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994; and questioning the existence and execution of the Special Power of Attorney in favor of said Ismael Favila by his siblings on 25 February 1965. These matters may only be resolved after a proper trial on the merits. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint, and respondent hypothetically admitted that: (1) Petitioners predecessors-ininterest, in the concept of owners, had been in actual, physical, open, continuous and adverse possession of the Subject Property against the whole world since time immemorial; (2) The Subject Property was part of the vast tract of land called Hacienda Quibiga awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain by virtue of a Spanish title; (3) Ismael Favila, an heir and successor-in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, acting as Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by his mga kapatid on 25 February 1965, executed Deeds of Assignment covering the Subject Property in favor of petitioners; (4) Petitioners still occupied and possessed the Subject Property, on which their houses were erected, when they discovered that the Subject Property was already covered by Torrens certificates of title in the name of respondent; and (5) That petitioners filed the Complaint to prevent their eviction by the respondent. To determine whether these allegations are sufficient to constitute a cause of action, it is important for this Court to establish first the nature of petitioners action. Indeed, petitioners Complaint filed before the trial court was captioned as an action for declaration of nullity of respondents certificates of title. However, the caption of the pleading should not be the governing factor, but rather the allegations therein should determine the nature of the action, because even without the prayer for a specific remedy, the courts may nevertheless grant the proper relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Complaint and the evidence introduced.[27] The trial court believed that petitioners action was ultimately one for reversion of the Subject Property to the public domain. Based on the testimony of Engineer Naval and the case of Nagao v. Court of Appeals,[28] it declared that the State,

represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, is the party-ininterest in an action for cancellation of a certificate of title illegally issued in the name of a private individual, because the eventual effect of such cancellation is the reversion of the property to the State. The Court disagrees in this pronouncement of the trial court, and calls for a far closer review of its decision inNagao v. Court of Appeals,[29] wherein the Court held that It is then clear from the allegations in the complaint that private respondents claim ownership of the 2,250 square meter portion for having possessed it in the concept of an owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely since 1920. This claim is an assertion that the lot is private land, or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, private respondents had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. No. 1942 Under Section 48, a subject lot is, for all legal intents and purposes, segregated from the public domain, because the beneficiary is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Consequently, merely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, the lot in question is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of the Bureau of Lands and could not be the subject of a Free Patent. Hence, dismissal of private respondents complaint was premature and trial on the merits should have been conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters. It would have been entirely different if the action were clearly for reversion, in which case, it would have to be instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 101 of C.A. No. 141, which provides: Sec. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the [Republic] of the Philippines. In the more recent case of Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of Honorio Dacut,[30] the difference between an action for declaration of nullity of land titles from an action for reversion was more thoroughly discussed as follows: An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land.

Hence, in Gabila vs. Barriga [41 SCRA 131], where the plaintiff in his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of the defendants title because even if the title were canceled or amended the ownership of the land embraced therein or of the portion affected by the amendment would revert to the public domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director of Lands. On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendants fraud or mistake, as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefore is consequently void ab initio. The real party-in-interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant In their Complaint, petitioners never alleged that the Subject Property was part of the public domain. On the contrary, petitioners asserted title over the Subject Property by virtue of their actual, physical, open, continuous and adverse possession thereof, in the concept of owners, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The Deeds of Assignment executed in their favor and attached to their Complaint referred to a Spanish title granted by the Queen of Spain to their predecessor-in-interest, Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Clearly, petitioners are asserting private title over the Subject Property, and consequently, their action could not be one for reversion. In their instant Petition, petitioners further averred that rather than an action for nullity of respondents certificates of title, theirs was more appropriately an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet their title over the Subject Property. Article 476 of the Civil Code, on removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, provides that: Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein. Respondents certificates of title over the Subject Property appeared valid or effective; but according to the petitioners, they were fake, spurious and/or fraudulent, and a cloud on their title to the same property that needed to be removed. A cloud on title has been defined as follows: Cloud on Title. A cloud on title is an outstanding instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is actually invalid or inoperative, but which may nevertheless impair or affect injuriously the title to property. The matter complained of must have a prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. The cloud on title is a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact unfounded. The invalidity or inoperativeness of the instrument is not apparent on the face of such instrument, and it has to be proved by extrinsic evidence [31] Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioners had no personality to file the said action, not being the parties-in-interest, and their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause of action. According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the subject matter of the action.[32]Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint that they had any legal or equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify their right to file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title. Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.[33] In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject Property by virtue of their actual and continuous possession of the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in their favor, attached to and an integral part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property on the Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of title to the Subject Property on their possession thereof since time immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish title granted to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession since

time immemorial carried the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. [34] If the Subject Property was already private property before the Spanish conquest, then it would have been beyond the power of the Queen of Spain to award or grant to anyone. The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners predecessors-in-interest could be traced only as far back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Petitioners, having acquired portions of the Subject Property by assignment, could acquire no better title to the said portions than their predecessors-in-interest, and hence, their title can only be based on the same Spanish title. Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners from invoking the Spanish title as basis of their ownership of the Subject Property. P.D. No. 892 strengthens the Torrens system by discontinuing the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law, and by categorically declaring all lands recorded under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title, unregistered lands. It further provides that within six months from its effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their land under what is now P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles can no longer be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system. [35] Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in establishing ownership over real property. P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the Subject Property. In the absence of an allegation in petitioners Complaint that petitioners predecessors-in-interest complied with P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration proceedings. Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or vest title, but only confirm and record title already created and vested.[36] By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration proceedings under the Torrens system, are precluded from accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish

title in some other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on or quieting of title), only short of ordering its recording or registration. To rule otherwise would open the doors to the circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by the courts, but would never be recorded under the Torrens system of registration. This would definitely undermine the Torrens system and cause confusion and instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to eliminate. Petitioners argued that the Spanish title may still be presented as proof of ownership on the basis of the exception provided in the fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads: WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual possession; . . . Since Petitioners alleged that they were in actual possession of the Subject Property, then they could still present the Spanish title as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property. [37] This Court cannot sustain petitioners argument. Actual proof of possession only becomes necessary because, as the same whereas clause points out, Spanish titles are subject to prescription. A holder of a Spanish title may still lose his ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually possesses the same for the required prescriptive period. [38] Because of this inherent weakness of a Spanish title, the applicant for registration of his Spanish title under the Torrens system must also submit proof that he is in actual possession of the real property, so as to discount the possibility that someone else has acquired a better title to the same property by virtue of prescription. Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not just a particular provision alone. A word or phrase taken in the abstract may easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. An apparently general provision may have a limited application if read together with other provisions of the statute.[39] The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892 should be interpreted and harmonized with the other provisions of the whole statute.[40] Note that the tenor of the whole presidential decree is to discontinue the use of Spanish titles and to strip them of any probative value as evidence of ownership. It had clearly set a deadline for the filing of applications for registration

of all Spanish titles under the Torrens system (i.e., six months from its effectivity or on 14 August 1976), after which, the Spanish titles may no longer be presented to prove ownership. All holders of Spanish titles should have filed applications for registration of their title on or before 14 August 1976. In a land registration proceeding, the applicant should present to the court his Spanish title plus proof of actual possession of the real property. However, if such land registration proceeding was filed and initiated after 14 August 1976, the applicant could no longer present his Spanish title to the court to evidence his ownership of the real property, regardless of whether the real property was in his actual possession. Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the Subject Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial court on 29 April 1996 does not exclude them from the application of P.D. No. 892, and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property, whether in a land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title. The preceding discussion does not bar holders of Spanish titles from claiming ownership of the real property on some other basis, such as those provided in either the Land Registration Decree[41] or the Public Land Act.[42]Petitioners though failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their Complaint aside from possession of the Subject Property from time immemorial, which this Court has already controverted; and the Spanish title, which is already ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject Property. Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the case on this ground, it is already unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of prescription of the action. Wherefore, this Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 July 2002, and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners Complaint for failure to state a cause of action. SO ORDERED.

TOMAS ROCO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JUAN GIMEDA, defendant-appellee. Ricardo V. Reyes for appellants. Remotigue, Nacua, Remotigue and Palma and Rafael O. Gimarino for appellee. LABRADOR, J.: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Hon. Jose S. Rodriguez, presiding, dismissing the complaint upon petition of defendants, on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action. The complaint makes the following allegations: that before August 22, 1918, Espiridiona Caramihan, owned and possessed two parcels of land known as lots Nos. 2741 and 3082 of the Barili Cadastral Survey No. 219, covered by tax declarations Nos. 01865 and 01854; that upon the death of said Espiridiona Caramihan on August 22, 1918, said lands were partitioned equally among her children, who similarly possessed and cultivated their respective shares and paid the taxes thereon; that in the years 1925 to 1927, through ignorance and inadvertence of the heirs, the said lots were declared public land in a cadastral proceeding; that Espiridiona occupied said lands openly, adversely, continuously and publicly, planting coconut and fruit trees and building her dwelling house thereon, and that said improvements and house are still on said lots; that the present plaintiffs acquired their rights to the lots by purchase from the heirs of the original owner Espiridiona Caramihan; that on or about December 7, 1940, Juan Gimeda, defendant, filed an application for a free patent to said lands, surreptitiously and fraudulently, without knowledge of the owners and possessors, and on December 7, 1940, the Director of Lands issued an order and in accordance therewith, on September 17, 1951, the Bureau of Lands issued patent No. 51552 in the name of defendant Juan Gimeda; that the plaintiffs and their original predecessor-in-interest have always been in the actual, physical, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the said parcels of land and defendant Juan Gimeda applied for and obtained his patent thereto without notice to them and without their knowledge, and secured the approval of his patent by fraudulent statements, alleging that he was the only heir of Espiridiona Caramihan and the only occupant of the land; and that by such false and fraudulent statements the Bureau of Lands approved his application and ordered the issuance of his patent.

The defendant filed an answer to the complaint, then amended the said answer and alleges that he is the youngest among the children of Espiridiona Caramihan; denies the allegations made in the complaint as to the acquisition by false and fraudulent means of the said lands; alleges that the complaint states no cause of action. He presents a counterclaim for P5,000 and P10,000 as moral and exemplary damages, respectively, and P500 as attorney's fees. Plaintiffs deny this counterclaim. Later on defendant presented a motion to dismiss, alleging that the complaint alleges no cause of action, arguing that as the title in his favor was issued on October 17, 1951 and action was filed on July 15, 1954, the action was filed more than two years after the issuance of the patent, beyond the one-year period provided by law. The authorities cited for this defense are the case of Director of Lands vs. Gutierrez David, 50 Phil., 797; Villarosa vs. Sarmiento, 46 Phil., 814;Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil., 620; Sumcad vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance, et al., 96 Phil., 946; 51 Off. Gaz., [5] 2413.lawphil.net It is to be noted that the petition does not seek for a reconsideration of the granting of the patent or of the decree issued in the registration proceeding. The purpose is not to annul the title but to have it conveyed to plaintiffs. Fraudulent statements were made in the application for the patent and no notice thereof was given to plaintiffs, nor knowledge of the petition known to the actual possessors and occupant the property. The action is one based on fraud and under the law, it can be instituted within four years from the discovery of the fraud. (Art. 1146, Civil Code, as based on Section 3, paragraph 43 of Act No. 190.) It is to be noted that as the patent here has already been issued, the land has the character of registered property in accordance with the provisions of Section 122 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 2332, and the remedy of the party who has been injured by the fraudulent registration is an action for reconveyance. (Director of Lands vs. Registered of Deeds, 92 Phil., 826; 49 Off. Gaz. [3] 935; Section 55 of Act No. 496.) The order of dismissal appealed from is, therefore, reversed and the case is returned to the court a quo for further proceedings in accordance with law.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR) REGION IV, MANILA,Petitioner, v. AMOR HACHERO AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PALAWAN, Respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: Subject of this petition for review on certiorari is the July 4, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 87267 and its March 6, 2012 Resolution,2 affirming the March 29, 2006 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Puerto Princesa, Palawan (RTC), which denied the Petition for Cancellation of Free Patent, Original Certificate of Title and Reversion filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic). The Antecedents Sometime in 1996, Amor Hachero (Hachero) filed his Free Patent Application No. 045307-969 covering Lot No. 1514, CAD1150-D (subject land) before the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Palawan. The subject land, with an area of 3.1308 hectares or 31,308 square meters (subject land), is located in Sagrada, Busuanga, Palawan.4 The said application for free patent was later approved by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) of Palawan based on the following findings: 1) That Hachero was a natural-born Filipino citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, qualified to acquire public land through free patent; 2) That the land applied for had been classified as alienable and disposable and, therefore, subject to disposition under the Public Land Law; 3) That an investigation conducted by the Land Investigator/Inspector/Deputy Public Land Inspector Sim A. Luto, found that the subject land had been occupied and cultivated by Hachero himself and/or through his predecessor- in-interest since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; 4) That the notice for the acquisition of the land by Hachero was published in accordance with law and that no other person provided a better right to the land applied for;

5) That there was no adverse claim involving the land still pending determination before the CENRO; and 6) That the claim of Hachero was complete and there was no record in the CENRO of any obstacle to the issuance of the patent.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On March 29, 2006, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of Hachero. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to deny the instant action for cancellation of Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title and Reversion for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. IT IS SO ORDERED.9

On October 15, 1998, Free Patent No. 045307-98-9384 was issued to Hachero and the subject land was registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. E-18011 on May 7, 1999. After an inspection and verification were conducted by the CENRO in 2000, it was discovered that the subject land, covered by OCT No. E-18011, was still classified as timberland and so not susceptible of private ownership under the Free Patent provision of the Public Land Act.6 Consequently, on November 26, 2002, the Republic, represented by the Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Region IV, Manila, filed the Complaint for the Cancellation of Free Patent No. 045307-989384 and OCT No. E-18011 and for Reversion, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 3726. Despite personal receipt of the summons and the complaint, however, Hachero did not file any responsive pleading within the period required by law. Upon the Republic's motion, the RTC declared Hachero in default. Thereafter, the Republic was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte.7 The Republic presented its lone witness, Diosdado Ocampo, former CENRO officer of Palawan, and formally offered the following documents as its exhibits: a) Application for Free Patent of Amor Hachero; b) Orders of Approval of the Application and Issuance of Free Patent; c) Free Patent No. 045307-98-9384; d) OCT No. E-18011 issued in the name of Amor Hachero; e) Inspection Report, dated July 24, 2000; and f) Verification, dated July 17, 2000, both issued by one Sim Luto.8 The Ruling of the RTC

The RTC explained that the free patent and title had already been issued after Hachero was found to have complied with all the requirements; that it was the Republic itself thru the DENRCENRO, Coron, which brought the subject land under the operation of the Torrens System; that it could not understand the complete turnabout made by the same office and its officials who certified before that the subject land was alienable and disposable and who approved Hachero's application; that the Republic failed to show the document which stated that the subject land was still timberland as indicated under Project No. 2A L.C. Map No. 839, released on December 9, 1929, despite the fact that said document was already available at the CENRO office at the time of the application for free patent; that the lands adjacent to the subject land were already alienable and disposable; that the free patent and the title itself were public documents entitled to the presumption of regularity; and that the verification and inspection report of one Sim Luto together with the other CENRO officials presented by the Republic were insufficient to defeat Hachero's patent and title. 10 The Ruling of the CA On July 4, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, stating that the verification presented by the Republic could not be given probative value because L.C. Map No. 839, dated December 9, 1929, which served as basis for the verification, was not presented before the RTC. According to the CA, the Inspection Report, standing alone, was not sufficient to overcome the burden imposed upon the Republic and could not serve as basis of the reversion of the subject land. The CA doubted the subsequent findings of the land investigator that the subject land was still timberland because he was the same land investigator who previously evaluated the subject land and certified that it was alienable and disposable.11

Not in conformity, the Republic filed the subject petition anchored on the following GROUNDS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S ACTION FOR CANCELLATION OF FREE PATENT NO. 045307-98-9384 AND ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) NO. E-18011 AND REVERSION, CONSIDERING THAT: I THE DISCHARGE OF THE OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS BY THE INVESTIGATING PERSONNEL OF THE DENR IN THIS CASE HAS THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY, WHICH PRVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT. II THE PREVIOUS FACTUAL MIS APPRECIATION COMMITTED BY THE DENR EMPLOYEES CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT BIND THE GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY WHEN, AS IN THIS CASE, THE MISTAKE OR ERROR REFERS TO IMMUTABLE MATTERS SUCH AS ALIENABILITY OF A PORTION OF PUBLIC DOMAIN.12 In advocacy of its cause, the Republic basically argues that per its investigation and verification conducted in July 2000, the free patent issued to Hachero was defective and erroneous considering that the land it covered fell within the timberland zone. It contends that the said factual findings carry great weight and should be accorded respect by the courts due to the special knowledge and expertise of DENR personnel over matters within their jurisdiction. Considering that the DENR personnel acted in the discharge of their official functions, the Republic asserted that they have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties. Moreover, Hachero failed to rebut the DENR's investigation report and, for said reason, the presumption in favor of the investigating personnel and their report has become conclusive. The Republic further contends that the title issued to Hachero,

which had been issued based on an erroneous DENR finding that the land was alienable, can still be overturned by a later report stating otherwise. Thus, the Inspection Report, 13 dated July 24, 2000, and Verification Report, 14 dated July 17, 2000, superseded the previous finding that the subject land was alienable and disposable. The Republic avers that the State is not estopped by the mistakes of its officers and employees and that the previous factual misappreciation committed by DENR employees cannot bind the government.15 Hachero's

counter-position

Hachero counters that the petition should be dismissed on the ground that it has raised substantially factual matters. He points out that the findings of fact of the RTC and the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal if there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact that the officials, who previously certified to the alienability and disposability of the subject land but made a complete turn around by declaring otherwise, could not have made a mistake or error. He asserts that the main document a vital piece of data denominated as Cadastral Map No. 839, which became the basis for the reinspection/reinvestigation and verification by CENRO, Coron, was released on December 9, 1929 and admittedly already in their records when the application was approved for titling, and yet was not presented in court as evidence. Finally, Hachero stresses that the government cannot be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens and that titleholders may not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's agents, in the absence of his complicity in a fraud or manifest damage to third persons.16 The Court's Ruling The Court finds merit in the petition. General Rule and Exceptions when factual findings of the trial court are affirmed by the CA It is generally settled in jurisprudence that the findings of fact of

the trial court specially when affirmed by the CA are final, binding and conclusive and may not be re-examined by this Court. There are, however, several exceptions to this rule, to wit: 1] When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; 2] When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3] When there is grave abuse of discretion; 4] When the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5] When the findings of facts are conflicting; 6] When in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; 7] When the findings of the CA are contrary to that of the trial court; 8] When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 9] When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the main and reply briefs are not disputed; 10] When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and 11] When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.17 After combing through the records, the Court is of the considered view that there is a need to review the findings of the courts below due to the presence of some of the enumerated exceptions mentioned above, which are 1) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and 2) when the findings of fact are contradicted by the evidence on record. The Republic showed clear and convincing proof that the subject land was inalienable and non-disposable Records reveal that on October 15, 1998, upon the approval of Hachero's application by CENRO of Palawan, Free Patent No. 045307-98-9384 was issued and, on May 7, 1999, the property was subsequently registered under OCT No. E-18011.

Thereafter, in an effort to find out fake or illegal titles, the DENR created a task force to investigate and evaluate all issued patents and titles. An investigation conducted by a representative of the Regional Executive Director of the Regional Office No. IV revealed that the subject land covered by OCT No. E-18011 was still timberland and, therefore, could not be segregated from the public domain as timberlands were classified as inalienable and non-disposable public lands. Accordingly, both Sim Luto, Land Management Officer III, and Diosdado L. Ocampo, Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer, prepared and signed the Inspection Report, dated July 24, 2000, and Verification, dated July 17, 2000, attesting to the fact the subject land fell within the timberland zone under Project No. 2A, L.C. Map No. 839, released on December 9, 1929. For said reason, both recommended the cancellation of OCT No. E-18011. Aside from the Inspection Report and the Verification, the Republic also adduced maps18 prepared by the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), which showed that the subject land was located within the periphery of the land area classified as unclassified public forest and beyond the alienable and disposable area. In other words, as the maps clearly reveal, every inch of the subject land is inside the unclassified public forest area. Evidently, these maps presented by the Republic, together with the Inspection Report and the Verification, all clearly demonstrate that the subject land is not yet subject to disposition. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties applies favorably to Republic

performance of official duties applies favorably to the Republic. This means that the DENR's inspection report and the verification stating that the subject land is still inalienable has become conclusive. The doctrine in Bustillo vs. People,19 xxx In sum, the petitioners have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties which the records failed to rebut. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. [Emphasis Supplied] and in Farolan v. Solmac Marketing Corp.,20 In the same vein, the presumption, disputable though it may be, that an official duty has been regularly performed applies in favor of the petitioners. Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta. (All things are presumed to be correctly and solemnly done.) It was private respondent's burden to overcome this juris tantum presumption. We are not persuaded that it has been able to do so. are both instructive. Cancellation of title and reversion proper where there exists a mistake or oversight in granting free patent over inalienable land

The Court would have wanted to study Hachero's position on the matter, but he did not file an answer or responsive pleading to the complaint filed by the Republic before the RTC. It appears from the records, however, that he was duly served with the summons together with a copy of the complaint. He, apparently, opted to ignore it, in effect, waived his right to rebut the allegations thereof at the first opportunity.

The courts below ruled that the Inspection Report and the Verification had no probative value because the land classification map (L.C. Map No. 839) on which they were based was not presented in the trial court. Likewise, the courts below considered the subsequent findings of the land investigator - that the land still belonged to the public domain - as doubtful because the officials who previously evaluated and verified that the subject land was alienable were the same officials who now investigated and verified the same and found it inalienable.

There being a controversion, the presumption of regularity in the

The Court holds otherwise.

Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation therefore is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.21 InRepublic v. Guerrero,22 the Court gave a more general statement that "this remedy of reversion can only be availed of in cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or certificates of title."23 Nonetheless, the Court recognized in Republic v. Mangotara,24 that there were instances when it granted reversion for reasons other than fraud: xxx. In Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic (Yujuico case), reversion was defined as an action which seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. It bears to point out, though, that the Court also allowed the resort by the Government to actions for reversion to cancel titles that were void for reasons other than fraud, i.e., violation by the grantee of a patent of the conditions imposed by law; and lack of jurisdiction of the Director of Lands to grant a patent covering inalienable forest land or portion of a river, even when such grant was made through mere oversight.25cralawred [Emphasis Supplied] In the case at bench, although the Republic's action for cancellation of patent and title and for reversion was not based on fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Hachero, his title could still be cancelled and the subject land reverted back to the State because the grant was made through mistake or oversight. This could probably be the reason why, shortly after one (1) year from the issuance of OCT No. E-18011 to Hachero, the DENR personnel conducted another investigation and verification on the subject land. It would appear that they suspected that a mistake was made in their issuance of the patent as the subject land had not been reclassified or released as alienable or disposable land. It remained plotted within the timberland classification zone. This time, they supported their findings with maps prepared by the NAMRIA. The Republic also followed the proper legal procedure for cancellation of patent and title and for reversion. They filed a complaint in court and notified Hachero through summons. They gave Hachero an opportunity to be heard in court. For unknown reasons, however, he disregarded

the summons, allowed himself to be declared in default, and forfeited his right to adduce evidence in his defense.

the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.

111598 and OCT No. P-5885 issued in respondent Roxas's name are void; and the right of petitioner Republic to seek cancellation of such void patent/title and reversion of the subject property to the State is imprescriptible.

Prescription and estoppel cannot lie against the State

There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public land patent is open to review on the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a public land patent certificate of title with indefensibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in the aforecited cases clearly reveal that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was applied by implication by this Court to the patent issued by the Director of Lands duly approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines in accordance with law. The date of issuance of the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases because the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the land applied for to the applicant. This, to our mind, is in consonance with the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e., conservation of a family home, and to encourage the settlement, residence and cultivation and improvement of the lands of the public domain. If the title to the land grant in favor of the homesteader would be subjected to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been given by the Government thru the process of proceedings in accordance with the Public Land Law, there would arise uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the government's system of distributing public agricultural lands pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of the State. (Emphases ours, citations omitted.)

We have addressed the same questions on indefensibility of title and prescription inMangotara, thus:

Contrary to the observation of the courts below, there is nothing incomprehensible or puzzling or suspicious about the complete turnaround made by the DENR after its re-investigation. The Court has carefully reviewed the records and found nothing anomalous. At any rate, it is a time-honored principle that the statute of limitations or the lapse of time does not run against the State. Jurisprudence also recognizes the State's immunity from estoppel as a result of the mistakes or errors of its officials and agents. These well-established principles apply in the case at bench. The Court in Republic v. Roxas elucidated: It is true that once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Act 496, otherwise known as The Land Registration Act, or Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree, the certificate of title issued by virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens title issued under said registration laws. We expounded in Ybafiez v. Intermediate Appellate Court that: The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one (1) year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible. The settled rule is that a decree of registration and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto may be attacked on the ground of actual fraud within one (1) year from the date of its entry and such an attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. The validity of the certificate of title in this regard can be threshed out only in an action expressly filed for the purpose. It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, as in

Yet, we emphasize that our statement in the aforequoted case that a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent becomes indefeasible after one year, is subject to the proviso that "the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law." As we have ruled herein, the subject property is part of the Matchwood Forest Reserve and is inalienable and not subject to disposition. Being contrary to the Public Land Law, Homestead Patent No.

It is evident from the foregoing jurisprudence that despite the lapse of one year from the entry of a decree of registration/certificate of title, the State, through the Solicitor General, may still institute an action for reversion when said decree/certificate was acquired by fraud or misrepresentation. Indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent under the Torrens system does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrant's already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring ownership. But then again, the Court had several times in the past recognized the right of the State to avail itself of the remedy of reversion in other instances when the title to the land is void for reasons other than having been secured by fraud or misrepresentation. One such case is Spouses Morandarte v. Court of Appeals, where the Bureau of Lands (BOL), by mistake and oversight, granted a patent to the spouses Morandarte which included a portion of the Miputak River. The Republic instituted an action for reversion 10 years after the issuance of an OCT in the name of the spouses Morandarte. The Court ruled: Be that as it may, the mistake or error of the officials or agents of the BOL in this regard cannot be invoked against the government with regard to property of the public domain. It has been said that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. It is well-recognized that if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public domain, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land or property

illegally included. Otherwise stated, property of the public domain is incapable of registration and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title. Another example is the case of Republic of the Phils, v. CFI ofLanao del Norte, Br. IV, in which the homestead patent issued by the State became null and void because of the grantee's violation of the conditions for the grant. The Court ordered the reversion even though the land subject of the patent was already covered by an OCT and the Republic availed itself of the said remedy more than 11 years after the cause of action accrued, because: There is merit in this appeal considering that the statute of limitation does not lie against the State. Civil Case No. 1382 of the lower court for reversion is a suit brought by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines as a sovereign state and, by the express provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, any transfer or alienation of a homestead grant within five (5) years from the issuance of the patent is null and void and constitute a cause for reversion of the homestead to the State. In Republic vs. Ruiz, 23 SCRA 348, We held that "the Court below committed no error in ordering the reversion to plaintiff of the land grant involved herein, notwithstanding the fact that the original certificate of title based on the patent had been cancelled and another certificate issued in the names of the grantee heirs. Thus, where a grantee is found not entitled to hold and possess in fee simple the land, by reason of his having violated Section 118 of the Public Land Law, the Court may properly order its reconveyance to the grantor, although the property has already been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. And, this right of the government to bring an appropriate action for reconveyance is not barred by the lapse of time: the Statute of Limitations does not run against the State." (Italics supplied). The above ruling was reiterated in Republic vs. Mina, 114 SCRA 945. If the Republic is able to establish after trial and hearing of Civil Case No. 6686 that the decrees and OCTs in Dona Demetria's name are void for some reason, then the trial court can still order the reversion of the parcels of land covered by the same because indefeasibility cannot attach to a void decree or certificate of title, xxx (Citations omitted.)

Neither can respondent Roxas successfully invoke the doctrine of estoppel against petitioner Republic. While it is true that respondent Roxas was granted Homestead Patent No. 111598 and OCT No. P-5885 only after undergoing appropriate administrative proceedings, the Government is not now estopped from questioning the validity of said homestead patent and certificate of title. It is, after all, hornbook law that the principle of estoppel does not operate against the Government for the act of its agents. And while there may be circumstances when equitable estoppel was applied against public authorities, i.e., when the Government did not undertake any act to contest the title for an unreasonable length of time and the lot was already alienated to innocent buyers for value, such are not present in this case. More importantly, we cannot use the equitable principle of estoppel to defeat the law. Under the Public Land Act and Presidential Proclamation No. 678 dated February 5, 1941, the subject property is part of the Matchwood Forest Reserve which is inalienable and not subject to disposition.26 [Emphases Supplied; citations omitted] WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 4, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87267 and its March 6, 2012 Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Free Patent No. 045307-98-9384 and OCT No. E-18011 in the name of Amor Hachero are hereby declared NULL andVOID and CANCELLED. The subject land is ordered reverted to the public domain as part of the inalienable timberland. SO ORDERED.