Relgious Pluralism




Michael
Guzman
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 Religious Pluralism and The Diversity of The Anthropomorphic Religious Experience The various religions of the world all share a common ideology—“[the radical

transformation] from [an]…unsatisfactory state to [one that is] limitlessly better” (John Hick, Ten Essential Texts p. 451). It can safely be said that all forms of religion point to the Christian idea of salvation in different ways. Whether it may be the Christian account of human redemption through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the Islamic account that God created man embedded with his best qualities and the knowledge of the “One,” but through ignorance has lost that knowledge and therefore salvation is found in its rediscovery. The fulfillments of nirvana in the Buddhist tradition or Brahman in the Hindu religion likewise, are all personalization’s of the divine—different conceptions of the Ultimate. As humans we cannot fully grasp the concept of the ultimate, so we have attributed the human qualities in which we experience to conceptualize the One, the Absolute—God—our ultimate concern. Paul Tillich in “Symbols of Faith” discusses his philosophical idea of the symbolic and mythological nature of God and religious beliefs. He discusses the various ways myths and symbols can be valuable for religious communities and also, why the truth of, or affirmation of God and religious beliefs is meaningless. In “Symbols of Faith,” Tillich’s argument stems from the idea that religion should be interpreted as symbolic in nature. With this philosophical view in hand, one could make the inference that since religion is essentially a human interpretation of the divine, that salvation could be attained from more than one singular religious experience. Yielding the possibility for the plurality of religious experiences—an idea that would shake the confines of western theology, yet provide the grounds for a universal




Michael
Guzman
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acceptance, appreciation and respect for the diversity of the human religious experience. Paul Tillich explains that symbols, if used to express the ultimate concern, cannot be literal and therefore must be perceived as symbolic in nature, because to accept them as literal interpretations, one would be applying ultimacy (or divine truth) to something physical, something finite, formed and interpreted in the human mind. Tillich maintains the idea that “that which is true ultimate transcends the realm of finite reality” (p. 385). And therefore, no human conception, understanding or explanation “can express [the ultimate] directly and properly” (p. 385). Tillich even goes as far as to say that even “God transcends his own name” (p. 385). He further clarifies that, for instance, “when we attribute [humanly traits] to him, power, love, [and] justice, [we are speaking] symbolically [of] that which is beyond finitude and infinity” (p. 386). Thus, nothing should be ultimately concerned except that which is ultimate. No religion, scripture, text, handbook, or manual should be a substitute for that which is ultimate. If you accept Tillich’s premise, all religious texts must be interpreted as symbols of the ultimate. Accepting this notion gives rise to Tillich’s claim that the “stories of divine human encounters” are mythological symbols of faith (p. 387). These mythological stories allow man to conceptualize something as infinitely great as God. Tillich claims: “Even one God is an object of mythological language, and if spoken about is drawn into the framework of time and space. Even he loses his ultimacy if made to be the concrete concern” (p. 388). God and the symbols of religious experience must be understood symbolically, so the symbols themselves do not turn into idolatrous representations.




Michael
Guzman
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 Myths, like symbols, can also be expressed in different ways and have various

functions in the communities which find truth in them. Myths can be understood literally or symbolically as “broken myths” and/or “broken consciousness of myth.” Broken myths are those in which are acknowledged as myths but are not substituted by another. For instance, the fairy tale of Santa Claus is a broken myth, for it is acknowledged as myth but children are still led to believe it. This myth specifically, although like many others (especially those of greater importance), is essential in communities to establish good behaviors among children with the idea of reward for good behavior and punishment for bad behavior. The truth of the myth does not affect its effectiveness. This simple idea brings up the question: Does the literal truth of religious stories, or stories in general, affect the benefits they have for religious communities? Philosopher John Hick, like Paul Tillich, addresses this question in his work “Religious Pluralism and Salvation.” However, before we address this the remaining types of myths must be explained. Tilichs’ explanation of “broken consciousness of myth” relates to those groups of people whom cannot distinguish between the mythical and the literal claims of their religious text. However, once the individual or community realizes the once literal scripture as mythological, either the now ‘broken myth’ is replaced or the group partakes in the latter stage of literalism. They “half consciously, half unconsciously” notice the dispute and discrepancy presented, however, they push the questions away for whatever personal reasons and continue to follow the broken myths—while still affirming of them in the literal sense. This is one of the most dysfunctional forms of religious experience, because eventually the question will have to be resolved. The group’s constant denial of




Michael
Guzman
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the discrepancies of their religious claims is in no way furthering the transcendent experience in which religion should provide. Tillich supposes that “all mythological elements in the Bible…should be recognized as mythological, but…maintained in their symbolic form” and not be substituted for anything that attempts to approve or deny their validity—like science based claims for instance (p. 388). Tillich sees these mythological symbols as “the language of faith” (p. 388). Although religion is symbolic, it still has justification for belief, because symbolism itself is the language of faith and can be expressed in no other way. This brings us again to the question of the effectiveness of religion through mythic symbolism. Paul Tillich’s view entirely supports what John Hick means by “effective” in the following statement: “We have to be content with different communal memories, enriched as they are by the mythic halo that surrounds all long-lived human events of transcendent significance. Once again, then, I suggest that differences of historical judgment, although having their own proper importance, do not prevent different traditions from being [equally] effective…contexts of salvation” (TET p. 459). This brings home the idea that the justification of scripture or the existence of God is essentially meaningless since it should be viewed as symbolic in nature. Its literal truth does not have a proportional relationship to its effectiveness. Religious stories are still very effective and hold truth even if they were interpreted symbolically. Both Tillich and Hick would probably agree with the statement: there is no one sovereign religion that holds Truth over another. The varieties of religions are simply




Michael
Guzman
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different ways to apprehend the limitless divine being in which we conceptualize as God. Recognizing the mythic symbolization of religion, which opens the possibility for the acceptance of religious pluralism, is the only way in which religion makes sense to me. Whatever brings one person to inner peace will probably be different than another’s, however, that is why there exist the concepts of religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence—may we all use them excessively.