Reformasi IMF dan Inisiatif Kebijakan Nilai Tukar Anjloknya nilai tukar Rupiah terhadap Dolar sudah sangat memerlukan perhatian khusus. Penyebabnya bisa dibilang ada yang dari luar: yaitu, kenaikan suku bunga oleh Fed Reserve Amerika Serikat yang berinisiatif mengantisipasi kemungkinan inflasi di AS, berakibat jatuhnya harga-harga saham di bursa, disamping melemahnya nilai tukar Euro, memang berperan terhadap Rupiah. Namun, yang paling banyak diributkan penyebab yang merupakan unsur-unsur di dalam negeri yaitu kerawanan antar elite politik, keraguan terhadap integritas kebijakan pemerintahan, sampai kepada Bank Indonesia yang seharusnya paling bertanggung jawab atas kestabilan rupiah masih jauh dari pembenahan yang diharapkan. Jelas diperlukan suatu sistim yang lebih baik dari Nilai Tukar Mengambang murni yang paling tanpa harapan dan pernah dipakai menjadi senjata oleh dewa IMF. Yang paling diharapkan adalah integritas yang tinggi dari otoritas moneter beserta kemampuan setaraf Alan Greenspan di AS, atau Joseph Yam dari HKMA, atau seorang Mahathir Muhammad dari Malaysia, untuk menentukan arah kebijakan yang perlu diambil. Selamat jumpa di situs DisKrisek, Edisi Juni 2000.
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EDISI JUNI 2000 IMF: Bikin Reformasi Yang Baik atau IMF: Sebaiknya DiReformasi? Kontrol Modal atau Kontrol Devisa? Nilai Tukar Super-Fix Bukan Kurs Tetap, Bukan Mengambang Bebas
IMF: Bikin Reformasi Yang Baik atau IMF: Sebaiknya Di-Reformasi? Lembaga-lembaga internasional seperti IMF dan Bank Dunia kena serangan berat tuntutan reformasi, seperti di Washington D.C. April 2000, dan konperensi WTO di Seattle akhir tahun lalu. IC Interview: A System in Turmoil [IntellectualCapital.com: Thursday, April 13, 2000] ....Allan Meltzer is a professor of political economy and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University and a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He is a former member of the president's Council of Economic Advisers. In 1998, he was appointed by Congress to chair a commission studying the role and effectiveness of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Meltzer Report Misses the Mark: Commission’s recommendations for World Bank, IMF need further consideration [Economic Policy Institute April 13, 2000 Issue Brief #141] by Christian Weller Banking on multinationals: Increased competition from large foreign lenders threatens domestic banks, raises financial instability [Economic Policy Institute April 14, 2000 Issue Brief #142] by Christian Weller
Presentation to the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission [Washington, D.C., February 2, 2000] By Stanley Fischer, First Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund The international community has learned many lessons from the turbulent events that have taken place in emerging markets over the last three years. With the support and encouragement of our members, the IMF has already been taking important steps to reform itself in the light of those lessons. Let me briefly mention some of the reforms under way in four areas: efforts to strengthen macroeconomic policies and financial sectors; strengthening surveillance and increasing transparency - both central to increasing the effectiveness of the Fund; restructuring IMF lending facilities; and sharpening the focus of IMF activities. On macroeconomic policies, the recent crises have thrown a sharp light on the key role of the exchange rate system. It is a fact that all the countries that had major international crises had relied on a pegged or fixed exchange rate system before the crisis; and it is also true that some countries that appeared vulnerable but that had flexible exchange rates avoided such crises. Countries with very hard pegs have been able to sustain them. Accordingly, we are likely to see emerging market countries moving towards the two extremes, of either a flexible rate or a very hard peg - and in the long run, the trend is most likely to be towards fewer currencies.
Debt Relief, Globalization, and IMF Reform: Some Questions and Answers [April 12, 2000] By IMF Staff The IMF's misplaced priorities. Flawed Fund. [The New Republic Issue date: 03.09.98] By James Tobin and Gustav Ranis What I learned at the world economic crisis. The Insider. [The New Republic Issue date: 04.17.00] By Joseph Stiglitz World Bank aid strategy flawed says Stiglitz [ft.com Monday November 29 1999] By Alan Beattie Reform them [Forbes Global, October 04, 1999]
By Domingo F. Cavallo Enough is enough By Steve H. Hanke The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank start their annual meetings in Washington on Sep 21, 1999. Not on the agenda (but on many policymakers' and analysts' minds) is a question that won't go away: Have these institutions outlived their usefulness? Forbes Global asked columnists Domingo F. Cavallo and Steve H. Hanke to explain what future, if any, they see for the fund and the bank.
Bretton Woods Revisited [Intellectualcapital Thursday, April 20, 2000] by Susan Aaronson Affirmative action, IMF style. Fund and Games. [The New Republic Issue date: 03.27.00] By Alexandra Starr The World Economy ["Finance & Development" A quarterly magazine of the IMF, December 1999] The directors of the six IMF area departments assess the current situations in their regions, the challenges these regions face, and their opportunities for growth in the coming years. World Bank Global Economic Prospects 2000 Executive Summary Frontline Interviews: William Greider Frontline Interviews: Joseph E. Stiglitz Rethinking Neoliberalism? [Global Policy Forum, January 10-14 2000] This week, Joseph Stiglitz was at it again. On Sunday, January 9, the departing World Bank Chief Economist gave a speech in Boston to the annual meeting of the American Economic Association, stepping up his criticism of the Bank, the Fund, the US Treasury Department, and the dominant neoliberal policy "consensus" in Washington. His remarks drew a standing ovation from a large
audience, marking a deep change in the thinking of mainstream professional economists.
Challenges of the New Millennium [Finance & Development, December 1999] John Kenneth Galbraith talks with Asimina Caminis John Kenneth Galbraith, Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics Emeritus at Harvard University, discusses the major events of the past century and takes a look at the challenges ahead, in this conversation with Asimina Caminis, Senior Editor of Finance & Development. The International Monetary Fund: Challenges and Contradictions [Cato Journal, September 28, 1999] Testimony of Ian Vásquez, Director, Cato Institute The world economy has changed dramatically since the creation of the IMF. The fund long ago lost its original mission but has taken on new functions since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. The rise of IMF lending and crisis mediation since the early 1980s reflects, in large part, the development of a dysfunctional relationship between lenders and borrowers in international finance. Repairing that relationship requires that moral hazard be reduced and that crisis prevention and management be more effective. The IMF's new initiatives to deal with crises, however, are likely to be ineffective. An approach based on greater reliance on two-party negotiations holds more promise in stabilizing the international financial system than the current approach, in which the IMF too often becomes a burdensome third party.
Kontrol Modal atau Kontrol Devisa? Sesudah kenyataan membuktikan kontrol modal di Malaysia berhasil menihilkan peranan IMF dalam menyelamatkan ekonomi negara itu dari krisis yang begitu parah di Indonesia dan negara Asia lainnya, langkah yang mana bisa menjadi pelajaran? Seorang pejabat senior Bank Sentral Amerika Serikat menerangkan dengan lugas dan jujur bahwa mekanisme kontrol modal, bila dijalankan dengan hati-hati dan untuk kebutuhan terbatas, bisa 'dimainkan' untuk menghambat krisis yang tak terkendali. Fakta: "Akta Pendirian" IMF yang dibuat di Bretton-Woods tahun 1944 secara eksplisit memperbolehkan kebijakan kontrol modal. Fakta: Ada berbagai instrumen ekonomi bisa digunakan untuk
mencegah hantaman krisis yang paling parah. Masalah yang dihadapi: inkapabilitas dan integritas. Fakta: Jangan mengandalkan IMF. Lihat tulisan Stiglitz.
An Introduction To Capital Controls [REVIEW November/December 1999] Christopher J. Neely, Federal Reserve Bank Of St. Louis .....Recently, a number of opinion leaders, including some prominent economists, have suggested that developing countries should reconsider capital controls. This article has reviewed the issues associated with capital controls. Controls most often have been used to permit more freedom for monetary policy during balance of payments crises in the context of fixed exchange rates. Restrictions on inflows have been implemented to prevent real appreciation of the exchange rate or to correct other pre-existing distortions, like the incentives for financial institutions to take excessive risk. Although controls on capital flows may change the composition of flows, they impose substantial costs on the economy and cannot be used to indefinitely sustain inconsistent policies......
World Bank Reverses Position on Financial Controls and on Malaysia [Global Intelligence Update Weekly Analysis, September 20, 1999] In Defense of Capital Controls. At Trade Conference, a Push to Curb Forces of Globalization [International Herald Tribune Paris, Friday, February 18, 2000] By Thomas Crampton IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Malaysia On July 7, 1999, the Executive Board concluded the Article IV consultation with Malaysia. .... Directors broadly agreed that the regime of capital controls--which was intended by the authorities to be temporary--had produced more positive results than many observers had initially expected. They welcomed the pragmatic and flexible way in which Malaysia had implemented and adjusted the controls, notably by replacing the quantitative restrictions on the repatriation of portfolio investments by an exit levy in February 1999. A number of Directors expressed support for the authorities' intention to maintain the control measures while preparing for an orderly exit from these controls. A number of other Directors, however, were more skeptical about the decision to impose capital controls, as they felt that the costs, in terms of an adverse impact
on the prospects for recovery, may become more visible in the future. They therefore recommended that the authorities remove the exit levy applied to profits on portfolio investments. These Directors also considered that, since Malaysia is in a position of strength, an early exit would help to boost investor confidence in Malaysia and attract long-term capital.... Malaysian capital controls a failure, says Nobel Prize winner Merton Miller This article appeared in the 9 July 1999 edition of The Asian Wall Street Journal. Malaysians may be paying for mistake for years. Agaknya Merton Miller terlalu memandang enteng kemampuan Malaysia, karena ia (Merton Miller) lebih percaya sistim Currency Board sebagai pilihan yang tepat. Siapa Merton Miller? Tale of Two Continents: A Comparison of Asian and Latin American Experiences during Recent Financial Turmoil [FRB January 7, 2000] By Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Federal Reserve Board Vice Chairman ......Judged by several measures, however, the Asian countries were hit much harder by the recent crisis than were the Latin American countries. Why was this the case? What vulnerabilities pushed these dynamic Asian economies into severe crisis? ......
Nilai Tukar Super-Fix Nilai Tukar Mengambang murni berada diujung kutub yang berlawanan dengan Nilai Tukar Super-Fix. Currency Board dan Unifikasi Moneter termasuk golongan nilai tukar super-fix. Selain itu ada kategori Dolarisasi, yang pernah menjadi pertimbangan oleh negara-negara Amerika Latin, seperti Argentina dan Mexico. Sedangkan Dolarisasi tidak resmi, di Indonesia pun akan banyak terjadi kalau orang semakin tidak percaya kepada Rupiah, apalagi jika program penjaminan deposito berakhir tahun depan.
Exchange Rate Systems In Emerging Economies [University of California and National Bureau of Economic Research, January 1,
2000] By Sebastian Edwards This paper is part of U.S. Department of the Treasury project on the international financial system directed by Allan Meltzer. The purpose of this paper is to discuss, within the context of the reforms of the 'financial architecture,' exchange rate policies in emerging economies. I am particularly interested in understanding the relationship between exchange rate policies and currency crises. This analysis is helpful for determining the type of exchange rate practices -- or more generally, policy packages -- that should be strongly discouraged (ex ante) by the IMF, as a way of reducing policy-making moral hazard. The paper draws on my own work on exchange rates in emerging markets during the last dozen years, as well as on contributions by other academics and policy analysts.... ..... In the longer run, pegged-but-adjustable exchange rate regimes are unstable, and invite speculation. Consequently, countries should opt either for floating rates or for super-fixity (currency boards or dollarization).... Some Reflections on Monetary Institutions and Exchange-Rate Regimes By Steve H. Hanke, Professor of Applied Economics, The Johns Hopkins University. Chairman Allan Meltzer requested that I present an overview of my thoughts on exchange-rate regimes. I will do this as briefly as possible, with an emphasis on emerging market countries and what I consider to be some of the more important points that merit your consideration. ......volatile hot money flows have battered pegged exchange rate regimes, causing volcanic-like eruptions in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (1992 and 1993), the CFA franc (1994), the Turkish lira (1994), the Mexican peso (1994-95), the Thai baht and the other Asian currencies (1997-98), the Russian ruble (1998) and the Brazilian real (1999)...... ......My experience in Indonesia was quite interesting. Indeed, a real education in the politics of currency reform. Christopher Culp, Merton Miller and I addressed many of the technical aspects of my Indonesian experience and I won't dwell on them here (C.L. Culp, S.H. Hanke and M.H. Miller, "The Case for an Indonesian Currency Board," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol.11, No.4, Winter 1999)...... ......What is interesting is that no official from any government or the IMF, no professional economist and no journalist ever inquired as to what was contained in my CBS and related proposals which President Suharto called "the IMF-plus program." It is no wonder that we cannot find any analysis of the technical questions raised by the CBS proposal and we can find no mention of the CBS episode in the IMF's account of the Indonesian crisis. The IMF's exercises in revisionist history are truly remarkable. This has astonished me, particularly given all the ink that was spilled on that sorry episode in early 1998. It all reminds
me of a quote from the Wallet of Kai Lung: "It is the mark of insincerity of purpose to spend one's time looking for the Sacred Emperor in the low-class teashops"...... Press Conference On Exchange Rate Regimes In An Increasingly Integrated World Economy [Partial Transcript, Friday, April 14, 2000] PANEL: MICHAEL MUSSA, IMF Economic Counselor and Director, IMF Research Department; GRAHAM HACCHE, Deputy Director IMF External Relations Department, PAUL ROBERT MASSON, Senior Advisor IMF Research Department; ALEXANDER SWOBODA, Senior Policy Advisor IMF Research Department Towards A Stronger Financial System [Hong Kong Society of Accountants, 29 October 1999] by Joseph Yam, JP, Chief Executive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority .....It is true that we have had to take unconventional and controversial actions in the financial markets. But regulators do have a responsibility to deal with market failures, which in our case arose from market concentration and manipulation. The few of us involved received a lot of criticisms as a result, and some of these were not pleasant, particularly the accusations that we betrayed the free market. But I hope the way the matter has played out, and the handsome book profits that we are making, will serve as a vindication of our decisions. And, in case it has crossed your mind, luck has had very little, if any, to do with it, although I do not mind luck being on my side. The whole explosion of international finance has simply gone too far. If it were not the default by Russia, some other event would have caused yield spreads to widen sharply. If it were not LTCM, then some other hedge fund would have needed the massive de-leveraging that, had it been allowed to take place, threatened dislocation even in the largest market in the world. Some event, large or small, would have triggered all that. As some of you may remember, the sharp correction in the stock market in Hong Kong in 1973 was triggered by the Fire Brigade being sent in to inspect over-crowding on the then rather small trading floor of one of the stock exchanges before unification. Incidentally, the widening of the yield spreads that caused problems for LTCM last year actually started when we entered the market in August, according to a chart prepared by Stanley Fischer of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It gathered momentum as Russia defaulted. So perhaps we played a part in turning around the sentiment of international finance last year.....
Why Attack a Currency Board? [FRBSF Economic Letter; November 26, 1999] Kenneth Kasa, Senior Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
• • •
The evolution of Hong Kong's currency board From rules to discretion The HKMA puts its money where its mouth is
Official or "Full" Dollarization: Current Experiences and Issues [June 9, 1999] by Zeljko Bogetic, International Monetary Fund The Dollarization Debate [Finance & Development, March 2000] Andrew Berg and Eduardo Borensztein Full dollarization of the economy is widely discussed as a way of enabling developing countries to overcome monetary and exchange rate instability. What are the costs and benefits of dollarizing, and which developing countries are most likely to benefit? The Dollarization Debate [Bradynet Sunday, May 09, 1999] Posted by Pillz Encouraging Official Dollarization in Emerging Markets [Joint Economic Committee Staff Report, April 1999] Office of the Chairman, Senator Connie Mack Prepared by Kurt Schuler, Senior Economist to the Chairman Dollarization In Emerging-Market Economies And Its Policy Implications For The United States [April 22, 1999] by C. Fred Bergsten, Director Institute for International Economics A Contingency Plan for Dollarizing Hong Kong [Reprinted from HKCER Letters, vol. 52, September 1998] By Kurt Schuler .....The Asian financial crisis takes on Hong Kong mainly in the form of speculative attacks on the Hong Kong dollar. In the past year or so, there have been heated debates and proposals on how the dollar should be defended with minimal adverse effects on the economy. Dollarization is one option that has been repeatedly mentioned but not thoroughly discussed. Here Mr. Schuler puts forth a detailed proposal that should serve as the basis for further analysis and exchange of ideas......
A Critical Comment on Government-sponsored Dollarization as a Rescue [26 October 1998] Tsang Shu-ki, Department of Economics Hong Kong Baptist University ......Dollarization has become a popular idea for some economists who want to save battered currencies..... ......A fixed exchange rate regime, including a currency board arrangement (CBA), may be used to solve an internal crisis through compliance with strict monetary discipline. Having said that, I do not support the notion that a fixed exchange rate, chosen on a particular date against a particular currency at a particular exchange ratio, can and should last forever. How can we have so much confidence and faith in a possibly "desperate" choice?....... Robert Mundell's Work on Optimum Currency Areas Don Roper The 1999 Nobel Prize in Economics was given to Robert Mundell, in part for his work, Optimum Currency Areas, which is often credited with the development of the Euro. The history of this classic article is found in a 1997 speech by Mundell.... Optimum Currency Areas By Robert A. Mundell Columbia University Extended version of a luncheon speech presented at the "Conference on Optimum Currency Areas," Tel-Aviv University, December 5, 1997 Robert Mundell and the Theoretical Foundation for the European Monetary Union [December 13, 1999] By Alexandre Swoboda, Senior Policy Adviser and Resident Scholar, International Monetary Fund Robert Mundell laid the theoretical foundations for the European Monetary Union. His theory of optimum currency areas, highlighted in the Nobel Committee's citation as one of his most significant scientific contributions, has served since the 1960s as an analytical framework for numerous debates on the validity of the creation of a European currency. Mundell was an ardent supporter of the euro, of which he is considered the godfather. Paradoxically, his theory has been used by numerous economists to oppose the European Monetary Union and question its chances of success. How can one be the author of a theory that criticizes the monetary union and one of the principal spiritual fathers of the euro at the same time? The paradox is merely an illusion, as I will try to explain.....
Adam Smith in Jakarta [Forbes Global, February 22, 1999] Meet leading Indonesian presidential candidate Amien Rais, a populist who's also talking up the virtues of currency boards. By Monica Showalter
Bukan Kurs Tetap, Bukan Mengambang Bebas: Terserah Anda...... "Crawling Band" atau "Monitoring Band" .......katanya kebijakan kurs yang dianut oleh Indonesia sekarang. Berkat nasihat IMF, guncangan terhadap rupiah yang telah berlangsung sejak Agustus 1997 masih akan terus berlangsung, sambil menanti datangnya belas kasihan politik. Alternative Exchange Rate Systems and Reform of the International Financial Architecture [IIE, May 21, 1999] by C. Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute for International Economics ......As noted above, both rigidly fixed and freely flexible exchange rates have been tried and found wanting. Fixed rates, unless carried to the extreme of monetary union, as in Europe, or a currency board, as in Argentina or Hong Kong, have proved too prone to degenerate into costly over- and undervaluations. Flexible rates tend to overshoot wildly and generate equally disruptive misalignments......
CRAWLING BANDS OR MONITORING BANDS: How to Manage Exchange Rates in a World of Capital Mobility [October 1998 inaugural issue of International Finance] by John Williamson, Chief Economist, South Asia Region, World Bank ......The authorities think about where the rate needs to be from the standpoint of the macro fundamentals, and the market is then guided by that judgment as long as it finds it plausible while being free to challenge it when it concludes that the authorities have got it wrong -- but even then the market knows that what it needs to think about is whether the authorities have misjudged the fundamentals, and not what other market operators are going to be thinking in the next ten minutes. A system of crawling bands relies on constructive interactions between the market and the authorities, it does not pretend that all the wisdom lies with one or the other....... [?????]
The Case For Joint Management Of Exchange Rate Flexibility [Institute for International Economics, 1999] C. Fred Bergsten, Institute for International Economics Olivier Davanne, Conseil d'Analyse Economique Pierre Jacquet, French Institute of International Relations C. Fred Bergsten, Olivier Davanne, and Pierre Jacquet naturally have differing sensitivities and views on what is ultimately feasible and desirable in terms of the evolution of the international monetary system, but they strongly share the presumption that governments can and should develop a systematic approach to managing exchange rate flexibility, and they discuss here how this could emerge. This paper was originally prepared for the Conseil d'Analyse Economique, created by Prime Minister Lionel Jospin to advise him and the French Government.
Monetary Policy During the Transition to a Floating Exchange Rate: Brazil's Recent Experience [Finance & Development, March 2000] Arminio Fraga The financial crisis that erupted in Asia in 1997 quickly spread to other developing regions, as international investors panicked and pulled their capital out. In this article, the governor of Brazil's central bank outlines the steps Brazil took to avert financial disaster when inflows of private foreign capital suddenly dried up.
Related Articles Lain-lain Artikel mengenai serangan terhadap lembagai-lembaga Internasional seperti WTO Hidden strength [Forbes Global, March 06, 2000] By David Roche Based on conventional international financial analysis, the U.S. dollar is heading for big trouble. The U.S. current-account deficit looks ready to jump this year to well over $400 billion, from about $320 billion in 1999, driven by the continuing
strength of the U.S. economy. Any slowdown in domestic demand during 2000 will come too late to make things better.
Backlash: Behind the Anxiety over Globalization [Businessweek Online : April 24, 2000] Many fear that free trade harms wages, jobs, and the environment ......Why are so many people so angry about globalization--a term that has come to encompass everything from expanded trade and factories shifting work around the world to the international bodies that set the rules for the global economy? Political and business leaders across the spectrum were caught off guard by the strong feelings expressed in Seattle last fall. Although they're better prepared this time, they remain perplexed.....
As The World Gets Tight [Asiaweek February 18, 2000] Globalization does not happen "out there." It happens at home, and Asia must learn to deal with it. By Jonathan Sprague ......This week, a meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Bangkok sums up the globalization disjunction. "We are confident that in our conference, there will be what we could call a healing process after Seattle," says UNCTAD secretary-general Rubens Ricupero, promising a "parliament on globalization."..... ......The WTO talks in Seattle collapsed not because of the protestors outside but because the negotiators inside could not agree on how to distribute the pain and pleasure of further liberalization..... ......To climb on board the development bandwagon, some people are voluntarily jettisoning their "excess" baggage. And ethnic/local traditions are being judged using the global value system - money...... ......Moreover, human activity and its impacts are spilling over borders and demanding multilateral solutions. Most of all, growing trade links, the increasing cross-border flow of students, migrants and business people, and the everexpanding information technology web make further globalization irreversible. Once a consumer knows a foreign-made car is of better quality, once a new graduate knows the opportunities are better in Silicon Valley, once a reader knows that the Internet carries opinions unavailable in local newspapers, there is no going back. Hiding behind national barriers only ensures internal rot - even as the barriers erode...... WHOSE TRADE? [The Nation, December 6, 1999]
.......trade was the province of policy wonks and special interests--and the experts and lobbyists liked it that way. No longer. Now it's a hot political issue. One reason is the growth of trade; just 4 percent of GDP in the early fifties, it's more than 13 percent today. Another is that international capital flows, ranging from productive pursuits like building factories to speculative ones like betting against national currencies, have grown even more strongly. And still another is that the areas covered by trade agreements have widened from traditional concerns with tariffs and quotas to cover labor, environmental and health regulations as well....
Interview with Kevin Danaher on Globalism and Its Discontents [Policy.com, April 14, 2000] This week Policy.com sat down with one of the leaders of this week's IMF/World Bank protests. Apa yang diprotes? ......Both the World Bank, the IMF, and also the World Trade Organization, have been hiding, they've been making policy for the whole planet for decades, and nobody even knew they existed. You can test it, go out on the street and ask people to give you one intelligent sentence about the International Monetary Fund, and they can't do it...... .......So the question then comes up, how do you have institutions that are moving billions and billions, tens of billions of dollars around the planet, controlling policy in all these Third World countries, and they're operating in secret? So we want to flush them out, we want to get the snake out from under the rock....
Sejumlah links yang membahas krisis ekonomi Asia dan berbagai topik ekonomi yang relevan dapat diikuti dibawah ini: World Bank US Federal Reserve Board Bank Sentral berbagai negara Asia Crisis Homepage - Nouriel Roubini CURRENCY BOARDS Kurt Schuler Homepage PAUL KRUGMAN Homepage Penerbitan IMF : IMF Recent Publications
IMF Papers on Policy Analysis and Assessment in Full Text IMF Publications Memorandum Indonesia - IMF : Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, May 17, 2000 Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, January 20, 2000 Letter of Intent and Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, July 22, 1999 Letter of Intent and Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, March 16, 1999 Letter of Intent and Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, November 13, 1998 Letter of Intent and Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, October 19, 1998 Letter of Intent and Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, September 11, 1998 Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, July 29, 1998 Second Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, June 24, 1998 Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, April 10, 1998 Aneka Artikel : EURO: Dampaknya bagi Asia (990107) Aliran Modal dan Kebijakan Nilai Tukar (Rev.990109) Kumpulan Pidato: Gagasan Otorita Moneter Internasional (Rev.981224) Ilmu Ekonomi untuk Orang Awam (Rev.990109) Kearah Regulasi Kapital Global (Rev.981018) Hedge Fund LTCM Hampir Runtuh (Rev.981004) Jurus Malaysia: Kebijakan Pengendalian Devisa (Rev.981004) Jurus Hong Kong: Intervensi di Pasar Bebas (Rev.981026) Riwayat Bantuan IMF (Rev.980910) Kumpulan berbagai komentar, kritik dan saran-saran mengenai program kebijakan dan bantuan IMF kepada negara berkembang: tulisan Jeffrey Sachs, George Schultz, Joseph Stiglitz, artikel WSJ, FT, Washington Post, NYT, dll. Tiga Makalah oleh Robert Wade mengemukakan analisa yang kritis terhadap "Wall Street - Treasury - IMF Complex" serta merangkum pandangan para pakar lainnya.
Tabel Kurs Harian beberapa mata uang Asia, dll, terhadap USD: mulai tanggal 2 Juli 1997 s/d 31 Desember 1998 mulai tanggal 1 September 1998 s/d 12 Maret 1999 mulai tanggal 1 Maret 1999 s/d 31 Desember 1999 mulai tanggal 1 Januari 2000 s/d 31 Mei 2000
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First edition created 16 August 1998. Last updated 18 June 2000 16:50:07. A remark on the name in this website: "mugajava" is derived from the meaning 'a cup of coffee' which has quite similarity to 'a mug of java'. The word 'java' is becoming popular worldwide in the information technology circle after it is being adorned to the name of a programming language. Although people from the island which has the same name may silently wonder whether such reasoning is apparently plausible, the creators of the programming language, which happened to be some how related to the sun, insist that it's a popular drink which gives them inspirations. By the way, how come the word 'gamelan' could also have a new meaning, a
collection of wonderful pieces, in the same programming community....., it shall rather be the exotism to remain in its canonical writings :-)