Recent Jurisprudence.docx

POLITICAL LAW Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, GR 211010, 7 March 2017 (Caguioa) Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one’s constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats. At the very least, the magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is allowed where it is dictated by public welfare. Heirs of Salas, Jr. v Cabungcal, GR 191545, 29 March 2017 An executive regulation cannot go beyond the law. RA 3844 broadly defined an agricultural land as “land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands.” RA 6657 also broadly defines agricultural land as land devoted to agricultural activity. In contrast, the HLURB Regulations restrict the definition of agricultural lands to those lands “exclusively or predominantly used for cultivation,” not being a farmlot subdivision. In limiting the definition of an agricultural land to one “without the intended qualities of a farmlot subdivision,” the HLURB Regulations are overriding, supplanting, and modifying a statutory definition. This is prohibited. A mere executive issuance cannot alter, expand or restrict the provisions of the law it seeks to enforce. Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., GR 213948, 25 April 2017 (Carpio) Pro hac vice means a specific decision does not constitute a precedent because the decision is for the specific case only, not to be followed in other cases. Apro hac vice decision violates statutory law - Article 8 of the Civil Code - which states that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." The decision of the Court in this case cannot be pro hac vice because by mandate of the law every decision of the Court forms part of the legalsystem of the Philippines. If another case comes up with the same facts as the present case, that case must be decided in the same way as this case to comply with the constitutional mandate of equal protection of the law. Thus, a pro hac vice decision also violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. ~ Mandamus does not lie against the legislative and executive branches or their members acting in the exercise of their official discretionary functions. This emanates from the respect accorded by the judiciary to said branches as co-equal entities under the principle of separation of powers. In exceptional cases, the Court has granted a prayer for mandamus to compel action in matters involving judgment and discretion, only “to act, but not to act one way or the other,” and only in cases where there has been a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. DPWH v. Malaga, GR 204906, 5 June 2017 (Del Castillo) The mere submission of the lowest bid did not automatically entitled the bidder to an award. Before a government project is awarded to the lowest calculated bidder, his bid must undergo a mandatory postqualification procedure whereby the “procuring entity verifies, validates, and ascertains all statements made and documents submitted by the bidder with the lowest calculated or highest rated bid using a non discretionary criteria as stated in the bidding documents.”

POLITICAL LAW Public bidding as a method of government procurement is governed by the principles of transparency, competitiveness, simplicity and accountability. Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC, GR 159139, 6 June 2017 (Jardeleza) As a general rule, the Court does not intervene with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Office of the Ombudsman which, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service. This policy rests on the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, which is one of the foundations of our republican government. The determination of probable cause – that is, one made for the purpose of filing an information in court – is essentially an executive function ad not a judicial one. The State’s self-preserving power to prosecute violators of its penal laws is a necessary component of the Executive’s power and responsibility to faithfully execute the laws of the land. On the other hand, the Constitution vests the Supreme Court with judicial power, defined under Section 1, Article VIII as the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Conspicuously absent in the provision is the power of the judiciary to prosecute crimes – much less the broader power to execute laws from which it can be inferred. In view of the constitutional delineation of powers, we reject the petitioner’s contention that we already made a determination in the Infotech case that a crime has been committed. We could not have made such determination without going beyond the limits of our judicial power and thereby unlawfully impinging the prerogative of the constitutionally created Office of the Ombudsman. In Infotech, we only exercised our mandate to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC. Ultimately, we found that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it (a) awarded the project to MPC, an entity that did not participate in the bidding; (b) accepted and paid for MPEI’s ACMs that failed the 99.9995% accuracy requirement stated in the COMELEC’s own bidding rule, including the software’s failure to detect previously downloaded precinct results and the ACM’s inability to print audit trails without loss of data; and (c) accepted and awarded the contract based on a mere demo version of the software. However, a finding of grave abuse of discretion is not necessarily indicative of probable cause. We never decided whether the facts were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondents were probably guilty thereof. Representatives Lagman, et al. v. Senate President et al., GR 235935, 6 February 2018 (Tijam) Presidential privilege of immunity from suit is a well-settled doctrine in our jurisprudence. The President may not be sued during his tenure or actual incumbency, and there is no need to expressly grant such privilege in the Constitution or law. This privilege stems from the recognition of the President’s vast and significant functions which can be disrupted by court investigations. Petitioners in GR Nos 236061 and 236145 committed a procedural misstep in including the President as a respondent in their petitions. ~~ The 1987 Constitution grants the Congress the power to shorten or extend the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Congressional check on the President’s martial law and suspension powers consists of: First. The power to review the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to revoke such

POLITICAL LAW proclamation or suspension. The review is “automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension is made.” The Congress’ decision to revoke the proclamation or suspension cannot be set aside by the President. Second. The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension, upon the President’s initiative, for such period as it may determine, if the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it. When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or suspension becomes a “joint executive and legislative act” or a “collective judgment” between the President and Congress. ~~ The manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s request for extension is not subject to judicial review. No less than the Constitution, under Section 16 of Article VI, grants the Congress the right to promulgate its own rules to govern its proceedings. The exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process. In other words, the Court cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the absence of any constitutional violation. Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating its rules, the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, explained that the limitation of this unrestricted power deals only with the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. It should be added that there must be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts. Absent a showing of violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals, the Court will not intrude into this legislative realm. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal workings of the Congress. ~~ Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Section 18, Article VII is silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. While it does not specify the number of times that the Congress is allowed to approve an extension of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the provision is clear that the only limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are that the extension should be upon the President’s initiative; that it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and that it is subject to the Court’s review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen. Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the authority to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that the extension shall be “for a period to be determined by the Congress.” The Court cannot accept petitioners’ argument that the 60-day limit can be deduced from the following clause in Section 18, Article VII: “The Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension.” The word “manner” means a way a thing is done or a mode of procedure; it does not refer to a period or length of time. Thus, the clause should be understood to mean that the Congress must observe the same manner of voting required for the revocation of the initial proclamation or suspension, as mentioned in the

POLITICAL LAW sentence preceding it, i.e., “voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session.” Plain textual reading of Section 18, Article VII and the records of the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission buttress the view that as regards the frequency and duration of the extension, the determinative factor is as long as “the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires” such extension. ~~ The determination of which among the constitutionally given military powers should be exercised in a given set of factual circumstances is a prerogative of the President. The Court’s power of review does not empower the court to advise, nor dictate its own judgment upon the President, as to which and how these military powers should be exercised.

LABOR LAW Digital Telecommunications Philippines v. Ayapana, GR 195614, 10 January 2018 (Martires) The willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or the latter’s duly authorized representative is a just cause for dismissal. However, the validity of a dismissal based on this ground is premised upon the concurrence of these conditions: (1) the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence; and (2) there must be a willful act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence. The first requisite is present in this case. Rank and file employees who are routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer’s money or property are classified as occupying positions of trust and confidence. The second requisite is likewise present. It must be emphasized that a finding that an employer’s trust and confidence has been breached by the employee must be supported by substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. It must not be based on the employer’s whims or caprices or suspicions; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. The totality of the circumstances in the case at bar supports a conclusion that respondent’s dismissal was based on substantial evidence that he had willfully breached the trust reposed upon him by petitioner, and that petitioner was not actuated by mere whim or capriciousness. ~~ Generally, an employee dismissed for any of the just causes under Article 297 is not entitled to separation pay. By way of exception, the Court has allowed the grant of separation pay based on equity and as a measure of social justice, as long as the dismissal was for vauses other than serious conduct or those manifesting moral depravity. The Court is mindful of the new rule it established in Toyota v. NLRC, where the Court held that in addition to serious misconduct, in dismissals based on other grounds under Article 282 like willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his family, separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed employee. However, the Court also recognizes that some cases merit a relaxation of this rule, taking into consideration their peculiar circumstances. Here, while it is clear that respondent’s act constitutes a willful breach of trust and confidence that justified his dismissal, it also appears that he was primarily actuated by zealousness in acquiring and retaining subscribers rather than any intent to misappropriate company funds; as he admitted in his response to the notice to explain that offering an alternative FEX line to Lim was part of his strategy to ensure her subscription. His zealousness was manifested through acts that shown an inordinate lapse of judgment warranting his dismissal in accordance with management prerogative, but this Court considers in his favor circumstances of lack of moral depravity on his part and grants him separation pay in the amount of one month pay per year of service.

CIVIL LAW PNB v. Chan, GR 206037, 13 March 2017 (Del Castillo) Under Article 1256 of the Civil Code, consignation alone is suficient even without a prior tender of payment: a) when the creditor is absent or unknown or does not appear at the place of payment; b) when he is incapacitated to receive the payment at the time it is due; c) when, without just cause, he refuses to give a receipt; d) when two or more persons claim the same right to collect; and e) when the title of the obligation has been lost. For consignation to be valid, the debtor must comply with the following requirements: 1) there was a debt due; 2) valid prior tender of payment unless the consignation was made because of some legal cause provided in Article 1256; 3) the amount or thing due was placed at the disposal of the court; and 4) after the consignation had been made, the persons interested were notified thereof. Failure in any of these requirements is enough ground to render a consignation ineffective. PNB’s deposit of the monthly rentals in a non-drawing savings account is not the consignation contemplated by law, precisely because it does not place the same at the disposal of the court. Consignation is necessarily judicial; it is not allowed in venues other than the courts. The deposit cannot be considered to have the effect of payment. ~xx~ A mortgagee has the right to recover the deficiency resulting from the difference between the amount obtained in the public auction and the outstanding obligation of the mortgagor at the time of the foreclosure proceedings. Philippine Steel Coating Corp v. Quinones, GR 194533, 19 April 2017 The following requisites must be established in order to prove that there is an express warranty in a contract of sale: (1) the express warranty must be an affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the subject matter of the sale; (2) the natural effect of the affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the thing; and (3) the buyer purchases the thing relying on that affirmation or promise. A warranty is a statement or representation made by the seller of goods – contemporaneously and as part of the contract of sale – that has reference to the character, quality, or title of the goods; and is issued to promise or undertake to insure that certain facts are or shall be as the seller represents them. A warranty is not necessarily written. It may be oral as long as it is not given as a mere opinion or judgment. An express warranty can be oral when it is a positive affirmation of a fact that the buyer relied on. Under Article 1546 of the Civil Code, “no affirmation of the value of the thing, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller’s opinion only, shall be construed as a warranty, unless the seller made such affirmation or statement as an expert and it was relied upon by the buyer.” Despite its claims to the contrary, petitioner was an expert in the eyes of the buyer Quinones. As the sales manager of Philsteel, Angbengco made repeated assurances and affirmations and even invoked laboratory tests that showed compatibility. In the eyes of buyer Quinones, Philisteel’s Angbengco was an expert whose word could be relied upon. California Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Advanced Technology System, Inc., GR 202454, 25 April 2017 (Sereno) In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary that (1) each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other; (2) that both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated; (3) that the two debts be due; (4) that they be liquidated and demandable; (5) that

CIVIL LAW over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor. The law requires that the debts be liquidated and demandable. Liquidated debts are those whose exact amounts have already been determined. CMCI has not presented any credible proof, or even just an exact computation, of the supposed debt of PPPC. It claims that the mobilization fund that it had advanced to PPPC was in the amount of 4M. Yet, Felicisima’s proposal to conduct offsetting in her letter pertained to a 3.2M debt of PPPC to CMCI. Meanwhile, in its Answer to ATSI’s complaint, CMCI sought to set off its unpaid rentals against the alleged 10M debt of PPPC. The uncertainty in the supposed debt of PPPC to CMCI negated the latter’s invocation of legal compensation as justification for its nonpayment of the rentals for the Prodopak machine. Dadis v. Spouses Magtanggol, GR 206008, 7 June 2017 (Peralta) There is a situation where despite the fact that the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, his title being fraudulent, the mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy. This is the doctrine of the mortgagee in good faith, based on the rule that all persons dealing with the property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. The doctrine of mortgagee in good faith presupposes that the mortgagor, who is not the rightful owner of the property, has already succeeded in obtaining a Torrens title over the property in his/her name and that, after obtaining the said title, he/she succeeds in mortgaging the property to another who relies on what appears on the said title. The protection accorded by law to mortgagees in good faith cannot be extended to mortgagees of properties not yet registered with the Register of Deeds or registered but not under the mortgagor’s name. When the mortgagee does not directly deal with the registered owner of the real rpoeprty, like an attorneyin-fact of the owner, it is incumbent upon the mortgagee to exercise greater care and a higher degree of prudence in dealing with such mortgagor. Paradigm Development Corporation of the Philippines v. BPI, GR 191174, 7 June 2017 (Reyes) According to PDCP, when FEBTC registered both REMs, even if the intent was only to register one, the validity of both REMs was vitiated by lack of consent. The Court cannot see its way clear through PDCP’s argument. To begin with, the registration of the REM contract is not essential to its validity (Article 2085 on the requisites). In relation to Article 2085, Article 2125 provides that if the instrument is not recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties. ~~ Novation is a mode of extinguishing an obligation by changing its objects or principal obligations, by substituting a new debtor in place of the old one, or by subrogating a third person to the rights of the creditor. Article 1293 of the Civil Code defines novation as “consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original one, [which] may be made even without the knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not without the consent of the creditor.” However, while the consent of the creditor need not be expressed but may be inferred from the creditor’s clear and unmistakable acts, to change the person of the debtor, the former debtor must be expressly released from the obligation, and the third person or the new debtor must assume the former’s place in the contractual relation.

CIVIL LAW The CA’s rejection of PDCP’s claim of novation is based on the fact that the non-execution of the Deed of Assumption by Sengkon, STI and FEBTC rendered the existence of novation doubtful because of lack of clear proof that Sengkon is being expressly released from its obligation; that STI was already assuming Sengkon’s former place in the contractual relation; and that FEBTC is giving its conformity to this arrangement. While FEBTC indeed approved Sengkon’s request for the change in account name from Sengkon to STI, such mere change in account name alone does not meet the required degree of certainty as to establish novation absent any other circumstance to bolster said conclusion. ~~ A dragnet clause is a stipulation in a REM contract that extends the coverage of a mortgage to advances or loans other than those already obtained or specified in the contract. Where there are several advances, however, a mortgage containing a dragnet clause will not be extended to cover future advances, unless the document evidencing the subsequent advance refers to the mortgage as providing security therefor or unless there are clear and supportive evidence to the contrary.

COMMERCIAL LAW Taiwan Kolin Corporation, Ltd. V. Kolin Electronics Co., Inc., G.R. No. 209843, 25 March 2015 Identical marks may be registered for products from the same classification. Mere uniformity in categorization, by itself, does not automatically preclude the registration of what appears to be an identical mark, if that be the case. In fact, this Court, in a long line of cases, has held that such circumstance does not necessarily result in any trademark infringement. Verily, whether or not the products covered by the trademark sought to be registered by Taiwan Kolin, on the one hand, and those covered by the prior issued certificate of registration in favor of Kolin Electronics, on the other, fall under the same categories in the NCL is not the sole and decisive factor in determining a possible violation of Kolin Electronics’ intellectual property right should petitioner’s application be granted. It is hornbook doctrine, as held in the above-cited cases, that emphasis should be on the similarity of the products involved and not on the arbitrary classification or general description of their properties or characteristics. The mere fact that one person has adopted and used a trademark on his goods would not, without more, prevent the adoption and use of the same trademark by others on unrelated articles of a different kind. In trademark cases, particularly in ascertaining whether one trademark is confusingly similar to another, no rigid set rules can plausible be formulated. Each case must be decided on its merits, with due regard to the goods or services involved, the usual purchaser’s character and attitude, among others. In such cases, even more than in any other litigation, precedent must be studied in the light of the facts of a particular case. That is the reason why in trademark cases, jurisprudential precedents should be applied only to a case if they are specifically in point. While both competing marks refer to the word “KOLIN” written in upper case letters and in bold font, the Court at once notes the distinct visual and aural differences between them: Kolin Electronics’ mark is italicized and colored black while that of Taiwan Kolin is white in pantone red color background. The differing features between the two, though they may appear minimal, are sufficient to distinguish one brand from the other. Y-I Leisure Philippines, Inc. v. Yu, GR 207161, 8 September 2015 Section 40 refers to the sale, lease, exchange or disposition of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets, including its goodwill. The sale under this provision does not contemplate an ordinary sale of all corporate assets; the transfer must be of such degree that the transferor corporation is rendered incapable of continuing its business or its corporate purpose. It must be clarified, however, that not every transfer of the entire corporate assets would qualify under Section 40. It does not apply (1) if the sale of the entire property and assets is necessary in the usual and regular course of business of corporation, or (2) if the proceeds of the sale or other disposition of such property and assets will be appropriated for the conduct of its remaining business. Thus, the litmus test to determine the applicability of Section 40 would be the capacity of the corporation to continue its business after the sale of all or substantially all its assets. Jurisprudence has held that in a business-enterprise transfer, the transferee is liable for the debts and liabilities of his transferor arising from the business enterprise conveyed. The transfer of all or substantially all the proper from one corporation to another under Section 40 necessarily entails the assumption of the assignor's liabilities, notwithstanding the absence of any agreement on the assumption of obligations. The transfer of all its business, properties and assets without the consent of its creditors must certainly include the liabilities; or else, the assignment will place the assignor's assets beyond the reach of its creditors. In order to protect the creditors against unscrupulous conveyance of the entire corporate assets, the transfer of assets of a corporation under Section 40 must likewise carry with it the transfer of its liabilities.

COMMERCIAL LAW Fraud is not an essential consideration in a business-enterprise transfer. While the Corporation Code allows the transfer of all or substantially all of the assets of a corporation, the transfer should not prejudice the creditors of the assignor corporation. Under the business-enterprise transfer, the petitioners have consequently inherited the liabilities of MADCI because they acquired all the assets of the latter corporation. The continuity of MADCI's land developments is now in the hands of the petitioners, with all its assets and liabilities. There is absolutely no certainty that Yu can still claim its refund from MADCI with the latter losing all its assets. To allow an assignor to transfer all its business, properties and assets without the consent of its creditors will place the assignor's assets beyond the reach of its creditors. Thus, the only way for Yu to recover his money would be to assert his claim against the petitioners as transferees of the assets. Fruehauf Electronics Philippines Corporation v. Technology Electronics Assembly and Management Pacific Corporation, GR 204197, 23 November 2016 Arbitration is an alternative mode of dispute resolution outside of the regular court system. Although adversarial in character, arbitration is technically not litigation. It is a voluntary process where one or more arbitrators - appointed according to the parties' agreement or according to the applicable rules of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Law - resolve a dispute by rendering an award. Resort to arbitration is voluntary. It requires consent from both parties in the form of an arbitration clause that pre-existed the dispute or a subsequent submission agreement. This written arbitration agreement is an independent and legally enforceable contract that must be complied with in good faith. By entering into an arbitration agreement, the parties agree to submit their dispute to an arbitrator (or tribunal) of their own choosing and be bound by the latter's resolution. However, this contractual and consensual character means that the parties cannot implead a third-party in the proceedings even if the latter's participation is necessary for a complete settlement of the dispute. The tribunal does not have the power to compel a person to participate in the arbitration proceedings without that person's consent. It also has no authority to decide on issues that the parties did not submit (or agree to submit) for its resolution. As a purely private mode of dispute resolution, arbitration proceedings, including the records, the evidence, and the arbitral award, are confidential unlike court proceedings which are generally public. This allows the parties to avoid negative publicity and protect their privacy. Our law highly regards the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings that it devised a judicial remedy to prevent or prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information obtained therefrom. The contractual nature of arbitral proceedings affords the parties I substantial autonomy over the proceedings. The parties are free to agree on the procedure to be observed during the proceedings. The parties likewise appoint the arbitrators based on agreement. There are no other legal requirements as to the competence or technical qualifications of an arbitrator. Their only legal qualifications are: (1) being of legal age; (2) full-enjoyment of their civil rights; and (3) the ability to read and write.77 The parties can tailorfit the tribunal's composition to the nature of their dispute. Thus, a specialized dispute can be resolved by experts on the subject. ~~ An Arbitral Tribunal does not exercisequasi-judicial powers. Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power: (1) to hear and determine questions of fact to which legislative policy is to apply, and (2) to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. Quasi-judicial power is only exercised by administrative agencies - legal organs of the government.

COMMERCIAL LAW As government organs necessary for an effective legal system, a quasi-judicial tribunal's legal existence, continues beyond the resolution of a specific dispute. In other words, quasi-judicial bodies are creatures of law. As a contractual and consensual: body, the arbitral tribunal does not have any inherent powers over the parties. It has no power to issue coercive writs or compulsory processes. Thus, there is a need to resort to the regular courts for interim measures of protection and for the recognition or enforcement of the arbitral award. The arbitral tribunal acquires jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter through stipulation. Upon the rendition of the final award, the tribunal becomes functus officio and - save for a few exceptions - ceases to have any further jurisdiction over the dispute. The tribunal's powers (or in the case of ad hoc tribunals, their very existence) stem from the obligatory force of the arbitration agreement and its ancillary stipulations. Gaisano v. Development Insurance and Surety Corporation, GR 190702, 27 February 2017 (jardeleza) The premium, therefore, is the elixir vitae or source of life of the insurance business. There are, of course, exceptions to the rule that no insurance contract takes effect unless premium is paid. In UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., we summarized the exceptions as follows: (1) in case of life or industrial life policy, whenever the grace period provision applies, as expressly provided by Section 77 itself; (2) where the insurer acknowledged in the policy or contract of insurance itself the receipt of premium, even if premium has not been actually paid, as expressly provided by Section 78 itself; (3) where the parties agreed that premium payment shall be in installments and partial payment has been made at the time of loss, as held in Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp. v. Court of Appeals; (4) where the insurer granted the insured a credit term for the payment of the premium, and loss occurs before the expiration of the term, as held in Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp.; and (5) where the insurer is in estoppel as when it has consistently granted a 60 to 90-day credit term for the payment of premiums. The fourth and fifth exceptions to Section 77 operate under the facts obtaining in Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp. and UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. Both contemplate situations where the insurers have consistently granted the insured a credit extension or term for the payment of the premium. Here, however, petitioner failed to establish the fact of a grant by respondent of a credit term in his favor, or that the grant has been consistent. While there was mention of a credit agreement between Trans-Pacific and respondent, such arrangement was not proven and was internal between agent and principal. Under the principle of relativity of contracts, contracts bind the parties who entered into it. It cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of the contract and has acted with knowledge. We cannot sustain petitioner's claim that the parties agreed that the insurance contract is immediately effective upon issuance despite non payment of the premiums. Even if there is a waiver of pre-payment of premiums, that in itself does not become an exception to Section 77, unless the insured clearly gave a credit term or extension. This is the clear import of the fourth exception in the UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. To rule otherwise would render nugatory the requirement in Section 77 that "[n]otwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy or contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and binding unless and until the premium thereof has been paid, x x x." Dy and Philites Electronic & Lighting Products v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV., GR 186088, 22 March 2017 (Sereno) A mark cannot be registered if it is identical with a registered mark belonging to a different proprietor or a mark with an earlier filing or priority date, in respect of the same goods or services, or closely related goods or services, or if it nearly resembles such a mark as to be likely to cause confusion; or if the mark is identical with, or confusingly similar to, or constitutes a translation of a mark which is considered by the competent

COMMERCIAL LAW authority of the Philippines to be well-known internationally and in the Philippines, whether or not it is registered here, as being already the mark of a person other than the applicant for registration, and used for identical or similar goods or services: provided, that it determining whether a mark is well-known, account shall be taken of the knowledge of the relevant sector of the public, rather than of the public at large, including knowledge in the Philippines which has been obtained as a result of the promotion of the mark. Philips is a registered and well known mark. Despite its diversification to numerous and varied industries, the records show that both parties are engaged in the same line of business: selling identical or similar goods such as fluorescent bulbs, incandescent lights, starters and ballasts. In determining similarity and likelihood of confusion, jurisprudence has developed two tests: the dominancy test and the holistic or totality test. The dominancy test focuses on the similarity of the prevalent or dominant features of the competing trademarks that might cause confusion, mistake, and deception in the mind of the purchasing public. Duplication or imitation is not necessary; neither is it required that the mark sought to be registered suggests an effort to imitate. Given more consideration are the aural and visual impressions created by the marks on the buyers of goods, giving little weight to factors like prices, quality, sales outlets and market segments. The holistic or totality test necessitates a consideration of the entirety of the marks as applied to the products, including the labels and packaging, in determining confusing similarity. The discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the predominant words, but also on the other feature appearing on both labels so that the observer may draw conclusion on whether one is confusingly similar to the other. Applying the dominancy test, we agree with the CA that the mark “PHILITES” bears an uncanny resemblance or confusing similarity with “PHILIPS.” The confusing similarity becomes even more prominent when we examine the entirety of the marks used by petitioner and respondent, including the way the products are packaged. In using the holistic test, we find there is a confusing similarity between PHILIPS and PHILITES. BIR v. Lepanto Ceramics, Inc., GR 224764, 24 April 2017 (Perlas-Bernabe) Section 4 (gg) of RA 10142 states: “Rehabilitation shall refer to the restoration of the debtor to a condition of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan, more if the debtor continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated.” Case law has defined corporate rehabilitation as an attempt to conserve and administer the assets of an insolvent corporation in the hope of its eventual return from financial stress to solvency. It contemplates the continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and liquidity. The inherent purpose of rehabilitation is to find ways and means to minimize the expenses of the distressed corporation during the rehabilitation period by providing the best possible framework for the corporation to gradually regain or achieve a sustainable operating form. "[It] enable[s] the company to gain a new lease in life and thereby allow creditors to be paid [t]heir claims from its earnings. Thus, rehabilitation shall be undertaken when it is shown that the continued operation of the corporation is economically more feasible and its creditors can recover, by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan, more, if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated. To achieve these objectives, Section 16 of RA 10142 provides that upon the issuance of a Commencement Order - which includes a Stay or Suspension Order - all actions or proceedings, in court or otherwise, for the enforcement of "claims" against the distressed company shall be suspended. Under the same law, claim "shall

COMMERCIAL LAW refer to all claims or demands of whatever nature or character against the debtor or its property, whether for money or otherwise, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent, matured or unmatured, disputed or undisputed, including, but not limited to; (1) all claims of the government, whether national or local, including taxes, tariffs and customs duties; and (2) claims against directors and officers of the debtor arising from acts done in the discharge of their functions falling within the scope of their authority: Provided, That, this inclusion does not prohibit the creditors or third parties from filing cases against the directors and officers acting in their personal capacities." To clarify, however, creditors of the distressed corporation are not without remedy as they may still submit their claims to the rehabilitation court for proper consideration so that they may participate in the proceedings, keeping in mind the general policy of the law "to ensure or maintain certainty and predictability in commercial affairs, preserve and maximize the value of the assets of these debtors, recognize creditor rights and respect priority of claims, and ensure equitable treatment of creditors who are similarly situated." In other words, creditors must ventilate their claims before the rehabilitation court, and any "[a]ttempts to seek legal or other resource against the distressed corporation shall be sufficient to support a finding of indirect contempt of court." In this case, LCI filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation. The Rehabilitation Court issued a Commencement Order which: (a) declared LCI to be under corporate rehabilitation; (b) suspended all actions or proceedings, in court or otherwise, for the enforcement of claims against LCI; (c) prohibited LCI from making any payment of its outstanding liabilities as of even date, except as may be provided under RA 10142; and (d) directed the BIR to file and serve on LCI its comment or opposition to the petition, or its claims against LCI. The BIR personally and by publication - was notified of the rehabilitation proceedings involving LCI and the issuance of the Commencement Order related thereto. Despite the foregoing, the BIR still opted to send LCI: (a) a notice of informal conference, informing the latter of its deficiency internal tax liabilities for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 2010; and (b) a Formal Letter of Demand, requiring LCI to pay deficiency taxes, notwithstanding the written reminder coming from LCI's court-appointed receiver of the pendency of rehabilitation proceedings concerning LCI and the issuance of a commencement order. Notably, the acts of sending a notice of informal conference and a Formal Letter of Demand are part and parcel of the entire process for the assessment and collection of deficiency taxes from a delinquent taxpayer, - an action or proceeding for the enforcement of a claim which should have been suspended pursuant to the Commencement Order. Unmistakably, Misajon, et al. 's foregoing acts are in clear defiance of the Commencement Order. BIR’s insistence that: (a) Misajon, et al. only performed such acts to toll the prescriptive period for the collection of deficiency taxes; and (b) to cite them in indirect contempt would unduly interfere with their function of collecting taxes due to the government, cannot be given any credence. As aptly put by RTC Br. 35, BIR could have easily tolled the running of such prescriptive period, and at the same time, perform their functions as officers of the BIR, without defying the Commencement Order and without violating the laudable purpose of RA 10142 by simply ventilating their claim before the Rehabilitation Court. After all, they were adequately notified of the LCI's corporate rehabilitation and the issuance of the corresponding Commencement Order. In sum, it was improper for Misajon, et al. to collect, or even attempt to collect, deficiency taxes from LCI outside of the rehabilitation proceedings concerning the latter, and in the process, willfully disregard the Commencement Order lawfully issued by the Rehabilitation Court. Hence, the RTC Br. 35 correctly cited them for indirect contempt. Republic v. Bolante, GR 186717, 17 April 2017 (Sereno) Under the enactment of RA 10167 on 18 June 2012, Section 11 of RA 9160 was further amended to allow the AMLC to file an ex parte application for an order allowing an inquiry into bank deposits and investments. The constitutionality of Section 11 of RA 9160, as presently worded, was upheld by the Court En Banc in the recently promulgated Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices v. CA. The Court therein ruled that the AMLC’s ex parte application for a bank inquiry, which is allowed under Section 11 of RA 9160, does not violate substantive due process. There is no such violation, because the physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property is not contemplated in any form by the law. The AMLC may indeed be authorized to apply

COMMERCIAL LAW ex parte for an inquiry into bank accounts, but only in pursuance of its investigative functions akin to those of the National Bureau of Investigation. As the AMLC does not exercise quasi-judicial functions, its inquiry by court order into bank deposits or investments cannot be said to violate any person’s constitutional right to procedural due process. The Court in Subido emphasized that the holder of a bank account that is the subject of a bank inquiry order issued ex parte has the opportunity to question the issuance of such an order after a freeze order has been issued against the account. The account holder can then question not only the finding of probable cause for the issuance of the freeze order, but also the finding of probable cause for the issuance of the bank inquiry order. California Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Advanced Technology System, Inc., GR 202454, 25 April 2017 (Sereno) Whether one corporation is merely an alter ego of another, a sham or subterfuge, and whether the requisite quantum of evidence has been adduced to warrant the puncturing of the corporate veil are questions of fact. ~~ Any piercing of the corporate veil must be dones with caution. It must be certain that the corporate fiction was misused to such an extent that injustice, fraud, or crime was committed against another, in disregard of rights. Moreover, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established. CMCI’s alter ego theory rests on the alleged interlocking boards of directors and stock ownership of the two corporations. Mere ownership by a single stockholder of even all or nearly all of the capital stocks of a corporation, by itself, is not a sufficient ground to disregard the corporate veil. The instrumentality or control test of the alter ego doctrine requires not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete dominaiton of finances, policy and business practice with respect to the transaction in question. The corporate entity must be shown to have no separate mind, will or existence or its own at the time of the transaction. Spouses Celones are incorporators, directors, and majority stockholders of ATSI and PPPC. But that is all that CMCI has proven. There is no proof that PPPC controlled the financial policies and business practices of ATSI either in July 2001 when Felicisima proposed to set off the unpaid 3.2M mobilization fund with CMCI’s rental of Prodopak machines; or in August 2001 when the lease agreement between CMCI and ATSI commenced. There is nothing to support CMCI’s claim that it had been led to believe that ATSI and PPPC were one and the same; or, that ATSI’s collectible was intertwined with the business transaction of CMCI. The fraud test, which is the second of the three-prong test to determine the application of the alter ego doctrine, requires that the parent corporation’s conduct in using the subsidiary corporation be unjust, fraudulent or wrongful. Under the third prong, or the harm test, a causal connection between the fraudulent conduct committed through the instrumentality of the subsidiary and the injury suffered or the damage incurred by the plaintiff has to be established. None of these elements have been demonstrated in this case. Ambassador Hotel, Inc. v. SSS, GR 194137, 21 June 2017 (Mendoza) Even when the employer is a corporation, it shall be held liable for the non-remittance of SSS contributions. It is, however, the head, directors or officers that shall suffer the personal criminal liability. Although a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it, the corporate veil is pierced when a director, trustee or officer is made personally liable by specific provision of law. In this regard, Section 28(f) of RA 8282 explicitly provides that if the act or omission penalized by the Act be committed by an association, partnership, corporation or any other institution, its managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided. Thus, a corporation cannot invoke its separate judicial entity to escape its liability for nonpayment of SSS contributions.

COMMERCIAL LAW

To acquire jurisdiction over the corporation in a criminal case, its head, directors or partners must be served with a warrant of arrest. In this case, Yolanda, as President of Ambassador Hotel was arrested and brought before the RTC. Consequently, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Yolanda and of Ambassador Hotel as the former was its representative. No separate service of summons is required for the hotel because the law simply requires the arrest of its agent for the court to acquire jurisdiction over it in the criminal action. Likewise, there is no requirement to implead Ambassador Hotel as a party to the criminal case because it is deemed included therein through its managing head, directors or partners, as provided by Section 28(f) of RA 8282. Chinatrust Commercial Bank v. Turner, GR 191458, 3 July 2017 (Leonen) Once the amount represented by the telegraphic transfer order is credited to the account of the payee or appears in the name of the payee in the books of the receiving bank, the ownership of the telegraphic transfer order is deemed to have been transmitted to the receiving bank. The local bank is deemed to have fully executed the telegraphic transfer and is no longer the owner of this telegraphic transfer order. When the funds were credited to the account of Min Travel at Citibank-Cairo, ownership and control of these funds were transferred to Min Travel. Thus, the funds could not be withdrawn without its consent. The tour travel arrangement, which brought about the remittance of the funds, is a separate and private arrangement between respondent and Min Travel. Respondent’s change of mind and claim for refund, therefore, should have been properly addressed to Min Travel, which already had possession of the funds and not to petitioner, who was not privy to the arrangement. DyTeban Trading, Inc. v. Dy, GR 185647, 26 July 2017 (Jardeleza) The existence of an intra-corporate dispute must be properly alleged in a complaint filed before a commercial court because the allegations in the complaint determine a tribunal’s jurisdiction over the subject matter. This means that the complaint must make out a case that meets both the relationship and the nature of the controversy tests. Under the relationship test, a dispute is intra-corporate if it is: (1) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. The nature of the controversy test, on the other hand, requires that the dispute itself must be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation, partnership or association. The controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must also refer to the enforcement of the parties’ correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code as well as the internal and intracorporate regulatory rules of the corporation. Evangelista v. Screenex Inc., GR 211564, 20 November 2017 (Sereno) A check is discharged by any other act which will discharge a simply contract for the payment of money. By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. It is a negotiable instrument – written and signed by a drawer containing an unconditional order to pay on demand a sum certain in money. It is an undertaking that the drawer will pay the amount indicated thereon. Section 119 of the NIL, however,

COMMERCIAL LAW states that a negotiable instrument like a check may be discharged by any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money. A check therefore is subject to prescription of actions upon a written contract. Barring any extrajudicial or judicial demand that may toll the 10-year prescription period and any evidence which may indicate any other time when the obligation to pay is due, the cause of action based on a check is reckoned from the date indicated on the check. If the check is undated, however, the cause of action is reckoned from the date of the issuance of the check. This is so because regardless of the omission of the date indicated on the check, Section 17 of NIL instructs that an undated check is presumed dated as of the time of its issuance. While the space for the date on a check may also be filled, it must, however, be filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time. Assuming that Yu had authority to insert the dates in the checks, the fact that he did so after a lapse of more than 10 years from their issuance certainly cannot qualify as changes made within a reasonable time. Given the foregoing, the cause of action on the checks has become stale, hence time-barred. No written extrajudicial or judicial demand was shown to have been made within 10 years which could have tolled the period. Prescription has indeed set in. ~~ The delivery of the check produces the effect of payment when through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired. It is a settled rule that the creditor’s possession of the evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been discharged by payment. It is likewise an established tenet that a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, and the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment. However, payment is deemed effected and the obligation for which the check was given as conditional payment is treated discharged, if a period of 10 years or more has elapsed from the date indicated on the check until the date of encashment or presentment for payment. The failure to encash the checks within a reasonable time after issue, or more than 10 years in this instance, not only results in the checks becoming stale but also in the obligation to pay being deemed fulfilled by operation of law. Colegio Medico-Farmaceutico de Filipinas, Inc. v. Lim, GR 212034, 2 July 2018 (Del Castillo) In the absence of a charter or by law provision to the contrary, the president is presumed to have the authority to act within the domain of the general objectives of its business and within the scope of his or her usual duties. Unless authorized by the board of directors or trustees, corporate officers and agents cannot exercise any corporate power pertaining to a corporation. A board resolution expressly authorizing the officers and agents is therefore required. However, in filing a suit, jurisprudence has allowed the president of a corporation to sign the verification and the certification of non-forum shopping even without a board resolution as said officer is presumed to have sufficient knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations stated in the complaint or petition. ~~ The president of a corporation has the power to perform acts within the scope of his usual duties. In this case, the issuance of the demand letter to collect the payment of unpaid rentals from respondent and to demand

COMMERCIAL LAW the latter to vacate the subject property was done in the ordinary course of business, and thus, within the scope of the powers of Del Castillo. In fact, per the by-laws, it was his duty as President to manage the affairs of petitioner, which included the collection of receivables. Accordingly, even without a board resolution, del Castillo had the power and authority to issue the demand letter.

REMEDIAL LAW

Fruehauf Electronics Philippines Corporation v. Technology Electronics Assembly and Management Pacific Corporation, GR 204197, 23 November 2016 An arbitral award is not appealable via Rule 43 because: (1) there is no statutory basis for an appeal from the final award of arbitrators; (2) arbitrators are not quasi-judicial bodies; and (3) the Special ADR Rules specifically prohibit the filing of an appeal to question the merits of an arbitral award. The Special ADR Rules allow, the RTC to correct or modify an arbitral award pursuant to Section 25 of the Arbitration Law. However, this authority cannot be interpreted as jurisdiction to review the merits of the award. The RTC can modify or correct the award only in the following cases: a. Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; b. Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted; c. Where the arbitrators have omitted to resolve an issue submitted to them for resolution; or d. Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy, and if it had been a commissioner's report, the defect could have been amended or disregarded by the Court A losing party is likewise precluded from resorting to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Because an arbitral tribunal is not a government organ exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers, it is removed from the ambit of Rule 65. The only remedy against a final domestic arbitral award is to file petition to vacate or to modify/correct the award not later than thirty (30) days from the receipt of the award. Unless a ground to vacate has been established, the RTC must confirm the arbitral award as a matter of course. Once the RTC orders the confirmation, vacation, or correction/modification of a domestic arbitral award, the aggrieved party may move for reconsideration within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order. The losing party may also opt to appeal from the RTC's ruling instead. Coombs v. Castaneda, et al., GR 192353, 15 March 2017 (Leonardo-De Castro) In a petition for annulment of judgment grounded on lack of jurisdiction, it is not enough that there is an abuse of jurisdictional discretion. It must be shown that the court should not have taken cognizance of the case because the law does not confer it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. In a judicial reconstitution of a lost or destroyed owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title, the RTC has no jurisdiction when the certificate sought to be reconstituted was never lost or destroyed but is in fact in the possession of another person. In other words, the fact of loss of the duplicate certificate is jurisdictional. Dadis v. Spouses Magtanggol, GR 206008, 7 June 2017 (Peralta) Under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules, not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Although classified as a public instrument, a notarized document is merely evidence of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. When the notarization is defective, the public character of the document is stripped off and it is reduced to a mere private document that should be examined under the parameters of Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules DFA v. BCA International Corporation, GR 225051, 19 July 2017 (Peralta)

REMEDIAL LAW It is clear that an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court is from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals and only questions of law may be raised. There have been instances when we overlooked the rule on hierarchy of courts and took cognizance of a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion by the Regional Trial Court when it granted interim relief to a party and issued an Order assailed by the petitioner, considering the transcendental importance of the issue involved therein or to better serve the ends of justice when the case is determined on the merits rather than on technicality. However, in this case, the appeal by certiorari is not from a final Order of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, but from an interlocutory order of the Arbitral Tribunal; hence, the petition must be dismissed. Representatives Lagman, et al. v. Senate President et al., GR 235935, 6 February 2018 (Tijam) In a petition filed with the Supreme Court assailing the constitutionality of the Resolution of both Houses No. 4, the failure to attach a copy of the same is not a fatal defect. A court can take judicial notice of the official acts of the legislative department without the introduction of evidence. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because these facts are already known to them; it is the duty of the court to assume something as matters of fact without need of further evidentiary support. Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 is an official act of Congress, thus, this Court can take judicial notice thereof. ~~ In these consolidated petitions, petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of a congressional act, specifically the approval of the President’s request to extend martial law in Mindanao. Petitioners in GR 235935 and 236155 have also put in issue the manner in which the Congress deliberated upon the President’s request for extension. Clearly, therefore, it is the Congress as a body, and not just its leadership, which has interest in the subject matter of these cases. Consequently, it was procedurally incorrect for petitioners in GR Nos. 235935, 236061 and 236155 to implead only the Senate President and the House Speaker among the respondents. Inasmuich as the Congress was impleaded as a respondent in GR 236145 and the OSG has entered its appearance and argued for all the respondents named in the four consolidated petitions, the Court finds that the essential and jurisdictional requirement of impleading an indispensable party has been substantially complied with. ~~ Conclusiveness of judgment, a species of the principle of res judicata, bars the re-litigation of any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits. In order to successfully apply in a succeeding litigation the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, mere identities of parties and issues is required. ~~ Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution pertains to the Court’s judicial power to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The first part is to be known as the traditional concept of judicial power while the latter part, an innovation of the 1987 Constitution, became known as the court’s expanded jurisdiction. Under its expanded jurisdiction, courts can now delve into acts of any branch or instrumentality of the Government traditionally considered as political if such act was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

REMEDIAL LAW A certiorari petition invoking the Court’s expanded jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the Congress’ extension of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. Furthermore, the court’s judicial review of the Congress’ extension of such proclamation or suspension is limited only to a determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.

LEGAL ETHICS Belo-Henares v. Guevarra, AC 11394, 1 December 2016 (Perlas-Bernabe) Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking activity - in this case, Facebook - it is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration. Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts were limited to or viewable by his "Friends" only, there is no assurance that the same - or other digital content that he uploads or publishes on his Facebook profile - will be safeguarded as within the confines of privacy, in light of the following: (1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way"; (2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers; (3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and (4) A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag" others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends. Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends." Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is negated. Neither can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks were written in the exercise of his freedom of speech and expression. A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the name and reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured ("binaboy") his client Norcio, labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services all these despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against complainant. He even threatened complainant with conviction for criminal negligence and estafa which is contrary to one's obligation "to act with justice."· In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly insulting and undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter violation of the following provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

LEGAL ETHICS

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. chanrobleslaw By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and BMGI's reputation. That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who is exposed to criticism That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who is exposed to criticism does not justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. In this case, respondent's remarks against complainant breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be administratively sanctioned. "Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to one's behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession—would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them." 74 Accordingly, the Court finds that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, as originally recommended by the IBP-CBD, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Sison v. Valdez, AC 11663, 31 July 2017 (Perlas-Bernabe) Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, a lawyer is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion. He owed fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. In this relation, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the status and developments of the case and all over relevant information. ~~ The highly fiduciary nature of an attorney-client relationship imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the filing and processing of a case, if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. His failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has appropriated it for his own use, and the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes a gross violation of his professional obligation under Canon 16 of the CPR. Mabini v. Kintanar, AC 9512, 5 February 2018 (Del Castillo) It is a truism that the duties performed by a Notary Public are not just plain ministerial acts. They are so impressed with public interest and dictated by public policy. Such is the case since notarization makes a private document into a public one. However, a lawyer cannot be held liable for a violation of his duties as Notary Public when the law in effect at the time of his complained act does not provide any prohibition to the same.

LEGAL ETHICS

The 1917 Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law. In turn, the provisions anent notarial practice embodies in the Revised Administrative Code were superseded by the passage of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. This only means that any prohibition enumerated in the 20004 Rules on Notarial Practice does not cover the acts made by a Notary Public earlier, including those executed in 2002. Respondent therefore, did not violate any of his duties as notary public when he notarized the affidavit of his wife on April 25, 2002.