Reading Response: Bonjour's "a Critique Of Foundationalism"

 

θωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψ υιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδ φγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζ READING RESPONSE  ξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµ Laurence Bonjour’s “Critique of Foundationalism”  θωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψ υιοπασδφγηϕκτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβν µθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτ ψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπα σδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκ λζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβ νµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτ ψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπα σδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκ λζξχϖβνµρτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθ ωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυι οπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγ ηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξ χϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθ ωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυι οπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγ ηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξ χϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθ                                                

Patrick Shannon  PHIL 215 

Dr.Jenna Woodrow 

September 29,2008 

Shannon  1  Bonjour begins his “Critique of Foundationalism” with a brief summarization of the epistemic regress argument: For any inferred belief to be justified, the beliefs that support it must be justified themselves, resulting in “an infinite and apparently vicious regress of epistemic justification”(184). Bonjour suggests four possible outcomes of this regress:  1) Termination in beliefs that are ultimately unjustifiable. (Scepticism) 2) Infinite regression (Scepticism) 3) Continuous appeal to beliefs which have already been called upon (Coherentism) 4) Termination in beliefs that constitute knowledge without requiring inferential justification (Foundationalism). Because scepticism constitutes surrender to epistemic regress, and Coherentism is subject to “seemingly decisive” objections, he asserts that, prima facie, Foundationalism appears to be the most attractive solution . Bonjour distinguishes two principal varieties of Foundationalism: Strong Foundationalism, which holds that certain basic beliefs possess “sufficient non-inferential justification to be…indubitable”(185), and Weak Foundationalism, which admits that these non-inferential beliefs must appeal to other beliefs to form epistemically justified knowledge. The author’s central criticism of Foundationalism is concerned with whether or not these answers present an acceptable foundation for knowledge. Absenting the possibility of innate knowledge, Bonjour argues that no empirical belief can be justified epistemically without referencing further beliefs. To accept unjustified beliefs for the sake of convenience would be “epistemically irresponsible”. The author does, however,

Shannon  2  admit that two foundationalist answers appear to counter his objection: externalism and givenness. Externalism holds that the justification of a subject’s belief does not necessarily have to fall within his or her reflective purview. The belief may be considered knowledge as long as it is true and the “natural relation…between the believer and the world” makes the belief highly likely to be true”(187). Bonjour objects to Externalism on the grounds that it seems only to waive the requirement for justification when convenient. Givenness asserts that certain beliefs are not inferred, but are “immediately apprehended” by the subject, and require no further justification. The difficulty with this response is that this apprehension would require justification itself, or would be incapable of providing an epistemic foundation for further knowledge. In his critique, Bonjour raises decisive objections against the foundationalist solution to epistemic regress. Presupposing that all knowledge is inferred from the senses, he makes it quite clear that “no account seems to be available of how an empirical belief can be genuinely justified …while avoiding all reference to further empirical beliefs or cognitions which themselves would require justification”(193). It would seem, then, that we are left with a choice between the Coherentist acceptance of a non-linear dependence of justification, which “seems unacceptable”, and sceptical surrender (185). Bonjour does, however, mention a third alternative that he seems hesitant to address. While discussing Externalism, he mentions that we might abandon the traditional conception of epistemic justification and knowledge. While Bonjour considers this solution too radical to discuss in his essay, he admits that “such an altered conception of knowledge may be inescapable or even…desirable”(189). Furthermore, if Bonjour is correct in his assertion

Shannon  3  that the epistemic regress problem is a direct result of our traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, then the most efficient solution would be to alter this definition to avoid the problem entirely. Willard Van Orman Quine, a proponent of naturalized Epistemology, explains concisely the difficulty of resolving the epistemic regress argument with our current conception of knowledge: I see philosophy and science as in the same boat – a boat which…we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There is no external vantage point, [therefore] no first philosophy (O’Brien 129). Indeed, it seems impossible to confirm without the slightest doubt the veridicality of our sense data without appealing to any other source of information. If the coherentist conception of a non-linear corroboration of our perceptions is a sufficient source of justification, or if there exists within us some innate truth from which we might construct further knowledge, then we may yet escape from epistemic regress. If not, it follows that we must develop a new understanding of knowledge. While Quine argues for the abandonment of normative epistemology, I agree with Bonjour’s view that this is too radical for immediate consideration. Instead, it seems reasonable to ask whether or not it is a philosopher’s responsibility to accept the limitations of the human consciousness. If this is the case, what alternatives are available in our search for wisdom?

Shannon  4  WORKS CITED Bonjour, Laurence. “A Critique of Foundationalism.” The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings 3rd Edition. Ed. Louis P. Pojman. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003. O’Brien, Dan. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2006.