Raw Case Digest.docx

1. Francisco I. Chavez vs NHA, et. Al. G.R. No. 164527 15 August 2007 PONENTE: Velasco, JR. J. FACTS: On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state. As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into lowcost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the importance of private sectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others. The same MO also established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA). Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. ThenPresident Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI. Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties. To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite. Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of

Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project. Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33. On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI. On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc. Hence this case. ISSUE/S: 1. Whether the contention of the Petitioner is correct that neither respondent NHA nor respondent RBI may validly reclaim foreshore and submerged land because they were not given any power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power was delegated by law to PEA; and 2. Whether Petitioner is correct that even if the NHA and RBI were granted the power to reclaim, they are still required to procure DENR’s authorization. HELD: 1. NO. The Court laid down the following laws where it stated that PEA has no exclusive power to reclaim lands of public domain in the Philippines, to wit: EO 525 reads:

Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. All reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation

projects of any national government agency or entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon approval of the President. (Emphasis supplied.) The aforequoted provision points to three (3) requisites for a legal and valid reclamation project, viz: (1)

approval by the President;

(2)

favorable recommendation of PEA; and

(3)

undertaken by any of the following: a.

by PEA

b.

by any person or entity pursuant to a contract it executed

with PEA c.

by the National Government agency or entity authorized

under its charter to reclaim lands subject to consultation with PEA Without a doubt, PEA under EO 525 was designated as the agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects. Primarily means mainly, principally, mostly, generally. Thus, not all reclamation projects fall under PEAs authority of supervision, integration, and coordination. The very charter of PEA, PD 1084,1 does not mention that PEA has the exclusive and sole power and authority to reclaim lands of public domain. EO 525 even reveals the exceptionreclamation projects by a national government agency or entity authorized by its charter to reclaim land. One example is EO 405 which authorized the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to reclaim and develop submerged areas for port related purposes. Under its charter, PD 857, PPA has the power to reclaim, excavate, enclose or raise any of the lands vested in it.

While the authority of NHA to reclaim lands is challenged by petitioner, the Court find that the NHA had more than enough authority to do so under existing laws. While PD 757, the charter of NHA, does not explicitly mention reclamation in any of the listed powers of the agency, The Court rule that the NHA has an implied power to reclaim land as this is vital or incidental to effectively, logically, and successfully implement an urban land reform and housing program enunciated in Sec. 9 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. From the foregoing provisions, it is readily apparent that the TFDA has the explicit power to develop public lands covering the Tondo foreshore land and any other additional and alternative resettlement sites under letter b, Sec. 3 of PD 570. Since the powers of TFDA were assumed by the NHA, then the NHA has the power to reclaim lands in the Tondo foreshore area which covers the 79-hectare land subject of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 and Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598. 2. YES.

The Court said that DENR is vested with the power to authorize the

reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain. Despite the Court’s finding that PEA case is not a precedent to the case at bar, The Court find after all that under existing laws, the NHA is still required to procure DENRs authorization before a reclamation project in Manila Bay or in any part of the Philippines can be undertaken.

The

requirement applies to PEA, NHA, or any other government agency or office granted with such power under the law. However in this case, the Court ruled that it was clear that the DENR, through its acts and issuances, has ratified and confirmed the reclamation of the subject lands for the purposes laid down in Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465.

2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY (PRA) v. CITY OF PARANAQUE G.R. NO. 191109 15 August 2007 PONENTE: Mendoza, J. FACTS: On February 14, 1979, by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 525 issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos, PEA was designated as the agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. On October 26, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 380 transforming PEA into PRA, which shall perform all the powers and functions of the PEA relating to reclamation activities. By virtue of its mandate, PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay, including those located in Parañaque City, and was issued Original Certificates of Title (OCT Nos. 180, 202, 206, 207, 289, 557, and 559) and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT Nos. 104628, 7312, 7309, 7311, 9685, and 9686) over the reclaimed lands. On February 19, 2003, then Parañaque City Treasurer Liberato M. Carabeo (Carabeo) issued Warrants of Levy on PRA s reclaimed properties (Central Business Park and Barangay San Dionisio) located in Parañaque City based on the assessment for delinquent real property taxes made by then Parañaque City Assessor Soledad Medina Cue for tax years 2001 and 2002. On March 26, 2003, PRA filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction against Carabeo before the RTC. On April 3, 2003, after due hearing, the RTC issued an order denying PRA s petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Hence this case. ISSUE/S: Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to consider that Reclaimed Lands are part of the public domain. Hence, exempt from Real Property Taxes.

HELD: YES. The Court agrees with PRA that the subject reclaimed lands are still part of the public domain, owned by the State and, therefore, exempt from payment of real estate taxes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part, as follows: Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of waterpower, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant. Similarly, Article 420 of the Civil Code enumerates properties belonging to the State:ςrαlαω Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. [Emphases supplied] Here, the subject lands are reclaimed lands, specifically portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. As such, these lands remain public lands and form part of the public domain. In the case of Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and AMARI Coastal Development Corporation, the Court held that foreshore and submerged areas irrefutably belonged to the public domain and were inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as

alienable lands open to disposition and further declared no longer needed for public service. The fact that alienable lands of the public domain were transferred to the PEA (now PRA) and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA s name did not automatically make such lands private. This Court also held therein that reclaimed lands retained their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. As the Court has repeatedly ruled, properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or foreclosure sale. Thus, the assessment, levy and foreclosure made on the subject reclaimed lands by respondent, as well as the issuances of certificates of title in favor of respondent, are without basis.

3. Francisco I. Chavez vs PEA and AMARI G.R. No. 133250 9 August 2002 PONENTE: Carpio, J. FACTS: Sometime in 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP). PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA. By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS. Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a ThaiPhilippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the “mother of all scams”). Hence this case where Petitioner Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. ISSUE/S: Whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: NO. The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973

Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which state that: "Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. x x x. xxx Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x."(Emphasis supplied) Hence, the stipulation in this case still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that private corporations "shall not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease." The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI will "hold" the reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a "disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141,the Government Auditing Code, and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

4. Republic of the Phiippines v CA and Republic Real Estate Corporation G.R. No. 103882 25 November 1998 PONENTE: Purisima J. FACTS: These is a consolidated petitions. Republic Act No. 1899 (RA 1899), which was approved on June 22, 1957, authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities. Section I of said law, reads: SECTION 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. On May 6, 1958, invoking the aforecited provision of RA 1899, the Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation of Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City, empowering the City Mayor to award and enter into reclamation contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions therefor. The said Ordinance was amended on April 21, 1959 by Ordinance No. 158, which authorized the Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions. On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an Agreementi for the reclamation of the foreshore lands in Pasay City. On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a Complaintii for Recovery of Possession and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Preventive Injunction and Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 2229-P before the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, (Branch 7, Pasay City) On March 5, 1962, the Republic of the Philippines filed an Amended Complaintiii questioning subject Agreement between Pasay City and RREC (Exhibit P) on the grounds that the subject-matter of such Agreement is outside the commerce of man, that its terms and conditions are violative of RA 1899, and that the said Agreement was executed without any public bidding. The Answers was filed by RREC and Pasay City. Dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Republic appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals. However, on January 11, 1973, before the appeal could be resolved, Presidential Decree No. 3-A issued,

amending Presidential Decree No. Pasay City and RREC presented a Motion for Reconsideration of such Decision of the Court of Appeals, CA decided favorably. Hence, this case. ISSUE/S: Whether CA erred in upholding the validity of Pasay City Ordinance no. 158 and Reclamation Contract entered between Pasay City and RREC. HELD: YES. The Court said that erroneous and unsustainable is the opinion of respondent court that under RA 1899, the term foreshore lands includes submerged areas. As can be gleaned from its disquisition and rationalization aforequoted, the respondent court unduly stretched and broadened the meaning of foreshore lands, beyond the intentment of the law, and against the recognized legal connotation of foreshore lands. To repeat, the term foreshore lands refers to: The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. (Words and Phrases, Foreshore) A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Websters Third New International Dictionary) The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning, much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term foreshore lands. Hence, it bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.

NOTE: case 5 and 6 on fulltxt not applicable here 5. Republic of the Philippines represente by Philippine Reclamation Authority (PARA) v City of Paranaque G.R. no. 191109 10 July 2012 PONENTE: Mendoza, J. FACTS: On February 14, 1979, by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 525 issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos, PEA was designated as the agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. On October 26, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 380 transforming PEA into PRA, which shall perform all the powers and functions of the PEA relating to reclamation activities. By virtue of its mandate, PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. On March 26, 2003, PRA filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction against Carabeo before the RTC. On April 3, 2003, after due hearing, the RTC issued an order denying PRA’s petition. On April 4, 2003, PRA sent a letter to Carabeo requesting the latter not to proceed with the public auction of the subject reclaimed properties. On August 3, 2009, after an exchange of several pleadings and the failure of both parties to arrive at a compromise agreement, PRA filed a Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached Supplemental Petition which sought to declare as null and void the assessment for real property taxes, the levy based on the said assessment, the public auction sale conducted on April 7, 2003, and the Certificates of Sale issued pursuant to the auction sale. Thereafter, RTC rendered its decision dismissing PRA’s petition. Hence, this case. ISSUE/S:

Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to consider that reclaimed lands are part of public domain. Hence, exempt from Real Property Tax. HELD: YES. The Court agrees with PRA that the subject reclaimed lands are still part of the public domain, owned by the State and, therefore, exempt from payment of real estate taxes. Reclaimed lands such as the subject lands in issue are reserved lands for public use. They are properties of public dominion. The ownership of such lands remains with the State unless they are withdrawn by law or presidential proclamation from public use. As the Court has repeatedly ruled, properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or foreclosure sale. Thus, the assessment, levy and foreclosure made on the subject reclaimed lands by respondent, as well as the issuances of certificates of title in favor of respondent, are without basis.

NB:Case no. 8 same with case no. 4 here, case 9,11,12 in fulltxt file not applicable; no. 10 same in 5 here 6. Malayan Integrated Industries Corp. v CA, et. Al. G.R. No. 101469 4 September 1992 PONENTE: Gria’o-Aquino, J. FACTS: The records show that on December 12, 1977, a reclamation contract was signed between the City of Mandaue and MALAYAN for the reclamation of some 180 (later increased to 360) hectares of offshore and foreshore land and their development into an industrial and trading center with a modern harbor and port facilities for both domestic and international commerce. The area would connect Cebu City harbor with the City of Mandaue from the Cabahug coastway up to the Cebu City Mandaue boundary. The project was supposed to be completed within four (4) years after approval of the contract by the Office of the President. However, that transaction appeared to be unauthorized under P.D. No. 3-A dated January 11, 1973 which provides that the reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, will be done only by the national government or any person authorized by it with a proper contract. Moreover, Executive Order No. 525 of President Marcos designated the Public Estates Authority (PEA) as "the central authority primarily responsible for integrating, directing and coordinating all reclamation projects for and in behalf of the National Government. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue, in its session of October 12, 1979, passed Resolution No. 116 authorizing the City Mayor to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the PEA. Its Resolution No. 117 of the same date authorized the City Mayor to enter into a contract with the PEA for the reclamation of 360 hectares, more or less, of the foreshore and submerged lands of Mandaue City. On August 13, 1980, MALAYAN submitted to PEA documents relating to the Metro Cebu Reclamation and Development Project. Two days later, or on August 15, 1980, MALAYAN submitted a detailed land use and development strategy and an overview of the project. On September 29, 1980, PEA Chairman, Ruben Ancheta, recommended approval of the project. Thereafter, several transactions and agreements took place.

Malayan filed a protest with the Office of the President agaisnt the reclamation contract between City of Mandaue. Thereafter, Malayan filed a petition for prohibitory and mandatory injuction against City of Mandaue before the RTC of Cebu. RTC denied MR while CA maintained the previous decisión. Hence this case. ISSUE/S: Whether the act of approval and/or disapproval of the reclamation contract by the Executive Secretary is valid. HELD: YES. The act of approval and disapproval by the Executive Secretary is valid. Although the letter to the PEA advising it of the approval of the reclamation contract between the City of Mandaue and F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. and the disapproval of the earlier agreement between the City of Mandaue and MALAYAN, was signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President," and not by the President's own hand, the Executive Secretary's action is presumed to be valid and to have been regularly performed in behalf of the President and thus should be accorded due respect. As head of the Executive Office, the Executive Secretary, is an alter ego of the President. One of his myriad functions is "to exercise primary authority to sign papers `By authority of the President,' attest executive orders and other presidential issuances unless attestation is specifically delegated to other officials by him or by the President; assist the President in the administration of special projects; and perform such other functions as the President may direct". Paraphrasing Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phils. 451, his personality is in reality "but the projection of that of the President," his acts, "performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." The approval by the Office of the President of the reclamation contract in favor of F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. and the rejection of the contract with MALAYAN, is not subject to review by the courts in view of the principle of separation of powers which accords co-equal status to the three great branches of the government, absent any showing that the President, in doing so, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Only on that ground may this Court justifiably intervene in a transaction that otherwise would be the exclusive preserve of the Chief Executive. In fact, while MALAYAN has asked the courts to nullify the reclamation contract between the City of Mandaue and F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., it did not assail the Office of the President for having approved it. Its petition for prohibitory and mandatory injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (CEB-9658), did not implead, as respondents, nor charge with grave abuse of discretion, the President of the

Philippines, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal Elma, Jr., and PEA General Manager Eduardo Zialcita, for having approved, or recommended the approval, by the President, of the said reclamation contract with F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. and the disapproval of the prior agreement between the City of Mandaue and MALAYAN.

7. Governor Garcia, et. Al v Hon. Burgos, et. Al. G.R. No. 124130 29 June 1998 PONENTE: Panganiban, J. FACTS: The Cebu South Reclamation Project is a FOUR BILLION PESO (P4,000,000,000.00) project of the, Government of the Republic of the Philippines funded out of a loan taken out by the government from the Government of Japan, through its international financing institution, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund The loan arrangements having been entered into, and the funds ready for release to the City of Cebu, the implementing agency of the project, the City of Cebu, the Department of Public Works and Highways and the Metro Cebu Development Project Office executed, on 11 September 1995, the "implementing Arrangement for Metro Cebu Development Project Phase III , under which agreement is outlined the procedure for implementation of the project as well as the rights and obligations of the parties thereto. Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation filed a case for "Specific Performance, Declaration of Nullity, Damages and Injunction, with Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" against herein petitioners, alleging that on October 31, 1977, a Contract of Reclamation and Development was entered into, signed and executed by and between the Province of Cebu, represented by then Governor Eduardo R. Gullas, and private respondent. Thereafter, a TRO which pertains to the implementation of the Metro Cebu Development Project, Phase III, a major component of which is the Cebu South Reclamation Project , was issued by Judge Jose P. Burgos of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. Hence, this case. ISSUE/S: Whether Private Respondent is correct that the Cebu South Reclamation Project is not an infrasctructure Project. HELD:

NO. The Court held that This is erroneous and misleading. In Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, the Court unequivocally held that the reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands along the coast of Mandaue City up to the Cebu City boundary for the purpose of developing the reclaimed area into an industrial and trading center with a modern harbor and port facilities for both domestic and international commerce is an infrastructure project as contemplated under PD 1818. Private respondent should know this not only because everyone is presumed to know the law, but also because it was a principal party in that case.

8. rancisco I. Chavez vs NHA, et. Al. G.R. No. 164527 15 August 2007 PONENTE: Velasco, JR. J. FACTS: ISSUE/S: HELD:

9. rancisco I. Chavez vs NHA, et. Al. G.R. No. 164527 15 August 2007 PONENTE: Velasco, JR. J. FACTS: ISSUE/S: HELD: