Rapid Deployment As A Response To An Active Shooter Incident

Rapid Deployment as a response to an

Active Shooter Incident

Illinois State Police Academy 2003

Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The T actic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Inc idents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The Findings & Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 The Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 The Recommend ations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Rapid Deployment in a post 9-11 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The Experts’ Opinions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Synopsis o f Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

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Introduction

hostage incidents are infrequent. So, many SWAT teams trained heavily but rarely deployed. Administrators looking for w ays to justify their investment in these units realized that the entry team component of SWA T units was perfectly suited to conduct high-risk raids for the service of arrest or search warrants. Many SWAT teams now spend as much as 80 per cent of their time conducti ng preplanned raids, not eme rgency response missions.

In less than 33 years, the U.S. law enforcement commu nity has experienced two watershe d events which shaped our respo nse to incidents involving an active shooter. The first rude awakening was perpetrated by Charles Whitman from the clock tower at the Univ ersity of Texas at Austin. In a sniper incident lasting 90 minutes, Whitman killed 15 and wounded 31 victims. Whitman's training in the U.S. Marine Corps apparently prepared him well for dealing with targets as distant as 500 yards from his perch on the 30th floor obse rvation dec k.

What does this brief history of SWAT have to do with a study of Rapid Deployment - Immediate Action tactics for patrol officers? More than 32 years after Charles Whitma n's rampage , two teenage rs in Colorado logged a similar death and injury toll at another school ... this time a high scho ol.

Many regard this incid ent as the impetus of d ramatic change in police training and response. Some agencies issued long-range rifles and trained their officers in the role of counter-sn iper, while other agencies formed more comprehensive para-military teams with even greater capabilities. The genesis of what would become Special Weapons and Tactics teams (SWAT) undoub tedly began at 1 1:48 a.m . on August 1 , 1966 in the form of Charles Whitman's murderous spree. Notably, Whitman was finally stopped that day by two police office rs and an arm ed citizen wh o teamed up to attack his sniper perch and kill him.

Within 13 minutes of the first police call to the April 20, 1999 inc ident at Colu mbine H igh Schoo l, Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris killed 13 and wounded 24. Unlike Whitman's sniper incident, the Columbine event was planned around explosives. Klebo ld and H arris had set a large impro vised bom b in the schoo l cafeteria with a timer set to go off when the lunch crow d would provide nearly 500 victims. The killers planned to shoot any fleeing students from positions they w ould take up in the parking lot. Only when their bomb failed to detonate did Klebold and Harris enter the scho ol to kill who they co uld with firearm s.

The evolution of SWAT teams in U.S. police agencies followed a rather hopscotch pattern around the nation. Most large cities had very well equipped and trained teams, while some suburban and rural areas basically ignored the conce pt or deve loped m utual-aid agreements with neighboring tea ms. Outside of major metropo litan areas, few age ncies expe cted incide nts requiring a SWAT -type response. Another important consid eration is the fact that SWAT teams are expensive and time consuming.

In researching the Whit man shooting in A ustin, little criticism of the police response could be found. Anyone who left cover within Whitman's field of fire was shot down. Indeed, one police officer was among the dead that day in Austin. No one on that day had heard of S WAT , a concep t which came later.

Most agencies developed policies setting clear guidelines for the activation of a SWAT team. Patrol officers in these agencies were gener ally trained to wait for SWAT when an incident justified deployment of the special team. Patro l officers were ex pected to "Contain, Isolate and Negotiate” until SWAT arrived.

At the Columbine incident, however, the police were loudly criticized. Even other police agencies have joined in the condemnation of the police response to the attack perpetrated by Klebold and Harris. At Columbine, numerous SWAT units deployed as quick ly as possible an d made e ntry into the school within 45 minutes of the first call. In fact, the shooters committed suicide at about the same time the first SWAT team was entering the o ther side of the m assive schoo l.

During this same time, the primary mission of most SWAT teams was evolving. Originally, most SWAT teams were structured for scenarios involving snipers (or other barricaded gunmen) and hostag e incidents. In actuality, active shooters, barricaded gunmen and -2-

risk to the responding officers and the possibility that these tactics could a ctually make some situations worse.

The current movement to train patrol officers to respond using Rapid D eploymen t tactics began in earnest in the aftermath of the Columbine shooting. Response strategies like Rapid Deployment have been around for a while in several forms, but emotions surrounding the Colu mbine incident caused many officers to insist they would “never again wait for SWAT ” at the scene of an active shooter.

The concern m any express for the use of Ra pid Deployment falls into the theory...“a little bit of knowledge is dangerous.” One SWAT team commander in Illinois put it this way: “In SWAT, making an entry is always our last option, for w hen all other methods of resolution have failed ... but, with Rapid Deployment, we’re telling minimally trained patrol officer s to use SWA T’s last option as the ir first option. I wonder if we ’ve really thought this thing through?”

Like so many things in the law enforce ment com munity, we have come full circle; from Rapid D eploymen t through the evolution of SW AT - bac k to Rapid Deployment in just over 32 years. The resolution of the Texas Tower incident was a Rapid D eploymen t, unorganized as it was, by those police officers and the armed citize n.

It is quite easy for two police officers to pencil out a scenario where Rapid Deployment tactics are the obvious answer. In looking at 44 active shooter incidents from the real world, the practicality of R apid Deploym ent is not so clea r cut.

Our research into these incid ents has uncovered other instances where an im mediate, unorganized response by arriving police officers probably saved lives. There is no question: R apid De ployment tac tics can save live s in some circumstances. However, the driving force behind this research project is the understanding that Rapid Deploym ent tactics carry w ith them a substantial

Our mission in this research was to first identify any patterns inherent in active shooting incidents, if indeed any such patterns exist. By better understanding how these events unfold , we hoped to determine when and where Ra pid Dep loyment is app ropriate.

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The Tactic simply too great. For situations where immediate action is not deemed appropriate, the Rapid Deployment team(s) would be used as an inner perimeter to control the suspect’s movement while a fully trained S W AT team is assembled.

What is Rapid Deployment? Rapid Deployment is a response strategy utilizing a small team of patrol officers to assault and neutralize an active criminal shooter. The theory behind Rapid Deployment is; we can’t afford to wait for the arrival of a SWAT unit when a killer is actively shooting victims. The Columbine school shooting is the example most often pointed to by Rapid Deployment proponents. Detractors feel the use of Rapid Deployment tactics at Columbine would have done no good and possibly made the situation even worse.

Most agencies set a minimum size for the Contact Team at four officers, tho ugh some will send in a team with only two officers. Most agencies dictate the use of long guns for the Con tact T eam, while others will utilize only the officers’ sidearms. Some departments issue ballistic shields and Kevlar © helmets to their patrol officers for use during a rapid de ployment. A few agencies require one or more members of their SWAT team to be on-duty around the clock. These SW ATtrained officers will assess an active shooter situation and lead the Rapid Deployment team when they determine the tactic is appropriate.

There are several variations of this technique, but most are quite similar. The names given to this technique include: Rapid D eploymen t, Immediate Action, H all Boss training, Active Shooter Response, Violent Intruder - Police and Educators Response (VIPER) and Quick Action Deployment (QUAD). We’ve undoub tedly missed a few acronyms for this technique, but for the sake of simp licity, we’ll call it Rapid Deploym ent.

Even the training fo r this technique v aries widely. Many agencies set up elaborate training exercises for patrol officers using live role-players as suspects and victims. Combined with a stressful setting and the use of specialized training weap onry (like Simunitions©), these sessions can b uild the requisite skills for this highrisk course of action. However, some locales have mandated Rapid Deployment training, but deliver it in a short classro om-only form at.

W ith Rapid Deploym ent, a team of patrol officers, preferably armed with shotguns or carbines, will enter the “Kill Zone” and mov e rapidly to make contact with the shooter. Standard SWAT entry tactics, such as the systematic clearing of all rooms, a re not used during Rapid Deploym ent. The contact team’s job is to move rapidly through an area to find and neutralize the active shooter...to e ssentially run to the so und of gunfire .

No matter how agencies train initially, the question of continuity of training for these perishable skills remains unresolved. If this tactic is to be maintained long-term, it must be a part of an agency’s in-service refresher program.

Depend ing upon the circumstances, the contact team may bypass downed victims and proceed past obvious hazards, such as explosive devices. Two types of teams are generally developed. T he first is the Contact Team whose mission is to find a nd neutralize the active shooter. Following the contact team will be one or more Rescue Teams who will deal with any victims bypassed by the contact team.

Clearly, many agencies ad opted R apid Deployment as an emoti onal response to the Columbine incident and have not fully developed their policies for use of the technique or the circum stances for wh ich it is appropriate. The mo st importa nt aspect of this policy development may be the supervisory decision making process for approving the entry of a Rapid Deployment team.

Most agencies training Rapid Deployment develop a companion policy in their Standard Operating Procedures outlining the criteria for response and the type of incidents appropriate for its use. As an example, most agenc ies specify that Rapid Deployment is not appro priate for eve nts involv ing a gunman that has barricade d in a fixed loc ation or is known to be holdin g hostages. Commanders theorize that in such circumstances, the risk to patrol officers and h ostages is -4-

The Incidents Though these incidents are quite rare, they can be very deadly for those involved. In the 44 incidents we debriefed, 152 people were killed and 214 were wounded. These numbers average out to 3.5 killed and 4.8 wounded per incident. Truly, these are serious events.

History teaches us not to make a major change in police practice based on a single incident, no matter how dramatic the incident. Instead, we should base our changes on a demonstrated pattern of criminal activity. W e began by o utlining the catastrophic University of Texas and Colu mbine H igh Schoo l incidents , but we must remember that they were separated by nearly 33 years.

For compar ison purpo ses, we also analyzed a 45 th incident where the Los Angeles (California) Police Department used Rapid Deployment tactics in an attempt to rescue a downed officer from a location controlled by a barricaded gunman. This incident was included in our discussion for two reasons. First, LAPD officers use this incident as an example in a Rapid Deployment training program they have delivered across the co untry. Secondly, the incident in question points out ho w Rapid Deployment tactics can actually make a bad incident worse, when used in the wrong situation.

How frequently do U.S. police agencies face such overwhelming firefights? Are we justified in spending precious time and money in preparin g for the unlikely event that our jurisdiction will ever face such a threat? On the other hand, we train extensively with firearms even though we know very few police officers will ever fire a single shot in the line of duty during their career. Training for an event w e may never face is clear ly justified if the potential consequences are seriou s. By searching various sources, we were able to iden tify nearly 80 active shooter incidents in the United States dating back to the 1966 incident in Austin, Texas. As we tried to debrief these incidents, many proved to not fit within our parameters of an active shooter and some were simply too old to allow us to obtain worthwhile information .

After these inciden ts were deb riefed and a nalyzed, a summit was held to gather input from a number of experts with extensive expe rience in resp onding to critical incidents. This report is a compilation of the discussions and reco mmend ations gener ated during this meeting held in November of 2001. Each of the experts helped edit this final docu ment and c ontribute their personal opinions at the end.

Ultimately, we obtained detailed information about the police response to 44 incidents. Undoubtedly, a number of incidents went undiscovered, but the number of active shooter incidents in an average year from 1966 through 20 01 could easily be cou nted on o ne hand.

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The Findings and Patterns Respond er Casualties: Responders were killed or injured in four of the 44 incidents.

W e always seem to have a compulsion to define the “average” of any series of events being measured. The following average active shooter incident is based on our analysis o f 44 events.

A police officer was wound ed in an exchange of gunfire at the end of a p ursuit of a suspect who killed four and wounded six firefighters in a wo rkplace sho oting in Jackson, Mississippi in 1996.

A single, white male shooter, age d 30, will enter a well populated location and open fire without warning. This shootin g spree will probably be over in two to three minutes, usually long befor e even a single police officer can arrive. The suspect will almost certain ly be familiar with the locale and will initially target specific people, but is very likely to fire rando mly before h e stops. Th is shooter will probably be armed with more than one firearm and will fire about 25 rounds, killing th ree to four victims and wounding an additional five people. After the shooting spree, the suspect is likely to end up dead, probab ly by comm itting suicide. The incid ent is almost guaranteed to take place during daylight hours and will probably occur inside a building.

A New Hampshire Troo per was killed and a second Trooper was wounded during a traffic stop/ambush at the onset of a five hour shooting spree near Colebrook, New Hampshire in 1997. In a subsequent ambush set by the rifle-armed suspect, four additional officers were wounded before the suspect was killed. A police officer was wounded in a 500 round shootout following the pursuit of an active shooting suspect from a Cal-Trans maintenance yard near Ora nge, Californ ia in 1997.

Surprisingly, many of the incidents we debriefed closely fit the average we have outlined above. Incidents like the Texas tower and Columbine are truly exceptional and far outside the norm.

A security guard was killed and two police officers were wounded by a man who had entered the library of the Salt Lake City Latter Day Saints church and opened fire in 1999. This 70 ye ar old man was ultimately killed by police.

Victims: As mentioned before, these incidents resulte d in 152 deaths and 214 people wounded . The largest death to ll, 23, was at the Luby’s Restaurant shooting in Killeen, Texas in 1991 and the largest number of wounded, 25, was at the Thurston High School in Springfield, Oregon in 1998.

Response Strategy: A true Rapid Deployment response, by an agency which had previously trained in this tactic, was only u sed in three of the 44 active shooter incidents we debriefed. In two of the Rapid Deployment responses, the use of these tactics affected the outcome of the incident in a positive way. In the remaining Rapid Deployment use, the incident was over before the team was ab le to make entry into the scho ol.

Suspects: Only two incidents involved multiple shooters, with a maximum of two suspe cts in any single incident. Of the 46 shooters, only two were females. The age range of shooters ran from 11 to 70. Tw enty of the suspec ts died at the scene; four were killed by police and 16 committed suicide.

In the opinion of the writer, Rapid Deployment either did or might have resulted in a positive effect on the outcome of the incident in 11 of the 44 incidents (25 percent). In the incidents where Rapid Deployment would have made no difference in the ultimate outcome, there was no longer an active shooter to engage by the time a team could have made entry into the location. In three of these incidents the shooter had already barricaded himself, with hostages, in a fixed location.

Shots Fired: Suspects in these 44 incidents fired from one to 188 shots. The 188 shot incident was Columbine High School. Police fired during nine of these incidents, rangin g from two to more than 500 shots. More than 500 shots were fired by seven police officers in an incident that started at a Cal-Trans maintenance yard near Orange, California.

Environment of Incident: The majority of the incidents in our study oc curred at a

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school or workplace. Over 95 percent of these incidents took place during daylight hours. About twothirds of the incidents took place within a b uilding. The other one-third of the incidents involved some shooting in an outdo or environ ment.

Weap ons: More than one-half of the incidents involved su spects armed with one or m ore hand guns. Near ly one-fourth of the suspects used both handguns and long guns (rifles and/or shotguns). Four of these incidents (nine percent) involved the use of impro vised explo sive devices.

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The Conclusions stop the killing. In five of the incidents, the suspect was forcibly detained by citizens at the shooting site (often at great risk to themselves). In two of these incidents, the suspect was taken into custody by on-scene police officers (both at a school).

There were four general categories o f response identified in these 44 incidents: •

Immedia te - unorganized response by personnel on the scene when the incident began (police, security or citizens).

•

Immedia te - unorganized response by arriving police officers.

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Immedia te - organized response by a r r i v in g p o l i c e o ff i c e r s ( R a p id Deployment).

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Arriving police officers contained the incident and waited for the arriv al of SWA T assets.

The need for im mediate ac tion by whomever is there when the incident begins was born out by the actions of passengers on Flight 93 on September 11, 2001 and subsequent flights where dangerous activity has been encountered. These events happen in seconds and, unless they are quick ly ended b y someon e already on scene, the criminals will likely kill until they choose to stop. The police simply cannot be everywhere violence may occur and are un likely to arrive before the violence ends. A parallel example of on-scene personnel minimizing death and destruction has been seen recently in Isra el. Terrorist shooting and bombing attacks have taken a huge toll in Israel, but some events have surprisingly low death tallies when you consider the weaponry brought to the scene by the terrorists. The low body count is generally attribute d to the terrorist being shot by military or police p ersonnel. Other reports suggest many of these terrorists are being sh ot by armed Israeli citizens who happened to be on the scene or arrived before military or police units.

Except in the rarest of incidents, like the shootings at the University of Texas and Colum bine High School, only the most imme diate respo nse will have a chan ce to reduce the number of innocent victims likely to be killed or injured b y an active sho oter. Even a rapid response by a team of officers using R apid Deployment tactics will likely find the incident over by the time they enter the shoo ting area. Immedia te action taken by personne l who are on -site when the sho oting starts is the mo st effective way to

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The Recommendations Based on our analysis of 44 high profile, active shooting incidents, some general recommendations were developed by our panel of experts. •

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Effective command and control mus t begin immediately at the onset of the incident and must take place independent of the use of Rapid Deployment tactics. The on-scene commander must not become personally involved in the response. The incid ent comm ander mu st, instead, conduct a n initial problem assessment, coordina te the arriving resources, and ensure commun ication is established between all responding units. The single greatest problem facing the on-scene commander will be the threat/risk assessment (intelligence gathering). Analysis of the incidents suggests the following problems can be e x p e c t e d : co n fu s in g in fo rma tio n describing multiple location s and multiple suspects, a breakdown in nearly all forms of technological and inter-personal communication, being inundated by fleeing inhabitants and rapid ly arriving resources and unfam iliarity with the incident site.

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The training must be refreshed on a periodic basis (at least annually) and should involve all jurisdictions who might respond to a given location.

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The incident commander must consider a “response in depth,” an d contem plate delaying the insertion of a contact team until a backup team can be asse mbled, in the most threatening incidents.

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A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) must be develo ped to cover the use of Rapid Deploym ent and th e overall management of the incident. This SOP should include the minimum requirements for manpower, equipment and training for the use of Rapid Deployment teams. The SOP should also address complicating issues, such as: explosive devices; ambush survival; and p rocedur es to follow in the event a team takes casualties.

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Agencies should pre-plan high-risk locations. These plans should include floor plans, initial perimeter points and command post and resource staging locations.

Based upon this analysis, we recommend police agencies develop procedures for three levels of response to active shooter incidents. Ou r experts have drawn up recom mendatio ns for specific tra ining and equipment needs for each of these response strategies, which will be o utlined in deta il.

All officers should have access to singleprojectile shoulder-f ired weapons, preferably a carbine chambered for a cartridge capable of penetrating soft body armor. Such weapons w ill greatly increase the effectiveness of contact and rescue teams, as well as allowing some incidents to be terminate d quickly by the first arriving officers.

The first level of response would be an Instant Response by personnel who are on-scene when the shooting starts. This would include police officers regularly assigned to patrol schools, business or public areas where large numbers of people congregate. In some instances, this could include a n immedia te response by the first arriving patrol officer.

The training provided by an age ncy must include force-on-force sessions in which officers move as a team, encountering high-stress complications and liv e adversaries. The training must include tactics for team movement in both indoor and outdoor se ttings.

The second level of response would be a structured and coordinated response by team(s) of arriving officers Rapid Deployment. To be most effective, these teams need to be better equipped and more fully trained than the level at which most agencies currently operate. The

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officers. In some situations, the SWA T eleme nts would be the second wave to enter a shooting location. Upon arrival of the SWAT entry team, the Rapid Deployment team(s) would switch from the ro le of “Pathfind er” to rescue team, working behind the SWAT element s. However, some shooting situations may require Rapid Deployment teams to me rely provide c ontainmen t until SWAT assets arrive on-scene.

on-scene commander must have already assumed command and cond ucted a pre liminary “threat/risk assessment.” The on-scene comman der must also begin to establish an inner perimeter prior to giving authorization for entry of any “contact” team s. The third level o f response would be a Traditional SWAT Response of highly-trained and fully-equipped

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Instant Response:

penetrate ligh t intervening co ver, like soft body armor. Positioning such equipment in a secure loc ation at a school or other sensitive facility will require some imagination. These officers must also have the ab ility to comm unicate with arriv ing police re sources.

This response strategy appears to have the best chance for successfully stopping an active shooter. However, this type of respo nse also carr ies with it the highest degree of risk to the officer. In the case of a school shooting, this response would be handle d by a School Resource Officer (SRO) or possibly a D.A.R .E.© Officer who might be on-site when the shooting starts. In jurisdictions where manpower limitations are severe, a single patrol officer might be duty bound to seek out and engage the active shooter without assistance. In the private sector, properly se lected and trained secu rity officers can prov ide instant resp onse to an a ctive shooter.

Officers likely to make an “instant response” must take part in high-stress training scenarios on a regular basis. These are the officers who will have the be st chance to “run to the sound of the guns” and thereby save innocent lives ... but at extrem e risk. In the event these officers are unable to neutralize the active shooter, they will serve as a “pathfinder” for arriving resources. The instant respond er must link up with a Rapid Deployment or SWAT team and prov ide their intimate knowledge of the surroundings. The training provided to these officers must address the following issues:

In the past, we have not necessarily chosen an SRO or DARE officer based upon their ability as a “warrio r.” Whil e is it still highly unlikely any particular SRO or DARE officer will need to confront an active shooter, we must now factor that possibility into our selection process. Clearly, all officers assigned to re gularly patrol a highrisk location must be armed with at least a duty-grade sidearm, a flashlight and clearly recognizable police identification. Though the circumstances may require these officers to respond to an active shooter with the equipment they have on their person, we should consider w ays to make a dditional eq uipment av ailable to them. Protective gear, like a ballistic helmet and tactical vest will enhance the ir survivability. A singleprojectile shoulder-fired weapon will allow these officers to deliver much more precise deadly force and

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individual movement and danger areas (hallways, corners, rooms, stairs, etc.);

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when to use covert, as o pposed to overt, movem ent;

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intelligence gathering/reporting and risk assessment;

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communications with arriving resources; and,

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f o r c e - o n - fo r c e scenarios simunition© type weapons.

usin g

Rapid Deploym ent:

to an inciden t.

This response strategy is a viable alternative to waiting for a fully-trained SWAT team, in some circumstances. In the opinion of ou r panel of ex perts, few Ra pid D eployment training progra ms are ade quate . Additiona lly, some situatio ns are beyond the capabilities of a Rapid Deployment response. While a policy may outlin e “safety stops” to help determine when we should wait for SWAT, we know from vehicle pursuits there will be some hard charging officers who may exceed the bounds of prudence.

The training must addre ss the following issues:

In a perfect world, every police officer would be trained in Rapid De ployment tac tics and wou ld be men tally prepared to succeed . Realistically, some officers are not physically or m entally equipped for specialty teams, like SWAT. Likewise, some of our officers may not be approp riate for assignment to a Rapid Deployment team. In fact, some officers want no part of this type of police response. Forcing such officers to train for and respond with Rapid Deployment tactics is probably not a good idea. W e can assign re luctant officers to perimeter points and other less dangerous assignments, but most agencies are already hard pressed to assemble sufficient manpower for an effective Rapid Deployment response. If an agency chooses not to train a ll its officers for Rapid Deployment, they should devise a system for quickly ide ntifying those tr ained. Some agencies are issuing a special pin or patch to denote a Rapid Deployment trained officer.

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team command and comm unication;

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intelligence gathering/reporting and risk assessment;

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team movement indoors (diamond, wedge or “T” formations, etc.);

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team movement outdoors (bounding overwatch, etc.);

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improvised explosive devices (find another way? ... step over and proceed?);

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dealing with downed victims;

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lifting and rescue techniques;

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evacuation and control of innocents; and,

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“failure drills,” in the event a team takes casualties without neutralizing the active shooter(s).

Based upon an on-scene problem assessment, the incident commander may put seve ral “safety stops” in effect. If one of these “s tops” is enco untered, the R apid Deployment team must stop hunting the active shooters and shift to a static mode and maintain a tight inner perimeter. The team ’s goals in a static m ode are to limit the movement of the suspect(s), keep innoc ents from wandering into the kill zone and relay information to the incident commander and arriving SWAT assets.

A Rapid Dep loyment response team should have acc ess to single-proje ctile shoulder -fired weapons equipped with a practical sling . Weap on-moun ted light sources are highly recom mended . Protective gear, like ballistic helmets and bullet-resistant shields will enhance an officer’s survivability. The team should hav e a well equipped “traum a” kit and simple breaching to ols. No officers without a uniform or b old “Police” garment should ever enter the Kill Zone or man the inner perimeter. Traffic safety ve sts can easily fulfill this requirement for plainclothes o fficers. Initial Rapid Deployment training should consist of not less than eight hours of instruction, with at least 75 percent of that being practical training under high-stress conditions. The initial training should include minimum performance standards, with tests. The training must follow the established SOP, w hich should be coordinated with other agencies that might respond -12-

A Rapid D eploymen t team should shift to an inner perimeter mode if there is probable cause to believe one or more o f the following co nditions exist: •

multiple active shooters;

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boob y trap s preparations;

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active shooter(s) barricaded defensible location;

or

other

ambush

in

a

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hostages being held in a fixed location or being used as human shields;

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suspect is and/or,

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the incident involves the release of hazardous materials (H azMat) or the use or threat of a Weap on of Mass Destruction (WMD - biological, nuclear, incendiary, chemical or lar ge-scale explosive weapon).

communicating

dem ands;

Traditional SWAT Response:

Some agencies ha ve chosen to concen trate on Ra pid Deployment tactics to the exclusion of traditional SWA T respo nse tactics. Our pan el of experts c ame to realize two important aspects of an active shooter incident which point to the need to maintain SWAT assets.

agencies train their Rapid Deployment teams to deal with taking casu alties. Wha t is the rate of “acceptab le loss” for Rapid Deploym ent teams? W hat if multiple shooters have laid an ambush for the first Rapid Deployment team or have positioned explosive devices along likely response routes?

First, few incidents in the real world resemble our image where a team can assemble rapidly, run to the sound of the guns and quickly neutralize an active shooter. Most incid ents will be ove r before a R apid Deployment team has a chance to gather and confusion at the scene will generally prevent a clear picture of the events until long after the shooting is over.

Such complica ted criminal e vents are extr emely rare, but could devastate a Rapid Deployment team. If you have committed the bulk of your resources to a single team, the failure of that team could lead to disaster. An active shooter is a terr ible event. However, sacrificing a number of officers in a noble, but unsuccessful response is likely to make the situation worse , not better. Some situations still dictate the use of patrol officers for containment while waiting for a S W AT team to arrive.

Second, Rapid Deployment teams are only trained and equipped to deal with relatively simple problems. Few

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Rapid Deployment in a post 9-11 Environment effort by multiple terrorists intended to lure in and eliminate our first responders, clearing the way for the terrorists to kill without interference.

As we were completing the research phase o f this project, the United States was struck with the most horrific terrorist attack yet experienced. When we consider the very real thre at of continued terrorist attacks, parallels can be dra wn to the use o f Rapid Deployment tactics. Both federal agencies and U.S. military assets are gearing up to deal with terrorist attacks, but we all know that local police agencies will be the first to respond to an unexpected strike. And, we will be facing terrorists willing to die as a part of their plan.

The recommendations of this report seem to hold up even when compared to attacks like those faced by Israel: the best chance for neutralizing the attacker is an instant response b y someon e who is there when the shooting starts (or when the bomber is recognized). Similarly, most of these incidents will be over before even a sma ll team can be assembled . If the incident is still ongoing as a team arrives, there is a distinct possibility they could b e facing multip le terrorists who have planned and organized their actions. We must not underestim ate the terrorists; their p lan will proba bly include preparations for our response. Sending a team to their death in a well meaning, but futile gesture will do nothing to eithe r neutralize the active shooters or save innocent lives. M ost police comm anders wo uld never consider sending unprotected officers into the “hot zone” of a chemical atta ck, but expect their officers to run without h esitation into the “k ill zone” of an active shooter.

As a profession, law enforcement has a lot to learn about responding to critical incidents. Our brothers and sisters in the fire service have much more experience at responding as a team and organizing themselves upon arrival. Still, the highest price paid by first responders at the World Trade Center was paid by the New York City Fire Department. Fire administrators across the nation have made a tough decision in the aftermath of September 11 th. Fire Departments will now make a reasoned risk assessment before sendin g their peop le into the hostile environment of a terrorist attack . We have trained for several years to expect terrorist groups to utilize “secondary devices” with an eye toward killing arriving eme rgency responders. The most effective secondary device in history was the second airliner crashing into the second tower in New York City. We m ust assume the terrorists expected fire and police responders to rush the site of the first “crash,” thereby adding to the tally of victims killed by the second airliner. The te rrorists app arently did n’t anticipate the collapse of the Twin Towers, but we must always consider a worst case scenario. While our goal is always to save as many innocent lives a s possible, to accomplish this we must stay alive ourselves.

Our worst fear is a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction (W MD) . We no w know that th e response to a biolog ical attack will pro bably com e in the form of an investigation, such as people suffering from unexplained respiratory problems at a sporting event. Should an attack involve chemical, radiological or large-scale explosive weapon s, our response must be slowed still further. The initial response will require a risk assessment prior to any deplo yment of resources. Only a handful of police agencies have the specialized training and equip ment to resp ond to the sc ene of a W M D attack, though these capabilities are being upgraded at emergen cy speed. In Illinois, State Weapon of Mass Destruction Teams w ere in training prior to September 11 th. These teams include members of several emergency response disciplines, with the core of each team being T actical Response officers from the Illinois State Police. Thes e S W AT teams a re fully trained and equipped to respond to terrorist thre ats involving a WMD , but their response time is measured in hours, not m inutes. Local p atrol officers will alw ays be the first to respond, and the first to die if not adequately trained and effectively led.

Some in the intelligence community are predicting terrorist attacks like the Israelis have experienced for several years. The Israeli attacks are committed by individuals or small groups who attack with small arms and/or explo sive devices. The label of “suicide bomber” is accurate, since these terrorists ex pect to die in the commission of their strike. Like Israel, we must be prepare d to engag e these attacke rs quickly and effectively, lest they succeed in spreading terror. W e must also consider the possibility of a coordinated

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The Expert’s Opinions Lieutenant C. W. Black, Littleton (Colorado) Police Department Lt. C.W. "Bill" Black is with the Littleton, Colorado Police Department and was Commander of their SWAT T eam during the Columbine High School Inc ide nt. H e wa s ask ed b y the Inc ide nt C omm and er fr om J effe rso n Co unty She riff's Department to deploy the arriving SWAT teams and organize the rescue of students during that incident. Lieutenant Black has been with Littleton Police Department for 23 years and is a Guest Instructor at Thunder Ranch. Lieutenant B lack’s Comm ents: “At last we have some empirical data that supports my view, and that of others, that Active Shooter Response is risky and should only be attempted when no other approach is possible. I still think it is the exception and not the rule. Unfortuna tely, our profession seems to make the exception the rule when it reacts to a horrendous event in law enforcem ent. This study supports the need for BAS IC training in sho oting, movin g and com municating a s an appro ach to any rap id deployment scenario-no t some mag ic "footba ll play." Law enforc ement's strategy is that w e will respond to any "Active Shooter" situation, wherever it may occur. Our tactics are what we do once we arrive. These tactics should include sound, proven, patrol and SWAT tactics as well as stopping the killing where ap propriate . Our tactics should not make things worse. But, without officers who have the will, the skill and some basic equip ment, chanc es of success a re slim.”

Mr. Richard E. Fairburn, Illinois State Police Academy Mr. Fairburn has over 20 years of law enforcement experience in both Illinois and Wyoming. Mr. Fairburn’s experience has included assignments in patrol, investigations, administration and training, including a stint as a municipal police chief. Mr. Fairb urn has bee n with the Illinois Sta te Police sinc e 1996 , serving in the C riminal Intell igence Bureau, Critical Incident Re sponse C omman d and T raining Aca demy. Dick developed th e Illinois State P olice Acad emy’s Critical Incident Response training program and those duties served as the impetus for this research project. Mr. Fairburn holds a B.S. degree in Law Enforcement Administration from Western Illinois University and has authored more than 100 articles on police equipment and training issues and a book on police rifle training. Mr. Fa irburn’s Co mments: “As the primary author of this report, my comments are already well represented. My goal when proposing this research project was to more clearly define the mission and practicality of Rapid Deployment. In many respects, the proliferation of Rapid Deployment training is little more than an emotional response to the Columbine High School shooting. As professionals, we must not give in to an emotional response at a horrific incident. The citizens have a right to expect from us an effective and measured response. I feel that Rapid Deploym ent training is bo th practical and worthwhile. Sta tistically, however , active shoo ter incidents are very rare and this research illustrates that almost all of them will be over long before even the quickest teams can hope to make contact with the shooter. What we can do, is to better train and equip all police officer s for “immed iate response” in the event they are very close when the shooting starts. In a few of these incidents, including the Columbine High School incident, had the first arriving officer been armed with a rifle, and well trained it its use, the active shooter(s) might have b een neutralize d almost imm ediately. In my opinion , the single most im portant asp ect of the use o f Rapid Deploym ent tactics by pa trol officers is the ro le of on-scene supervisory personnel. The commander on the scene must take immediate control of the responding assets and conduct a threat/risk assess ment. The comm ander must set the response priorities, including the essential requirement to set perimeters to minimize the number of potential victims in the “Kill Zone” and to ensure the shooter cannot escape to endang er other are as. Before deploying a Rapid Deployment team, the commander has an obligation to ensure the team has a re asonable chance for success.”

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Mr. Thomas T. Gillespie, Criminal Justice Training & Consulting Services M r. Gillespie began his law enforcement career in 1970 in Detroit, Michigan. He has served as a police sergeant, municipal police chief, city manager, State of New Mexico law enforcement training director and Director of the New Mexico Attorney G eneral’s Investigations Division. Since 1990, Mr. Gillespie has conducted over 400 Critical Incident Management programs to more than 6,000 law enforcement supervisors and commanders throughout the United States and abroad. He has authored a textbook on the police use of force and provides expert witness case review, evaluation and testimony in crim inal and civil actions involving police training, supervision and use of force. Mr. Gillespie has authored numerous articles in the field of critical incident management and use of force. Mr. G illespie’s Comments: “I have had the distinct honor of training thousands of police supe rvisors and comm anders in critical incident response and mana gement ov er the past 12 years and the invitation to participate in the Rapid Deploym ent Summ it was greatly appreciated. The perspective I was able to bring to the table was an awareness of the wide variety and types of instruction being offered by police agencies in the area of “Rapid Deployment (RD)” training throughout the United States. The participants were dedicated police commanders, trainers and tactical leaders attempting to determine the standard protoco ls to effectively respond to active shooter events. Most were surprised at the various levels of training being offered to police officers nationwide in the response to and handling of active shooter incidents. As mentioned in the report, many “Rapid Deployment” training programs mere ly offer classroom instruction. There was unanimous agreement that RD training must include realistic, hands-on skill building exercises. The failure to conduct practical and realistic ‘team’ exercises would be similar to atte mpting to train an officer to fire a w eapon fo r accuracy w ith only ‘classroom’ instruction on sight alignment and trigger squeeze. The RD protocols recommended in this report are simply minimum standards of training for officers facing — potentially — the most dangerous and high-risk event they may ever deal with in their careers. Tactical officers understand the need for on-going, rigorous and demanding training for the high -risk incidents they a re expecte d to “handle.” We must not use shortcuts in preparing patrol officers to deal with the exact same type of incidents for which tactical officers are training on a regular basis. Lastly, the need to provide p roper comm and and control at these types of even ts must not be ig nored. First responding supervisors are the key to effective and successful resolution of the incident. They mus t take charge a nd assume the role of the COACH, not the PLAY ER. Risk and/or threat assessment, identification of the “kill zone” and establishing a perimeter must be initiated by the on-scene commander prior to authorizing any type of tactical deployment for resolution. It is my hope tha t this effort will attract criticism and comment. It is only through disagreement and discussion of the issues that clarity and agreement can occur. It is only those supervisors that have nev er experien ced a po lice officer’s injury or death at the scene of a critical incident that casually comment, “that’s what we get paid to do, it’s a dangerous job!” We ow e our polic e officers and their families only the best training when confronte d with these type s of life threatening incidents.”

Mr. Larry Glick, Executive Director, National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) Mr. Glick has over 28 years experience in the criminal justice field. Mr. Glick spent seven years as a special response team member for the Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear W eapons Complex. Four of those years were at the DOE Central Training Academy as a tactics and firearms instructor and Safeguards and Security Training Departm ent Chief. Larry completed four years as a Regional Director with the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Contractor Support Program. After the retirem ent of John K olman in 19 93, Mr . Glick became the Executive Director of the NTOA. Currently he oversees the operations of the NTOA including the NTOA's Information Resources, Regional Seminar and -17-

Training Program , Tactical U nit and Incident Review Program as well as the publication of The Tactical E dge journ al. Mr. Glick has lectured nationally to school and police audiences regarding school and police response to active shooters in schools and public buildings. He testified before the Colorado Governor's Commission on the Columbine High School tragedy concerning po lice training and response to violent active sho oter situations. Mr. La rry Glick’s Co mments: “I want to commend your group on the resea rch and rep ort you pro duced o n Rapid D eploymen t. I have read through the report twice and the information contained in the report is very informative. I would add nothing.”

Associate Professor David A. Klinger, Univer sity of M issouri-St. L ouis David A. Klinger is Associate Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Missou ri-St. Louis. He also has held positions as A ssistant Profess or (199 2-1998 ) and Asso ciate Professor of Sociology (1998-1999) at the University of Houston. Prior to pursuing his graduate degrees, he worked for three and one-half years as a patrol officer for the Los Angeles and Redmond (WA) Police Depa rtments. He has held research positions at the Police Foundation in W ash ingt on, D.C .; the Uni ver sity o f W ash ingt on, Sea ttle; the W ash ingt on S tate 's Atto rne y's Office; and the Seattle Police Department. He has written num erous scholarly articles, book chap ters, and encyclopedia en tries that address topics such as arrest p ractices, the use of force, and how features of comm unities affect the actions of patrol officers. He has recently completed a research project on officer-involved shootings and is currently nearing completion of a study of police special we apons an d tactics (SW AT) tea ms. He rec eived his Ph .D. in Socio logy from the U niversity of Washington in 1992. Professor K linger’s Comm ents: “I take issue with the argument that officers who aren’t keen o n the idea shouldn’t be trained in rap id response tactics. Since when doe s a line officer get to tell the chief to buzz off and select w hat parts of the d epartmen t mission s/he will and wil l n o t d o ? If the b os s s ay s “M y officers will have rapid response training and they will rapidly respond to active shooting situations” and some officer doesn’t like it, that’s too ba d. S/he can a lways find ano ther job. A s far as I’m concerned, an officer has n o more a right to recuse h im or herself from rapid respo nse training that s/he d oes from b asic firearms, tactics, em ergency veh icle opera tion, report w riting, or any othe r aspect of the job.”

Sergeant Patrick Kreis, Winnetka (Illinois) Police Department Patrick Kreis is a Sergeant with the Winnetka Police Department where he manages a comprehensive Use of Force training program . He has sixteen years combined law enforcement and military instructional experience and is certified as a Master Firearms Instructor by the Illinois Po lice Training Institute. Sergea nt Kreis is state b oard cer tified to teach numerous police subjects including Less Lethal Weapons , Tactical Team Operations, Patrol Tactics, Scenario Based Training, Use of Force Policy, and Critical Incident Response. He is a primary instructor for the Rapid Deployment Instructor training offered by Mobile Training Unit #3. Sergeant Kreis is a former SWAT (NIPAS EST) Team Leader and an active me mber of the Illinois Tactic al Officer’s Association . He is a graduate of Northwestern University School of Police Staff and Command and holds a Bachelors degree in Criminal Justice Science. Sergeant Kreis served eleven years in the U.S. Army Reserve with qualifications in Special Forces and Military Intelligence. Sergeant K reis’ Commen ts: “We will have to disagree on the issue of perimeter establishment. I feel strongly that deploying the 10-15 initial officers (5-10 minute response in the urban environment) on scene should be as follows: They are going to be much more effective at protecting life if they deploy in contact teams to stop the active killing. They are going to be less effective trying to control a perimeter that in many cases will be a square city block. My town's high school has 27 different doorway entry points. T he first respon ders are the o fficers that I have the most confidence in. They work together and train together. They have the same radios and are most familiar with the terrain. The second and third wave of -18-

responders will be capable of establishing inner and outer perimeters, but less prepared to make entry. What good is a perimeter outside the b uilding when th e bad guy is inside actively killing multiple victims? This philosophy is even more essential in the rural communities that can't even count on a 10-15 officer response within a 30 minute response time. It’s just not practical to tell them to set a perim eter before deciding to make entry. Regardless of when Klebold and Harris chose to stop killing their victims, the fact of the matter is that those two killers were still seen on video walking around with guns down without an apparent care in the world. Clearly they were not being pursued or engaged by the Police, even 37 minutes after the killing started. Just how is a perimeter going to shorten the amount of killing opportunity time? Recently, we had an example of victims being their best self-protection in Skokie, Illinois. A student brought a loaded gun to school and showed it to a friend. The suspect stated that he was going to kill a particular girl th en get to the cafeteria to do mass murder before suicide. Another kid spotted the gun in the would-be shooter’s bag. The second student calmly told a girl nearby, who used a ruse to leave class and inform the Dean. Then the hero slid the bag away from the bad-guy when he wasn’t looking. The second student turned the bag over to the Dean and the suspect was arrested witho ut incident.”

Sergeant Edward F. Mohn II, Libertyville (Illinois) Police Department Sergeant Edward F. Mohn II is a 12-year veteran of the Libertyville (Illinois) Police Department, a suburb of Chicago Illinois. He has been a member of the Northern Illinois Police Alarm Systems Emergency Services Team (NIPAS-EST) for 11 years were he currently serves as the Entry Team Leader. Sergeant Mohn has participated in the successful resolution of numerous critical incidents, felony fugitive apprehensions and high risk w arrant service operation s. He is an Illinois State certified instructor in a wide variety of tactical and firearms related disciplines and is the lead instructor for the NIPAS-EST 96 hour b asic SW AT co urse. Sergea nt Mohn serves on the Board of Directo rs for the Illinois Tactical Officers Asso ciation (IT OA) and is the lead instructo r for the ITO A's Rapid D eploymen t program . He has personally trained over a thousand officers in Rapid Deployment technique and tactics. A Grad uate of Na tional-Louis University, Sergeant Mo hn served six years in the US Arm y as an infantryman prior to starting his law enforcement career. Sergeant E dward F. Mo hn’s Comm ents: "Train Hard ..............For The Day Will Come. This motto has become the driving force behind the training and preparation that I have dedicated my team, my fellow officers and myself too. While the panel of experts p resented in this docume nt do not ag ree on all asp ects of this proj ect, we all strongly agreed and are committed to improving the training police officers are, or should be receiving in rega rds to the response and mana gement of c ritical incidents. W hile active shooter type incidents occur infrequently, they present a unique set of challenges and problems that many officers and agencies are not prepared to face. The traditional response of "Contain, Wait and Negotiate" has served us well and should still be implemented in 99.9% of the critical incidents that occur. But, when an offender is actively murdering innocent civilians how can police officers who are sworn to protect and serve our community and it's citizens stand by and wait? I always ask my students during Rapid Deployment Training "W hat if that was your child, your mother, your wife or husban d inside that b uilding"? W hat would yo u do? It is, and shall always be d ebated as to how Rapid Deployment would of made a difference in many of the active shooter situations that have occurred. It is my belief that the immediate deploym ent of law enforcement resourc es against the active shooter can and does save lives. One mu st only take a look a t the situation in Israe l and see that live s are saved when polic e officers arriv e quickly and deploy against armed offenders. Is this a dangero us endeavor?.… ..Yes. Do these techniques and tactics place officers in greater danger than the tradition al "contain a nd wait" utilized in the past?........Y es. But, if not Rapid Deploym ent, then what? We continually ask and search for a better solution from those who say Rapid Deployment is not the answer..........but none have been presented. As long as there are those in the world who will prey upon and murder innocent people, then there must be those of us who are trained, willing, ab le and ded icated to see king them ou t and stopp ing their dead ly behavior . To do less is inconceiv able. Train Hard...........For The Day Will Come".

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Commander Richard A. Ryan, Decatur (Illinois) Police Department Commander Ryan is a twenty-nine year police veteran. He holds a BA from Eastern Illinois University and served four years with the USMC, including one tour with an infantry rifle company in Viet Nam. He is a graduate of the FBI National Academy. Command er Ryan’s police experience includes operational service with both patrol and investigations functions. He has served as coordinator of the K-9 Unit and as Commander of the Professional Standards and Investiga tions Division s of the Dec atur Police Departm ent. Commander Ryan is currently Commander of the Patrol Division of the Dec atur Police Departm ent. He was r esponsib le for the development of the Decatur Police Department's Emergency Response Team and is Commander of the ERT. Commander Ryan was the on-scene Commander for all major events related to the five years of turmoil experienced by the City of Decatur resulting from three maj or labor disputes, a major K lu Klux K lan rally and turmoil during November 1999 involving Jesse Jackson's Rainbow-Push Coalition and white supremacist organizations. The Decatur Police Departm ent’s Emergency Response Team has served in excess of five h undred h igh-risk search w arrants and has been involved in the resolution of both hostage and barricaded suspect incidents, including incidents where deadly force was used. Commander Ryan is a member of the Nat ion al T acti cal O ffice r's A sso ciat ion (NT OA ), th e Ill ino is T acti cal O ffice r's Association ( IT OA), is a fo rme r me mbe r of t he B oar d of Dir ecto rs o f the ITO A an d is c urre ntly C hair of th e IT OA 's Legislative Committee. He is the owner of Ryan Crisis Management Consulting, Inc. He has presented at State and National conferences and has provided training throughout the State for topics related to Tactical Team Operations, Managing Labor Disputes and Interest Group Events, High Risk Strategy and Tactics for Patrol Operations, Developing School Crisis Response Plans and Patro l Rapid R esponse T actics for Activ e Shoote r Incidents. He is Coordinator for Law Enforcement Programming and an adjunct faculty member at Richland Community College in Decatur and an adjunct faculty member an d Advisory Bo ard member a t the Police Training Institute of the University of Illinois. Comma nder Rya n’s Comme nts: “As is often the case in law enforcement, the development of active shooter policies and training were a reaction to an incident. We have reacted by training operators (first responding officers), hopefully well and to the standards indicated above. However, we as administrators too often feel that we have done what is expected of us by providing some training in the area of concern to the oper ators. In a pro fessional law en forcemen t environme nt, it is essential that administration set clear (and high) standards for the agency in terms of the outcomes expected if the "active shooter" situation develops in its jurisdiction. Having done so, the administration has the obligation to the officers to provide the policy, training and equip ment nece ssary to succe ssfully achieve that o utcome. Second ly, it is important to understand that crisis situations involve much more than the first responder's response. Once containment and isolation have been accomplished, the real work of the administration begins... mana ging whateve r is left. That may include managing a hostage or barricade situation (in the traditional fashion), managing a major criminal investigation and crime scene, victim a ssistance, family reu nification, facility man agement, relief of security teams, etc. It is critical that our administrators know, understand and be ready to implement a comprehensive Incident Command Center to ensure that the whole incident is managed professionally--not just the crisis response. Further, it is critical for the responding officers to understand that there are NO EXCU SES if an active shooter situation develops. Whether administration has provided the policy, equipment and training or not, those we are sworn to protect rightfully expect us to be there for them. No matter how many officers we have to respond with, we must be prepared to get the job done. That means that each individual officer has the moral and professional obligation to have the heart to respond, to be tactically proficient in terms of both skill development and the wisdom to know when to apply the approp riate tactics, and must be physically able to perform. It sim ply isn't acceptab le to sit back an d comp lain that the Departm ent, for whatev er reason, d idn't give me eve rything I need. G ood pe ople, using go od tactics will p revail.”

Master Sergeant John Simonton, Illinois State Police - Critical Incident Response Command M aster Sergeant John Simonton is a 20-year law enforcement veteran, beginning his career with the Boone County -20-

Sheriffs Department and moving on to the Illinois State Police in 198 4. John has been a member of the Tactical Response Team program since 1986 and is currently the Team Leader for one of three full-time Tactical Response Teams with the Illinois State Police. Master Sergeant Simonton is a certified instructor in close quarter battle, Critical Incident Response and operational planning and management. He holds a bachelors degree in law enforcement administration and has atten ded num erous supe rvisory training c lasses through out his caree r. Master Sergea nt John Simonton’s Commen ts: “While I certainly don’t consider myself an expert in this subject, I d id apprec iate the invitation to discuss the R apid Deploym ent issues with this diverse and educated panel. W e in law enforc ement nee d to do a better job of critiquing high-risk incidents and, most importantly, sharing that information with other law enforcement organizations. This “commu nication gap ” has caused many negativ es in law enforc ement such as: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Inconsistent training for high-risk incidents; No basis for decision m aking by new or inexperien ced supervisors facing similar incidents; Repeated improper tactics; and, Improper assessment of high risk factors leading to delayed or disastrous decision-making.

It is incumbent upon us, the trainers, to communicate our thoughts and experiences in handling critical incidents to those preparing for them. We would not be here today discussing this issue if we had not created our own luck by exhaustive prepara tions for the ultima te challenge. A few years ago, a few team members and I started teaching an eight hour room clearing / building entry class for patrol officers. This training was created for several reaso ns: 1. 2. 3.

Requests by patrol officers assisting investigations with other than high risk (SWAT criteria) search and arrest warrants; a trend was beginning with departments buying equipment for officers, but not budgeting for adequate and consistent training; and, to prepare as many officers as possible in not only the physical art of room clearing, but the mental aspect of risk assessm ent when co nfronted with a n active shoo ter incident that m ay require im mediate ac tion.

This type of training has been well received and has been made cost effective through the M obile Te am Tra ining Units throughout Illinois. The training has been cond ucted now for app roximately three years, with several repeat officers and agencies attending. Realistic “win” scenarios are utilized and made progressively more difficult, using Simunition© and incorpo rating decisio n-making am ong peer s in a “stressful” training environme nt.”

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Synopsis Active Shooter Incidents Case #

001

002

003

004

Location

Type

Suspects

Tampa , FL Radisson Hotel

Workplac e

Tampa , FL Fireman’s Fund Insurance building

Workplac e

Anaheim, CA Hospital

Rampage after mother died in this hospital

1 male aged 43

Olivehurst, CA - High School

School

1 male aged 19

1 male aged 36

1 male mid-30's

Weapons

Killed

Injure d

9mm and .38 handguns. Many shots fired (unsure #).

5

15+

9mm handgun. Many shots fired (unsure #). Probable reload.

3

2 revolvers. 7 shots fired. Probable reload.

2

12 gauge shotgun and .22 rimfire rifle. Estimated 1520 shots fired, most were 3 inch #4 shot loads.

4

2

1

10

Times

RD used?

RD make a Difference?*

1500 hours. 4+ officers on scene within 5 minutes

NO

1100 hours. 4+ officers on the scene within 5 minutes.

NO

1040 hours. 4+ officers on scene within 6 minutes.

NO

1405 hours. 4+ officers on scene within 5 minutes. SWAT entry within 10 minutes.

NO -

NO

BUT very rapid response by SWAT trained officers

Suspect had already barrica ded with hostages

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NO Gone on arrival

NO Gone on arrival

NO Already in custody

Narrative

Suspect shot specific co-workers at hotel, except last victim (a women killed during a carjacking 2 miles from scen e). Suspect surrendered after vehicle pursuit. Suspect had fled the scene before police arrived. Suspect entered workplace and targeted specific co-workers. Suspect fled the scene before officers arrived and was later found dead, from a self-inflicted wound, at a nea rby golf course.

Suspect entered the hosp ital where his mot her had recently died and shot random targets. Shot 3 people, reloaded revolver and was grabbed and detained by hospital staff before police arrived. First arriving officer set-up a Command Post and implemented ICS. 15-20 minutes before police entered the building and took sus pect in to custo dy. Former student entered school and killed the teacher that had flunked out this student the previous year. Remaining gunshot victims were more random in nature. Suspect then barricaded himself into the upstairs library with 80+ hostages. Two of first arriving officers were SWAT, who entered as a two man team with long guns, but no other SWAT gear. This team withdrew with a victim. Upon re-entering, the SWAT duo met a student who had been sent from the library to announce that hostag es were being held. The suspect surrendered through negotiations after about 8 hours.

Case#

005

006

007

Location

Type

Pelham, AL - multiple business locations

Workplac e

Jonesboro, AR Middle School

School

Conyers, GA - High School

School

Suspects

Weapons

Killed

.40 handgun. 9-10 rounds fired (6-7 at first scene/2 killed, 3 at second scene/1 killed).

3

2 males, aged 11 and 13

Each suspect had 5 guns, including (used): .44 Carbine, .30 Carbine, scoped .30-06, .357 revolver. 26 shots fired, over 400 rounds in possession.

5

1 male aged 15

.22 rimfire rifle (stock cutdown for better concealment) and .357 revolver. Fired 12 shots (11 from .22 at victims and 1 at school from .357).

0

1 male aged 33

Injured

0

10

6 - all wounds were below the waist

Times

RD Used?

0730 hours. 4+ officers on scene within 5 minutes.

NO

1220 hours. 4+ officers on scene in less than 5 minutes. 1520 officers on scene within 10 minutes.

NO

0759 hours. 4th officer arrived in 7 minutes. Incident over in 12 minutes.

NO

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RD Make a Differenc e?

NO Gone on arrival at both scenes

NO Shooting was over by the time officers arrived

NO Shooting was over by the time officers arrived

Narrative

Suspect shot specific targets at each of two business locations about 6 miles apart. Suspect allowed some potential targets to leave unharmed from each location. Sus pect had fled both scenes before police could arrive. Police knew suspect’s name and description after the first shooting incident. Suspect was taken into custody shortly after the second shooting in a felony traffic stop. Suspects used the fire alarm to draw victims from the school gymnasi um and fired wi th rifles from a woodline 93 yards away. The .357 handgun was fired at a construction worker in the distance. A Deputy Sheriff located the suspects as they attempted to flee their shooting positio n and to ok them i nto cust ody.

Suspect got off the school bus (with weapons), walked into the “commons” area and began shooting with the .22 rifle. Suspect fired the .357 revolver over his shoulder back towards school as he fled on foot. Suspect dropped the rifle in the school as he fled. Suspect was confronted by an assistant principle (student had the .357 in his mouth) and surrendered the revolver to the prin ciple when ordered to do so. First officer to arrive was dealing with victims. Second arriving officer placed suspect into custod y.

Case#

008

009

010

Location

Type

Sheridan, WY Middle School

School

Newington, CT - State Lottery Headquarter s.

Workplac e

Wakefield, MA - Office complex

Workplac e

Suspects

1 male aged 29

1 male aged 35.

1 male aged 43

Weapons

Killed

Injured

9mm handgun. Fired 15-20 rounds (uns ure) with reload.

0

4

9mm handgun, large hunting knife. 20 shots fired (18 before police arrived and 2 after police arrived).

4 - (3 killed by gunfir e and 1 killed by gunfir e and knife.)

0

Shotgun, handgun, AK47 type rifle. At least 7 shots fired, most from AK, some from shotgun.

7

0

Times

RD Used?

RD Make a Differenc e?

1100 hours. First officer arrived within 3 minutes and third officer arrived within 4 minutes.

NO

0844 hours. Four+ officers arrived at 0846. Incident resolved at 0846.

NO

Times unsure: reported that a 3 officer team entered the building in from 5-10 minutes. 10 officers in the building by the time of arrest.

NO -

NO

BUT very rapid response by patrol officers

Shooting was over by the time officers arrived

-24-

NO Suspect commi tted suicide as the officers arrived

NO Suspect commi tted suicide as the officers arrived

Narrative Suspect walked onto middle school playground and opened fire on a group of 20-25 students. All victims had been shot prior to the first officer’s arrival. As the arriving officers approached the playground area, the suspect committed suicide with the handgun.

Suspect killed co-workers at the Lottery building. 2 shots were reported fired after police arrived. Suspect committed suicide upon arrival of the first officers.

Suspect entered a business in a huge multibusiness complex and shot employees in his former employer’s personnel office. The first three officers found a victim and then found the suspect a few feet away from that victim. The suspect had put down his weapons, was almost in a trance, and offered no resistance to arrest.

Case#

011

012

Location

Type

Great Barrington, MA Preparatory School

School

Royal Oak, MI - Post Office

Workplac e

Suspects

1 male aged 19

1 male in 30's.

Weapons

Killed

AR15. Many shots fired at 3 different locations around the campus.

2

Rifle and handgun. Unknown number of shots fired.

5

Injured

4

4

Times

RD Used?

RD Make a Differenc e?

2230 hours. The first officer arrived within 5 minutes. 4+ officers on scene within 20 minutes. Incident resolved at about 2300 hours.

NO

0800 hours. First officer arrived within 2 minutes. 3 officers entered the building in less than 5 minutes. 4-5 officers in the building by the time they found the dead suspect.

NO -

NO

BUT very rapid response by patrol officers

Shooting was over by the time officers made contact

-25-

NO Shooting was over by the time officers arrived

Narrative Suspect, a student at this exclusive school, first shot a security guard at the gate, then shot a professor in his car. From there the suspect walked to the library and a dorm, shooting random targets. Suspect barricaded himself in the cafeteria and called 911. An officer at 911 center convinc ed the su spect to surrend er. At time of surrender 7 officers were on the scene and had just completed setting on-scene perimeters. SWAT team had been called but was 1-2 hours out. Shooting was apparently over by the time offic ers arrived on scen e.

Suspect, a suspended postal employee and former Marine, entered the central post office and targeted former supervisors and co-workers. Suspect was found inside dead from a selfinflicted gunshot wound.

Case#

013

014

Location

Type

Suspects

Lincoln Park , MI Senior Citizens’ Residential High Rise

Rampage after argument.

1 male aged 55.

Dearborn, MI - Post Office

Workplac e

1 male mid 50's.

Weapons

Killed

.22 rimfire rifle. 20-30 shots fired both inside building and out of window at arriving officers.

3

Handgun. 2530 rounds fired, with reloads. Some shots were fired after the police arrived.

3

Injured

Times

RD Used?

1 (elderly man shoved over against water cooler as suspect fled shootin g scene).

1145 hours. First officer arrived in 2 minutes. 6 officers on scene within 5 minutes. Officers entered the building in 6 minutes. Suspect in custod y about 3 hours.

NO

0

1000 hours. First officer arrived within one minute. 4-5 officers on scene in 3 minutes. Entry made about 20-30 minutes into incident.

NO

-26-

RD Make a Differenc e? NO Suspect had barricaded by the time officers arrived

POSITIVE A Rapid Deployment team might have been able to make contact with shooter before he committed su icide.

Narrative Resident of high rise went to his apa rtment after an argument at a meeting and returned with a .22 rifle. Suspect shot managers of the residential complex and returned to his apartment on the 14th floor. Arriving officers found victims, but no active shooter. At that point the suspect opened fire on arriving police units from the window of his apartment. The suspect called his son and c laimed to be holding hostages (did not actually have any hostages). The son relayed this info to police. Police heard man snoring on open phone line after he had taken medications. SWAT entered and took suspect into cu stody.

Suspect entered central post office and began shooting co-workers and supervisors. The first officers that arrived heard shots from inside the building after their arrival. Policy in effect required contai nment, s o immedi ate entry wa s not made. Negotiators attempted to make contact by bullhorn. SWAT made a hasty entry 20-30 minutes into the incident and found the suspect dead from a self-inflicted wound. Though unsure of the time sequence of shots, all victims were probably shot before an RD team could have made contact. However, the remote possibility remains that one or more lives could have been saved by immediate action.

Case#

015

016

Location

Type

Melrose Park, IL NaviStar plant

Workplac e

Topeka, KS - Federal Courthouse

Courthous e

Suspects

1 male aged 66.

1 male

Weapons

Killed

Handgu n, SKS (7.62x39) used; 12Ga and .3030 not used. 17 shots fired, most from the SKS.

4

Handgun(s), pipe bombs, several shots fired.

2

Injured

4

2

Times

RD Used?

RD Make a Differenc e?

0944 hours. First officer arrived in one minute. 4+ officers on scene within 5 minutes. Officers made immediate entry as they arrived.

NO -

NO

BUT very rapid response by patrol officers

Shooting was over by the time officers made contact

1100 hours. First officer arrived within 1-2 minutes and 4+ officers were on scene within 4 minutes.

NO -

POSITIVE

BUT very rapid response by patrol officers

Rapid entry probably forced suspect away from additional victims

-27-

Narrative Suspect, a former employee, entered factory and fired randomly at workers in the section of the plant where he was most familiar. Arriving officers “followed the trail of bodies.” Officers found the suspect, dead from a self-in flicted wound, within 10-15 minutes of the call. Extremely high noise level of the factory prevented officers from hearing gunshots, if any shots were fired after their arrival. Suspect had probably already killed him self before the officers arrived at the plant.

Suspect had previously d etonated a car bomb in another county as a diversionary device prior to entering the federal building for this incident. The suspect was due to be sentenced on drug related charges the next day. Upon arrival on the 4th (court) floor, the suspect shot the security guard and proceeded to the court clerk’s office, firing at random targets along the way. A pipe bomb hanging on the suspect’s clothing detonated, severely wounding the suspect. Arriving officers pulled the dead security guard off the floor and quickly returned to search for the suspect. The s everely injured susp ect fired a suicide shot as the officers ret urned to the 4 th floor. Topeka PD felt their immediate action pushed the suspect into a room where was unable to make contact with additional victims.

Case#

017

018

019

Location

Type

Southfield, MI Psychiatrist’ s Office shooting

Doctor’s office

Jackson, MS - Fire Department

Workplac e

Jackson, MS - High School

School

Suspects

1 male in his 40's

1 male aged 32

1 female in 30's

Weapons

Killed

.45 caliber handgun, emptied 2 magazines, 10+ shots fired.

2

.25/9mm and .357 handguns and small propane containers. Many shots fired (reloaded TEC9 at least twice). Suspect fired at small propane tanks, but did not cause them to explode.

4

Handgun, unsure of number of shots fired (7?).

0

Injured

2

6

0

Times

RD Used?

RD Make a Differenc e?

1700 hours. First two officers arrived within 2 minutes (1 officer was SWAT armed with MP5). RD Team made entry into the building within 5 minutes.

YES

1200 hours. First officer arrived within 2 minutes. Suspect had fled before additional officers arrived at FD.

NO

Times unsure.

NO -

NO

BUT very rapid response by SRO

Already in custody

-28-

POSITIVE Rapid entry probably forced suspect away from additional victims

NO Suspect was leaving as officers arrived (Counts as Gone on arrival)

Narrative Suspect entered his psyc hiatrists’ o ffice and began shooting members of his counseling group. Suspect had brought a handgun to a meeting on a previous occasion. Arriving officers organized a RD res ponse and ent ered the building within 5 minutes of the call. Shooting was on the 12th floor of a 26 story building. RD team was made aware of active shooting, a good location description and told of severely injured (but still alive) victims. FD/Paramedics and building security were incorporated into the RD response. RD team arrived on the 12th floor as the suspect fired a shot. The suspect ran back into the doctor’s office and fired another shot (suicide shot). This PD is convinced that RD saved lives in this incident. Suspect/fir efighter entered a FD staff meeting and shot/killed all 10 personnel in the meeting. Suspect deployed small propane containers, but could not get them to explode. A firefighter in the meeting had a safety device which opened a microphone on FD channel and audio of almost the entire incident was broadcast and recorded. Suspect fled the scene and was fired at by an arson investigator (not hit). After a pursuit, an officer from a neighbori ng agency engaged the suspect and both were hit/wounded. Suspect had fled the initial shooting scene before any response was possi ble.

Mother was called to school to meet with son and school counselor. Son was accused of selling drugs at the school. Mother arrived and opened fire on the son, landing no hits. Mot her ran from the school an d was tac kled by a School Resource Officer that was on campus and ran to the report of gun fire.

Case#

020

021

Location

Type

Lynnville, TN (Giles County S.O.) - High School

School shooting

Reno, NV random highway shooting.

Random shooting on Interstate (I-80).

Suspects

1 male aged 17

1 male aged 19

Weapons

Killed

.22 rimfire rifle, 3-4 shots fired.

1

.22 rimfire rifle, 20+ shots fired. One victim wounded by glass shards in face, another wounded by small bullet fragments in arm.

0

Injured

2

2

Times

RD Used?

0800 hours. First officer was already at school (DARE officer) , 4+ officers on scene with 12 minutes.

NO

0815 hours. First officer on scene 0838, 4+ officers on scene by 0845.

NO

-29-

RD Make a Differenc e?

NO Already in custody

NO Gone on arrival

Narrative

Suspect entered school intending to shoot specific teachers. Student shot/killed one teacher and then sh ot another in t he head (survived). As suspect moved through the school, he fired at anot her teacher, bu t missed and hit a student in the neck (survived). DARE officer in the grade school wing was unarmed (by policy at that time), ran to his vehicle to retrieve his sidearm and got to the shooting location just as 2 teachers and a student wrestled the suspect to the ground. DARE officer handcuffed the suspect and radioed to responding officers that the suspect was in custody. Suspect reported that he had intend ed to execute a traffic deputy normally stationed in front of the school and then to later use the police car to escape. The traffic deputy was off that day. Incident was over before RD team could have arrived/deployed. Suspect fired at random vehicles t ravel ing on I80 near Reno, NV with a .22 rimfire rifle. Victims first thought their vehicles were being hit by rocks and did not call police for at least 15 minutes. Incoming calls gave multiple locations and shooting location was very difficult to pin down. SWAT units and air assets arrived and searched the area (very rugged and difficult terrain) until 1 300 hours without locating suspect. The suspect had fled the scene several mi nutes before police arrived. Suspect was later apprehended when NHP officers saw a rifle in the back of his vehicle during a traffic stop.

Case#

022

Location

Colebrook, New Hampshire, ambushes.

Type

Shooting spree and ambush after shooting two Troopers at traffic stop.

Suspects

1 male aged 62.

Weapons

AR15 with Aimpoint sight, 9mm handgun (not used), 75+ shots total. 43 shots fired at first incident (traffic stop). Some .223 rounds were M855 “green tip” penetrator cartridges. Suspect was wearing level III body armor at ambushes.

Killed 2

Injured 4

Times 1330 hours. First two officers initiated a traffic stop on suspect.

-30-

RD Used?

RD Make a Differenc e?

NO -

POSITIVE

BUT very rapid response by patrol and SWAT trained officers

However, this situation required fire & maneuver tactics, not a diamond formation

Narrative Suspect, with long history of violent threats, was stopped by NHSP Trooper. Suspect exited his vehicle with an AR15 and shot the first Trooper (survived). The second arriving Trooper was shot/k illed through the windshield of his vehicle, being unable to return fire or exit the kill zone (43 rounds fired by suspect at this scene). Suspect then drove one of the police cars to Colebrook where he killed specific targets (judge t hat was fl eeing her la w office and a newspaper editor that wrestled the suspect down). The suspect drove to his home, cha nged clothes, gathered more ammunition and donned level III soft body armor. The suspect drove the police car to a remote location and set it up as ambush “bait.” The su spect took up a highground position overlooking the stolen police car. When a Fish & Game officer located the stolen police car, he was shot at several times, including a .223 hit that fragmented on his badge. Fish & Game officer was able to drive out of the kill zone. As many other police agencies arrived, they saw th e “bait” police vehicle, but did not approach it. As officers moved through the heavily wooded area, a K9 alerted and in a subsequent gunfight, 3 officers were wounded and the suspect was killed.

Case#

023

024

Location

Aiken, SC, factory.

Pearl, MS, High School.

Type

Workplac e

School

Suspects

1 male in late 30's.

1 male aged 16.

Weapons

Killed

Armed with 2 handguns (semi-autos), more than 50 shots fired.

6

Armed with Marlin .30-30 lever action rifle. Fired 6-7 rounds - and reloaded. Had 30 more rounds in pocket when captured.

2

Injured

6

7

Times

RD Used?

RD Make a Differenc e?

1530 hours. 15 officers on scene within 4 minutes.

NO -

POSITIVE

BUT very rapid response by patrol officers

Teams probably forced suspect away from additional victims

0800 hours. 3 officers on scene within 4 minutes, 11 officers on scene within 6 minutes. Suspect in custody within 3 minutes of first call to police.

NO

NO

-31-

Already in custody

Narrative Suspect was fired employee of engine parts plant. Shot security guard at gate and then entered building and killed the plant man ager and other specific targets. Arriving officers formed two hasty t eams, lead by on-dut y SWAT personnel (5-man team in front and 6-man team in back). The entry teams moved through the building, advancing toward the sound of gunshots. After several minutes, they heard no more gunshots and relied on workers in the plant to direct them toward the suspect. Teams bypassed the dead and wounded and called in additional officers to deal with the victims. About 15-20 minutes after entry, the teams realized the suspect was in a fixed location, so they set an inner perimeter around the suspect and waited for SWAT to arrive and clear the area. The suspect tried to commit suicide by drinking a poisonous liquid. SWAT officers found him unconscious. Department’s RD policy/training was developed around the details of this incident, so their response now would be the same as they used in this event. Suspect killed his moth er earlier that da y, then entered school and killed two specific students. He sought a third specific student, but when unable to locate that t arget, he began firing randoml y. First two students were killed with head/neck shots. One wounded student received a torso shot, others were minor wounds from bullet/concrete fragments from missed shots. A teacher (National Guard Captain) ran to his vehicle and retrieved his Beretta service pistol. As the suspect attempted to drive from the scene, the teacher detained him at gunpoint. The first arriving officer took the suspect into custod y. Suspect was one of 5 students conspiring to conduct a large-scale executionstyle shooting event, but the other students backed out of the plan. Suspect was detained by armed teacher before police arrived.

Case#

025

026

027

Location

Type

Blackville, SC, High School.

School

Lewistown, MT, High School

School

Sandy, UT, hotel/restaur ant shooting.

Random shooting spree after an argument.

Suspects

1 male aged 16.

1 male aged 16

1 male aged 21

Weapons

Killed

Armed with stolen H&R .32 revolver with 4 rounds. 4 shots fired.

1

Armed with a .41 Magnum revolver. Suspect fired 5 shots.

1

Armed with a .38 caliber handgun, 6 shots fired.

2

Injured

1

3

3

Times

RD Used?

0837 hours. First officer arrived at 0839. 4+ officers on the scene within 10 minutes.

NO

Morning event. Two officers in the school at a ball game, but several minutes elapsed before the y were notified of the shooting.

NO

2100 hours. Four+ officers arrived about simultaneou sly within 4 minutes.

NO

-32-

RD Make a Differenc e?

NO Shooting was over by the time officers arrived

NO Gone on arrival

NO Gone on arrival

Narrative

Student had been expelled p revious day, and was part of a 3 student conspiracy to kill the principle. The other students backed out of the plan. Student enter ed the school and shot/killed the bandleader and a teacher. A third shot hit a wall (possibly a missed shot at someone). The student then used his fourth, and last shot to commit suicide. Suspect had along history of juvenile arrests. Incident was over before police arrived on scene. Student intended to shoot a teacher that was flunking him. He walked into the classroom and shot the teacher in the back of the head before realizing it was a substitute teacher. This teacher was killed. Suspect t hen walked through hallway and shot the vice principal in the chest. Ast the vice principal was on the floor, the suspect fired a head shot at close range, but missed (vice principal survived). As the suspect ran from the sch ool, he fir ed two additional rounds at students he thought were pursuing him and th ey received minor wounds from fragments. The student was captured lat er at home. The time line of this event was estimated to be less than 2 minutes from the first shot to the suspect leaving the building. Two Police officers were on-duty in the school gymnasium at a basketball tournament, but were not aware of the shooting for several mi nutes and were the first to arrive on the shooting scene. Suspect shot his girlfriend in a hotel after a argument. Suspect then fled to a nearby restaurant and sho t the man ager and a waiter. He then ran to the parking lot and attempted to carjack a vehicle, shooting the driver. Suspect then ran to a gas station and attempted to carjack another vehicle, eventually fleeing on foot. The suspect was captured the following day. The suspect had fled the scene before police officers arrived.

Case#

028

029

030

Location

Type

Suspects

Killeen, TX, Luby’s Restaurant.

Random shooting spree.

1 male in late 20's.

Salt Lake City, UT, LDS Church library.

Random shooting spree.

1 male aged 70.

Salt Lake City, UT, KSL-TV station.

Random shooting spree.

1 female aged 25.

Weapons

Killed

Armed with two 9mm handguns (Glock and Ruger). Suspect fired at least 50 shots, with several reloads.

23

Armed with a .22 rimfire semi-auto handgun, 25-30 rounds fired, including multiple reloads of a single magazine.

2

Armed with a Taurus 9mm handgun. 14 rounds fired, with a reload.

1

Injured

20

3

1

Times

RD Used?

RD Make a Differenc e?

1230 hours. First officer arrived within 5 minutes and 4+officers on the scene within 10-15 minutes. Event was over within 20 minutes from first call.

NO -

POSITIVE

BUT very rapid response by patrol officers

Actions of officers forced suspect away from additional victims

1031 hours. More than 4 officers were on the scene within 3 minutes.

NO -

POSITIVE

BUT very rapid response by patrol officers

Actions of officers forced suspect away from additional victims

1515 hours. More than 4 officers on the scene within 4 minutes.

NO -

NO

BUT very rapid response by patrol officers

Already in custody

-33-

Narrative Suspect drove his truck through the front windows of a Luby’s restaurant and began randomly shooting patrons. Responding police officers entered through the crash site and immediately engaged the suspect, hitting him several times (non-life threatening wounds). The suspect was driven through the building, and attempted to b arricade himself in the women’s restroom, but a patron held the door closed. As police officers closed on his position, the suspect committed suicide. Most of his shots were directed at women and were close-range execution-style shots. Majority of the wounded were from glass fragments and trampling as the crowd escaped. Suspect was schizophrenic Russian immigrant who thought he was being pursued by the KGB. Suspect entered t he librar y of the down town Latter Days Saints (Mormon) church and began shooting random targets. An unarmed church security guard was killed. Responding officers were dragging shooting victims out to safety while being fired upon by the suspect. The suspect fled to a nearby hallway, where he u sed cover to continue fi ring at police. He reloaded the single magazine of the pistol multiple times. Police officers eventually were able to get 2 shots at the suspect, a .223 rifle shot that missed and a .45 caliber pisto l shot that hi t and killed the suspect. Schizophrenic female had a history of stalking and threatening media personalities. Suspect entered the KSL-TV station and began firing in the reception area, but did not hit anyone there. Suspect went up to the 2 n d floor and shot through a door she could not open. Suspect then went up to the 3 rd floor, offices of AT&T, where she killed one person and wounded another before being wrestled to the ground and detained by workers in the offic e. Shooting was over before police arrived.

Case#

031

032

Location

Type

Williamspor t, PA, parochial school.

School

Edmond, OK, Post Office.

Workplac e

Suspects

1 female aged 14.

1 male aged 30's.

Weapons

Killed

.22 rimfire revolver. 1 shot fired.

0

2 - .45 calib er semi-auto handguns. 20+ shots fired, at least 1 reload.

15

Injured

1

3

Times

RD Used?

1203 hours. Four-man RD team made entry at 1207, suspect in custody at 1208.

YES

0730 hours. No entry until SWAT arrived. 4+ officers on scene within 5 minutes.

NO

-34-

RD Make a Differenc e?

NO Already in custody

NO Shooting was over by the time officers arrived

Narrative

Female student used a .22 revolver to shoot a specific fellow student in the cafeteria. That student survived. After firing the shot, the girl pointed the revolver at others and then threw the weapon down. A teacher escorted the student to the assistant p rincipal’s off ice where she was held until police arrived. Williamsport PD had fully trained their personnel in RD tactics and a 4-man RD team entered the school in a diamond formation within 3 minutes of receiving the call of this incident. The team moved quickly through the building, was directed to the principal’s office and took the suspect into custody at that location. Shooti ng was over before the police a rrived on the scen e. Suspect had been reprimanded by his supervisor at the Post Office the previous day. Suspect was a OK National Guard competitive shooter. Suspect entered the post office and shot his supervisor and then shot random co-workers. Arriving police supervisor made the decision not to enter the post office until SWAT arrived. Reports indicate that the last shots were fired at about the same time that officers arrived on the scene (suicide shot).

Case#

033

034

Location

Type

Suspects

Edmond, OK, random shooting.

Random shooting spree.

1 male aged 40's.

Bethel, AK, High School.

School

1 male aged 16.

Weapons

Killed

M1, Garand, .30-06. 8 shots fired. Reloaded and was preparing to shoot again when killed.

1

12 gauge shotgun loaded with birdshot. 6+ shots fired.

2

Injured

1

2+

Times

RD Used?

1730 hours. See narrative for response data.

NO

0849 hours. 3 officers on scene and made entry within 4 minutes. Suspect in custody within 7 minutes.

YES

-35-

RD Make a Differenc e?

POSITIVE However, this situation required fire & maneuver tactics, not a diamond formation

POSITIVE Rapid police action almost certainly saved lives caused the surrender

Narrative

Suspect’s son called police to report that his father had shot his computer with a rifle and was wandering the neighborhood. Several officers (5?) Had respond ed to the area to find the suspect. About 10 minutes after the initial call, the suspect fired at a man in his backyard, killing the victim. Nearby, the suspect fired at a man near a backyard pool, wounding that victim. An officer in the area heard the shots, saw the suspect running and fired 2 shots at him (.45 handgun - 1 hit @ 73 yards). When hit in the buttocks, the suspect went down and crawled under a bush. The suspect reloaded his rifle and was rising to fire when two other officers fired (1 with AR15, 1 shot, 1 hit – 1 with 9mm, 2 shots, 0 hits). The suspect was killed by the AR15 hit. Suspect walked into high school with shotgun hidden under a trench coat. He entered principal’s office and argued for the return of confiscated property, then sh ot & killed the principal. While walking from the office, the suspect shot a specific student he wan ted to kill. 2 other students had taken part in a pre-event conspiracy to kill people in the school, but the others did not participate in the actual shooting. The suspect fired shots at lockers that produced minor wounds to at least 2 other students. This school is built on high supports because of surrounding tundra. Several students were injured when they jumped from 1s t floor windows to exit the school (1-2 story drop from “first” floor windows). The suspect walked up the stairway to the 2n d floor of the school and was part way up the stairs when the 3-man police team made entry in to the lobby/stairway area. The suspect fired two shots at the arriving officers. One officer returned fire with 2 - 12 gauge slugs that narrowly missed the suspect. At that point the suspect threw down his weapon an d was tak en into c ustody.

Case#

035

036

Location

Type

Fort Worth, TX, Wedgewoo d Baptist Church.

Church

Littleton, CO, Columbine High School.

School

Suspects

1 male aged 47.

2 males aged 17 and 18.

Weapons

Killed

.380 and 9mm handguns and a pipe bomb. 63 shots fired, still had 96 rounds on his person.

7

9mm handgun (TEC9), 9mm carbine and 2 sawed off 12ga shotguns. 188 shots fired (most were from 9mm carbine). 76 explosive devices at the scene, 30 devices were used by the suspects.

13

Injured

7

24

Times

RD Used?

RD Make a Differenc e?

1851 hours. First two officers arrived simultaneou sly within 2 minutes. More than 4 officers on the scene within 3 minutes.

NO -

NO

BUT very rapid response by patrol officers

Shooting was over by the time officers made contact

1119 hours. First officer on scene within 2 minutes. more than 4 officers on the scene within 5 minutes.

NO

NO

-36-

Victims were all shot before officers could have made contact

Narrative Suspect walked into a crowded church gathering and opened fire with handguns. An off-duty officer that lived across the street arrived at the same time as the firs t on-duty officer and they made immediate entry to find the shooter. The arriving officers heard a single shot after they arrived (which was the suspect committing suicide). A pipe bomb the suspect had hanging on his clothing exploded during the event, severely injuring the suspect, but no one else. The suspect was already dead when the officers made ent ry into th e sanctu ary. Suspects had a detailed plan to use explosives and guns to kill hundreds of students at their high school. Incident began with a diversionary explosion some distance from the school. When a large explosive device they had secreted in the cafeteria failed to explode, t he suspects walk ed from the parking lot toward the school, shooting some students outside the building before entering. Most of the victims were shot in the upstairs library area. The first arriving officer (the school resource offi cer - SRO) was pinn ed down by gunfire as he attempted to exit his vehicle. The SRO returned fire, but did not hit the suspects (using a handgun @ 60 yards). The suspects fired at officers and rescuers at several points during the in cident. SWAT offic ers poured a high volume of fire into the library windows at one point to cover the rescue of downed students below the library. The suspects comm itted suicide in the library about 47 minutes int o the inciden t; About the same time that the first SWAT officers were making entry on the opposite side of the school. All of the victims in this incident were shot within the first 13 minutes.

Case#

037

038

Location

Type

Thurston High School, Springfield, OR.

School

Frontier Middle School, Moses Lake, WA.

School

Suspects

1 male aged 15.

1 male aged 13.

Weapons

Killed

Ruger 10/22 .22 rimfire rifle with a 50 round magazine, Glock 9mm pistol and Ruger .22 rimfire, semiauto pistol (not fired at school) and knives. Fired 51 rounds, 50 from rifle and 1 from Glock. Had 500+ additional rounds on person when detained.

2

.30-30 lever action rifle, 5 shots fired.

3

Injured 25

1

Times

RD Used?

0754 hours. First officer on the scene within 2 minutes. Four+ officers on scene within 5 minutes.

NO

1400 hours. 4+ officers on scene within 6 minutes.

NO

-37-

RD Make a Differenc e? NO Already in custody

NO Suspect had already barrica ded with hostages before officers arrived

Narrative Student had been arrested previous day for possession of handgun at school (expelled). That evening he killed both paren ts at home. The next morning, t he suspect walk ed onto campus and started shooting randomly at students along a breeze way with a Ruger .22 rimfire semi-auto rifle with a 50 round magazine. He then entered the busy cafeteria and began randomly shooting students with the rifle. As he attempted to reload the rifle (all 50 rounds had been fired), he was rushed by a student he had already shot in the torso. The suspect was able to draw the Glock pistol from a holster and fire one round, wounding a student in the hand, before being overpowered by several students. Suspect was being held down by students when the first officer arrived and rushed directly into the cafeteria, taking the suspect into custody. It took about 15-20 minutes to clarify that the incident involved the single sh ooter tha t was alrea dy in cus tody. Suspect (student) called in sick then walked into his algebra class and opened fire on the first 3 students near the doorwa y. When the teacher in the class yelled at the student, he turned and shot the teacher. A teacher from a neighboring class ran into the room and the studen t pointed the rifle at the second teacher. At that point the suspect held the remainder of the students hostage in the classroom , but allowed the single wounded individual to be dragged out into the hallway. Police entered the building and saw the wounded stud ent in the hallway. After a stand-off of 10-15 minu tes, the second teacher was able to wrestle the gun from the suspect and call in p olice to ta ke the boy i nto cust ody.

Case#

039

040

041

Location

Type

US Embroid ery, Sante Fe Springs, CA.

Workplac e

Omni Plastics, Sante Fe Springs, CA.

Workplac e

Santana High School, Santee, C A.

School

Suspects

1 male aged 37.

1 male aged 38.

1 male aged 16.

Weapons

.38 revolver, 8 shots fired.

Killed

1

9mm Beretta handgun. 2530 shots fired, with reloads.

2

.22 rimfire revolver, 15 shots fired.

2

Injured

1

3

13

Times

RD Used?

RD Make a Differenc e?

1050 hours. First officer on scene within 3 minutes. 4+ officers on scene within 6 minutes.

NO -

NO

BUT very rapid response by patrol officers using ballistic shield

Shooting was over by the time officers made contact

0955 hours. First officer arrived within 2 minutes. 4+ officers on scene within 4 minutes.

NO

NO

0921 hours. SRO and off-duty San Diego PD officer were on campus when incident started. 4+ officers on scene within 4 minutes.

NO -

POSITIVE

BUT very rapid response by SRO, off-duty and patrol officers

Rapid response by officers undoubtedly contained the suspect and caused him to surrend er

-38-

Gone on arrival

Narrative Suspect walked into place of business and shot his business partner and the receptionist. The suspect fled to another business in a nearby building. As the people in the second business ran from that building, they heard a shot fired inside and reported that to arriving officers. Arriving police officers made immediate entry into the second location, using a ballistic shield. As soon as they entered the second building, they saw the suspect , dead from a self-i nflicted wound. Suspect walked into the plastics plant and began shooting random co-workers. Suspect fired 2530 rounds in rapid succession, then fled the scene. The suspect’s weapon was either empty or had malfunctioned, as he attempted to shoot other victims outside the building as he fled. Arriving officers were told the suspect was already gone and were p rovided with a d etailed suspect and vehicle description. About 1 hour later the suspect committed suicide in neighboring Los Angeles. Suspect walked onto campus and began firing from a restroom entran ce under a breeze way canopy. After firing at several random and specific targets, the suspect retreated into the restroom, popping in and out. The school Resource Office and an off-duty officer responded towards the shots and were joi ned by two arriving patrol officers by the time they made contact with the suspect. When the suspect saw the arriving officers, he present ed the gun by grabbing th e barrel and surr endered to the police. Suspect made no attempt to point the gun or fire the gun at arriving officers.

Case#

042

043

044

Location

Type

Granite Hills High School, San Diego, CA.

School

Cal-Trans maintenanc e yard, Orange, CA

Workplac e

Jewish Child Care Center, Los Angeles, CA

School

Suspects

1 male aged 19.

1 male aged 35

1 male aged 37

Weapons

Killed

20 gauge shotgun with birdshot, several rounds fired.

0

AK47 type rifle, shotgun and handgun. Handgun not used. Dozens of shots fired with AK, 3 shots fired with shotgun.

4

unsure

1

Injured

5

0

5

Times

RD Used?

RD Make a Differenc e?

Morning (time unsure). 2 officers already on the scene handled immedia tely.

NO -

POSITIVE

BUT very rapid response by SRO and patrol officer

Rapid actions by on-scene officers neutralized the active shooter

1509 hours. First officer on scene within 1 minute. 4+ officers on scene within 3 minutes.

NO

NO

Morning, time unsure. 4+ officers on scene within 5 minutes.

NO

NO

BUT very rapid response by patrol officers

Gone on arrival

-39-

Ongoing gunfight/chase from the arrival of the first officer.

Narrative Suspect arrived in front of the school and began firing a shotgun from the street at both specific and random targets. A SRO and another police officer (on campus for an unrelated call) responded immediately to the sound of gunshots and engaged the sus pect. One offic er fired (unsure how many rounds fired), hitting the suspect twice (one in the buttocks and one in the cheek). Suspect was in custody before any other officers had arrived. Suspect had been fired from Cal-Trans sometime before this incident. Suspect drove to maintenance yard and shot his first victim with a shotgun while the victim was still in his vehicle. The suspect then walked into the maintenance yard and fired dozens of rounds from an AK-type weapon randomly at people and blindly into buildings. The first arriving officer saw the shooter firi ng and exchan ged rounds with the suspect, but neither of them was hit. Suspect got into his vehicle and fled the scene with arriving officers in pursuit. A short distance from the maintenance yard, the suspect got stuck in an intersection and a large gunfight ensued. Seven police officers fired more than 500 rounds from handguns, eventually killing the suspect. One officer was wounded by the suspect dur ing this exch ange. Suspect entered a child car e center and open ed fire with an unspecified firearm, wounding 5. Responding patrol officers made immediate entry into the center to find that the suspect had already fled the scene. While driving away from the first shootin g site, the susp ect stopped and shot/killed a postal worker he encountered. It took nearly two hours to determine that these two shooting incidents were related. The suspect eventually fled to Las Veg as, NV, where he su rrend ered t o the FBI.

Case#

XXX

Location

Commercial warehouse, Los Angeles, CA

Type

Attempted Officer Rescue

Suspects

1 male

Weapons

9mm handgun

Killed

1

Injured

Times

2

RD Used?

YES

NOT AN ACTIVE SHOOTE R EVENT - BUT RAPID DEPLOY MENT TACTICS WERE USED

-40-

RD Make a Differenc e?

NEGATIVE

Narrative

Two Glendale PD officers entered warehouse to investigate the attempted murder of the suspect’s common-law wife. When the manager escorted them into the warehouse area, the suspect opened fire with a 9mm pistol from an elevated positio n. The lead detect ive went down immediately with a head wound and the second detective exited the warehouse and called for assistance. Officers rolled a flashlight in the doorway of the warehouse in an attempt to locate the downed officer and the suspect shot the lens of the flashlight. A 7 man rescue team was formed and entered the warehouse using suppressive fire directed at the last kno wn location of the suspect. Two LAPD officers on the rescue team were wounded by the suspect. Additional officers laid down cover fire while the 2 wounded offi cers were extr acted. K9 “Saber” was sent into the warehouse 2 times, drawing fire both times but not being hit. SWAT officers then en tered the warehous e, deploying several diversionary devices, and extricated the downed detective, taking fire from the suspect, but suffering no casualties. The SWAT officers returned fire during the rescue. Attempts to negotiate with the suspect met with no success. Chemical agents were introduced into the warehou se, but produced no results. SWAT re-entered the warehouse and, after a lengthy search, found the suspect - dead from a self-inflicted wound.

About School Safety Partners   School Safety Partners (www.SchoolSafetyPartners.org) is dedicated to creating long‐term funding partnerships to  support school safety best practices. We are a facilitator of joint research projects, reaching out to the general  public as well as stakeholders in the public, private, non‐profit, and academic sectors. Since our start in January,  2008, our projects have addressed the legislative, training, compliance, funding, and public awareness sides of  school safety. Here are some highlights:  1.

We created a reference library documenting all aspects of Colorado Senate Bill 08‐181, a first‐of‐its‐kind  measure introduced by Senator Tom Wiens to modernize emergency planning in schools, so students,  teachers, and first responders can act fast in an emergency. 

2.

For the 10th anniversary of the Columbine High School tragedy, we produced the national media event,  "Colorado Rising," focusing on the future of school safety in America, and our guests and speakers were  covered by NBC‐TV, CNN, NPR, FOX, Oprah Radio, Channel One News, Associated Press, Reuters, the  Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Los Angeles Times, German Public Radio, the Guardian, and dozens of  other news sources.   

3.

We assisted in the 2008 Symposium and the 2009 Symposium on the Prevention of School Violence at  Johnson & Wales University, and in the tabletop exercises on interoperable communications conducted  for these events by one of our partners, SchoolSAFE Communications (www.SchoolSAFEcom.org). 

4.

We produced over 4 hours of video footage, with 2 video crews, covering a full‐scale active shooter and  multi‐hazard school exercise that involved 18 agencies and over 1,200 persons, and tested interoperable  communications in several school‐related settings. 

5.

We co‐created the School Response Framework Fund in support of the National Incident Managment  System (NIMS) and to help Colorado schools become NIMS‐compliant as quickly as possible. 

6.

We also developed a virtual campus that schools can use as an online training site for their safety  teams, and as an action center where schools can build strong relationships with community partners,  or local responders. 

7.

We have developed with ABC‐TV a nationwide community awareness campaign, giving recognition to  educators as first responders, and calling for the creation of public‐private partnerships to make school  safety sustainable in communities across America. 

8.

We have also developed with the creators of the feature motion picture, "April Showers," the  educational and school safety materials to accompany the film as it is released to the worldwide  educational market.  

9.

Other states have shown an interest in what we have done in Colorado about school crisis response, and  for them we have designed webinars and information kits about improving school safety legislation and  finding long‐term funding solutions. 

We hope that you find our information useful and our contacts productive. We invite you to explore all parts of  our website, and also share with us your views, experiences, lessons learned, best practices, and innovations.  Please visit us at www.SchoolSafetyPartners.org and register online in order to access all of our sections.  Registration is free.